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Abstract 
This thesis presents new evidence regarding voluntary health insurance in Vietnam. At 
present, the evidence base from which policy-makers in low-income countries can 
draw, is dominated by the experience of high-income countries, despite the very 
different institutional environment within which health insurance functions. 
In theory, health insurance can protect and improve access to health services, by 
pooling individual risks, whilst raising additional funds from private sources. 
However, incentive problems, in particular adverse selection and moral hazard, can 
lead to greater inefficiencies. These theoretical predictions are tested empirically in 
this thesis using data from a household survey of 2,751 individuals in Vietnam. 
Community structure, which is used to develop new conceptual insights into current 
economic frameworks of analysis, is shown to be relevant to the development of 
formal health insurance. In terms of demand for health insurance, the thesis shows that 
adverse selection is a significant problem. Economic status, however, has no 
statistically significant effect on uptake. This finding, together with evidence that 
being insured reduces out-of-pocket expenditures significantly, and more so for poorer 
individuals, implies that income-related inequalities in financial access to health 
services has reduced, as a direct result of health insurance. 
In-depth interviews with insured patients reveals that many are dissatisfied with the 
quality of care they receive. Providers appear to discriminate against insured patients 
depending on how much income they bring to a facility, which impacts negatively on 
the intention of many to purchase insurance in the future. Insured patients trade-off 
these negative effects with expected benefits, when deciding whether to use insurance 
or pay full charges. Finally, this thesis demonstrates how drawing on frameworks from 
other disciplines, in particular sociology and development economics, can enrich 
current thinking about the development of health insurance in low-income countries. 
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Preface 
Health insurance schemes are being introduced in a large number of low and middle-
income countries. Frequently, health insurance is wrongly seen as a panacea for the 
development of financially sustainable health systems that protect access to health 
services. Whilst the literature is rich with evidence of the problems facing health 
insurance (e.g. adverse selection and moral hazard) in richer economies, the evidence 
base for poorer countries is very limited. This thesis contributes to the literature by 
presenting the findings of an evaluation of a national voluntary health insurance 
scheme in Vietnam. 
Extending insurance beyond those in salaried employment is a major policy issue for 
governments concerned with protecting access to health services. In the final 
paragraph of an article discussing rural health financing in Thailand, published as part 
of the proceedings ofa World Bank conference, the author writes: 
"But certain preconditions must be in place for such a scheme (Health 
Insurance Card Scheme) to get off the ground. The most important of 
these preconditions is sufficient social capital." (Khoman 1997) 
This statement raises a large number of questions, not least what social capital actually 
is. Khoman had not mentioned social capital previously in the article, yet suggested it 
was necessary for rural risk-sharing in the health sector, and a key to its success. 
Several years since the concept became popular in the sociological literature, an 
increasing number of texts state the importance of social capital for health financing, 
but usually in a superficial way. This thesis attempts to disentangle the social capital 
literature, concluding that there are serious definitional problems with the term. It does 
draw, however, health economists towards a rich literature that is not usually 
considered. 
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Part 1 
Background, Literature Review and 
Methods 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
Health financing policy has become, over the past fifteen years, central to the 
development of financially sustainable health systems, which also strive to ensure 
access to essential health interventions for all citizens. Increased attention to the 
financial aspects of health systems has been driven partly by better information on 
flows of financial resources, which, for example, frequently exposes the dominance of 
out-of-pocket health expenditures in many low-income countries. By implication, ill-
health represents a considerable risk to individuals and households, given that use of 
health services is largely determined by ability to pay. As a result, there is concern 
amongst policy-makers that attempts to improve the financial sustainability of health 
systems, for example through the introduction of user charges, have damaged access 
to health services for poorer households. 
One strategy being widely adopted by governments is to strengthen the role of 
insurance within health systems. The central objective of this thesis is to evaluate one 
such attempt in Vietnam, where the government introduced both compulsory and 
voluntary health insurance schemes, in 1992. Given the lack of experience, and hence 
empirical evidence from low-income countries, decisions to establish health insurance 
schemes are based principally on the theoretical merits of risk-pooling. The report of 
the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health also encourages governments in low-
income countries to promote community-financing schemes in order to facilitate risk-
pooling amongst poor households (Sachs 200 1). This advice reflects the lack of formal 
mechanisms that currently exists for households to protect themselves against the risks 
associated with ill-health. Most households in low-income countries operate in the 
informal economy, relying on a range of informal risk-sharing arrangements to 
maintain expenditures on essential goods and services, such as food, health, and 
education. 
The results presented in Chapters 5-7 are based on analysis of an original dataset, 
collected in three provinces of Vietnam, using both a household survey and in-depth 
interviews. New knowledge relates to two key issues. First, what factors, at both the 
individual and community level, determine the purchase of voluntary health 
insurance? Secondly, what has the impact of the scheme been, for example on access 
to health services? 
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Several issues central to the theory of health insurance are tested empirically, offering 
new evidence, in the context of a low-income country. Explaining the results in a 
country such as Vietnam, however, requires an understanding of the very different 
structure of its economy, legal and regulatory framework, and culture. Chapter 1 
presents this societal context together with an overview of the health system and 
health insurance scheme. This information is used, together with a review of theory 
and evidence in Chapter 2, to develop specific research questions in Chapter 3. It is 
also used when interpreting the results. 
Two aspects of the research represent new approaches to analysing traditional 
questions regarding health insurance. First, the relevance of social structure to the 
development of health insurance is examined in detail. Many articles refer to the 
importance of social capital, a term now widely used by sociologists and political 
scientists. Substantial space is devoted to this issue, particularly in the context of 
demand for health insurance, in an attempt to disentangle a concept· that cannot be 
easily defined, and as a result is often used somewhat superficially. Despite this 
constraint, many related terms such as social cohesion, are useful in their own right. 
Secondly, this thesis is motivated by a desire to understand the way in which formal 
health insurance interacts with private systems of risk-sharing, an issue not previously 
examined. Most households do not benefit from national social security schemes, in 
contrast to informal systems, which have often existed for generations. An insight into 
this issue may prove useful in understanding why individuals in certain communities 
are more likely to purchase health insurance than are others. Empirical evidence is 
also produced on several other issues on which little evidence currently exists, 
including the impact of insurance on patient satisfaction, and private out-of-pocket 
health expenditures. The context and structure of the thesis are presented in detail in 
the next section. 
1.2 Context and structure 
Figure 1.1 presents the conceptual model within which the thesis is placed, both in 
tenus of theoretical, and policy concerns. It does not aim to be comprehensive, but 
rather to reflect those relationships that have particular importance to this thesis; 
arrows represent expected causal relationships. The figure provides a contextual 
framework for the analysis that follows, and is referred to throughout the thesis. 
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Health status, the ultimate concern of health financing policy, is the starting point for 
discussion I. Nonnand (1999) stresses that the policy objectives of health insurance 
cannot be divorced from broader health policy goals, in particular access to, and 
quality of, health services, and the importance of appropriate incentives to ensure 
efficient service provision and cost control. 
Health status is detennined by a wide range of factors, many of which are not easily 
influenced by health policy makers. For example, Grossman (l972a) highlights the 
important role of education, which improves the efficiency with which individuals 
produce their own health. In a recent review, Grossman and Kaestner (1997) present 
evidence that the number of years of fonnal schooling explains more variation in 
individual health status, than either income or occupation. 
Whilst there is now considerable support for the effect of absolute income on health 
status (e.g. Gravelle 1998), attention has grown on the importance of relative income. 
Proponents of the relative income hypothesis, such as Kawachi et a1. (1997b) and 
Wilkinson (1996), suggest that inequalities in health are explained not only by 
variations in absolute income, but also by the degree of income inequality, 
independent of an individual's absolute level of income. The central argument is that 
as income inequality increases within a community, so do levels of mortality. Kawachi 
proposes that the causal link is disinvestment in social capital, which he equates with 
social cohesion, stating " ... there has been a renaissance in the notion of community 
cohesiveness". He also notes that Robert D. Putnam2, in his study of democracy in 
Italy, " ... sought to measure the strength of social cohesion - what he terms 'social 
capital' - within regions of Italy" (Kawachi and Kennedy 1997: 1037)3. Wagstaff and 
van Doorslaer summarise the debate as follows: 
"The relevant individual-level studies to date, all on U.S. population 
data, provide strong support for the "absolute-income hypothesis," no 
support for the "relative-income hypothesis," and little or no support for 
the "income-inequality hypothesis." (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 2000: 
I). 
I ConceptuallY, the figure has no central or starting point. 
2 Putnam is the author of one of the seminal texts on social capital, discussed in Chapter 2. 
3 Chapter 2 reviews the social capital literature and highlights the problems involved in 
defining the concept. 
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Analysis by Deaton suggests that increasing income inequality doesn't directly 
influence levels of mortality, but that as income inequality increases, income has an 
important protective effect against mortality. If this is the case, then policies to reduce 
income inequality will not necessarily have any effect on aggregate (or even individual) 
mortality. Deaton continues that 
"When the ratio of between-group to within-group inequality changes, 
any given income group has a different mix of high status and low 
status individuals, and it is the change in this mix that changes health 
conditional on income, not any change in health". (Deaton 1999: 29) 
Examining inequalities in health status is not, however, a central research question for 
this thesis, although the issue is referred to during discussion of the results. Health 
status is also influenced by the extent to which individuals demand health services, 
which in tum is a function of several factors, including the supply of services (physical 
access), and the way in which health services are financed (financial access). Again, 
education has an important influence on perceptions of the need for, and uptake of, 
health services provided by health professionals as opposed to practitioners without 
formal training. Finally, health status is also likely to have a bearing on demand for 
health insurance, which, as discussed later in Part 2.1, is derived from a demand for 
health services and, ultimately, a demand for health. Whilst the impact of insurance on 
health status is not a focus of the thesis, the health status of individuals is an important 
explanatory factor incorporated into the econometric analysis. 
(8) Economic status and level of education. the latter measured in terms of the 
number of years of formal schooling completed, are included in Figure 1.1 as two 
important characteristics of individuals that influence their demand for health, health 
services, and health insurance. As such, both variables are incorporated into the 
analysis presented in Chapters 5-7, as explanatory variables. In addition, there is some 
evidence that social capital increases income (see Part 2.2.3), and a suggestion that as 
communities become wealthier, social capital is likely to decrease, an idea closely 
linked to the debate on the relationship between levels of income within a community, 
and the extent to which informal risk-sharing arrangements exist (see Part 2.3.2). 
Several factors influence levels of effective demand for health services (C), low levels 
of which are a concern for policy-makers in many low-income countries, given high 
levels of unmet health needs. These include physical access (quantity of supply), 
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financial access (the cost to the individual), and perceptions of quality (which in turn 
influences perceived value for money). Economics uses the concept of price elasticity 
of demand, to measure how demand changes in response to variations in price; as the 
price of a normal good or service increases, demand will fall, and vice versa. Even 
where the price of a health service is officially zero at the point of delivery, effective 
demand is rationed by the indirect costs (e.g. transportation), and opportunity costs 
(e.g. time), involved with obtaining services, particularly in rural communities where 
the supply of services tends to be inadequate. Unofficial user charges, which are 
widespread in low-income countries, also increase the cost of accessing health care, 
and are likely to reduce the protective effective of insurance, although this is an under-
researched issue. Levels of effective demand for health services will also be 
influenced by the presence and structure of health insurance, within a health system, 
an issue discussed in detail in Part 2.1. 
The financial sustainability of health systems in low-income countries dominated the 
policy agenda during the late 1980s and throughout the I 990s, in part due to the 
expansion of primary level health facilities in many countries following the Alma Ata 
declaration, and fiscal problems reSUlting from the 'debt crisis'. In Vietnam, public 
spending was tightly controlled throughout this period, in an attempt to improve 
macro-economic stability. At the same time, alternative sources of financing for public 
health services were promoted. An economic justification for the introduction of user 
charges was made by the World Bank (Akin 1987), and UNICEF launched the 
Bamako Initiative, which stressed the need for greater community financing and 
ownership of health services. Since then, certain international agencies, such as WHO 
(2000) have stated clearly that they consider prepayment schemes, including 
mandatory health insurance, to be the best form of health financing. 
Concern that direct charges for health services led to lower levels of service usage 
amongst high need population groups, despite the presence of exemption mechanisms, 
grew during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Several authors, including Enyimayew 
and Waddington (1989), Creese (1991), Enyimayew and Waddington (1989), and 
Gilson (1997), produced evidence that poor households were increasingly turning 
towards self-treatment, and low-cost health services, provided by unregulated private 
practitioners. The central policy concern was one ofjinancial access to health services 
(D). 
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Risk-sharing mechanisms aim to improve financial access to health services whereas 
physical access is largely determined by the quantity of supply. Increased access to, 
and effective demand for health services, can have an important influence on health 
status, as demonstrated by reductions in the burden of disease from communicable 
diseases in many countries, particularly as a result of improved access to immunisation 
services. As governments introduce direct user charges for health services, in order to 
improve the financial sustainability of health systems, protecting and improving 
access to health services has become a major policy concern (see in particular Figure 
1.2 later in this chapter). New knowledge regarding the impact of voluntary health 
insurance in Vietnam, on both financial and physical access to health services, is 
presented in Part 6.2 and Chapter 7 respectively. 
The relevance of informal risk-sharing mechanisms (E), to formal health insurance 
schemes in low and middle-income countries, has received little attention in the 
literature or by policy-makers to date. Considerable research into risk has, however, 
been conducted by development economists, and this literature is drawn on in the 
development of the research questions presented in Part 3.2.2 (also see Part 2.3.2). 
One of the aims of this thesis is to draw on these ideas to enrich thinking about the 
development of health insurance. Formal risk-sharing can be defined as an agreement 
between individuals to which a money price is attached. Private financial networks, 
the basis of informal risk-sharing, are often important where formal, institutional 
mechanisms for risk-sharing are absent or weak and, possibly, where there is little 
trust in those institutions that do exist. The recent sociological literature suggests that 
the level of social capital in a community also has an important influence. As already 
noted, the way in which formal and informal systems interact is, potentially, an 
important issue for policy-makers and is addressed as part of Research Question 6 
(again see Part 3.2.2). 
Understanding demand for health insurance (F) in low-income countries is important 
for the development of voluntary schemes, given the limits that exist to extending 
compulsory social insurance beyond workers in salaried employment. Drawing on the 
experience of Latin America, Ensor (1999) estimates the likelihood of achieving 
universal coverage in a range of countries, including Vietnam. The ease of registering 
individuals, assessing income levels, and collecting contributions is estimated based 
on several factors, which reflect the structure of economy and society. These include 
per capita income levels, population density, the degree of urbanisation, and the 
percentage of the labour force working in industry. In summary, Ensor predicts that 
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Vietnam, which scores low on each measure apart from population density, faces 
significant constraints to extending compulsory health insurance nationally. Due to 
these limitations, attention has turned to the role of voluntary health insurance 
mechanisms, although almost ten years' ago, Brian Abel-Smith seriously questioned 
the potential of such schemes, saying that: 
'It has still to be shown that voluntary local prepayment schemes can 
make a major contribution to health financing, except perhaps in a 
coercive political system.' (Abel-Smith 1994: 174) 
Elements of coercion have been reported within the insurance scheme in Vietnam, 
particularly with respect to the enrolment of schoolchildren (see Part 1.3.2). Political 
culture in Vietnam is the product of a variety of influences, including Confucianism, 
Communism, and more recently corruption, which, in turn, are likely to affect both the 
way in which insurance is organised and delivered, and consumer attitudes towards 
government and its schemes. 
Several ideas and concepts have developed around voluntary health insurance, 
including micro-insurance (Dror and Jacquier 1999), community-based health 
insurance (Chabot et al. 1991; Ron and Kupferman 1996), and mutual health 
organisations (Atim 1998; eriel and Van Dormael 1999). Bennett et al. (1998) and 
Preker et aI. (2001) highlight the need to increase access to health services amongst 
low-income rural populations and workers in the informal sector. They suggest that 
community financing is a necessary but insufficient first step to achieving this. 
Current evidence regarding the uptake and impact of voluntary health insurance is 
based primarily on the experience of rich economies, however, which is reviewed later 
in this chapter. It is debatable how useful this evidence is in terms of policy lessons for 
low-income countries, given the very different structure of health systems, and this is 
an issue discussed throughout the thesis. 
A range of factors is likely to influence uptake of health insurance. Part 2.1 discusses 
economic models of demand for health insurance, which stress the importance of risk-
aversion, and quality of service. Empirical studies focus on the effect of individual 
levels of income, education, and health status. Demand for health insurance in the 
context of Vietnam is tested empirically, in Chapter 5. A theoretical insight developed 
in this thesis is that uptake is also influenced by the extent of informal risk-sharing in a 
given community (see Part 3.2). It has also been suggested that by facilitating 
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collective action, social capital (G) is important for the development of health 
insurance, an idea explored in some detail in Chapters 2 and 3. In the literature, social 
capital is increasingly referred to as important for the development of health insurance. 
To date this idea has been used in a peripheral sense, however, but it is addressed in 
detail in this thesis. 
Briefly, social capital refers to the level of trust or social cohesion within a community 
and, whilst measured at the individual level (i.e. the links and ties an individual has 
with other individuals), tends to be analysed at the community level to represent the 
institutions, relationships, networks, and social norms that shape the quantity and 
quality of a community's, or society's, social interactions. After examining the roots 
of this concept and its suggested links with health insurance, an alternative hypothesis 
is presented, in which social cohesion, the measure of social structure used in this 
thesis, has the opposite effect, by resisting uptake of, and effectively substituting for, 
health insurance (see Part 3.2.2t. 
Whilst a major emphasis of this thesis is an analysis of demand for health insurance 
and health services, as reflected in Figure 1.1, the way in which health services are 
supplied will have also a significant effect. For example, Normand and Weber (1994) 
note that without good administration, many of the advantages of health insurance 
may be lost. Where an insurance agency is a purchaser of health services, its 
effectiveness will, to a large extent, determine whether health insurance has a positive 
impact on policy goals such as equity in access to health services, and efficiency in 
their delivery. Kutzin and Barnum (1992a, 1992b) stress the importance of organising 
the entry of consumers, and of removing incentives for providers, to increase both the 
volume and the cost of health services. Despite the importance of supply-side issues, 
they are not the major focus of this thesis. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised into several parts. Part 1.3 provides an 
overview of current health financing policy in Vietnam, and details the health 
insurance scheme in question. Part 1.4 describes the Vietnamese health system more 
generally, with a focus on trends in health status and the supply of health services, 
whilst Part 1.5 profiles Vietnamese society. In socio-economic terms, north and south 
Vietnam are quite different. A brief history of Vietnam is presented, together with an 
4 Chapter 2 discusses the problems in defining social capital. 
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overview of Vietnamese culture, and of the economy. The way in which government 
is structured, and a discussion of whether or not Vietnam can be said to have a civil 
society, an important dimension of the institutional environment within which health 
services and health insurance exist, are issues discussed in Part 1.5. 
1.3 Health financing policy in Vietnam 
1.3.1 Overview 
The way in which health services are financed is important for the achievement of 
health system outputs and, ultimately, health outcomes. Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 
(1992) review several different approaches, and conclude that in OECD countries, tax 
financing tends to be proportional or mildly progressive, social insurance systems 
regressive, and private systems even more regressive. The study concludes that out-of-
pocket payments, which dominate financing in low-income countries, are an 
especially regressive means of raising revenues for health services. 
Out-of-pocket payments are typically introduced as a tool to manage demand, in 
particular when consumption is considered excessive, or funds are simply insufficient 
to provide services free-of-charge. In most low-income countries, however, user 
charges have been seen principally as a way of raising additional funds for cash-
starved public services. However, when faced with substantial out-of-pocket payments 
in order to access health services, many patients alter their health and treatment-
seeking behaviour. Much of the evidence from low-income countries shows that out-
of-pocket payments have reduced the consumption of health services 
disproportionately amongst poorer households (Creese and Kutzin 1995; Gilson and 
Mills 1995; Gilson and Russell 1995). 
In Vietnam, households account for the majority of spending on health services: in 
1998, out-of-pocket expenditures accounted for 81 % of total spending, an increase 
from 71% in 1993 (see Table 1.1). As a result, Vietnam has the lowest public sector 
share in aggregate health spending in the region, after Cambodia, reflecting the extent 
of out-of-pocket payments for both public and private health services. In terms of 
exemptions from user charges, following a Government Decree in Vietnam in 1995, 
health services for children under the age of six years are provided free of charge. 
Other categories exempt from charges include those with mental illness, patients with 
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epilepsy, leprosy or tuberculosis, and those living in New Economic Areas. The very 
poor are also exempt. 
Based on regression analysis of Living Standards Survey data in Vietnam (VLSS), 
Trivedi (2002) concludes that being married, and female, has a statistically significant 
and positive effect on demand for health services. Unexpectedly, age is negatively 
related to outpatient use but positively related to the use of inpatient services. Trivedi 
also finds that Commune Health Centres are not widely used by wealthier and better-
educated groups, which reflects both their inferior quality, and the different 
preferences of wealthier individuals. In a separate study, which uses household survey 
data from northern Vietnam, Ensor and San (1996) find that the poorest households 
spend 19.3% of annual income on health services compared with an overall average of 
7.1 %. Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (2001) analyse the impact of private expenditures 
on household poverty in Vietnam using data from 1998 (see Figure 1.2). 
Using a Pen's Parade analysis, Figure 1.2 presents 'before and after' scenarios, in 
which each vertical line represents the drop in income, or shock to consumption 
expenditures, resulting directly from out-of-pocket health expenditures. The top of 
each vertical line represents level of household consumption before health 
expenditures are incurred, whilst the bottom point represents the post-payment state. 
On average, for example, households at consumption point 2,995,000 Vietnamese 
Dong (VND) on the horizontal axis were above the food poverty line before incurring 
out-of-pocket health expenditures, but below it after payment. The food poverty line is 
defined as the cost of producing or obtaining enough food to achieve an intake of 
2,100 calories per day. The overall poverty line includes some non-food expenditure, 
and hence is higher (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 2001). The chart provides evidence 
that out-of-pocket health expenditures constitute a considerable risk to Vietnamese 
households, and are frequently a direct cause of poverty. 
The food poverty line is estimated to be 1,286,833 VND per annum per capita, 
whereas the overall poverty line is 1,790,000 VND. The way in which providers are 
paid determines the incentives, which in tum affect the way in which health services 
are supplied. Supplier-induced demand for health services is widely observed under 
systems that reimburse providers for each consultation, or operation conducted, and is 
a major theme in the health economics literature (see Newhouse and Culyer, 2000). 
The way in which provider reimbursement takes place under health insurance in 
Vietnam is discussed in Part 1.3.3. 
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Indicator 1993 1998 
-----
GOP per capita US$ 170 US$ 330 
Health expenditure as %GOP 5.2% 8.0% 
Per capita hea.1th spending (total) US$ 9.67 US$ 27.41 
Per capita health spending (public) US$ 2.71 US$ 5.21 
Private health eX2enditures as % of total 71% 81% 
TABLE 1.1 : HEALTH EXPENDITURES IN VIETNAMS 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
Expenditures on health via 
health insurance6 
64,619 
150,080 
236,158 
359,904 
383,528 
442,812 
As % total public health 
expenditures 
2.66% 
5.29% 
6.9% 
10.02% 
9.32% 
10.77% 
TABLE 1.2: THE FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION OF HEALTH INSURANCE 
S Source: World Bank (2001) 
6 Millions of constant 1994 VND - adapted from Dunlop (1999) 
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1.3.2 Insurance: target groups, premia, legislation, and policy objectives 
Most of the information presented in the remainder of this chapter is a summary of 
work presented in a number of published documents. These include Bennett et al. 
(1998), Dunlop (1999), Ensor (1995), Ron (1998), Ron et al. (1998) and World Bank 
(2001). Bao Hiem Y Te, or Vietnamese Health Insurance, was formally launched in 
August 1992, following the issuing of the National Health Insurance Decree 
(Ministerial Decision No. 299IHDBT), which called for compulsory health insurance 
for salaried workers in both public and private sectors (the latter for companies with 
over ten employees). A pilot scheme had earlier been initiated in Hai Phong Province 
in 1989 with technical support from both the World Health Organisation and the 
International Labour Organisation (Carrin et al. 1993). 
The stated goals of the scheme include raising extra resources, assisting in poverty 
alleviation efforts (particularly for special merit groups), and increasing financial 
protection against future uncertain health care expenditures (Solon and Tien 1997). 
Table 1.2 shows the increasing importance of health insurance as a financing 
mechanism for public health services, increasing from below 3% of total expenditure 
in 1993, to almost 11% in 1997. 
Figure 1.3 summarises the structure of Vietnamese health insurance in terms of target 
groups. Compulsory insurance is exclusively for state employees and employees of 
large organisations, who contribute 1 % of their salaried income, with employers 
contributing a further 2%. An estimated 85% of the approximately seven million 
people eligible for this scheme are currently enrolled (Ensor 1995; Jowett and 
Thompson 1999). Enrolment levels for each component of health insurance at the end 
of 1997, the most recent information available at the time of the research, are 
presented in Appendix 1. 
In the initial years after the launch of the scheme, there was considerable under-
reporting of average wages, which effectively reduced total contributions. At the same 
time, retired workers, a relatively high-risk group in terms of health, were entitled to 
the benefits of insurance despite not contributing. This group comprised 50% of all 
individuals insured in the first two years and was a significant drain on resources. The 
ratio then dropped, to 30% in 1998, and is expected to fall further in the coming years. 
Total coverage is now dependent on strengthening compliance in the private sector. 
Only individual workers are covered under the compulsory scheme with their 
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7 million 
retired government employees, 
and those employed in salaried 
employment (public and private) 
37 million in the informal sector, 
e.g. self-employed, farmers 
(of which approximately 12 million 
schoolchildren & 25 million adults) 
Compulsory 
Health Insurance 
(5.73 million) 
Voluntary Health 
Insurance 
(premium plus 
copayment) 
Full user 
charges 
Self-employed (farmers and 
other informal workers) 
(0.143 million) 
(Sub-group 3) 
Schoolchildren 
and other students 
(3.46 million) 
(Sub-group J) 
32 million estimated to be in 
need of humanitarian assistance 
(0.208 million insured) 
(Sub-group 2) 
Voluntary Health 
insurance (subsidised 
by government) 
Voluntary Health 
insurance (subsidised 
by non-government) 
organisations 
FIGURE 1.3: TARGET GROUPS FOR HEALTH INSURANCE IN VIETNAM (1997) 
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dependants encouraged to join the voluntary scheme. 
All those individuals not eligible for compulsory health insurance are encouraged to insure 
themselves on a voluntary basis. Initially, the intention was that the voluntary scheme would 
encourage rural farmers and the self-employed to enrol. In practice, membership falls into 
three distinct sub-groups: i) schoolchildren and students; ii) members of households eligible 
for humanitarian assistance to whom insurance is freely provided; and iii) others, including 
the self-employed (including farmers and service workers), employees of small enterprises, 
and dependants of those insured under the compulsory scheme. During fieldwork in Dong 
Thap Province (see Appendix 2), it was evident that government employees at the commune 
level are also incorporated into the voluntary scheme. This was not the case in the other 
provinces and the extent to which this approach applies nationally is unclear. State industries 
for rubber, oil, coalmining, gas etc. have established independent schemes. 
Despite this intended approach, in practice, schoolchildren and students in higher education 
were the primary focus in the initial years with between 20-30% of this group enrolled by the 
end of 1998 (Carrin et at. 1999a). This scheme is often referred to as soft compulsory, given 
the reported pressure on schools from local authorities to enrol all of their students i.e. entire 
classes. In return, teachers receive a commission for collecting contributions once a year, and 
in many cases a large part of the funds goes to maintain a school medicine chest which, it has 
been reported, often contains adult drugs, such as hypotensives, for the teachers themselves 
(Ron 1998). In many provinces the Vietnam Insurance Corporation, Bao Viet (the state 
company for liability insurance for property, cars and other general areas), also insures 
schoolchildren for private health expenditures under a general insurance policy. 
Over 99% of those low-income individuals eligible for free health insurance, the second of 
the three sub-groups, are not yet covered by health insurance i.e. they still await allocations 
from poverty alleviation funds or non-governmental organisations such as the Red Cross. 
Enrolment in this group is only likely to increase substantially if sufficient funds are 
available and politicians make the issue a priority. The third group comprises farmers and 
workers in the informal sector. Uptake amongst this group has been extremely low to date. 
Several reasons have been suggested for the low uptake of voluntary insurance amongst 
adults. One is a lack of institutional capacity at provincial and district levels to develop 
mechanisms that facilitate their enrolment. For example, monthly contributions would allow 
those who cannot afford to pay the full annual premium in one go, to still contribute. 
Furthennore, few measures have been taken to encourage the enrolment of very low-income 
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or non-economically active individuals, with provinces only encouraged to support high-
need groups through local government funds, and by approaching national and international 
agencies. 
Similarly, no regulations exist concerning how premia should be set under voluntary 
insurance e.g. linking to local income levels, or limiting the frequency of premium increases. 
Provincial funds propose a contribution level to the Provincial People's Committees, who 
give the final approval. Premia are fixed within provinces, but vary between them, and are 
typically in the region of US$ 2-10 for an annual policy. Fixed premia are likely to lead to 
problems of adverse selection (see Part 2.1.3). Whilst the National Directorate of the 
Voluntary Health Insurance Agency (VHIA) has undertaken costing studies, premia appear 
to be based on estimates, possibly infonnal, of willingness and ability to pay at the 
provincial level. 
One measure taken by central government was to establish a ceiling on a patient's annual 
out-of-pocket health expenditures, equivalent to half the minimum annual salary, 
approximately 860,000 VND (Solon and Tien 1997). This applies to both individuals paying 
full user charges and to those making co-payments under health insurance. Co-payments 
were introduced as part of Article 7, Decree 58/1998, to limit excessive use of health 
services (see Part 2.1.2). Under this measure, insured patients are obliged to make a co-
payment of 20% of the full user charges applicable, for the services they receive. This move 
was partly a response to the rapid growth in reimbursements in many provincial schemes. In 
1996, expenditures (reimbursements) exceeded revenues in almost one quarter of provincial 
funds, falling to around 10% in 1997 (Dunlop 1999). At the time of the survey, membership 
was based around individuals, rather than families, under both compulsory and voluntary 
schemes, although some moves are being made to promote family-based membership. 
Further details of the design of the scheme are presented in the next section. 
1.3.3 Insurance: benefits, provider payments and institutional design 
Under the initial decree of 1992, benefits under compulsory insurance were defined as 
including medical examinations, diagnostic tests, drugs, and diagnostic and treatment 
operations. Two types of policy are offered under the voluntary scheme, one covering only 
inpatient services, and a second covering both inpatient and outpatient services, with the 
benefits also covering consultation fees, diagnostic tests and medicines. At the time of 
purchasing an insurance policy, individuals must designate one public health facility at 
which benefits can be obtained which, in most cases, is a District Hospital. Members were 
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thus unable, at the time of the research, to use the insurance policy at private or non-
designated public facilities. A recent Government Decree states, however, that insured 
patients in some urban centres can access outpatient services at any facility, including private 
providers. 
Health insurance essentially offers financial benefits (i.e. an 80% reduction in user charges), 
rather than coverage for additional health services, or service provision in a separate facility. 
During the research, it became clear that in some provinces separate consultation rooms and 
wards are made available, with ceiling fans, as well as tea-making facilities. However, in 
many cases these benefits appear to be only for those with compulsory insurance, which 
highlights the lack of clarity on this issue. 
Certain policy measures exist to limit excessive adverse selection (see Part 2.1.3), which 
results when individuals with a high probability of requiring health services, dominate 
membership of a scheme. The main approach is to limit access to benefits until one month 
after the purchase of insurance. A recent decree, announced since the research, extended this 
period to three months. Furthermore, maternity benefits are restricted to a couple's first two 
children. 
Health facilities are reimbursed by provincial health insurance funds for the services they 
provide to insured patients. Reimbursements are made on a fee-for-service basis, which 
generally includes a flat fee for accommodation, and a standard fee for medical tests and 
procedures. In the early years of the scheme the average rate of reimbursement to facilities 
nationally, increased dramatically, partly due to the inclusion of referral services, which are 
typically more specialised and expensive. A Ministry of Health Circular in October 1995 
revised the approach to reimbursing providers from a fixed in-patient day payment to a fee-
for-service basis. This approach, which often encourages supplier-induced demand (see Part 
2.1.2), is reported to be a major cause of the financial debt in many provincial funds, with an 
estimated 75-80% of reimbursements made for medicines. 
In practice, reimbursement amounts are decided by provincial funds. Certain provinces have 
set a cap on reimbursements: in the case of Ben Tre The Province, this is VND 102,000 per 
inpatient case. Nationally, discussions have taken place on the possibility of introducing 
capitation payments to counter problems of debt. An additional change introduced by the 
October 1995 Circular was that a consultation fee would be applied to outpatient services, 
and that 30% of revenue could be used for staff bonus payments; health worker salaries 
continue to be paid through central government funds (i.e. not through the insurance fund). 
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The National VHIA Directorate was established as an operational unit within the MoH, and 
controls overall policy, infonnation systems, and training. Provincial funds are responsible 
for registering members, setting contribution levels, collecting premia, and organising claims 
and reimbursement procedures. Each Province has a department staffed by medical 
professionals, who scrutinise claims in tenns of the diagnosis and treatment provided, as a 
mechanism to limit supplier-induced demand. In addition, an accounting department verifies 
the standard payment to be made. The National Directorate monitors the implementation of 
these various activities. 
With respect to the marketing of voluntary health insurance, little infonnation on the specific 
strategies used, their intensity, or their effectiveness, was readily available from official 
sources, although some infonnation was collected as part of the household survey. It is 
reported that in Hai Phong Province, opinion polls are conducted in target communes, to 
establish the number of residents intending to purchase health insurance. Policies are only 
sold when this figure reaches 50%, a strategy that aims to reduce problems of adverse 
selection. Interestingly, in response to the financial problems discussed earlier, provincial 
health insurance funds were placed under the direct control of VHIA in 1999, and a 
tightening of guidelines concerning the control and use of funds took place. 
In tenns of the use of revenues, 0.5% goes to the National Directorate in Hanoi, 1.5% 
towards a national reinsurance fund to facilitate risk-sharing across provinces, 8% for 
administration and 90% for health services. An important point is that whilst a mechanism 
exists for some risk-sharing across provincial funds, there is an expectation that funds will, 
as far as is possible, cover the cost of treating insured patients within their province. 
Unlike schemes in other countries, there is little or no community involvement in the 
voluntary health insurance scheme in Vietnam, which is directed and managed entirely by 
the government. One advantage of this is that voluntary insurance has been established with 
a national perspective, which in the medium to long tenn may make the introduction of 
compulsion more feasible, and increase the efficiency of risk-sharing. In other respects, 
however, the lack of local involvement may limit interest in joining the scheme, and fail to 
take advantage of local monitoring, for example, which has the potential to limit the 
development of wasteful over-consumption of health services. 
Whilst institutional arrangements are an important consideration when interpreting the 
results presented in Chapters 5-7, the lack of good data regarding the way in which both 
health services and health insurance are supplied across Vietnam, limits the ability to draw 
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general conclusions, for example with respect to moral hazard (see Part 7.3 and 8.3.3). There 
may be aspects of the way in which the promotion of health insurance is organised which 
influence attitudes towards uptake, and issues around the reimbursement of providers, which 
create incentives that affect provider behaviour. Both are examples of influences that might 
partially explain some of the findings. 
1.4 Health and health services In Vietnam 
1.4.1 Health status 
Vietnam has achieved considerable improvements in the health of its population since 1945 
(see Table 1.3), the end of the Second World War, relative to its level of national income. It 
performs well on a range of indicators such as life expectancy and infant mortality, achieving 
levels equivalent to countries with income levels five times greater, such as Ecuador and 
Morocco. Using purchasing power parity (PPP) data, in 1995 Vietnam had a per capita 
income of USS 240 and an infant mortality rate of 45 per 1,000 live births, compared for 
example with a USS 1,110 per capita income and 55 infant deaths per 1,000 live births in 
Morocco. 
Life expectancy at birth in Vietnam is high for income levels: 64.7 years for males, and 68.8 
years for women, in 1999 (WHO 2000). Disability-adjusted life expectancy (DALE) figures 
for Vietnam estimated lower figures, with 56.7 years for males and 59.6 years for females 
(WHO 2000), ranking Vietnam 117 out of 191 countries, between Egypt and Nicaragua. 
Malnutrition rates are high compared to other countries in the region, however, standing at 
39% of all under-5 year 01ds7• The country also performs poorly on emerging diseases, such 
as lung cancer, and has the highest prevalence of smoking globally (World Bank 2001). As a 
cause of overall mortality, communicable diseases fell from 52% in 1986 to 27% in 1997, 
yet they remain a major public health problem for the sector. Non-communicable di,seases 
currently account for around 52% of all mortality, with the remaining 22% caused by 
accidents, injuries and poisoning. 
Table 1.4 highlights regional variations in infant mortality rates, which are highest in the 
Central Highlands. Rates are substantially higher in the Mekong River Delta than in the Red 
River Delta, the two regions in which fieldwork took place for this thesis. It is also estimated 
7 This figure is based on a measure of weight-for-age, reducing to 34% when the height-for-age 
measure is used. 
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INDICATOR 1945 1975 1998 
Life expectancy at birth 34 58 68 
Infant mortality rate 300 83 35 
(per 1,000 live births) 
Maternal mortality rate 200 105 
(per 100,000 live births) 
TABLE 1.3: HEALTH STATUS IN VIETNAM8 
=RE=-=G=I-=O_=_N.:.-___ --=1-=-98::..:9~ ___ _=1:.::..9_=_94_=__ _ __.:..%~!tanKe __ 
Northern Uplands 
Red River Delta 
North Central 
Central Coast 
Central Highlands 
Southeast 
Mekong River Delta 
Vietnam 
45.4 
37.0 
46.5 
47.5 
56.4 
33.9 
44.1 
45.0 
62.2 
35.2 
37.7 
37.2 
71.6 
31.2 
48.2 
45.1 
37.0 
-4.6 
-18.9 
-21.7 
27.0 
-8.0 
9.3 
0.2 
TABLE 1.4: INFANT MORTALITY RATES BY REGlON9 
REGION 
Northern Uplands 
Red River Delta 
North Central 
Central Coast 
Central Highlands 
Southeast 
Mekong River Delta 
CDCs 
2,520 
1,927 
1,743 
921 
557 
727 
1,311 
Beds in CDCs 
10,101 
8,193 
8,020 
3,404 
2,365 
2,347 
6,753 
Population per 
CDC 
4,969 
7,654 
5,850 
8,629 
5,951 
13,507 
12,677 
TABLE 1.5: POPULATION PER COMMUNE HEALTH CENTRE 199io 
8 Source: Guldner (1995) and World Bank (1998b) 
9 Source: World Bank (2001: 8) 
III Source: World Bank (2001: 68) 
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that mortality rates in rural communities are 80% higher than in urban areas, with the 
suggestion that disparities in access to health facilities and general living standards are the 
main causes (World Bank 2001). This contextual information is used in the interpretation of 
results presented in Chapters 5-7. 
1.4.2 Supply of health services 
Following independence from France in 1954, the government of the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam rapidly expanded its network of health facilities, in particular at the commune, or 
primary, level, and in the north of the country. The health system is based on a four-tier 
pyramid, with the Ministry of Health at the head developing and directing health policy, 
together with Provincial, District and Commune People's Committees. Sixty-one Provincial 
Health Bureaux form the second tier, serving between 0.25-5 million population through 
Provincial Hospitals, each with around 200-1,000 beds. The third tier is the District Health 
Centre, which manages services for an entire district. Finally, each Commune Health Centres 
(CHC) serves a population of between 2,000-10,000 at the sub-district level. 
Following reunification between north and south Vietnam, in 1975 (see Part 1.5.1), 
strengthening the network ofprirnary facilities in the south of the country was a priority. Due 
to financial constraints on public spending during this period, however, coverage in terms of 
population per CHC remains considerably higher in the north (see Table 1.5). Vietnam 
currently has 170 health centres per million people, compared with only 63 in China, the 
country with which Vietnam has most in common politically, socially and economically. In 
terms of doctors, Vietnam has 0.84 per 1,000 inhabitants, more than any other country in the 
region (Gertler and Litvack 1998). 
Private provision of health services was legalised in 1986 under doi moi reforms, in part 
justified by the need to harness the labour of many retired health workers. Detailed 
information about the extent of this sector has only recently started to emerge (see Gertler 
and Litvack 1998, and World Bank 2001). One estimate puts the number of licensed private 
personnel at 25,698, around one-half of which are government workers practicing privately 
out-of-hours (Gertler and Litvack 1998). Of this number, around 37% are physicians, whilst 
phannacists and drug vendors comprise a further 24%. Most private care is provided through 
clinics, of which only four existed in 1998, rather than hospitals. An estimated 70% of these 
facilities are located in urban areas. 
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The average number of consultations in public health facilities was 1.0 per person in 1993, 
falling considerably from 2.1 in 1987, but increasing to 1.7 in 1998, still below the average 
of 2.5 contacts in public facilities in low-income countries (Gertler and Litvack 1998). The 
number of in-patient days per capita increased by almost 50% between 1993 and 1998, with 
only Japan and Singapore having higher rates in Asia. One reason for the initial decline was 
the end of subsidised pharmaceuticals from the former Soviet Union, and the general 
breakdown in the Vietnamese health system in the early 1980s, as a result of economic 
depression. 
The growth in the number of private providers, together with reports that individual financial 
arrangements between users and health providers in the public sector have increased, may 
also have contributed to this downward trend. According to Vietnamese Living Standards 
Survey (VLSS) data, around 15% of all contacts were with private providers in 1998, 
ranging from 24% in the highest consumption quartile to 10% in the lowest (World Bank 
2001). 
As part of the process of economic transition, the Vietnamese government deregulated the 
pharmaceutical market, resulting in an estimated fall in the real price of medicines of more 
than 30% between 1993 and 1998. This has had two major effects: first out-of-pocket 
expenditures on medicines fell in real terms for all income groups and, secondly, self-
treatment with medicines has increased dramatically, raising fears both for the quality of 
treatment and growth in drug resistance, particularly of antibiotics. 
Whilst this section provides a broad overview of the supply of health services in Vietnam, it 
does not present a detailed comparative analysis, for example of the quality of health 
services, in the various provinces and districts included in the household survey (see Part 
4.2). Detailed analysis of health service delivery in the local context, whilst potentially 
important to enhance ail understanding of varying patterns of demand for health services and 
health insurance, could not be collected as part of this research. Economic transition in 
Vietnam has also brought with it a movement towards the decentralised management of 
health facilities. For example, Bloom comments that: 
"China and Vietnam ..... both countries have been liberalising their economies 
for a number of years. Partly as a result of these changes health facilities have 
become increasingly dependent on user charges, and they have gained 
considerable independence from political or bureaucratic control." (Bloom 
1998:233) 
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Drawing on experience from China, Bloom and Gu (1997) note that decentralised 
institutional arrangements and financing systems, prompted partly by economic transition, 
have led to growing inequalities in access to health services, cost escalation and, in some 
cases, lower quality health services. The reason, they propose, is the inadequate attention 
given by policy-makers to those factors influencing provider behaviour. With respect to the 
re-emergence of pre-payment systems in China, Bloom and Sheng Ian (1999) caution that 
without the involvement of a range of actors at the local level, including politicians, health 
officials, and patient groups, these schemes are likely to collapse. 
1.5 Profile of Vietnam 
1.5.1 Geograpby, climate and blstory 
Vietnam lies on a north-south axis extending from China in the north to the Gulf of Siam in 
the south (see Appendix 2), and has two densely populated areas, both located on river 
deltas. In the north, the capital city Hanoi is located on the Red River, with Ho Chi Minh 
City, the main commercial centre, on the Mekong River in the south. Connecting these two 
deltas is a long band of coastal plains along the South China Sea. Highlands are found both 
in the central region and in the north-west of the country. The northern point lies at 23° 
latitude whilst, some 1,800 kilometres to the south, the southern point lies at 8° latitude. The 
north of the country is on the edge of the tropical climatic zone, with a winter season 
between December and April. In the south of the country, temperatures are generally higher 
all year around. A recent review of the health sector notes the importance of climate for 
health: 
"The disease pattern in Vietnam is strongly related to geography, climate and 
socio-economic characteristics. For instance, malaria is most serious in the 
Central Highlands and mountainous districts of the Central Coast provinces; the 
prevalence of dengue fever is highest in the Mekong River Delta; bubonic 
plague often appears in the Central provinces and Central Highlands; and 
Japanese encephalitis mainly occurs in the North during the wet season. Malaria 
is often serious in the remote disadvantaged areas, while dengue fever typically 
breaks out in crowded urban and delta areas." (World Bank 2001: 12-13) 
Details of health status in Vietnam were presented in part 1.4.1. The history of modem-day 
Vietnam began in the north of the country. Austronesians, remote relatives of the peoples of 
islands in the Pacific and Southeast Asia, inhabited the area until four to five thousand years 
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ago, when people flowed into northern Vietnam from what is now southern China. 
Vietnamese culture today is primarily a mixture of these influences, although the north of the 
country maintains the strongest cultural similarities with China. 
In 208 B.C., northern Vietnam was conquered by the Chinese Nam Viet Kingdom, leading to 
the inclusion of the Red River region into a unified China. Chinese control and influence 
remained until 939 A.D., at which point northern Vietnam comprised a mixture of 
indigenous tradition, and a political and administrative system based primarily on the 
Chinese system. The Ly Dynasty (1009-1225) was the first to establish a distinct Vietnam, in 
terms of people and place, during which time the capital city was moved to Hanoi. During 
this period Buddhism flourished, and northern Vietnam remained at threat from Chinese 
invaders throughout the decades that followed, eventually coming under their control again 
in 1407, until 1428. 
The French conquest of Vietnam began in 1858 with an attack on what is now the city of 
Danang, in the central region of Vietnam, leading to the official incorporation of Vietnam 
into the French Empire in 1884. The Communist movement, led by Ho Chi Minh, became 
the main anti-colonial force in Vietnam, with the declaration of the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam on the 2nd September 1945, following the removal of French and Japanese forces at 
the end of the Second World War. With the arrival of Allied Forces, however, the newly 
declared government was forced to discuss the future of the country with the French. As 
tensions mounted between communist and non-communist elements, the latter group based 
in the south, hostilities eventually broke out. 
FoIlowing eight-years of war, the French Government signed the 'Agreement on the 
Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam' on the 20th July 1954. As part of this agreement, the 
country was partitioned into two separate administrations, north and south, at approximately 
the 17th Parallel. Communist forces in the north began infiltrating villages in the south soon 
afterwards, and made sufficient inroads to convince U.S. President IF. Kennedy to offer 
military support to the southern Vietnamese administration in 1961. The Vietnam War (or 
American War as it is referred to in Vietnam) followed, ending in victory for northern, 
Communist forces, over the capitalist southern regime, and the reunification of Vietnam at 
the end of 1975. The Vietnamese Communist Party continues to govern the country today. 
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1.5.2 Population and culture 
Vietnam is the thirteenth most populous country in the world, with an estimated 76.7 million 
inhabitants according to the National Census of 1999, and a growth rate of 1.8% per annum. 
In terms of age structure, Figure 1.4, juxtaposes population pyramids for 2000 and 2030, and 
shows that almost half of the population is currently under the age of 19 years, but ageing 
rapidly due to sharp reductions in fertility rates over the past two decades. Whilst the total 
population is expected to increase by approximately 31 % over the next 25 years, the number 
of people aged 60 years and over will grow by 118%, and the population aged below 15 
years is projected to decline by 14%. Morbidity rates and the prevalence of diseases 
afflicting the elderly (e.g. diabetes and coronary disease) are thus expected to increase in the 
coming decades. 
In the 12th and 13 th Centuries Buddhism flourished, as did two further influences on 
Vietnamese culture and religion, Taoism and Confucianism, both of which are also central to 
modem Chinese culture. The former is best known through the concepts of yin and yang, a 
system of balance between opposing forces, which is commonly applied to male and female 
roles and relationships, but also to any relationship, between individuals or institutions, 
benevolent and malign forces. The concepts are also used to represent good and bad health. 
Ethnic Vietnamese comprise between 85-90% of the total population, the remainder 
including people of Chinese, Hmong. Thai, Khmer, Cham, origin, as well as indigenous 
mountain-based populations. The Vietnamese language is Mon-Khmer, which is related to 
Cambodian, although Tai influence (which forms the basis of Thai and Laotian languages) is 
reflected in the tonal dimension of Vietnamese. Confucian doctrine has provided Vietnamese 
society with much of its hierarchical social structure, including the notion of subservience to 
state structures, and of children to parents. The concept of duty within such relationships 
originates from the teachings of Confucius. Figure 1.5 provides a further insight into the 
effect of Confucianism on Vietnamese culture, in particular the importance of duty within a 
variety of relationships. 
Tennesson (2000) provides a useful analysis of Vietnamese culture and society, which, he 
suggests, is made up of six separate layers. First, the Confucian layer, which refers to the 
period 1802-1863 and influenced all of Vietnam, was a period during which harmony was 
secured and order maintained through the promotion of values such as dignity, social 
harmony, virtuous behaviour, and education. These lay behind Ho Chi Minh's revolutionary 
ethics of humanity, a sense of duty, knowledge, courage, and integrity. To some extent this 
period cemented cultural differences between northern and southern Vietnam: the north 
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The Five Cardinal Rules and the Principle of Respeding the Superior 
"Emphasising the principle of respecting the superior in procedural justice, and the principle 
of favouring the intimate in distributive justice constitutes the formal structure of Confucian 
ethics for ordinary people. While this formal structure is manifest in many types of 
interpersonal relationships, Confucians made additional specific ethical demands on 
particular relationships. Confucians conceived five cardinal rules for the five major dyadic 
relationships in Chinese society, proposing that social interaction between members of each 
pair should proceed according to the Way of Humanity. Each of the roles in these five 
relationships is distinct, indicating that the core values emphasised in each are also different: 
Between father and son, there should be affection; between sovereign and subordinate, 
righteousness; between husband and wife, attention to their separate functions; between elder 
brother and younger, a proper order; and between friends, friendship. Three of these rules 
were designed for regulating interpersonal relationships with the family (expressive ties). 
The other two are for mixed ties--friends and sovereign/subordinate. It should also be noted 
that, except for the relationship between friends, the relationships are all vertical ones 
between superiors and inferiors. 
In accordance with the idea of "the ten things of righteousness (YO," persons who assume the 
roles of father, elder brother, husband, elders, or ruler should make decisions in line with the 
principles of kindness, gentleness, righteousness, kindness, and benevolence respectively. 
And for those who assume the roles of son, younger brother, wife, juniors, or minister, the 
principles of filial duty, obedience, submission, deference, loyalty and obedience to the 
instructions of the former group apply." 
FIGURE 1.5: CONFUCIANISM - THE FIVE RELATIONSHIPS II 
II This quote was taken from the website of Academica Sinica, a prominent Chinese academic 
institution based in Taiwan. At the time of submission it could be found at the following webpage: 
http://www.sinica.edu.tw/-kuoshuJpeoplelkkhuangirelation4.htm 
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which is close to China, is the traditional heartland of the Viet people, whilst in the south a 
greater mixture of Viet, Khmer, Cham, and Chinese exists. This heterogeneity allowed 
greater openness with other south-east Asian cultures. The north was also the base for 
government administration, whilst a commercial elite evolved in the south. 
Next came the colonial layer, during which period a police force was introduced. This police 
force still reports to government officials today on a variety of aspects of social, cultural, and 
political life, and has had a lasting effect on political culture. Thirdly, the Viet Minh layer 
represents the establishment formed as part of the National Liberation State with its goal of 
global revolution. Today this influence exists primarily within the elderly elite, which 
continues to venerate Ho Chi Minh, and still fundamentally opposes transition to a market 
economy. The author also notes that during this period an elaborate network of voluntary 
associations was established, with the task of mobilising popular support for the state. He 
continues that the process: 
" ... started during World War II as a system of 'national salvation organisations' 
which together formed the Viet Minh Front. Before the war with France the 
Front was broadened to become the Lien Viet, and today it is the Viet Nam 
Fatherland Front which serves the function of co-opting all such associations 
that do not need to be repressed, thus blocking the emergence of a civil society 
outside the state." (Tonnesson 2000: 244) 
The three final layers include the South Vietnamese layer, created by counter-revolutionary 
French forces and the US-sponsored Southern Vietnamese State, between 1946 and 1975. 
The fifth, centralised planning layer is embodied in a militarised, subsidised, and centralised 
planning state, nominally based on the Soviet model. Crisis in maintaining this system led to 
the market-oriented layer, which began in the late 1970s, culminating in 1986 with doi moi, 
the economic reforms announced at the Sixth Party Congress. 
1.5.3 Government, mass organisations, and civil society 
There are three components to the political system in Vietnam: the Communist Party, 
government and, as noted above, mass organisations, which are given the task of taking 
government campaigns to the village level. Government is organised into three main 
administrative units including the Province, of which there are currently sixty-one, which in 
turn are subdivided into Districts and Communes. Sub-Communes also exist but are less 
important as an administrative unit within government. A new constitution was approved in 
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April 1992, leading to a major restructuring of government, whilst reaffirming the role of the 
Communist Party as the leading force of State and society. In summary, the National 
Assembly, designated as the highest representative body of the people and the only body 
with legislative powers, was granted an increase in its power through further independence, 
and for the first time non-party members were permitted to stand for election. 
Gray (1999) provides one of the few published analyses of civil society, and the role of non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) in Vietnam, concluding that those currently in existence 
do not fit any definition of civil society, which stresses independence from the state, and 
opposition to state ideology. Indeed, most NGOs in Vietnam today are a construct of the 
state, which sets the parameters within which they operate. Gray considers that civil society 
manifests itself through non-state public sphere activities, and notes the confusion on the 
ground in Vietnam relating to this issue, as a result of institutions having to adapt to the 
uncertainties of economic and, increasingly, social transition. 
Whilst many Directors of NOOs in Vietnam have themselves been long-time state 
employees, and many are still members of the Communist Party, Gray accepts that they do 
indeed form part of a contested realm that itself constitutes civil society, with competing sets 
of obligations, responsibilities, and ideals pulling them in different directions. Although 
mass organisations remain fundamentally an extension of government, some have begun to 
distance themselves from state control. Gray (1999: 703) notes that" .. .it is misleading to see 
mass organisations such as the Women's Union as being locked in stasis, incapable of 
reform, and representing only state interests." He continues that many are in a " .... state of 
readiness towards taking on new approaches to the traditional work that they do." 
As a political issue, corruption amongst government officials has increased substantially 
during the 1990s, although little information is published on this matter. Tennesson (1997) 
refers to the rampant corruption under the present combination of market economy and 
privileged state sector, labelling it as the 'marketisation of the state'. A detailed review of 
modern Vietnamese society is provided by Templer (1998), who devotes considerable space 
to the issue of corruption in government, and provides some interesting insights: 
"Members of the National Assembly were asking when the government was 
going to stop talking and start acting against corruption, a problem that had 
become 'a national disaster' in the words of Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet. Pham 
The Duyet, former head of the Hanoi Party Committee, berated cadres at a 
meeting saying that one in five of the city's party officials had been disciplined 
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for corruption. Statements like these raised the question of whether anyone in 
the government was clean." (Templer 1998: 132) 
Corruption also appears to be widespread in the health sector: "Health ministry officials stole 
donated contraceptives and sold them in Russia" (Templer 1998: 133). He continues: 
"The list of corrupt officials seems depressingly endless. There is little that 
remains untouched by the blight. If you are sick, you have to pay extra for even 
the most basic medical treatment whether or not you are covered by government 
insurance." (Templer 1998: 133) 
The author sees corruption as something that removes whatever faith the public has in 
government and legal institutions, and these excerpts give some idea of the extent of the 
problem. Another indication of the severity of the situation is the decision by the government 
to execute several high-ranking officials found guilty of stealing public funds. Further 
information on this issue can be found from newspaper excerpts, and websites that monitor 
the use of the death penalty. In one case in 1998, three senior officials were sentenced to 
death, after one official was convicted of siphoning otT US$26 million from a State Owned 
Enterprise l2• Recent newspaper reports suggest that this problem remains critical (see The 
Economist 2002), and Vietnam was recently ranked 75 th out of the 91 countries surveyed by 
Transparency International (see Hodess et aI2001)13. 
From the perspective of this thesis, perceptions of corruption within government may well 
influence attitudes towards uptake of voluntary health insurance, given that the fund is 
managed entirely by government officials with little community involvement. This issue is 
developed further in Part 3.2.2 and is used in the development of Research Question 6. 
12 Details of this case were available on the Internet at the time of submission at the following 
website: http://legalminds.lp.findlaw .com 
13 The Transparency International report notes that: "The anti-corruption campaign in Vietnam began 
on a high note in November 1999 with the dismissal of then deputy Prime Minister Ngo Xuan Loc. 
His return to a key government post six months later was a blow to public enthusiasm, however, and 
rural villagers, angry at Ngo's apparent impunity, came out in force. The new leaders of the 
Communist Party promised more action, but political instability and the bottlenecks created by a 
corrupt bureaucracy in Vietnam continue to deter foreign investors." 
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1.5.4 Economy 
The decade following reunification (1975 to 1985) was marked by economic stagnation to 
which, critics argue, central planning was unable to effectively respond. The subsequent 
process of economic transition involved dismantling agricultural cooperatives, which had 
previously been the mainstay of economic production, allowing people to work their own 
plots, start businesses, and seek wage-paying jobs. Price and interest rate controls were eased 
and foreign trade and investment liberalised. 
Individual incomes have increased substantially from around US$ 100 in 1986, to US$ 330 
in 1998, and US$ 390 in 2000. In 1998 GOP growth stood at 3% (World Bank I 998a), 
increasing to 5.5% in 2000, and 4.8% in 2001 (World Bank 2002). Figure 1.6 presents data 
using per capita purchasing power parity dollars. Despite this rapid growth, Vietnam remains 
one of the poorest countries in Southeast Asia with an income level below the average of 
US$ 420 for all low-income countries. Growth faltered during the South-East Asian 
economic crisis, during which time demand for Vietnamese exports, in particular rice, oil 
products, and textiles and footwear, reduced substantially in Vietnam's major trading 
partners, Japan, Singapore and China. 
Agriculture remains the primary form of employment, for around 85% of the population, but 
contributes less than one-quarter of gross domestic product (GOP). Industry and construction 
accounted for 34% of GOP in 1998 (in particular food processing, textiles, cement, chemical 
fertilisers, steel, electric power), with the service sector comprising 42.5% of GOP. 
Government revenue comes primarily from profit and turnover taxes on State Owned 
Enterprises (SOE) and the non-agricultural non-State sector. Current reforms aim to decrease 
dependence on oil revenues given recent falls and general volatility in oil prices. Progress 
has been made in this area with the share of total revenue from oil SOEs reducing from 
almost 50% in the early 1990s to less than 25% at present. Strengthening the design and 
collection procedures for Value Added Tax is also a priority. 
Informal economic activity increased dramatically following doi moi, with private transfers 
playing an important role in maintaining household welfare. Le Minh Tam and Vinh (1999) 
estimate that almost a quarter of households in Vietnam receive remittances i.e. income 
transfers from family and friends, for whom this income constitutes an average of 38% of 
annual household expenditures. Vietnamese society has a long tradition of community and 
family spirit, strengthened by decades of war and separation due to migration. Intra-familial 
transfers are clearly of great importance for Vietnamese households to mitigate risks, and 
33 
Chapter I : Inlroduction 
4500 " Vietnam 
_ China 
4000 -l1 - ... - East Asia & Pacific ...-
_ Least developed countries /" 
.-' 
3500 I /" 
~-
.-' 
.¥ 
3000 
...-0' ....-
0... AI( 
0... .-' 
0... /" f 2500 
'0. 
--iC I<S 
u 
... 
~ 2000 
0... k-----li:-0 
(!) 
1500 
1000 
500 
0 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
FIGURE 1.6: ECONOMIC GROWTH TRENDS CPPP $) 
Source: World Development lndicators (2002) 
34 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
promote business, and are discussed further in Part 2.3.2 in the context of informal 
risk -sharing. 
Kumssa and Jones (1999) consider the slower approach to reforms in China and 
Vietnam to be preferable to the shock-tactics used in Eastern Europe. Whilst it is 
difficult to measure the socio-economic costs of transitional reforms, it is safe to 
assume that there has been a general shift of risk from state institutions to individuals 
and households. 
A report by the World Bank (1999) notes that, despite a modest increase in income 
inequality between 1993 and 1998, Vietnam remains a moderately egalitarian society 
by international standards. Its level of inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, 
is 0.35, lower than most other countries in Southeast Asia. In terms of poverty, 
whereas in 1993 58% of the population was defined as below the total poverty line, 
and 25% below the food poverty line, these figures had reduced to 37% and 15% 
respectively by 1998. Adger (1999) explains growing income inequalities in terms of 
the non-agricultural income opportunities available to a community, such as 
aquaculture, a sector that has grown rapidly in rural coastal areas. 
Wolz (1997) discusses the transformation of rural financial systems under doi moi, 
and the rapid increase in levels of production that followed, turning the country into 
the world's third largest exporter of rice. Interestingly, he attributes this growth to 
informal financial networks in rural areas, claiming that such income growth would 
not have been possible on the back of the chaotic formal financial sector, and that a 
lack of credit remains a limiting factor for continued growth in rural communities. 
Izumida and Duong (2002) show that formal financial institutions tend to specialize in 
lending for production purposes, whereas the informal sector finances more diverse 
and flexible activities. 
1.6 Concluding remarks 
This chapter presents the central objective of this thesis, which is to evaluate the 
system of voluntary health insurance introduced by the Government of Vietnam in 
1992, and is motivated by the current lack of empirical evidence from low-income 
countries to inform policy-makers. Health insurance was launched, and has developed, 
during a period of economic transition, in a country with a unique political and social 
culture, strongly influenced by both Confucian and Communist doctrines. In addition 
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to the social, economic, and cultural context, the theoretical frameworks reviewed in 
detail in the following chapter, are interpreted in the light of the structure of the health 
system, and the health insurance system, and used to develop a series of research 
questions presented in Chapter 3. 
Figure 1.1 provides the conceptual framework, within which the thesis is rooted, 
including several inter-linked policy goals and expected causal relationships. As part 
of the overview of health financing, it is clear that in Vietnam today, out-of-pocket 
health expenditures is a common cause of poverty for households. Whilst this thesis 
does not directly assess the impact of health insurance on poverty, it does provide new 
evidence on the extent to which, ceteris paribus, health insurance reduces out-of-
pocket health expenditures (see Chapter 6). 
In addition to the central focus on health insurance in this thesis, particular attention is 
give to the importance of social structure: an issue explored theoretically, and tested 
empirically, in the following chapters. For example, it has been suggested that, given 
the constraints in extending compulsory health insurance nationwide, the sharing of 
risks in terms of health expenditures is only achievable if communities organise 
themselves into voluntary risk-sharing arrangements. For such collective action to 
occur, it has been argued, communities must have a sufficient level of social capital. 
Given the increasing number of references to social capital in the context of health 
financing in low-income countries, the following chapter gives substantial attention to 
disentangling the social capital literature. 
The following chapters are organised as follows: Chapter 2 presents a review of 
theoretical models and empirical evidence which, together with the contextual 
information detailed in this chapter, are translated into a series of research questions in 
Chapter 3. The research methods used to collect data and address the research 
questions, including a large household survey and in-depth interviews, are presented 
in Chapter 4. The study thus focuses principally on the demand-side, rather than the 
supply-side, although a better understanding of the latter would enhance the 
interpretation of certain findings. Chapters 5-7 test the research questions through 
empirical analysis. Finally, Chapter 8 draws and presents conclusions, policy 
implications, and highlights ways in which the research might have been conducted 
differently. Issues for future research are also proposed. 
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A substantial theoretical and empirical literature exists on the development and 
functioning of health insurance schemes, in particular those in richer economies. 
Given the relatively recent introduction of health insurance schemes in many low and 
middle-income countries, from which policy-makers can draw, the evidence base for 
decision-making is limited. The main aim of this chapter is to begin the development 
of research questions, by examining the predictions of theoretical models, together 
with empirical evidence, and interpret these in the unique context of Vietnam. 
Theoretical frameworks of health insurance markets are reviewed first. Several 
predictions of existing models, such as adverse selection and the increased 
consumption of health services, are tested empirically using household survey data. 
A detailed review of the social capital literature follows in Part 2.2. Given that the 
concept is used as the basis of original conceptual analysis, substantial room is given 
to this section. Many of the ideas presented in the sociological literature led the author 
to review those studies by development economists concerned with informal systems 
of risk-sharing, (see in particular Part 2.3.2). Part 2.3 brings together these different 
sets of literature, which are used to develop new conceptual insights, formalised as 
two research questions in Part 3.2. 
Several approaches were used to collect the materials reviewed in this chapter. For 
theoretical writings on health insurance, the Handbook in Health Economics 
(Newhouse and Culyer 2000) was an essential text, each chapter reviewing seminal 
works in the specific sub-field. Several other textbooks, widely recommended on 
Health Economics courses, were also used. For empirical literature, relevant journal 
articles were identified through searches on bibliographic databases, in particular 
EconLit (the American Economic Association's electronic bibliography of economics 
literature), and the various databases provided by both the Joint Information Steering 
Committee (JISC), and the lSI Web of Science Service for U.K. Education. 
Unpublished material was collected through personal contacts established during the 
research, for example with members of the joint World Health Organisation and 
International Labour Organisation team, which has offered technical assistance to the 
Vietnamese Health Insurance Agency since the late 1980s. For literature on social 
capital, a useful starting point was the World Bank's website, which suggests key 
readings. The World Bank has also produced a series of working papers on the issue, 
and hosts an email-based discussion group, which proved particularly useful in the 
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early stages ofthe research. 
Searches were also conducted on the bibliographic databases referred to earlier. as 
well as Sociological Abstracts (two examples of searches are presented in Appendix 
6). The literature on this issue is young and growing rapidly, and some of the ideas 
prevalent at the onset of the thesis are already out of date, as discussed in this chapter. 
Finally, general Internet searches were used to locate unpublished papers and 
information on the health insurance market in Vietnam, for example. The thesis 
supervisors also directed the author to additional useful texts. 
2.1 Health Insurance: theory and evidence 
Why does demand for health insurance exist? Besley (1989) provides a theoretical 
framework to analyse the structure of demand for health insurance, drawing on the 
work of several authors, including Grossman (1972b). Whilst health insurance leads to 
gains through risk-sharing, problems may arise as a result of the information 
asymmetry inherent in insurance markets, most notably adverse selection and moral 
hazard. These issues are discussed in detail later in this section. First, however, two 
definitions of insurance are presented: 
'The use of contracts to reduce and redistribute risk. In health insurance 
the event insured against is medical expenses and/or loss of earnings 
through ill-health. Without insurance there is a small chance of a large 
loss; with insurance there is a small certain loss, that is the premium. The 
insurer makes the reverse exchange, accepting a new risk for the sake of 
the premium. Insurers may be risk-neutral or at least less risk-averse than 
the people they are insuring.' (Black 1997: 208-9) 
'The reduction or elimination of the uncertain risk of loss for the 
individual or household by combining a larger number of similarly 
exposed individuals or households who are included in a common fund 
that makes good the loss caused to anyone member'. (ILO 1996: 282) 
Insurance may be achieved in three main ways. Solidarity based systems redistribute 
income by pooling financial contributions typically based on ability to pay (e.g. 
through progressive direct income tax, as well as indirect taxation). The National 
Health Service in the U.K. is an example of this. Income pooling also takes place 
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informally, often through family and kin networks. and particularly in low-income 
countries. The relevance of informal systems of insurance are discussed in some 
details in Part 2.3.2 (see also Part 2.2.3.4). 
More recently, interest has grown in another variant of insurance. known as medical or 
health savings accounts. which have been implemented in Singapore. Under the 
scheme, citizens are obliged to save around 3% of their monthly salary into a special 
account, to which matching contributions are made by employers. Under this 
approach. funds are not pooled, and hence there is no cross-subsidisation between the 
rich and the poor, the old and the young, the sick and the healthy. This approach 
demonstrates that some of the uncertainty around ill-health, and its implications, can 
to some extent be dealt with without the sharing of risks between individuals. A 
medical savings scheme is in contrast to a typical health insurance scheme, such as the 
one addressed in this thesis, which brings together individuals with different risks of 
falling ill (i.e. sick and healthy individuals). The following discussion focuses on this 
type of scheme. 
In an insurance scheme in which individual risks are pooled, the aim is to reduce 
uncertainty over future private, or out-of-pocket, health expenditures. Uncertainty and 
risk are, theoretically, different concepts. Risk refers to an event, which mayor may 
not occur, but its probability of occurring is known. Uncertainty refers to a similar 
situation but one in which the probability of the event occurring cannot be estimated. 
For example, the probability of a particular individual having a car accident can be 
estimated using data on their history of accidents, or of people of similar age and other 
characteristics, with a similar type of car etc. Such events are insurable provided they 
are not close to certain i.e. with a probability close to one, such as the likelihood of an 
older person falling ill. An uncertain situation may exist during the emergence of a 
new communicable disease, where little knowledge of its epidemiology exists, making 
it impossible to estimate the probability of an individual becoming infected. In the 
economics literature, however, the terms risk and uncertainty are used 
interchangeably. 
A range of mechanisms exists that provides an insurance function. Ensor and Witter 
(1997) offer a typology of the various formal risk-sharing mechanisms used in the 
health sector, categorised in terms of the basis for contributions, whether or not these 
are earmarked for health services, and whether contributions determine entitlements 
(see Table 2.1). Five types of health insurance arrangements are defined: general 
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taxation (e.g. the funding base for the National Health Service in the U.K.); earmarked 
taxation (increasingly adopted as a means of financing public health services e.g. tax 
revenues from cigarette purchases used to fund health services); social insurance (i.e. 
the compulsory Bismarkian model widely adopted in Western Europe); voluntary 
community insurance (found mostly in low-income countries); and, finally, health 
insurance schemes which set premia according to actuarially-based risk. 
Whereas the last three mechanisms provide an explicit insurance function, the first two 
provide insurance implicitly. Publicly provided voluntary health insurance in Vietnam 
is closest to voluntary community insurance, although premia are not set according to 
average risk and, as noted earlier, the institutional design of the scheme is top-down, 
with very little community involvement. 
2.1.1 Derived demand: bealtb, bealtb care and bealtb insurance 
In Vietnam, demand for voluntary health insurance amongst adults not eligible for a 
freely provided insurance policy, has been extremely low to date. In order to increase 
uptake, a better understanding of factors motivating insurance purchase is required. 
The root of theoretical considerations of demand for health insurance is individual 
demand for health. Assuming health itself is a valued good there will be a demand for 
health. In turn, given that health services are important for the production and 
maintenance of health, demand for health services can be considered as derived from 
demand for health, an insight originally made by Grossman (1972a). Grossman also 
removed the traditional separation of consumption and production, central to standard 
economic models, developing in its place a model of household production of health. 
Given that health services can be expensive and that, for most people, illness and its 
timing is a random, or uncertain, event, demand for health insurance is likely to exist. 
Hence, just as demand for health services is derived from a demand for health, demand 
for health insurance can be considered as derived from a demand for health services. 
In Besley's (1991) theoretical framework, demand for health, health services and 
health insurance all build ultimately on demand theory. Following this approach, 
health is a commodity traded-off against other goods (e.g. smoking) and, as such, 
individual demand for health can be elicited through an analysis of tastes or 
preferences. 
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General Earmarked tax Social Voluntary Private 
taxation Insurance community insurance 
insurance 
Are contributions risk, Income! Income Income Community Risk 
community or income rated? Expenditure 
Are contributions earmarked No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
for the health sector? 
Do contributions determirie No No Yes Yes Yes 
entitlement? 
TABLE 2.1 : A TYPOLOGY OF HEALTH INSURANCE SCHEMES 
41 
Chapter 2: Theoretical models and existing evidence 
---------.-----... ~ .. 
Besley continues that individuals maximise their utility within budget constraints, 
health being one of the many goods contributing to utility. Better health is achieved by 
investing in goods that improve health, which in tum leads to both a consumption gain 
(i.e. being healthy enables a range of activities to be achieved), and an investment gain 
(i.e. better health increases lifetime earnings). In terms of demand for health services, 
in addition to the influence of income, education, and health status, the importance of 
which is represented in Figure 1.1, other characteristics such as age, aversion to 
receiving health care, and the availability of health-related information, will each 
influence individual, or private, demand for health services. Many of these factors are 
not easily observed, however. 
Conventional models of demand assume that individuals maximise expected utility, 
within a budget constraint, and according to their preferences. However, in the health 
sector these assumptions do not hold, for the reason that information is subject to 
asymmetry. For individuals, uncertainty over the quantity and type of care required, 
and the need to consult a third party (i.e. a physician), significantly erodes their 
sovereignty over the consumption decision. This uncertainty is the basis of the 
principal-agent relationship within health care markets. Not only is it difficult for 
individuals to assess the quality of the good or health service before receiving it, 
which is true of many products, but it is also difficult for them to assess its quality 
retrospectively. 
The importance of physician agency in the decision about the amount and type of 
health services consumed is further discussed later in this chapter, in relation to moral 
hazard under insurance. McGuire A. et al. (1992) note that as a product, health 
insurance is more amenable to demand analysis based on expected utility theory, than 
demand for health services, given that the former covers the risk of the costs of ill-
health, rather than ill-health itself. In this sense, health insurance acts as a form of 
income maintenance. 
Propper (1989) also presents a framework of demand for health insurance based on 
expected utility theory. In essence, the decision to purchase a health insurance policy 
is based on a comparison of expected utility with, and without, health insurance. In 
turn, this assessment is a function of the expected future distribution of states of ill-
health, and the costs and benefits of treatment in the public and private sectors under 
each. The cost of an insurance policy will also be important. In a separate paper, 
Propper (1993) suggests that individuals have restricted choice-sets: for example, in 
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the U.K. certain people do not consider private health insurance to be part of their 
choice-set, due to their political beliefs. This idea is relevant to Vietnam, given that in 
certain provinces many individuals have not heard of health insurance, and hence it is 
not part of their choice-sets. In Chapter 5, models of demand for health insurance are 
only estimated for individuals who are aware of the scheme. 
The presence of insurance within health care markets will also influence patterns of 
demand for health services, although the direction and magnitude of the effect 
depends on the structure of the insurance contract. For example, in the U.K. National 
Health Service, the state plays the role of implicit insurer with no observable link 
between contributions (the payment of taxes) and benefits (the consumption of health 
services). In most private health insurance schemes, however, the contract explicitly 
specifies the benefits available. Transactions take place between insured patients and 
approved providers, and a third-party insurer reimburses the provider, or in some cases 
the consumer. Each of these contract structures creates different incentives to 
providers and consumers of health services, and hence influences demand in different 
ways, the latter typically creating greater pressures for cost-escalation. 
Risk, as a concept, is widely used in economics to analyse consumption decisions 
under uncertainty (a number of texts cover this issue including Folland et a1. 1997, 
Gravelle and Rees 1992, and Sloman 1991). The payment of user charges for health 
services, at the point of service, constitutes a considerable risk for many individuals in 
low-income countries. In Vietnam, user charges represent a considerable shock to the 
ability of many households to maintain consumption levels of essential goods and 
services. Whether they decide to incur a relatively small additional expenditure i.e. 
purchase health insurance in order to reduce this risk, depends on several factors 
including their attitude towards risk. These various influences are discussed in Part 3.1 
and Part 3.2, and tested empirically in Chapter 5. 
Individual attitudes towards risk and uncertainty help to explain whether or not 
insurance will be purchased and, if so, at what price. Whilst some individuals are risk-
attracted, or risk-lovers (i.e. they will accept an actuarially unfair gamble), others are 
risk-averse (i.e. they will only accept a gamble with odds that are favourable to them). 
Risk-averse individuals gain more utility from the reduction in risk provided by 
insurance, than do risk-loving individuals. 
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Individual attitudes to risk can be represented in terms of the amount an individual 
will pay to obtain a greater degree of certainty over the future. This is referred to in the 
insurance literature as the certainty equivalent or, more commonly, as the insurance 
premium. Economists use utility of income theory to assess whether an individual is 
risk-averse. This theory predicts that, ceteris paribus, as an individual's income 
increases, they become less risk-averse. Wameryd (1996) reviews experimental 
approaches to the measurement of risk, such as lottery choice games, and draws 
attention to the paradox that individuals often purchase insurance, but also gamble l4• 
Another approach, commonly used in agricultural economics, is to elicit preferences 
using pair-wise choice questions, in which respondents are invited to choose between 
a low-risk low-return gamble, and a high-risk high-return gamble, for example when 
deciding which crop to produce. Such techniques have not to date been developed in 
the context of health services. 
Where demand for health insurance exists in a market economy, a supply-side 
response is expected i.e. private firms will otTer insurance products. However, the 
probability of certain individuals requiring health services (e.g. women requiring 
maternity services) is close to one, and hence not insurable. The result is market 
failure in the form of incomplete insurance coverage. Secondly, whilst risk-sharing 
leads to welfare gains, the associated incentive problems can lead to greater 
inefficiency, as discussed by Manning and Marquis (1996). The two main incentive 
problems in insurance markets result from hidden actions, more commonly known as 
moral hazard, and adverse selection. The trade-otT between risk-sharing and the 
inefficiencies that can arise as a result of these incentives, is central to health insurance 
schemes in which membership is voluntary. Market failure, manifested through 
unacceptable gaps in insurance coverage, for example, is frequently used to justify 
public intervention in insurance markets. Compulsory social insurance, or a tax-based 
system, are examples of such intervention. Current thinking with respect to moral 
hazard and adverse selection is presented next. 
2.1.2 Moral hazard and principal-agent problems 
One objective of this thesis is to establish the etTect of voluntary health insurance on 
the decision to consume, or use, health services. As discussed in this section, previous 
14 However, whilst many people gamble for entertainment, few will risk losing a major asset 
such as a house. 
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studies have been unable to separate out the effect of the voluntary scheme from the 
compulsory scheme. There are several reasons why the two components may have 
different effects, including different premium levels, the different socio-economic 
composition of membership, and other factors such as quality, and perceptions of 
quality, of the health services provided. 
Moral hazard refers to the tendency for insured individuals to increase their 
consumption of health care. Arrow (1985) refers to the less judgmental, and more 
informative, term, hidden action. Early work into moral hazard was conducted by 
Arrow (1963), Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000), Pauly (1968), and Pauly (1974). Cutler 
and Zeckhauser (2000) provide a comprehensive overview of the topic, a central 
theme of which is the conflict between moral hazard and risk-sharing. One of the 
conclusions is that measures are required to monitor, and if necessary punish, 
inappropriate behaviour by certain consumers. One criticism of this theoretical 
literature, however, is that it takes little account of the context of most low-income 
countries, in which levels of unmet health needs are significant. In this context, 
increased consumption resulting from insurance may be beneficial, and the conflict 
central to much of the theoretical literature, of less significance. 
On the demand side, two types of behavioural change may result from health 
insurance. Ex-ante moral hazard refers to the reduced consumption of preventive care, 
or changes in lifestyle, that result when an individual is insured, increasing the 
probability that they will fall ill and require health services. For example, if as a result 
of being insured, an individual feels less worried about the financial implications of 
falling ill, then they may decide to forego certain preventive, health-improving 
actions. Reducing consumption of immunisations, for example, would significantly 
increase the risk of illness. 
In practice, ex-ante moral hazard is not considered a major problem in the literature, 
given that the full costs of not taking care of one's own health can never be fully 
compensated for by an insurance scheme (e.g. in the case of death, or disability). As 
Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000) point out, however, ex ante moral hazard does exist to 
some extent. They provide the example of cigarette consumption, which, they expect, 
would fall if individuals faced the full cost of smoking in higher out-of-pocket medical 
payments. Whereas ex-ante moral hazard refers to the situation prior to an illness 
occurring, ex-post moral hazard refers to the increased consumption of health services 
once an individual has fallen ill. 
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In private health insurance markets, the marginal cost to the patient of accessing care 
is lower than the marginal cost to the provider of supplying care. The insurer pays the 
provider a price, which is sufficient to cover the marginal cost. The extent to which 
the reduced price to the patient of accessing care, actually leads to additional 
consumption, depends on the way in which they respond to changes in price. 
Empirical research into price elasticity of demand for health services is reviewed later 
in this section. In some circumstances, patients may also be able to influence the cost 
of care received, for example by demanding the best quality of treatment available. 
Where increased consumption is considered a problem, insurers typically respond by 
shifting part of the cost of care back on to the patient, for example through co-
payments or deductibles. 
Given the principal-agent relationship within health care markets described earlier, 
and the presence of an insurance fund, or agency, as a third-party payer, the provider 
may also influence the amount of health care consumed, and hence the level of 
reimbursements received. In some cases, providers may wish to do this in order to 
boost their own income. Pohlmeier and Ulrich (1995) note that: "The decision to 
contact a physician and the decision about how often to contact a physician are 
determined by different decision-makers". The authors motivate a two-part model to 
reflect what they recognise as two distinct and independent behavioural processes 
which is discussed further in Part 7.2.1. 
Referred to in the literature as supplier-induced demand providers may, for example, 
conduct more diagnostic tests on a patient than might be considered necessary. In 
many low and middle-income countries, where the decentralisation process has 
increased the autonomy of individual health facilities, the authority exists to raise and 
retain income directly from patients (either in the form of user charges or co-payments 
under insurance). In such cases, supplier-induced demand is likely to be a problem. In 
higher income countries, one response to this problem has been to remove the third-
party payer, and integrate the insurance and provision functions. 
With respect to voluntary health insurance in Vietnam, Research Question 9, 
developed in Part 3.3.3, focuses on the effect of being insured on the decision to seek 
health services as well as the type of provider contacted. Chapter 7 tests this question 
empirically, using both univariate and bivariate probit estimators, using data collected 
as part of the household survey. A dummy variable representing whether or not the 
respondent has health insurance is used to estimate its effect. 
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Whilst much of the literature focuses on the detrimental effect of insurance on 
efficiency in health care markets, Zweifel and Manning point out that moral hazard 
can have positive effects: 
" ..... some amount of moral hazard may be deemed beneficial for two 
reasons. First, to the extent that physicians wield a collective monopoly. 
the quantity of medical care consumed falls short of the optimum. The 
increase in quantity caused by the moral hazard effect of insurance can be 
efficiency-enhancing in this situation. Secondly, moral hazard may 
encourage the use of a more cost-effective medical service at the expense 
of a less cost-effective one within an insurance scheme. Thus the optimal 
amount of moral hazard is positive rather than zero." (Zweifel and 
Manning 2000: 413-4) 
Nyman (1999) offers a slightly different view, arguing that health insurance purchase 
is often motivated by a desire to access otherwise unaffordable services, and partly 
explains greater consumption of services by insured patients. The implication is that 
the additional care consumed is not necessarily inappropriate or wasteful. He argues 
that this issue has been overlooked in the literature and that, whilst reducing the risk of 
financial loss from falling ill remains an important motivation (Le. risk aversion), 
individuals also purchase insurance to access otherwise unaffordable care. In most 
low-income countries unmet health needs are substantial, largely due to the inadequate 
supply of health services, price sensitivity, and the associated opportunity costs of 
accessing care for under-served rural communities, all of which effectively ration 
demand. In this context, Nyman's argument appears particularly relevant, although 
careful analysis is required to establish whether or not the additional care consumed 
actually meets unmet needs, or is consumed by those who already have good access to 
health services. 
The most comprehensive analysis of a health insurance scheme to date is the RAND 
Health Insurance Experiment, conducted between 1974 and 1982, and based on data 
collected from 2,005 families in six locations across the USA. In the study, families 
were randomly assigned to fourteen different experimental insurance plans, which 
helped to avoid any bias resulting from self-selection by participants. One of the plans 
provided free access to services and the others a varying degree of cost-sharing. The 
study concluded that as the rate of cost-sharing fell, per capita out-of-pocket payments 
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increased, and calculated a price elasticity of demand of -0.2 for outpatient services 
(Manning et al. 1987). 
Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000) summarise several further studies in the USA, and find 
that price elasticity of demand ranges from -1.5 to -0.14. Using data from Australia, 
Cameron et a1. (1988) find evidence of moral hazard, whilst in Germany Geil et a1. 
(1997) conclude that other factors, rather than the economic incentives resulting from 
insurance, explain rapid increases in demand for inpatient services. Finally, Cameron 
et al. (1988) model demand for health care and health insurance in Australia, where 
joining a private insurance scheme obliges individuals to opt-out of the public 
insurance system. He concludes that health status is more important in determining 
utilisation levels than choice of insurance plan. 
In terms of the impact of health insurance on medical expenditures, Newhouse (1993) 
finds, as part of the RAND experiment, that when health insurance coverage is 
complete, private health expenditures increase by almost 50% relative to those 
insurance policies combined with a large deductible. A similar effect is found by 
Rubin and KoelIn (1993) in the USA, which they consider evidence of moral hazard. 
Using data from the Republic of Ireland, Harmon and Nolan (2001) find that being 
insured under the Voluntary Health Insurance scheme (which is supplementary to 
public insurance) increases the probability of being admitted to hospital by 3%, 
relative to those without insurance. The authors refer only to 'changes in utilisation' 
rather than the term moral hazard. Expenditures and treatment-seeking behaviour are 
analysed separately in this thesis. 
Few studies examine the effect of health insurance on health expenditures in low-
income countries, despite the importance of such information for policy-makers. There 
is, however, a substantial literature on the effect of user charges on demand for health 
services. Given that demand for health insurance is to some extent derived from 
demand for health services, this literature is relevant and hence examined first. 
In Peru and Cote d'Ivoire, Gertler and van der Gaag (1990b) conduct detailed analyses 
using World Bank Living Standards Survey data. Arc price elasticities of demand are 
calculated separately for adults and children. Similar patterns are found in each model, 
with a high negative elasticity for individuals in the lowest-income quartile, and 
inelastic results for those in the high-income quartile. In Peru, where indirect costs are 
low relative to direct monetary costs, arc travel time elasticities for adults are 
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significantly less than in Cote d'Ivoirels . As the authors note, however, the data do not 
account for variations in service quality. In this context, the effect of health insurance 
on consumer demand for health services is a function of expected reductions in the 
total cost of accessing care and, secondly, their sensitivity to changes in price. 
In Vietnam, econometric analysis of VLSS data by Trivedi (2002), concludes that 
health insurance has a strong positive effect on the use of outpatient services at public 
hospitals, and that income elasticity of demand is 0.4. The analysis is unable to 
distinguish between compulsory and voluntary insured patients, however. Waters 
(1999) provides a comprehensive analysis of the impact of health insurance in 
Ecuador, including the General Health Insurance scheme for formal sector workers, 
and a separate scheme for agricultural workers in rural communities. Using both 
univariate and bivariate probit estimators, and correcting for the effect of clustering in 
the sampling framework (i.e. heteroscedasticity), as well as selection bias resulting 
from adverse selection and other factors, he finds that being insured has a strong, 
positive, and highly statistically significant effect on the use of curative services, but 
no statistically significant effect on the use of preventive services. He also concludes 
that the scheme increases access to health care for its members but has a negative 
impact on equity across society overall. The primary reason for this is that insurance 
coverage tends to be for those already in employment, and for whom access is already 
relatively good. 
Finally, Yip and Berman (2001) analyse the Egyptian School Health Insurance 
Programme (SHIP), which aims to increase access and equity in access to health 
services. Using a logit model and data from a survey of over 10,000 households, 
insured children are found to have a higher probability of seeking outpatient care than 
the uninsured, in particular those in the lowest income quintile. On average, those 
children enrolled in the scheme are 34% more likely to visit a provider than children 
not in scho<?l, and 9% more likely than those in school but uninsured are. School 
Health Insurance is found to reduce out-of-pocket health expenditures by one half for 
the middle-income group, but only marginally for low and high-income groups. One 
weakness of the study is that the effect of illness severity is not controlled for within 
the regression analysis. 
15 Gertler and van der Gaag (1990a) calculate time elasticity of demand for adults in rural Peru 
to be -0.09 compared with -0.85 in Cote d'Ivoire. 
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Amongst other empirical evidence not based on econometric analysis, Ron (1999) 
finds some evidence that health care became more affordable for rural families with 
low and unstable incomes, as a result of joining a community health insurance scheme. 
In China, Carrin et a!. (1999b) evaluate the extent to which health insurance reduced 
the risk of paying health care bills that would otherwise have been a burden on 
families. The study concludes that the burden of health care costs on families was 
reduced, but that, in general, this reduction has been modest. 
In Bangladesh, Desmet et al. (1999) highlight the natural link between health 
insurance, as a means of spreading the risk of incurring treatment costs, and credit 
programmes as a means of decreasing the impact of illness on household income. The 
authors suggest that the credit schemes in which many individuals are already 
involved may provide the entry point for health insurance. Atim's (1999) study in sub-
Saharan Africa concludes that the social movement dimension has little impact on the 
performance of two community-based insurance schemes measured in terms of 
general organisational efficiency, impact on equity in and access to health services, 
and financial performance. Kutzin and Barnum (1992b) review insurance schemes in 
four countries, concluding that their impact, in terms of equity and efficiency, has 
been limited. Institutional weakness limits the ability to mitigate incentive problems 
within insurance schemes, often leading to greater income-related inequalities in 
access to health services. 
Jack (1999) summarises the three types of information asymmetry in health insurance 
markets. First, hidden action moral hazard refers to actions taken by insured 
individuals that alter the probability that they will suffer a loss, or its size. Secondly, 
hidden information moral hazard occurs when the insurer cannot verify whether a loss, 
or its size, has actually occurred. The third type of asymmetry, adverse selection, is 
discussed in the next section. 
2.1.3 Health insurance markets and adverse selection 
In Vietnam, as in many other countries, a primary motivation for introducing 
voluntary health insurance is to provide greater financial protection for the population 
against future uncertain health care expenditures (see Part 1.3.2). Insurance achieves 
this by pooling, and hence spreading risks, across individuals. 
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For health insurance markets to spread risks efficiently, several conditions must hold 
true. First, the probability that insured individuals will fall ill must be known to allow 
the insurer to make reasonably accurate predictions about the number and size of 
claims in a given time period. Secondly, these risks must be largely independent of 
each other. If an event occurs in which all members, or a significant proportion of 
them, simultaneously suffer an insured loss, the scope for sharing risks is severely 
limited, and the insurance function may collapse. Examples of such situations include 
earthquakes, tropical storms, epidemics, and major crop failures. The third condition is 
that the probability of an individual requiring medical treatment must be significantly 
lower than one (i.e. certainty). For example, elderly patients often face problems 
purchasing health insurance, as the probability of their falling ill is close to one. 
Fulfilling the first and third conditions is a common problem given that insurers are 
often unable to accurately establish the probability that an individual will require 
health services. When this is the case, the health insurance market will 'unravel'. 
Akerlof (1970) formalised this phenomenon using the example of second-hand car 
markets, in which sellers hold more information about the quality of a car, than 
potential buyers. Consequently, the buyer cannot easily distinguish between good and 
bad cars, and prices move towards the average quality of cars in the market. In 
response, owners of good quality cars remove theirs from the market, leaving poorer 
quality cars to dominate. Prices fall further to reflect lower average quality, pushing 
out more good quality cars, until only low quality cars are traded. 
In health insurance markets, the problem is essentially the same, although it is the 
consumer (patient), rather than the seller (insurer), that holds more accurate 
information, in this case about the quality of their own health. If each new customer 
provides information to the insurer, which is biased towards better health, then the 
actual number of claims and payouts will be higher than predicted. In order to protect 
profits the insurance agency will adjust premia upwards in response. Indeed, where the 
insurer expects new customers to provide biased information, the premium offered 
may already be loaded, or upwardly adjusted. In both cases, individuals in relatively 
good health may leave the market, increasing the average risk of those remaining in 
the pool. Premia will rise further in response, increasing the incentive for high-risk 
individuals to provide biased information about their health in order to lower the 
premium offered to them, and for better risks to leave the pool. A vicious circle of 
increasing average risk within the pool, and increasing premia, ensues. This process of 
unravelling describes the process of adverse selection - as the average risk of the pool 
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moves towards one, the third condition for efficient risk-sharing is violated, and the 
insurance market is likely to fail, manifested in terms of incomplete coverage. 
The extent to which adverse selection is a problem is also influenced by the way in 
which the insurance premium is set, for which there are two common approaches. 
Profit-maximising insurers set premia according to an individual's health status, 
effectively making an adjustment for the likelihood that they will require care, and 
make a claim. In contrast, non-profit schemes typically offer the same premium to all 
members, for example based on the average risk of the group. In this case, those 
individuals in poor health are not excluded, or discriminated against, through a higher 
premium. This approach is consistent with the policy objective of protecting access to 
health services, in particular for the poor. Adverse selection is likely to be more of a 
problem, however, when all consumers in a market face the same price. Whereas for 
high-risk individuals a premium based on average risk is low, relative to a risk-rated 
premium, for healthy individuals the average premium is relatively high. Individuals 
with poor health are thus more likely to purchase insurance and, where possible, more 
of it. This further highlights the trade-off between adverse-selection and gaps in 
coverage, and the importance of this problem from the perspective of financial 
sustainability. The design of the Vietnamese scheme, presented in Part 1.3.2, suggests 
that adverse selection is likely to be a problem. 
To summarise, adverse selection tends to exist in all health insurance schemes with 
voluntary membership, whether motivated by profit or social concerns. In a private 
market, the insurer may eventually go out of business if adverse selection is not 
adequately dealt with, whereas in the public sector schemes fall into debt and require 
additional public subsidy to survive. 
A number of studies estimate determinants of demand for health insurance in 
developed countries. In most cases, health insurance covers supplementary services, 
e.g. financial coverage for services such as dental care that are not financed through 
general taxation or compulsory insurance. Another common benefit is for services 
provided in a separate health facility or ward. Using a probability model, Besley et al. 
(1999) find that as waiting lists in the U.K. National Health Service increase, demand 
for private health insurance also increases. Perceived service quality, typically 
measured in terms of waiting times and the hotel aspects of health services, are 
important factors motivating the purchase of health insurance. Harmon and Nolan 
(200 I) find similar results in Ireland, where insurance purchase is motivated by a 
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demand for service quality, timely access, as well as reductions in out-of-pocket 
expenditures. These studies suggest that health insurance purchase is driven more by a 
taste for quality than aversion to risk. 
In Australia. Cameron et al. (1988) jointly model demand for health care and health 
insurance, the latter using a probit model, and concludes that income is a better 
predictor of health insurance purchase than health status. Cameron and Trivedi (1991) 
provide further evidence that income and price are more important than health status 
in explaining choice of insurance plan. Evidence from the U.K. also supports the 
positive influence of income (see Propper 1989, 1993), with political beliefs and 
health status having some, but a less significant, impact. 
Other research, concerned predominantly with supplementary health insurance in the 
USA, focuses on the responsiveness of demand to cuts in tax subsidies (see Farley and 
Monheit 1985, Keeler et a1. 1977. Marquis and Phelps 1985, and Marquis and Phelps 
1987). The general finding is that whilst demand tends to reduce slightly it is, overall, 
price inelastic. Marquis (1992) finds that price has a statistically significant effect on 
uptake, on the basis that adverse selection is substantially reduced when premia vary 
according to demographic factors. which provide a rough proxy of health needs. 
Further evidence of adverse selection is found by Hopkins and Kidd (1996), in their 
analysis of the Medicare insurance scheme in Australia; Marquis and Phelps (1987), 
who analyse demand for supplementary health insurance in the USA; and by Wolfe 
and Goddeeris (1991), who conclude that the magnitude of adverse selection is 
unlikely to create serious efficiency problems. Rubin and Koelln (1993) also produce 
evidence of adverse selection using data from the USA, as does Browne (1992). A few 
studies, however, find that health status does not have a statistically significant 
influence on the purchase decision, including Cameron and Trivedi (1991), Harmon 
and Nolan (2001), and Propper (1989). Harmon and Nolan (2001) conclude, 
unexpectedly, that good health status is positively associated with probability of 
purchase, the opposite of theoretical predictions. The authors suggest that further 
analysis and better data on health status are required. In most cases, the test for 
adverse selection is based on the estimation of a demand function that includes health 
status as an explanatory variable. 
Few studies have tested empirically for adverse selection in health insurance schemes 
in low-income countries. Two studies examine willingness to pay using contingent 
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valuation techniques. In Ghana, willingness to pay for social health insurance 
increases with income, as well as in households with high recent health expenditures 
and difficulties in making payments, (a possible indication of adverse selection). 
Better education and being male also increases the amount people say they are willing 
to pay (AsensoOkyere et at. 1997). In India rural health insurance is linked to private 
providers, and willingness to pay is found to be a function of consumer perceptions of 
greater inaccessibility, and lower quality of government services (Mathiyazhagan 
1998). 
In certain social contexts, infonnation asymmetry within insurance markets may be 
mitigated, without recourse to the collection of large quantities of data. Evidence of 
this is available from group lending schemes and informal insurance mechanisms such 
as rotating savings and credit associations, in which members tend to have good 
information about each others actions. This is particularly the case in traditional, pre-
industrial societies, and is an issue investigated by Wydick (1999), who asks whether 
social cohesion repairs market failure (i.e. moral hazard) in a group lending scheme in 
Guatemala (see Part 2.3.2). A similar concept, social capital, has been put forward as 
critical to the development of voluntary health insurance, and is discussed in the next 
section. 
2.2 Social capital: theory and evidence 
A growing number of studies refer, although often briefly, to the relevance of social 
capital to the development of health insurance in low-income countries (see, for 
example, Preker et al. 2001, Preker et al. 2002, and Ensor and Witter 2001). In the 
/ 
final paragraph of an earlier paper, Khoman (1997) argues that social capital is 
important for the development of rural health financing schemes in Thailand: 
'But certain preconditions must be in place for such a scheme (Health 
Insurance Card Scheme) to get off the ground. The most important of 
these preconditions is sufficient social capital. The concept of social 
capital stems from the recognition that social actions and the development 
of social organisations - such as a community health scheme - depend on 
expected mutual benefits that are affected by social norms and 
obligations within a community. Moreover, social structures that are welJ 
endowed with social capital are more amenable to collective action. Yet 
the small number of members required for community trust and 
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cohesiveness - the building blocks of social capital - is less conducive to 
risk pooling, which requires a large number of members.' (Khoman 
1997: 192) 
However, none of these studies addresses the issue of social capital in any depth. 
Indeed, the fact that social capital remains somewhat peripheral to the mainstream 
debate on health financing is a reflection of the definitional problems it faces. Clearly, 
however, there is some appeal in the idea that the social structure of a community is 
relevant to the development of health insurance. In order to assess the conceptual basis 
for this increasingly popular idea, substantial space is given here to reviewing the 
relevant literature. 
The idea of social capital has grown out of a belief amongst sociologists, and political 
scientists, that economic models under-represent the extent to which individual 
behaviour is influenced by social context, in particular social norms of behaviour. 
Economists argue, however, that rather than making unrealistic assumptions, the 
discipline attempts to identify solutions that could be reached if, for example, better 
information is made available within markets, and hence provides a clear direction for 
policy-makers. Furthermore, the assumption that rational individuals maximise 
personal welfare is, to some extent, dealt with through the concept of bounded 
rationality, in which an individual satisjices, choosing tolerable rather than best 
possible courses of action. Neither of these responses fully deals with the criticism that 
economics under-socialises human behaviour, however. Fukuyama suggests that: 
'We can think of neo-classical economics as being, say, eighty percent 
correct: it has uncovered important truths about the nature of money and 
markets because its fundamental model of rational, self-interested 
behaviour is correct about eighty percent of the time. But there is a 
missing twenty percent of human behaviour about which neo-classical 
economics can only give a poor account. As Adam Smith well 
understood, economic life is deeply embedded in social life, and it cannot 
be understood apart from the customs, morals, and habits of the society in 
which it occurs. In short, it cannot be divorced from culture'. (Fukuyama 
1995: 13) 
A review of the literature reveals that social capital has been used in explanations of a 
wide range of social phenomena. Table 2.2 offers a sense of this, by presenting a 
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selection of articles, together with the journal in which each is published. To the 
uninitiated reader, it might appear that social capital is a panacea for social policy 
makers. However, serious doubts about the concept's originality have been voiced by 
sociologists themselves l6 and, in the literature, considerable confusion remains about 
what social capital actually is. The remainder of this section attempts to disentangle 
the various arguments. 
2.2.1 Defining social capital 
French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, is generally credited with producing the first 
contemporary analysis of social capital, which he defines as: 
" ... the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to 
possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised 
relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition - or in other words, 
to membership in a group - which provides each of its members with the 
backing of the collectively-owned capital, a 'credential' which entitles 
them to credit, in the various senses of the word." (Bourdieu 1985: 248-9) 
Using this definition, social capital can be decomposed into two elements. The first is 
the social relationship that allows individuals to access resources owned by their 
associates, whilst the second is the amount and quality of those relationships. Most of 
the studies listed in Table 2.2, however, cite not the work of Bourdieu, but those of 
James S. Coleman, and Robert D. Putnam. Coleman began writing about social capital 
in the late 1980s (Coleman 1987, 1988), culminating in a chapter dedicated to the 
concept in 'Foundations of Social Theory' (Coleman 1990). His theoretical framework 
is motivated by a belief that the individualism, upon which the philosophy of natural 
rights and neo-classical economic theory is based, is inadequate. The key issue for 
Coleman is that individuals do not make decisions independently of the social norms 
and trust that is intrinsic to their various social relations. 
In developing his thesis, Coleman draws on the work of another sociologist, 
Granovetter (1985), who uses the concept of embeddedness to formalise the idea that 
social and organisational relations have an independent effect on individual behaviour. 
Economic transactions are, he claims, embedded in social relations, generate trust, 
Ih See in particular the argument made by (Portes and Landolt 1996) discussed in Part 2.2.1. 
56 
Chapter 2: Theoretical models and existing evidence 
.. _- .,---_ .. _--------
Social I economic Author Journal 
phenomenon 
Kawachi and Kennedy (1997) British Medical Journal 
Kawachi et al. (1997a) The American Prospect 
Health status Kawachi et al. (1997b) American Journal of Public 
Health inequalities Health 
Kawachi and Kennedy (1999) Health Services Research 
Welfare Bird (1999) Rationality and Society 
Poverty Grootaert (1999) World Bank Working Paper 
Kawachi et al. (1999) Social Science & Medicine 
Moser and Holland (1997) Book 
Narayan and Pritchett (1997) World Bank Working Paper 
Individual income Helliwell (1996) NBER Working Paper 
National income Woolcock (1998) Theory and Society 
Knack and Keefer (1997) Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 
Transaction costs Bhatt and Tang (1998) World Development 
Collier (1998) World Bank Working Paper 
DePoint (1998) PhD thesis 
Woolcock (1998) Theoryand Society 
Performance of public Cusack (1999) European Journal of Political 
institutions Research 
Putnam (1993a) Book 
Widner and Mundt (1998) Africa 
Political and civic Smith (1999) Political Psychology 
behaviour 
Educational Teachman et al. (1997) Social Forces 
performance Coleman (1988) American Journal of 
Rate of school dropouts Sociology 
Divorce rates Hetherington (1999) Minnesota Symposia On Child 
Psychology 
Success of development! Mullen and Allison (1999) Journal of the American Water 
community projects Resources Association 
(e.g. watershed and 
waste management 
Crime rates Kawachi et al. (1999) Social Science and Medicine 
TABLE 2.2: RANGE OF DISCIPLINES USING SOCIAL CAPITAL 
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create expectations, and enforce behavioural norms. Coleman sees relationships as a 
productive capital asset, enabling individuals to achieve goals that would otherwise be 
unobtainable, or only at a greater cost. Hence, social capital provides an additional 
resource for individuals to draw upon in order to achieve their personal goals. Whilst 
this point is motivated by a concern that economics, and its assumptions are 
inadequate, it appears to be entirely consistent with the concept of a utility-
maximising individual. 
Coleman attributes the first use of the tenn social capital not to Bourdieu, but to Loury 
(1987), who used it to describe the social endowments that children receive from their 
parents. In the context of low-income families and income inequalities in the USA, 
Loury believes that social capital is important for the creation of human capital in 
children and young adults, describing it as a non-transferable asset that inheres in 
family relations and community social organisation. In fact, Loury only refers to the 
term once in his article, and only then in passing, neither defining nor expanding on it. 
Rather than defining social capital in terms of networks and membership in groups, 
Coleman offers the following, slightly more vague definition: 
"Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity, but a 
variety of different entities having two things in common: they all consist 
of some aspect of social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of 
individuals who are within the structure." (Coleman 1990: 302). 
However, Coleman does offer a useful analogy with physical and human capital. 
Whereas physical capital results from changed material form (e.g. turning raw metals 
into machines and tools), and human capital is created by investing in education and 
training, social capital is created by investing in inter-personal relationships that 
facilitate productive activity. Thinking of individuals as a set of nodes in society, 
human capital exists within each node, whereas social capital exists in the links 
between them. These links are relationships, which Coleman categorises variously as 
based on trust, norms and authority, the latter implying hierarchy and vertical 
relationships. In contrast, Putnam, whose work is detailed later in this section, defines 
social capital in terms of civil society, which he measures in terms of the density of 
horizontal networks in a community. This focus on membership in social groups is 
also central to Bourdieu's definition. One conflict in much of the social capital 
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literature is whether value (in terms of measuring social capital) should be given only 
to horizontal networks or also to vertical ones. 
Portes (1998), and Portes and Landolt (1996), criticise the early writings of Coleman 
and Putnam for assuming that social capital has only positive effects, and redress this 
imbalance by highlighting the downside of social capital. Criticising the vagueness of 
its definition, they claim that the way is left open for a number of different and even 
contradictory processes, to be relabelled as social capital. They comment that " ... the 
point is approaching at which social capital comes to be applied to so many events and 
in so many different contexts as to lose any distinct meaning" (Portes 1998: 1). 
Examples of the negative effects or costs of social capital are presented by Woolcock 
(1998), who cites the existence of organised crime such as the Mafia which, it could 
be argued, possesses a high level of internal trust and social capital. 
Portes criticises Coleman for including in his definition some of the mechanisms that 
generate social capital, such as reciprocity, expectations and group enforcement of 
norms, and some of its consequences, such as better information. He continues that 
equating social capital with the resources acquired through it leads to tautological or 
circular statements. Saying, for example, that a student has social capital because he 
obtained access to a large tuition loan from his family, but that another student does 
not because she failed to do so, simply neglects the possibility that the second 
student's network is equally, or more motivated to come to her aid, but simply lacks 
the means to do so. Defining social capital as being equivalent to the resources 
obtained through it is tantamount to saying that the successful succeed. 
Problems with defining social capital continue to plague the literature, although this is 
not immediately apparent, given the number of articles employing the term (without 
challenging it). Woolcock (1998) criticises it for trying to explain too much with too 
little - the antithesis of a good theory. Others, such as Fine (1999a, 1999b), are 
concerned that recent interest in social capital is indicative of the extent to which 
economics is colonising other sub-disciplines within the social sciences. 
In reviewing the social capital literature, Woolcock (1998) believes that a definition 
should focus on sources rather than consequences, and considers trust, norms of 
reciprocity, fairness and cooperation as the benefits of social capital. He notes, 
however, that in practice it is conceptually difficult to separate the sources of social 
capital from its consequences. 
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A further example of confusion in the literature is evident in Putnam's (1993a) seminal 
work (see next paragraph) in which voluntary participation in clubs, societies, and 
other social networks, are not only considered to be a consequence of social capital, 
but also an additional investment. In this virtuous circle, trust promotes cooperation, 
and cooperation promotes trust. If this is the case then, as Thomas (1996) and others 
suggest, it is an asset with the unique quality of appreciating rather than depreciating 
with use, counteracting the economic law of diminishing returns. Indeed, the asset 
may actually deplete when not used. Whilst there is a logic to this circularity this 
feature of social capital is the principal cause of its definitional problems 17. 
Putnam's (1993a) analysis of the relative performance of regional government in Italy 
is, together with Coleman's work, the text most credited with developing a theoretical 
framework for social capital. In attempting to explain variations in institutional 
performance, the book examines a variety of societal structures, including the notion 
of a civic community, in which social solidarity, inter-personal trust, tolerance and 
cooperation are widespread. Putnam argues that "Citizens in the civic community are 
not required to be altruists. In the civic community, however, citizens pursue ..... self-
interest that is "enlightened rather than "myopic", self-interest that is alive to the 
interests of others" (Putnam 1993a: 88). 
Putnam defines social capital as a stock of '" .norms of reciprocity and networks of 
civic engagement' (Putnam 1993a: 167), and hypothesises that participation in civic 
organisations instils skills of cooperation, as well as a sense of shared responsibility 
for collective endeavours. Fukuyama (1999) points out that norms range from the 
reciprocity that exists between two individuals, to complex doctrines such as 
Christianity, and Confucianism, which suggest considerable complexity in its 
measurement. 
Measures of civic behaviour used by Putnam aim to capture what he terms the 
vibrancy of associationai life. These include the extent of newspaper readership, and 
turnout for referenda, measures used to construct an index of civicness. A strong 
17 It might be argued that an inability to agree on a precise definition of social capital should 
not prevent the use of a concept that has clearly captured the imagination of a wide range of 
academic disciplines. However, the lack of a definition leads to problems when attempting to 
measure social capital, as discussed in Part 2.2.4. Furthermore, many concepts, which 
apparently constitute social capital, have substantial value in their own right without making 
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positive relationship is found between this index and regional government 
performance, which in turn is based on twelve separate measures, including internal 
stability, responsiveness to public requests, the provision of information, and 
legislative activity. Putnam thus equates social capital with civic behaviour, defined in 
terms of the networks, norms, and trust, which facilitate cooperative action for mutual 
benefit: 
"Working together is easier in a community blessed with a substantial 
stock of social capital. In practice, this stock is equated with the level of 
associational involvement and participatory behaviour in a community 
and is measured by such indicators as newspaper reading, membership in 
voluntary associations, and expressions of trust in political authorities." 
(Putnam 1993b: 1) 
Putnam's emphasis on social capital as horizontal linkages in a community, rather than 
vertical ones, is evident in his observation that Catholicism tends to substitute for civic 
community, with vertical bonds of authority presiding over horizontal bonds of 
fellowship. Each indicator of religiosity used in Putnam's study, such as attendance at 
Mass and rejection of divorce, is negatively correlated with behaviour that typifies 
civic engagement. He also provides a useful historical analysis of the dominance of 
vertical authority relationships in the southern Italian feudal Kingdoms, in contrast to 
the civic republicanism that emerged in northern cities. 
Furthermore, in a chapter entitled 'Tracing Civic Roots', Putnam highlights the inter-
dependence of communal republicanism, civic institutions such as guilds, trust, the 
growth of credit, and mercantilism. In summary, he notes that "A vertical network, no 
matter how dense and no matter how important to its participants, cannot sustain 
social trust and cooperation" (Putnam 1993a: 174). In a subsequent and oft quoted 
paper, Putnam (1995) describes the decline of participation in group activities across 
the USA which, he argues, reflects a decline in social capital, and constitutes a threat 
to the quality of democracy and the quality of life. 
Theoretically, social capital has a variety of meanings to different disciplines, as 
described by Woolcock (1998): 
what is often a conceptual jump to the notion of social capital. In this thesis, social cohesion is 
used as a measure of social structure, without being labelled as social capital. 
61 
Chapter 2: Theoretical models and existing evidence 
"Rational choice theorists ..... regard social capital as an informational 
resource emerging as a result of interaction between rational agents 
needing to co-ordinate for mutual benefit. Durkheimians however, 
perennially at odds with Utilitarians claim that social capital in the form 
of normative non-contractual elements of contract, is in fact what makes 
possible any commitment to action, rational or otherwise ..... For network 
theorists, social capital is simply one's non-rational social ties. If social 
capital can be rational, pre-rational, or even non-rational, what is it not?" 
(Woolcock 1998: 155-156) 
Most published works consider social capital to be a public good given its 
indivisibility i.e. social capital cannot be the private property of an individual. Neither 
can social capital be exchanged, having value only when employed. According to 
economic theory, private investment in social capital will thus be sub-optimal, 
justifying public intervention either through direct provision or financing. 
Fukuyama (1999) rejects this idea, however, arguing that as cooperation is critical in 
order to achieve most selfish ends, social capital will be produced in adequate 
quantities as a private good. He also introduces the useful idea of a radius of trust to 
explain the fact that group solidarity is often achieved at the price of hostility to 
outsiders. This concept neatly encapsulates the potential for both positive and negative 
externalities of social actions. When the social capital of a particular group, for 
example its set of cooperative norms, produces positive externalities, then the radius 
of trust will be wider than the group itself. However, when a group's social capital is 
restricted only to its members, who are hostile to outsiders, the radius of trust will be 
narrow. 
Fukuyama defines social capital as " .... a capability that arises from the prevalence of 
trust in a society or in certain parts of it" (Fukuyama 1995: 26), which suggests that 
trust is a source of capability. Seminal work by Sen (1999) is also relevant here. 
Pereira (1993), in a review of equity concepts in the health sector, stresses the 
importance of Sen's work in drawing attention to the importance of the capability of 
an individual to transform the commodities they have control over, into human 
functionings such as enjoying good health. Pereira also refers to the work of Rawls 
(1972), whose theory of the maximin suggests that society should seek to maximise 
the position of the least well-off. 
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Much of the discussion presented so far is somewhat convincing, in that social 
networks, norms of behaviour, social cohesion, and a range of other concepts, are each 
likely to have an influence on individual behaviour. The problem arises, however, in 
the conceptual shift from each of these individual ideas to the composite notion of 
social capital, which in some respects adds confusion. Philosophy offers some useful 
ideas with respect to phenomena that are widely understood but not easily defined, 
frequently giving the example of a 'game'. Using the idea of a cluster concept, there 
are various phenomena, which are not identical, but resemble each other, and are 
thought of as games. These phenomena have what might be termed a family 
resemblance. There may be some room for the application of this idea to current 
thinking on social capital. Perhaps the greatest value of the idea, however, is to draw 
economists to a range of useful ideas and frameworks from the sociological literature. 
Given these definitional problems, in this thesis the various phenomena suggested in 
the literature as constituting social capital, are used in their own right, rather than as 
the composite term social capital. Despite this, social capital has led to a useful 
exchange of ideas between disciplines and for this reason, the discussion and the 
debate surrounding the concept continues below. 
Whether or not social capital merits the label capital is another issue of debate. 
Economics defines capital as an input to the production process, which can also be 
used as collateral. Essentially, capital augments income, but is not totally consumed in 
the process. For sociologists, capital is seen more generally as a resource. Whilst 
certain studies show that social capital can increase individual incomes, most notably 
Knack and Keefer (1997), and Narayan and Pritchett (1997», the majority are not 
concerned directly with increases in income (see Table 2.1). Collier (1998) attempts to 
settle the issue by proposing that only those social interactions that have persistent 
economic effects merit being labelled as capital. Unfortunately, few studies adopt or 
discuss this potentially useful condition. 
Definitions of social capital overlap considerably with a number of other concepts, 
several of which are listed in Table 2.3. For example, when one person does a favour 
for another, they may do so because they trust the other person to return that favour in 
the future. Whilst Fukuyama (1995) equates social capital with trust, and vice versa, 
Sobel (2002) offers a more precise definition: the willingness to accept a decision that 
affects one's welfare to be made by someone else. Such trust may be based on a belief 
that the other person is altruistic, or follows a set of moral principles. Alternatively, it 
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Concept Studies Definition / measure , Benefits/Conclusions 
I 
Social collateral can be harnessed to reduce the negative effects 
Social collateral Besley and Coate Replacement for physical collateral of group lending e.g. where a group defaults despite the fact that some members could have repaid. Fear of loss of social (1995) particularly in poorer communities. Similar 
collateral within a close-knit community, for example through 
Conning ( 1997) to reputational collateral. social penalties I sanctions may thus lead to increased rates of 
group repayment. 
Reputational Haller (1992) Widely used concept in theory of repeated Can be used to secure resources (such as financial credit) in the 
collateral games. Similar to social collateral. absence of physical collateral. 
Social cobeslon Wydick (1999) Three measures: pre-existing social ties, Examines whether social cohesion can effectively repair market 
existence of peer monitoring, and evidence failure by overcoming asymmetric information in credit 
of group pressure within the borrowing markets. Finds that better repayment perfonnance results not 
group. from stronger social ties between members, but primarily from 
peer monitoring, the use of sanctions against poor performers, 
and intra-group insurance, which assists borrowers who are 
victims of an unavoidable mishap. 
erie! and Van Dormael A union of interests, purposes, or Literature suggests that collective action embodied in voluntary 
(1999) sympathies among members of a group; a mutual organisations, for example, is more likely to occur in 
Solidarity Atim(I999) fellowship of responsibilities and interests. communities with high levels of social capital. Solidarity is an important factor in both the evolution, and the functioning, of 
mutual aid associations for health in West Africa. 
Desmet et al. (\999) 
-
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Concept Studies Definition / measure Benefits/Conclusions 
Bernheim and Stark (1988) Unselfish concern for the welfare of others. Worse outcomes may arise if altruists are 
reluctant to enforce agreements and punish 
Altruism betrayals amongst other members of group e.g. 
within group lendinglborrowing schemes. 
! 
Foster and Rosenzweig A situation where individual action is entirely Whilst imperfect commitment substantially 
(2001) unselfish i.e. not linked with any expected return, or constrains informal transfer arrangements, 
reciprocal arrangement. Examples include giving whether kin-based or not, there is evidence that 
money to charity, or volunteering. altruism plays an important role in ameliorating 
commitment constraints and hence in increasing 
gains from income pooling. 
Criel (1998) A mutual or cooperative interchange of favours or Reciprocity is one of the benefits of social privileges between self-interested individuals. capital (also trust and cooperation) and Reciprocity 
shouldn't be confused with social capital itself, 
or a source of it. 
Coate and Ravallion (1993) Theoretical paper concerned with informal insurance, in which it is argued that balanced reciprocity is at 
play when one individual performs a favour, and 
expects an equivalent one in return. 
Woolcock (1998) A situation in which an individual performs an initial 
action and expects an action of an approximately 
equal value in return. 
Social Marwell et al. (1988) Internal dynamic and structure of social networks Overall, density of ties in a group improves the 
networks influences likelihood of collective action occurring. prospects of collective action. Unexpectedly, 
Measures the cost of communicating and the centralisation of network ties always has a 
coordinating actions within networks. positive effect on collective action. 
-------- ---- -- -------- -- -----
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may be based on a belief that the other person will return the favour through a desire 
to maintain a reciprocal relationship. 
This idea has similarities with that of reputational collateral, used in the economics 
literature to explain why individuals enter unenforceable contracts. Social collateral, 
another concept used in the development economics literature, may also enable 
individuals without physical assets to access loans, e.g. through entering a reciprocal, 
risk-sharing arrangement. This argument is similar to that used by van Bastelaer 
(1999) in the context of social capital (see the discussion on informal systems of risk-
sharing later in this chapter). 
This brief overview suggests that many of the ideas that tend to be bundled together 
into the notion of social capital are not original. Conceptually, it is unclear whether 
social capital offers an original insight, although there are some useful ideas relevant 
to the development of health insurance schemes in low-income countries. These are 
presented in the remainder of this chapter. 
2.2.2 Sources of social capital 
In the same way that social capital is defined in a number of different ways, a variety 
of sources are proposed in the literature. First, in attempting to explain why social 
capital emerges in some communities and not others, Hsiao (1995) stresses the 
importance of closure within social networks for the emergence of obligations, 
expectations, and social norms. This idea draws directly from the work of Coleman 
(1990). Closure describes a situation, in which each member of a network knows the 
other, which Hsiao (1995) suggests is similar to stability within social structure, social 
proximity I 8, social integration, or social cohesion. These terms are, essentially, 
synonymous. 
The relevance of community structure becomes clearer in the context of negative 
behaviour. If, for example, one person conducts an action that imposes negative 
externalities on two other individuals, neither of whom knows the other, then their 
ability to combine forces to constrain the first person's actions is limited. Social norms 
of behaviour, which Coleman equates to social capital, can only emerge in closed 
networks. The aim of behavioural norms, he suggests, is to encourage positive social 
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actions and to curtail negative ones. Whilst the process of urbanisation is often 
associated with a breakdown in closed networks, in some cases, such as the Jewish 
diamond trading community in New York, closure is maintained. Closure is one of the 
more useful insights in the social capital literature, offering a logical explanation for 
the development of social norms of behaviour. As already noted, the problem arises in 
the conceptual leap from this very clear idea to that of social capital. 
Conceptually, closure has similarities to the persistent relationships suggested by 
Collier (1998), and repeated interactions or iterations in the economics literature on 
game theory. The latter is important to overcome selfish or opportunistic behaviour 
that may be in a person's short-term, but not medium or long-term, interest - when 
relationships are perceived to be more permanent than transient, then cooperative 
behaviour is likely to yield greater utility for the individual concerned. 
In addition to social closure, behavioural norms may be produced in other ways. 
Fukuyama (1999) notes the importance of authority structures, in particular major 
religions such as Buddhism, Hinduism, Christianity and Islam, which lay down codes 
of conduct and expect obedience to them. This viewpoint directly contradicts that of 
Putnam, who considers that the authority relations laid down by the Catholic Church 
effectively destroy social capital and prevent the development of civic behaviour. 
This issue further exposes the contradictions in the literature. Whilst many authors 
define social capital as social norms, which often result from hierarchical social 
systems, most studies do not give those vertical relationships any positive value in 
terms of social capital. Indeed, where social relations are based primarily on authority, 
social capital is considered weak, at least if Putnam's definition of social capital as 
civic community is followed. Similarly, the argument that social capital is important 
for collective action is contradicted by empirical evidence that leadership and 
authority within social systems is often necessary for collective action to occur. 
Collective action refers to the voluntary agreement between two or more individuals to 
cooperate i.e. to carry out a particular individual action in the future (see, for example, 
the work of network analysts discussed later in this chapter). In the same way that 
early writings on social capital neglected to acknowledge the presence of negative 
18 Coleman uses this term to describe the close relations between children at school. 
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consequences, many texts over-emphasise the importance of horizontal ties, at the 
expense of vertical relationships. 
A second related weakness in the social capital literature is whether heterogeneous or 
homogenous group composition increases the quality of social capital. On the one 
hand, Putnam sees value in networks that cut across social and economic groups, 
which, he argues, are the foundations of a civil society. Several studies that measure 
social capital follow this approach, giving a higher value to membership in groups 
with heterogeneous membershipl9. However, it appears intuitive that collective action 
is more likely to occur in homogenous groups where strong bonds of trust exist 
between the members. This is an additional argument supporting the suggestion that 
certain vertical networks should be credited with positive value. 
Given the importance of collective action in the social capital literature (see further 
discussion in Part 2.2.3.4), it is useful at this point to examine the approach taken by 
other disciplines. For example, development economists such as Fafchamps (1992), 
offer a different explanation for the emergence of collective action and solidarity in 
pre-industrial societies. The author believes that mutual insurance mechanisms spring 
primarily from scarcity and need, and that whilst altruism may be a catalyst for such 
solidarity networks, they are essentially motivated by economic concerns. Similarly, 
Platteau (1997) sees the formation of many social groupings, based on kinship, 
lineage, neighbourhood, consanguinity, and ultimately trust, as serving an economic 
function. He notes that: 
"It is scarcity not sufficiency that makes people generous, since 
everybody is thereby insured against hunger ... .in a community where 
everyone is likely to find himself in difficulties from time to time ..... he 
who is in need today receives help from him who may be in like need 
tomorrow". (Platteau 1997: 764-5) 
Fafchamps follows a similar line of thought, expecting that: 
" ... solidarity mechanisms should emerge quite naturally in societies that 
are vulnerable to starvation and in which idiosyncratic risk is large. 
19 See, for example, Grootaert (1999), and Narayan and Pritchett (1997). 
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Economic prosperity on the other hand undermines solidarity to the 
extent that it reduces individual risk of starvation." (Fafchamps 1992: 
150) 
The flip side of need and scarcity is affluence, another factor that Coleman considers 
important. He argues that where individuals can meet their own needs through self-
sufficiency, or through support from official sources e.g. government social security 
schemes, there is less need to incur an obligation by asking a favour of another person. 
For Coleman, asking favours and creating obligations effectively creates social capital, 
with the implication that affluence destroys social capital. On this issue, sociology has 
a similar view to economics. Part 2.1.1 showed how economic theory predicts that 
aversion to risk falls as individual income increases. 
Whilst Coleman stresses closure in social networks, and Platteau and Fafchamps stress 
scarcity and need, several authors explain the emergence of social organisations for 
collective action in terms of altruism. Ethics, based on a set of moral principles, may 
provide the intrinsic motivation to do something for its own sake. In the case of the 
welfare state in the U.K., Taylor-Gooby (2000) believes the foundations must remain 
at least partly altruistic, rather than simply incentive-based. If not, he argues, the 
patterns of citizenship obligation, which are fundamental to both civil society and the 
success of public organisations such as the NHS, which incidentally he considers a 
highly efficient organisation, would be undermined. 
In contrast, some economists such as Bernheim and Stark (1988), suggest that altruism 
may be bad for the development of institutions for collective action. They argue that 
whilst altruists should enhance the efficiency of resource allocation by internalizing 
externalities, worse outcomes may arise through a reluctance to enforce agreements 
and punish betrayals. Not punishing betrayals may limit an altruist's ability to enter 
cooperative agreements in which each individual depends on the actions of others in 
order for members of the group to achieve mutual benefits. 
On a more positive note, Foster and Rosenzweig (2001) analyse whether altruism can 
facilitate informal risk-sharing in the context of unenforceable contracts. Using 
consumption expenditure data from village communities in India and Pakistan, to 
assess the extent of informal risk-sharing, they conclude that whilst imperfect 
commitment problems constrain informal transfer arrangements, altruism has an 
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important role in mitigating these constraints, allowing some income pooling to take 
place. 
To summarise at this point, a non-profit health insurance scheme, as an institution that 
embodies collective action, may gain political support through a sense of solidarity in 
society, as suggested by Ostrom (1990). Institutions for collective action are not a new 
phenomenon, however, and a historical insight into the emergence of, for example, the 
Friendly Societies in 19th century England, and the credit cooperative movement of 
19th century Germany, may be relevant. These are discussed in further detail later in 
this chapter. 
The debate on the genesis of collective action is summarised in a review by Besley 
( 1995b). On the one hand, such institutions can be explained through altruistic 
motivations, the basis of the idea of a moral economy, as proposed by Thompson 
(1971). Alternatively, such institutions can be explained in terms of reciprocal 
arrangements between self-interested individuals, which allow risk-sharing to be 
sustained. Interestingly, this debate has been particularly fierce amongst 
anthropologists, with Scott (1976) suggesting that notions of altruism, and an ethic of 
mutual assistance, enable such arrangements to evolve. In contrast, Popkin (1979) 
argues that Scott's analysis of peasant culture in Vietnam romanticises village life. 
Essentially, the debate is a philosophical one about the nature of man. Economists 
typically fall back on models of reciprocity between self-interested individuals to 
predict situations in which collective action is expected to occur i.e. where cooperation 
brings mutual benefits to individuals who would otherwise incur greater costs. Two 
well-known examples, the prisoner's dilemma and the tragedy of the commons, 
demonstrate such situations theoretically. Economics is much weaker, however, when 
it comes to explaining why, when collective action or cooperation is expected to 
occur, it actually does in certain communities but not in others. Sociological concepts 
such as network closure are more useful in explaining such phenomena. 
What causes social capital to arise? In summary, sociologists highlight the importance 
of closure in social structures, which allows behavioural norms to emerge, in tum 
promoting positive cooperative behaviour, rather than selfish opportunistic actions. 
Secondly, authority structures are important sources of behavioural norms, despite the 
contradiction in many studies, which only give value to horizontal networks. Thirdly, 
economists consider scarcity and need as the primary motivation for individuals to 
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enter mutual support arrangements, which, as individuals become increasingly self-
sufficient, will fade away. This idea is further complicated, however, by evidence that 
informal risk-sharing is more prevalent amongst groups of wealthier individuals. 
Finally, altruism, based on moral principles and ethical codes, may also facilitate 
cooperative behaviour, although it is claimed that in certain circumstances such 
behaviour may actually be detrimental. In the following section, attention turns to the 
consequences of social capital. 
2.2.3 Consequences of social capital 
Many of the outcomes attributed to social capital in the literature are closely inter-
linked. Table 2.1 presented a selection of studies that employ the concept, illustrating 
the wide range of social and economic phenomena, to which its relevance is claimed. 
Studies considered of direct importance to this thesis are reviewed in detail. 
2.2.3.1 Health status 
Portes 1998) refers to Durkheim's seminal study into suicide, in which he emphasises 
the importance of group life, as an antidote to anomie and self-destruction. The 
positive consequences of participation in groups on health status, and the links 
between emotional and physical health, are well documented (see Editorial 1998). 
However, the literature is not conclusive. Seeman (1996) reviews papers cited on 
MEDLINE since the 1970s, and concludes that whilst social integration leads to a 
reduced risk of mortality, and fewer mental health problems, there is no conclusive 
evidence of its influence on physical health outcomes. 
In a study of health status in Russia, Rose (2000) finds, using regression analysis, that 
social capital, measured in terms of social integration, is more important than human 
capital in increasing physical and emotional health. He estimates that both together 
can raise an individual's self-reported health status from just below the average on a 
five-point Likert scale to approaching good health. Several studies by Kawachi and 
Kennedy(1997), Kawachi et al. (1997a), and Kawachi et al. (1997b), referred to in the 
context of health status in Figure 1.1, present data in support of the hypothesis that 
social capital reduces health inequalities. Wilkinson (1996) proposes a similar 
theoretical argument, which hinges on the causal relationships between income 
inequality, disinvestment in social capital, and increases in mortality. Gravelle (1998), 
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however, suggests that this relationship may simply be a statistical artefact, resulting 
from the use of aggregate data20• 
2.2.3.2 Economic status 
Grootaert (1998) analyses linkages between social capital and economic performance 
at the macro or national level, and suggests that the concept provides the missing link, 
explaining how economic actors interact with each other and organise themselves. 
Social capital provides an informal framework that facilitates the interaction and co-
ordination of different actors in the following ways: 
• increased information sharing (thus mitigating the negative outcomes 
resulting from uncertainty) 
• improved co-ordination of activities and collective decision making 
• peer-monitoring (through a common set of norms and local level sanctions) 
• the provision of a framework of mechanisms to enforce agreements 
• the reduction of contracting costs 
Two further papers, produced as part of the World Bank's Social Capital Initiative, 
develop thinking around the economic benefits of social capital. One way in which 
social capital affects income is through the facilitation and enhancement of collective 
action Grootaert (1998). A second way is through the creation of other capital items 
such as human capital. For example, where residents of a rural village club together to 
purchase a school bus, which increases access to formal schooling, greater levels of 
human capital will result in the medium term, and are likely to lead to economic 
benefits. If the stream of returns resulting from collective action is intrinsically 
persistent, Grootaert claims, then it can be converted into a present value and 
meaningfully valued as the social capital of the community concerned. 
In Tanzania, Narayan and Pritchett (1997) analyse the relationship between social 
capital and income levels at the community level. The authors define social capital as 
the quantity and quality of associational life, and related social norms, which are used 
to create a village level index21 • The authors propose five ways in which social capital 
can augment income, each sharing the characteristic that pure non-cooperative action 
would lead to an inferior outcome. Again, the central argument is that social capital 
20 Income-inequalities in health status are not examined in any detail in this thesis. 
21 The authors construct a multiplicative index rather than using principal components analysis 
(see Part 2.2.4). 
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facilitates cooperation. The results suggest that social capital increases income by 20-
30%, equal to an equivalent increase in non-farming assets, or a tripling of the number 
of years of formal education. More specifically, they conclude that a one standard 
deviation increase in the village social capital index, achievable ifhalf a village joined 
one additional group with average characteristics, would increase per capita 
consumption expenditures by approximately 20-30%. 
Woolcock (1998) illustrates the benefits of social capital using the example of a new 
arrival in an immigrant community. Whilst the individual may in the earlier months of 
her arrival have little physical capital (e.g. money or assets), or human capital (e.g. 
language, education), she may be able to make a living by drawing on social capital 
e.g. finding employment through existing networks and relationships. At a later point 
in time, however, it may be difficult for her to move beyond this community and 
operate in mainstream society, in particular where obligations to the immigrant 
community are great. Hence, the optimum amount of social capital either for efficient 
economic exchange, or for individual welfare, may not simply equate to the maximum 
amount available. Rather, the optimal amount will differ for each transaction and, as 
such, Woolcock concludes that there are different types, levels and dimensions of 
social capital, with different combinations giving different outcomes, facilitated by 
different conditions. 
2.2.3.3 Information and transaction costs 
Collier (1998) suggests that social capital facilitates information sharing through 
increased social interaction. When this information translates into knowledge the 
effect is intrinsically durable. The value of greater knowledge at the margin depends 
on pre-existing levels in a community, and the availability of substitutes such as 
newspapers, and formal education. Information is also required to assess the reliability 
of other agents, with repeated interactions allowing the generation of reputation. 
Collier defines reputation as the pooling of information on promise-trust relationships, 
with mechanisms such as gossip used to assign, and update reputations. 
Information is central to economic theory and its imperfection a common cause of 
market failure. Hence, any mechanism that can increase the availability of information 
is of interest to economic theorists, in that it may allow for improved resource 
allocation decisions, and reduced transaction costs. 
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Narayan and Pritchett (1997) also find that social capital has a positive effect on the 
adoption of improved seed varieties, fertilisers and agrochemical products, implying 
that social capital is important for the diffusion of innovations. Such insights are not 
altogether new. however. Network analysts examine the importance of social networks 
for the diffusion of innovations. For example, Valente (1996) develops a threshold 
model based on different types of individuals within a social network, labelling some 
as early adopters and others as laggards. Sobel (2002) analyses the efficiency of 
information flow through social networks, to assess the structural characteristics of 
social networks, such as global density, local density, diameter, and the number of 
bridges. Sobel (2002) sees one of the few positive aspects of social capital as drawing 
attention to the role of networks, as well as the idea of bridging and bonding 
relationships, the former creating larger networks where structural holes previously 
existed, and the latter denser networks. This idea is also used in the recently developed 
Social Capital Assessment Tool discussed later in this chapter. 
2.2.3.4 Cooperation and collective action 
As noted earlier, a range of institutions exists that facilitates cooperation or collective 
actions, allowing mutual gains to be achieved by participating individuals. The earliest 
recorded statute for a guild, one of the earliest such institutions, is from Verona in 
1303, although Guinnane (1992) lists similar mutual arrangements in other Italian 
associations at the end of the twelfth century. In mid-19lh century Germany, credit 
cooperatives for workers such as artisans and shopkeepers in urban centres were 
initiated by Schulze-Delitzch. 
Around the same time, Raiffeisen established an alternative scheme, motivated by a 
desire to assist poor rural farmers and labourers (Guinnane 1992). Similar schemes 
subsequently cropped up throughout much of Western Europe, although not always 
successfully. Guinnane (1994) puts the failed attempt to transplant Raiffesein's 
scheme in Ireland down to a range of factors, including poor management, 
competition for deposits from a well-entrenched savings bank system, and social 
problems that reduced the effectiveness of local monitoring. This last point is 
essentially the same as peer monitoring, discussed earlier in Part 2.1, and can be 
important in mitigating the moral hazard problem inherent in insurance markets. 
Rotating saving and credit associations (ROSCAs), widespread in low and middle-
income countries, are examples of informal risk-sharing institutions in which 
individuals come together to pool financial resources. Putnam (1993a) is particularly 
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interested in ROSCAs, which, he claims, represent something more than social 
entertainment or altruism. He argues that a powerful system of behavioural norms, 
together with a dense network of reciprocal arrangements, creates both a sense of 
cooperation, and effective sanctions against defaulting on repayments. In small, closed 
communities, members of such schemes are usually selected on the basis of reputation 
for honesty and reliability. In contrast, generalised reciprocity and mutual trust are 
more important in urban communities, with members having to trust the judgement of 
other members when accepting new applicants. For Putnam, trust is a mechanism that 
draws on social capital to overcome the dilemmas involved with collective action. 
Coleman argues that social capital emerges where closure exists within networks. 
Theoretical arguments presented by Coleman also draw on the existence of ROSCAs, 
on the assumption that such arrangements would not evolve, and could not function, 
without high levels of internal trust or social capital. Woolcock (1998) also notes that 
ROSCAs, and other group-based micro-finance institutions, use peer groups as 
collateral for the extension of credit. It does not logically follow, however, that 
communities without ROSCAs do not possess social capital. Trust and social cohesion 
may still exist but the perceived need for such informal arrangements may be limited, 
for example where income levels are higher. In addition, alternatives such as 
government schemes may exist which may substitute for formal institutions. 
Despite the suggestion that social capital is important for collective action, there is 
little distinction in the literature between formal or informal institutions. For example, 
whilst countries such as Pakistan could be argued to have high levels of social capital 
at the community level, formal institutions for risk-sharing at the national level remain 
extremely weak22• If social capital is important for the development of institutions for 
collective action, it seems likely that it is a necessary, but insufficient condition. This 
is a further issue, which the social capital literature needs to consider in more detail, in 
order to develop a more coherent theoretical framework. 
One institution that has attracted considerable attention from a range of academic 
disciplines, is the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, which relies on peer monitoring, and 
is also a response to the failure of the traditional banking system to provide credit to 
poor households. Rather than lending to individuals, loans are made to groups, who 
22 This point is made in the NGO Resource Centre Journal (Volume I, Issue 3, 2002). NGORC 
is funded by the Aga Khan Foundation. 
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face joint liability for a single loan. Conning (1997) points out that the scheme relies 
on social, rather than physical collateral, harnessing the substantial monitoring and 
enforcement advantages of such groups relative to outside monitoring intermediaries. 
Stiglitz (1990) makes a similar point, crediting effective peer monitoring with the 
success of the Grameen Bank, by enabling the enforcement of unwritten contracts. 
As with the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, Hollis and Sweetman (1998) explain the 
emergence of hundreds of loan fund societies across Ireland in the mid-nineteenth 
century, which offered micro-credit to the poor with no physical collateral, as a 
response to the gap left by formal financial institutions. In contrast to Guinnane's 
(1994) analysis of the failure of credit cooperatives, Hollis and Sweetman (1998) view 
loan funds as a success. In both cases, a demand for credit existed among the poor, 
which was not met by the formal banking sector. As such, informal risk-sharing 
institutions represented an innovative response to the failure of market institutions. 
Why such institutions evolve in certain communities, but not in others, is discussed in 
the remainder of this section, and is of direct relevance to Research Question 6 
presented in Part 3.2.2. 
Grootaert (1998) stresses the importance of collective decision-making in facilitating 
the provision of public goods and the management of negative externalities. In a 
seminal article by Garrett (1968) entitled 'The Tragedy of the Commons', the 
problems arising from the unorganised public use of a common property resource is 
clearly demonstrated. For each individual, the benefits of adding one more head of 
cattle to graze on the common land far outweighs the negative effects to them of 
overgrazing, until a point is reached where the resource becomes of no use to anyone. 
Whilst one solution is to privatise the resource i.e. allocate separate plots for each 
individual, leading to an increase in productivity and efficiency, but pricing some 
individuals out of the market altogether, an alternative is for users to join forces and 
cooperate in its management. The prevalence of such problems in the real world, from 
global warming to large-scale ocean fishing, is another reason for current interest in 
social capital. 
Political scientist Eleanor Ostrom (1998) stresses the need for a broader range of 
rational choice models to explain such dilemmas and proposes a behavioural theory of 
collective action. She discusses two empirical examples in which conditions of 
reciprocity, reputation, and trust, overcome the temptations of short-run self-interest. 
and achieve results that are better than rational. Coleman'S notion of closure is 
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relevant here, but at the micro-level, in that cooperative action is more likely to result 
when opportunistic behaviour reduces, possibly from a desire to maintain reputation in 
the local community and to avoid social sanctions. In this sense, social capital may 
help to ensure that self-interested actions are foregone in the interests of a wider 
community, in the absence of formal contracts. Whether spontaneous or informal co-
ordinated action occurs will also depend on the presence of substitutes such as 
government agencies and firms. 
In addition to work on transaction costs, network analysts have also examined the 
importance of network structure, for collective action. For example, Gould (1993) 
predicts that network density and size will influence collective action outcomes 
differently, depending on the position that those making unconditional contributions 
hold within the network. Marwell et a!. (1988) also argue that the overall density or 
frequency of ties within a group is critical in determining the potential for individuals 
to cooperate, in order to overcome the problem of free-riders. Other factors include the 
nature of social ties, in particular the extent to which they are centralised in a few 
individuals, and the costs of communicating and co-ordinating actions. 
Flache and Macy (1996) suggest that the situation is more complex, and that bilateral 
exchange may surmount multilateral exchange, resulting in the failure of broader 
collective action even in a highly cohesive group. Most of the arguments relating to 
collective action in the social capital literature remain at a more general level and 
rarely discuss the internal structure and dynamic of groups in such detail. This brief 
review suggests that the work of network analysts has much to offer current thinking 
on social capital, and exposes the somewhat superficial analysis presented in many 
articles. 
As discussed earlier, the debate in the literature over whether cooperative action 
results from reciprocity between individuals, or from an ethic of mutual assistance 
driven by altruism, is essentially a philosophical one. Figure 2.1 summarises the range 
of factors, proposed by different academic disciplines, used to explain the evolution of 
risk-sharing institutions. Coleman suggests that collective action will result when a 
system of norms and trust is already constructed. In this case, further social interaction 
creates further norms. He also points out that for cooperative behaviour to occur, 
conscious decisions often require initiating and, in turn, tend to depend on the 
presence of an accepted hierarchy and set of rules. As noted earlier, a major defect in 
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the social capital literature is that, until recently, no positive value has been given to 
such hierarchical relationships. 
Those studies that do include vertical relationships, for example through a measure of 
trust in government institutions, include Brehm and Rahn (1997), and Narayan and 
Pritchett (1997) (see next sub-section). Interestingly, whilst closure within social 
structure is considered critical for social capital to emerge, few studies attempt to 
measure this feature of a community directly. Indeed social network analysts examine 
network structure in considerably more detail than most studies about social capital. 
Norms of behaviour, which many studies argue actually constitute social capital, are 
also rarely measured. 
This section has highlighted a number of consequences of social capital, mostly 
positive, based on a review of the literature. In doing so, an attempt has been made to 
show the considerable overlap with other disciplines, including development 
economics and network analysis. Furthermore, the wide range of consequences 
proposed in the social capital literature, only some of which are presented here, partly 
reflects the lack of a clear definition, and can lead to conflicting arguments. For 
example, if social capital does increase income, then it is questionable whether it will 
also facilitate risk-sharing through collective action. Despite these problems, the next 
section devotes more space to the concept, reviewing two studies that use household 
surveys to measure social capital. 
2.2.4 Measuring social capital: previous surveys 
Just as the theoretical basis of the concept remains in its early stages, so are attempts 
to measure it, with many studies defining social capital in terms of its sources or 
consequences, often without any acknowledgement of the ongoing debate. This 
reflects the circular dimension of the concept discussed earlier. One widely used 
approach is to measure levels of inter-personal trust within a defined community or 
society. A second is to capture the density of networks, measured, for example, 
through membership in voluntary associations. This approach extends from Putnam's 
original study of regional government performance in Italy, in which he defines social 
capital in terms of civic behaviour. Putnam uses measures such as the density of 
cooperatives, membership in mutual aid societies, and the number of local 
associations. This approach is also consistent with Bourdieu's (1985) thinking, which 
stresses the importance of membership in a group. Recent studies have attempted to 
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measure not only the quantity of associations an individual has, but also their quality 
i.e. their relative contribution to social capital23• However, as stressed earlier in this 
chapter, one criticism of many studies is the lack of value given to vertical linkages 
within groups, despite their importance for collective action to occur. 
The remainder of this section presents, in detail, two studies that measure social 
capital. Narayan and Pritchett (1997) use data from the Social Capital and Poverty 
Survey in Tanzania, which collected information on three dimensions of network 
density, including membership in voluntary associations (using four categories: 0, I, 
2, 3+), characteristics of those associations in which households were a member, and 
levels of trust in various institutions, from the family to national government bodies. 
Finally, perceptions of social cohesion in the local community were also collected. 
With respect to voluntary membership in local associations or groups, several 
additional pieces of qualitative information were collected. First, the name of each 
group was recorded, and respondents were then asked to identify the most important 
group to them i.e. the group they would join ifthey could join only one. 
Further questions were then asked regarding the characteristics of this group, using 
five categories, with the aim of identifying the group's contribution to social capital. 
This approach draws heavily on Putnam's idea that the more heterogeneous the 
composition of a group is, the more it contributes to social capital. Narayan and 
Pritchett (1997) thus also collected data on the following group dimensions: 
a) whether membership of the group is voluntary 
b) kin heterogeneity of membership (using four alternative responses 
representing increasing degrees of heterogeneity) 
c) income heterogeneity of membership (using two questions, the first 
concerning all members, and the second only group leaders or officials. The 
aim was to establish whether members are from the same economic group). 
d) group functioning (based on two questions: the first measuring the 
respondent's perceptions of general group functioning using a five-point 
scale. The second measure relates to action taken in the event of a fee not 
being paid, using three alternative responses with no specific ranking). 
e) mechanisms employed for group decision-making (used as a proxy for the 
extent to which internal procedures are democratic). 
23 Again, see Grootaert (1999), and Narayan and Pritchett ( 1997). 
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This information was then combined into a single numerical, multiplicative index of 
social capital at the village level. As each variable was collected on a different scale, a 
re-scaling exercise was performed, effectively assuming that social capital increases in 
groups with greater kin heterogeneity (dimension b), more inclusiveness (it is not clear 
which dimension is used but presumably d), and which function in a more democratic 
way (dimension e). These three characteristics are used to create an equally weighted 
index, representing each group's contribution to social capital. 
In a separate study using data from Indonesia, Grootaert (1999) estimates the relative 
effect of human and social capital on household welfare and poverty, and on access to 
social services in general, using multivariate analysis. He takes a similar approach, 
quantifying household membership in local voluntary associations, together with six 
dimensions of quality: 
• density of associations / membership: measured in terms of the number of 
memberships per household. 
• internal homogeneity of associations: the three most important associations in 
each household were identified. For each, qualitative data were collected 
regarding internal homogeneity or heterogeneity using eight criteria 
(neighbourhood; kin group; occupation; economic status; religion; gender; 
age; level of education). A score was then constructed for each association 
ranging from 0 to 8. A value of eight is applied where, for example, 
" .... members were mostly from different kin groups, economic groups etc." 
The score for three associations was averaged for each household and the 
resulting index re-scaled from 0 to 100. This approach hence follows the 
heterogeneity approach advocated by Putnam. 
• attendance at meetings: an index was constructed based on the average 
number of times someone from the household attended meetings. This was 
then normalised for the number of memberships of each household over a 
three-month period. 
• participation in decision-making: the aim of this question was to assess the 
extent to which internal decision-making is democratic. A scale ranging from 
o to 2 was used, depending on how involved in the decision-making process 
respondents saw themselves as being. The results were averaged for the three 
most important groups and re-scaled from 0 to 100. 
• payment of dues: a simple yes or no response was used. 
• the community orientation of associations: it is unclear exactly what the 
author means by this particular dimension, but it possibly refers to whether or 
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not organisations were initiated by the community or imposed or organised by 
an outside agency. 
Each of the six dimensions is then entered both as an individual variable, and within a 
single combined index, into a regression model. The index is additive, and based on 
the number of memberships and the index of active participation, unlike the 
multiplicative index of Grootaert (1999), and Narayan and Pritchett (1997). A 
multiplicative index assumes that individual components interact with each other e.g. 
the effect of the internal functioning of a group on the dependent variable may differ 
as the density of associations changes. If the various dimensions are expected to act 
independently, however, the effects are included in an additive fashion. 
Generating indices can be useful when handling a large amount of data, although the 
effect of each individual component is, necessarily, lost. It can be agued that, in the 
case of social capital, the development of an index is further undermined by the lack 
of a clear definition and understanding of what the index is to represent, as well as the 
questionable assumption that only heterogeneous groups contribute positively to social 
capital. As the literature on social capital grows, so do approaches to its measurement. 
Harpham et al. (2002) describe the recently developed Social Capital Assessment Tool 
(ASCAT), in which both structural (what people do), and cognitive (what people feel) 
aspects of social capital are measured, each based on a large number of indicators. 
Several studies have used principal components analysis to measure social capital, 
effectively identifying a single factor that underlies a cluster of different variables. 
Narayan and Pritchett (1997) consider this approach but find several problems with it. 
First, as the inter-correlation amongst the various dimensions were not particularly 
high (the first principal component only explained 35% of the total variation), the 
principal components methodology was not considered appropriate. Secondly, the 
results on the first principal component alone were not robust when extended to other 
data, and variables. In this thesis, rather than attempting to measure social capital, a 
simple measure of social cohesion is used to represent social structure at the commune 
level (see Part 4.2.3). 
To summarise, current measures of social capital are highly varied, in part due to the 
lack of a clear theoretical basis for the concept. Using Fukuyama's idea of a radius of 
trust, it could be argued that Putnam's approach to social capital based on civic 
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community, and Coleman's emphasis on closure in social networks, represent 
diametrically opposite social structures. 
Another overriding criticism is that whilst each individual measure employed in the 
various studies (see Table 2.4) has considerable value in its own right, the conceptual 
leap from each to the notion of social capital is less than convincing. For this reason, 
in the empirical analysis presented in Chapter 5 and Chapter 7, the discussion refers 
only to social cohesion, which is not equated with social capital. Another aspect of 
social structure, membership in mass organisations, is also measured (see Part 3.2.1 
and Part 4.2.3 for further discussion). 
2.3 Health insurance and social capital 
In the literature, few attempts have been made to link aspects of community structure 
to the development of health insurance. Those that do are summarised below. This 
section aims to strengthen existing conceptual frameworks of demand for health 
insurance by bringing together ideas from a broad literature across the social sciences. 
Studies that refer to social capital and health insurance hint at the willingness of 
certain communities to share risks. Risk, and how individuals and households deal 
with it, is an issue analysed by development economics - the relevant literature is 
reviewed in this section. Whilst not concerned specifically with the health sector, 
many of the ideas presented offer theoretical frameworks and empirical evidence, 
which are useful in developing the conceptual framework. 
2.3.1 Willingness to Join a health lnsurante scheme 
Only one unpublished paper, by Hsiao (1995), attempts to develop a theoretical 
framework around social capital and risk-sharing for health. Combining Coleman's 
(1990) framework of social capital with standard economic theory of expected utility, 
Hsiao considers the re-establishment of cooperative health care organisations (CHC) 
in China as an empirical phenomenon searching for a theory. The theory aims to. 
predict the conditions under which such schemes will evolve, the central argument 
resting on the importance of the dual motivations of self-interested economic gain and 
a willingness to share risks, the latter resulting from social norms and high levels of 
inter-personal trust. 
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Study Measure/proxy for social capital Data source 
'Civil society' including measures 
Putnam (1993a) such as newspaper readership, Specially designed 
turnout for referenda, density of survey. 
co-operatives, membership in 
mutual aid societies, number of 
local associations. 
Aspects of social structure, in 
Coleman (1990) particular social norms of Not measured. 
behaviour and closure. Includes 
obligations and expectations, and 
the presence of voluntary 
organisations. 
Generalised trust ("Can most 
Knack and Keefer people be trusted") and norms of World Values Survey 
(1997) civic cooperation (views on a 
range of behaviour e.g. whether 
avoiding fares on public transport, 
is justifiable). 
Per capita density of membership 
Kawachi et al. (1997b) in voluntary groups and levels of General Social Survey 
social trust, gauged by the (U.S.A.) 
proportion of residents in each 
state who believe that people 
could be trusted. 
Civic engagement (membership in 
Brehm and Rahn voluntary groups, newspaper General Social Survey 
(1997) readership), interpersonal trust, (U.S.A.) 
confidence in government 
(Federal Government, Congress, 
Supreme CouJ1). 
Social integration: individual's 
Rose (2000) cumulative use of formal and New Russia Barometer 
informal networks to obtain food, Survey 
housing, employment, protection 
against crime etc. Also 
generalised trust. 
Attending a catholic school; 
Teachman et al. family structure; number of times Specially designed 
(1997) student has changed school. survey. 
Network closure (e.g. whether a 
parent knows the parents of their 
child's best friend). 
Trust in government institutions; Tanzania Social 
Narayan and Pritchett group membership, including Capital and Poverty 
(1997) heterogeneous membership. Survey 
TABLE 2.4: MEASURES OF SOCIAL CAPITAL IN THE LITERATURE 
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Hsiao considers social capital to be a precondition for the pooling of resources in this 
context, and notes the trade-off between increasing group size for effective risk-
sharing24, and maintaining small groups to preserve the internal trust which forms the 
basis of social capital. In the context of risk-sharing, the greater the number of 
members in a community financing scheme, the more predictable is the demand for 
health care, and hence insurance claims, allowing premia to be set more accurately. As 
the number of individuals in a scheme increases, it thus also tends to become more 
financially stable. 
The central argument is that where an individual perceives there to be gains from risk-
sharing, and this group exhibits a high degree of internal trust, they will more readily 
enter a cooperative arrangement. Cause and effect are linked through the proposition 
that social capital facilitates collective action. Hsiao's paper is theoretical, however, 
and does not attempt to measure social capital, which would allow its independent 
effect on the formation of CHCs to be estimated. Hsiao assumes, interestingly, that in 
Chinese society levels of social capital are high, given the prevalence of shared values 
and virtues, the importance of the family in Confucian doctrine, and empirical 
evidence of support for CHCs amongst the population. On the same issue, Woolcock 
(1998) believes that communism and socialism in China have led to an over-
bureaucratic system of government, not enough civil society, and low levels of social 
capital. These two opposing views again reflect the lack of precision and consensus in 
current thinking on social capital. 
Without referring specifically to social capital, several papers examine the importance 
of social movements for the development and functioning of health insurance 
schemes. Atim (1999) considers the role of voluntary, non-profit health insurance 
schemes in West and Central Africa. The Mutual Health Organisations considered are 
not dissimilar in design to the CHCs described by Hsiao: both have voluntary 
membership and are driven by social rather than profit motives, and focus exclusively 
on local health services. Atim measures the extent to which a scheme represents a 
social movement dynamic using four indicators: the rate of participation in meetings; 
the rate of payment of membership dues; the number and type of solidarity bonds 
linking the members; and the ratio of volunteers to paid staff. 
24 The 'law of large numbers' states that the average behaviour of a group of individuals is 
more predictable than that of a single individual (Black 1997). In other words, the tendency to 
behave more systematically and predictably increases with the size of a group. 
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For Atim, participation and internal democracy are key dimensions of how 'social' a 
scheme is, and as such the evaluation focuses on institutional design. No detail is 
given about the questions used to assess solidarity bonds, although reference is made 
to members inhabiting the same district, or being members of the same ethnic group, 
possibly similar to Coleman's idea of closure in social networks. The Babouantou 
Family Mutual Aid Association in Cameroon is referred to as an autonomous social 
movement, given its democratic accountability, high levels of participation, and sense 
of ownership amongst its members. In contrast, the Nkoranza community-financing 
scheme in Ghana scores poorly on most of the measures used. Whilst factors such as 
management arrangements and contract design have an important influence on 
performance, the extent to which a scheme is based on a social movement is only 
found to have a significant bearing on how accountable it is to the community. 
Support for social solidarity mechanisms are generally considered a precondition for 
the successful introduction of a risk-sharing mechanism. For example, in a guide for 
the development of social health insurance, Normand and Weber (1994) stress the 
importance of popular support for the risk-sharing and cross-subsidisation central to a 
compulsory health insurance scheme. Chapter 1 highlighted the importance of the 
institutional design of an insurance scheme for its success (Kutzin and Barnum 
1992b), whilst Liu et al. (1995) suggest that in China, community participation in and 
control of local health financing schemes, is essential for the development of a 
sustainable rural health system. 
CrieJ (1998) offers additional insights into voluntary health insurance in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Such schemes are, he states, built on self-interest or economic risk-aversion -
people will leave a scheme when they consider the returns from it to be too low. 
Wealthy individuals have the option to self-insure and, whilst individuals strive for a 
fair transaction, perceptions of what is fair are culturally bound. Whilst systems of 
compulsory insurance attempt to institutionalise solidarity, which he defines as the 
awareness of unity and willingness to bear its consequences, he also claims that: 
" ..... the distinction between reciprocity and insurance is conceptually 
artificial but helps to point to different expectations and time perspectives 
in terms of return. In the case of reciprocity, inputs and expected outputs 
are equivalent. In the case of insurance this is not necessarily so: the 
equivalence of return is mitigated by a varying degree of solidarity". 
(Criel 1998: 60) 
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A further reason for accepting non-equivalent financial returns discussed at the 
beginning of this chapter, is the utility derived from reduced uncertainty, which is 
central to insurance theory. As discussed earlier in Part 2.2.2, Fafchamps and Platteau 
both stress the importance of scarcity and need, for individuals to enter cooperative or 
reciprocal arrangements. However, in a review of the literature, Morduch (1999) 
provides some evidence that informal risk-sharing is actually more likely to occur 
between richer individuals (see next section). One possible explanation for this 
apparent contradiction is that the perceived risk involved in joining an informal risk-
sharing arrangement is lower when other members are wealthy i.e. they are seen as 
less likely to renege on an agreement, or less likely to default. 
2.3.2 Informal systems of risk-sbaring 
Many of the ideas in the social capital literature, for example the suggested linkages 
with ROSCAs, are not original. In addition to ROSCAs, the general issue of risk, 
which is highly relevant to insurance, is a major theme in the development economics 
literature. The focus is typically on the mechanisms used by individuals, households 
and communities to cope with risk. Indeed, human illness is frequently cited as one of 
the greatest idiosyncratic risks faced by the rural poor. 
Economists measure risk in terms of shocks to (i.e. reductions in) consumption 
expenditures, given their importance for the maintenance and enhancement of welfare 
e.g. ensuring adequate food and education. In this context, any strategy that smoothes 
or maintains consumption in the face of risk can be said to play an insurance function. 
In the context of low-income countries, where universal social security schemes rarely 
exist, much attention has been given to the role of financial systems based on informal 
social networks. Anthropologists have also long recognised the importance of 
informal, or non-market, arrangements in the village economy, which continues to 
typify much of the poor world today25. 
Rosenzweig (1988) equates consumption smoothing with insurance, although he notes 
that in a true and fair insurance contract, resources must flow out of households during 
the good times. In a separate analysis, Townsend (1995) refers to credit as 
consumption insurance. Academics and policy-makers concerned with the provision 
of micro-credit, the role of which is also to smooth consumption patterns and is 
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especially important in poor households, have similar concerns to those involved with 
the development of health insurance schemes. The common objective is to avoid 
welfare-damaging reductions in essential consumption expenditures. 
Besley (1995b) also suggests that risk-sharing and credit are closely linked, 
particularly in traditional rural communities, given that credit tends to substitute for 
insurance when market opportunities are limited. For example, an individual may 
borrow in lieu of an insurance payment, and lenders frequently relent on part of a 
repayment in the event of an unforeseeable shock to the borrower. Townsend (1995) 
notes that insurance mechanisms may be implicit or explicit, a useful conceptual 
separation given the wide range of actions that fit into the framework of consumption 
smoothing, or risk-reduction. Insurance is implicit in a number of possible actions that 
individuals might take. This broader definition of insurance is consistent with the 
typology presented in Table 2.1, which incorporates tax-financed health services such 
as the U.K.'s National Health Service, as an example of implicit insurance. 
Several studies published in the early 1990s, examine informal risk-sharing in detail, 
in an attempt to identify reasons for their success. Stiglitz (1990) explains the success 
of the Grameen Bank in terms of effective peer monitoring, which allows unwritten 
contracts to be enforced. Furthermore, when groups of individuals are jointly liable for 
a loan, there is a strong incentive not to misuse funds, given that the penalty falls on 
the entire group. 
Stiglitz argues that borrowed funds are more likely to be used productively when such 
incentives are applied. Whilst not explicitly referring to social capital, Stiglitz 
recognises the importance of the quality of relationships and trust between individuals, 
and shows how these can lead to efficiency improvements and welfare gains. As 
Arnott and Stiglitz (1991) suggest in a theoretical paper, when such groups use peer 
monitoring effectively, they can mitigate moral hazard. The key to success is often the 
threat of social sanctions on defaulting individuals, as Varian (1990) also points out. 
Norms of behaviour tend to be more prevalent in smaller communities, and are 
important for group formation, a central idea in Coleman's framework of social 
25 See in particular Popkin (1979) and Scott (1976). 
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capital. Dufwenberg and Lundholm (200 I) formalise this idea in terms of a per capita 
externality and, interestingly, refer to Coleman's work: 
"Coleman (1990) connects social rewards to externalities in decision 
making. Of course, the smaller is a risk sharing community the larger is 
the externality that an individual's decision has on any given other 
individual. Hence if the size of a risk-sharing community increases over 
time, and if social sanctions are related to 'per capita externalities', this 
could be a reason why social sanctions against opportunistic behaviour 
loses power over time". (Dufwenberg and Lundholm 200 I: 521) 
The authors suggest that reductions in per capita externality, during transition to a 
modem economy and the establishment of national institutions for risk-sharing, may 
be the reason why social sanctions against opportunistic behaviour start to lose power. 
Unenforceable contracts are a defining feature of informal risk-sharing. These studies, 
together with earlier references in Part 2.2.1, and Part 2.2.2, explain the evolution of 
unenforceable contracts in terms of the social structure of the concerned community. 
Where a high degree of internal connectedness, or closure, exists within a group, 
social sanctions offer a powerful incentive device to influence the behaviour its 
members. As well as incurring the wrath of fellow members, social penalties may 
include being removed from the group, reducing the individual's future access to 
credit, and increasing their chance of not receiving assistance in a time of need. In 
economies where contracts are difficult to enforce, and banks have weak sanctions 
against defaulting borrowers, the ability of informal groups to impose social sanctions, 
and enforce loan repayment, offers a real alternative to formal contracts. 
Fafchamps (1992) points out that incentive problems also existed in informal 
insurance arrangements, in pre-industrial societies, consistent with theoretical 
frameworks concerning the effect of incentives under insurance (see Part 2.1.2): 
"People may seek to hide, dissimulate, or misrepresent their situation of 
need or affordability. They also may be tempted to work less and rely on 
the mutual insurance system for their subsistence." (Fafchamps 1992: 
149) 
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Wydick (1999) attributes the success of group-lending schemes to their ability to 
mitigate asymmetric infonnation problems and tests empirically whether social 
cohesion can overcome market failures. Using data from Guatemala, he finds that 
better repayment perfonnance results not from greater social cohesion (measured in 
terms of pre-existing social ties between members), but from effective peer monitoring 
and the use of sanctions against poor perfonners. Another factor influencing 
repayment performance was the evolution of intra-group insurance to cover 
unavoidable problems faced by certain members. Finally, Wydick suggests that pre-
existing social ties, which social capitalists would label as social capital, may actually 
reduce willingness to use the social sanctions required to mitigate moral hazard. A 
similar point is made by Bernheim and Stark (1988) with respect to altruists26• 
Besley and Coate (1995) analyse repayment rates in the Grameen Bank, and conclude 
that joint-liability can result in both positive and negative outcomes. First, successful 
group members may have an incentive to repay the loans of other members in their 
group, whose projects have yielded insufficient returns. Where such intra-group 
insurance exists, the lender will still receive the necessary repayment whereas, under a 
system of individual loans, certain people would have defaulted and the lender would 
have lost out. Conversely, however, there may be circumstances when a whole group 
defaults, leaving the lenders particularly badly off, whereas under individual lending, 
some members would have made repayments. 
Besley and Coate (1995) refer to this feature of groups as social collateral, which, by 
ensuring that repayments are made, enables individuals with little or no physical 
collateral to access loans. Small-scale local funds have serious disadvantages, 
however. These are highlighted by Hollis and Sweetman (1998) with reference to 
micro-credit in 19th century Ireland. For example, the possibility of a severe negative 
shock correlated across borrowers, such as poor weather or crop disease (as in the 
Great Famine of Ireland 1846-1848), would lead to bankruptcy27. Hollis and 
Sweetman (1998) also highlight the dishonesty and incompetence that plagued many 
schemes. In the case of Germany, such problems were mitigated through the election 
of the scheme's manager by its members and, given that the implementers lived as part 
of the local community, reputation and norms of behaviour also had an important 
26 See Table 2.3 and the more detailed discussion in Part 2.2.2. 
90 
Chapter 2: Theoretical models and existing evidence 
influence. One further point of particular interest is that loan funds in Ireland were 
intended to be reproductive (i.e. for capital investments), as well as for insurance or 
consumption-smoothing purposes, for those who became ill or experienced a poor 
harvest. Whilst it is acknowledged that such dual functions are not always compatible, 
the observation adds weight to the fact that, in practice, credit often acts as a form of 
insurance. 
Local risk-sharing arrangements have informational advantages over distant market 
institutions, in that they reduce the transaction costs involved in monitoring and 
enforcing contractual arrangements, giving these communities the potential to mitigate 
incentive problems. These advantages are frequently eroded, however, during 
transition to a modem economy, which is typically accompanied by urbanisation and 
changes in social structure. 
Taiwan is an example of a country, which, despite rapid economic growth since the 
1970s, has a relatively underdeveloped and over-regulated formal financial sector. 
Besleyand Levenson (1996) and Levenson and Besley (1996), conclude that informal 
institutions such as ROSCAs continue to persist due to the failings of the formal 
financial sector. Interestingly, one of the study's conclusions is that ROSCAs are less 
prevalent in older, traditional households. Rather, participation is concentrated in 
younger households, which have reached the life-cycle stage where the acquisition of 
consumer durables typically peaks. One possible explanation put forward by the 
authors is that informal mechanisms provide a cheaper method of financing the 
purchase of consumer durables. The study presents a rare insight into the evolution of 
risk-sharing mechanisms in a transitional economy. 
In the context of India, Rosenzweig (1988) finds that geographical diversity does not 
usually present a problem for informal risk-sharing arrangements. Whilst networks 
based on family and friends are often spatially diverse, they can still be effective at 
maintaining the information flows critical to sustaining the insurance function across 
space and time. Using data from Kamataka State, the study reports that 87% of 
relatives providing support through remittances lived outside the recipient's village. In 
27 Note that this is consistent with the conditions required for insurance markets to operate 
efficiently (i.e. that the probabilities of illness amongst members of an insurance scheme must 
be largely independent of each other). 
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summary, Rosenzweig considers credit markets and inter-household transfers as 
substitutes, providing alternative mechanisms that smooth fluctuations in income. 
Infonnal credit flows within networks of families and friends are essentially what Cox 
et at. (1998) analyse using data from the Vietnam Living Standards Survey 1992-3, 
concluding that as private transfers tend to flow into poorer households, in a similar 
way to means-tested public transfers, there is a possibility that the two are substitutes, 
and that the fonner is crowded 'out by the latter. They add that, as private transfers are 
widespread in Vietnam, the scope for such crowding-out is substantial. In an earlier 
paper, Cox and Jimenez (1991) categorise private transfers into those that are 
motivated by altruism, and those motivated by exchange. 
An insight into how fonnal and informal risk-sharing arrangements might interact can 
be gained from a reading of the development economics literature. In a review of 
evidence, Dercon and Krishnan (2002) conclude that infonnal risk-sharing 
arrangements provide only limited protection for households, especially for the poor. 
Morduch (1999) makes a similar point, in his assessment of whether infonnal 
insurance can fill the gaps in public safety nets, suggesting that infonnal arrangements 
typically offer inadequate protection. 
Despite this, Attanasio and Rios-Rull (2000), Albarran and Attanasio (2002), and 
Attanasio and Rios-Bull (2000) are concerned that simplistic government 
interventions may crowd out private insurance arrangements, to the extent that welfare 
levels actually decrease. Morduch (1999) enters the debate by suggesting that by 
contributing to infonnal schemes households may actually retard their income growth 
and social mobility. He claims that overall, despite the crowding-out of infonnal 
networks, communities tend to benefit from government schemes. Furthennore, he 
argues, some crowding-out of informal networks may be necessary to reach the most 
vulnerable sections within a community. 
Several further points of interest are made in Morduch's paper: households with more 
friends (especially richer ones) have greater ability to use infonnal insurance; public 
transfers pool risks more efficiently than local private arrangements; reciprocal 
transfer systems work best when people have more money; the family is the most 
stable unit for informal insurance (especially in the context of urbanisation etc.); and 
micro-finance programmes directly operated by governments often fail in terms of 
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compliance. Under government schemes, Morduch notes, borrowers are also more 
likely to default, and governments less likely to enforce penalties. 
The idea that informal and formal risk-sharing arrangements may be substitutes is not 
considered in any of the studies that attempt to draw a link between social capital and 
health insurance, and is a major conceptual omission. This insight from development 
economics raises an important question for this thesis with respect to uptake of health 
insurance, an issue tested empirically in Chapter 5. Do cohesive social networks lead 
to the formation of informal financial networks that are preferable to formal risk-
sharing mechanisms promoted by the government? The question seems particularly 
valid where membership in a formal health insurance scheme is voluntary, and an 
annual premium must be paid. 
Interestingly, Rosenzweig (1988) analyses the insurance function played by family in 
India, and finds that households often perceive credit arrangements as inferior to 
familial transfers and self-insurance, implying that crowding out can work in both 
directions. If this is the case, then community structure may have an important effect 
on demand for government provided voluntary health insurance, but not in the way 
suggested in previous papers. Part 3.2.2 develops this argument further. 
2.4 Concluding remarks 
Both theoretical frameworks and empirical evidence have been reviewed in this 
chapter. Previous analyses of demand for health insurance draw on utility theory, 
which assumes that individuals compare expected levels of utility with and without 
insurance, and on this basis decide whether to purchase. The predicted effect of 
income is ambiguous: on the one hand theoretical models expect richer individuals to 
be less risk-averse, and hence to gain less utility from being insured. If this is the case, 
then income will have a negative effect on insurance purchase. However, richer 
individuals typically demand higher quality health services, and where health 
insurance is linked to better quality, income is expected to have a positive effect. 
Empirical studies find that in high-income countries, individual levels of income tend 
to have a positive effect on the probability of health insurance purchase, reflecting the 
view amongst consumers that there is a link between private health insurance and 
better service quality. Almost no evidence is available from low-income countries on 
this issue, although two willingness-to-pay studies conclude that income has a positive 
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effect. Further investigation is required to establish whether this reflects a demand for 
quality. 
Also in the context of low-income countries, it has been proposed that health 
insurance schemes are more likely to develop in communities rich in social capital, on 
the assumption that they are, as a result, more likely to act collectively for mutual 
gain. Given that to date this idea has been used only superficially, and is largely 
unexplored (except for one paper by Hsiao, 1995), this chapter has given substantial 
space to reviewing the relevant literature. Several weaknesses are apparent in the 
social capital literature. For example, the existence of institutions that share risks, such 
as rotating savings and credit associations, may arise for several reasons, not only 
social capital, as is argued in several seminal texts. In addition, many studies 
implicitly reject the idea of vertical social capital, and give positive value to 
heterogeneity within groups, rather than homogeneity, despite the fact that the latter is 
often essential for collective action to occur. In summary, social capital is a concept 
more easily understood than defined and measured, and requires greater clarity if it is 
to move into mainstream policy debates. 
One way to deal with this lack of clarity in definition is not to use the term at all, but 
rather to use the individual measures, which, it is claimed, constitute social capital 
(e.g. social cohesion). Nevertheless, social capital continues to hold some appeal in 
that, as Sobel notes, it " .... .is useful insofar as it draws our attention to those particular 
institutions serving economic life that might otherwise go unnoted" (Sobel 2002: 145). 
The reaction that social capital has provoked in the literature certainly suggests that it 
merits further consideration. 
This thesis suggests socially cohesive communities may create private financial 
networks, which actually resist the development, (i.e. uptake) of health insurance, by 
acting as a substitute. This idea is developed in light of the development economics 
literature concerned with informal risk-sharing systems in low-income countries. An 
important feature of the work presented here is the use of ideas, theoretical 
frameworks, and empirical evidence, from both sociology and development 
economics, to address what is a mainstream topic in the field of health economics. It is 
argued that this approach enriches the framework traditionally used to analyse demand 
for health insurance. Chapter 1 set out the theoretical and policy context for the thesis, 
and described the health insurance system in Vietnam. Together with this chapter, a 
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rigorous basis has been provided for the development of research questions, which are 
presented in the following chapter. 
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This chapter presents ten research questions that are tested empirically in Chapters 5-
7. These questions are either of theoretical interest, or of direct relevance to policy-
makers concerned with the development of voluntary health insurance schemes. In 
both cases, the questions are the product of the specific context of health insurance in 
Vietnam (Chapter 1), the predictions of theoretical models, and empirical evidence 
from health insurance schemes in other countries (Chapter 2). 
There are several reasons for focusing on the voluntary, rather than compulsory, 
component of Vietnamese Health Insurance. First, substantial increases in formal risk-
sharing within the health sector in Vietnam, can only be achieved through greater 
uptake of voluntary insurance, given almost complete coverage in the compulsory 
scheme. Secondly, an analysis of demand for insurance is not appropriate when 
membership is compulsory. Such analysis is, however, critical in a voluntary scheme 
in order to inform its development, and to mitigate adverse selection. Thirdly, 
previous analysis of health insurance in Vietnam is unable to distinguish between the 
compulsory and voluntary components of the scheme. 
In principle, health insurance offers the potential to raise additional funds for health 
services whilst also protecting access to these services, in particular for poor 
households. In practice, however, the introduction of a new scheme, such as health 
insurance, may not have the effect expected at the design stage. (Ensor and Witter 
2001) argue that the presence of unofficial markets, and poor regulation of service 
providers, are two examples of why this might be the case. One further reason for 
health insurance having unexpected effects, not previously suggested, is the presence 
of an underlying system of informal risk-sharing arrangements. This insight is 
developed in Part 3.2.2 of this chapter. 
If health insurance is not having the impact expected i.e. financial protection against 
the cost of accessing health services has not improved, then the additional costs of 
administering health insurance are not justifiable, particularly in a low-income country 
such as Vietnam where levels of public health spending are relatively low (see Table 
1.1). Several research questions relating to the impact of the scheme, are presented in 
this chapter. 
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3.1 Demand for health Insurance: Individual Influences 
Why do some individuals decide to purchase health insurance and others not? How 
can the uptake of voluntary health insurance, promoted by the Government of 
Vietnam, be increased in a way that is fmancially sustainable, and improves the 
efficiency of risk-sharing? If adverse selection is a problem, the financial 
sustainability of the scheme will be questioned. An understanding of factors 
influencing demand is thus of particular importance for the development of the 
scheme. Theoretical economic models make some predictions about who will 
purchase health insurance based on expected utility theory. Most of the studies 
reviewed in Part 2.1.3 specify models, in which a range of individual characteristics, 
(e.g. health status, economic status, level of education), are used as explanatory 
factors. 
Conceptual frameworks have been developed principally in the context of health 
insurance systems in rich economies built on assumptions, both explicit and implicit, 
that may not hold true in a predominantly informal economy. Where formal market 
institutions are underdeveloped, and fail to meet consumer demand for products that 
reduce risk, then informal risk-sharing arrangements are likely to develop. The extent 
to which such informal schemes develop is also likely to depend on the social 
structure of a particular community, which may in tum influence levels of uptake of 
formal health insurance. This is one of the questions examined in this thesis. 
The framework for analysing demand for health insurance is similar to that presented 
by (Propper 1989). Whilst Propper assumes that all individuals in the dataset have 
heard of private health insurance, which is presumably appropriate in the context of 
the U.K., in Vietnam this is not necessarily the case. Hence, the regression analysis 
presented in Chapter 5 is estimated only for those individuals who are aware of the 
scheme28• Propper's framework is followed, in which individuals face two possible 
courses of action or prospects. Under the first, health insurance is purchased and, in 
the event of feeling ill, health services are accessed with an 80% reduction in user 
charges. Under the second, health insurance is not purchased, and patients seek no 
care, self-treat, visit a private provider, or pay full user charges at a government health 
facility. Under both scenarios, individuals may also draw on informal, private 
28 Limiting estimations to those individuals in Vietnam who are aware of the health insurance 
scheme is consistent with Propper's (1993) idea of constrained choice-sets. 
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financial networks, to cover the cost of accessing health services, and hence smooth 
consumption expenditures. Individuals will choose between these two prospects, and 
any factor that increases expected utility under insurance relative to being uninsured, 
increases the probability of purchase. Several such influences are examined in detail 
below. 
3.1.1 Health status and advene seleetloD 
Given the relationship between demand for health, health services, and health 
insurance, discussed in Part 2.1.1 (see also Figure 1.1), individual health status is 
expected to influence the probability of insurance purchase. Asymmetries in 
information about health status held by the insurer, and the insured, is a fundamental 
driving force behind adverse selection, a central concept in health insurance theory, 
and discussed in Part 2.1.3. Establishing whether adverse selection is present in the 
scheme is important for several reasons, but primarily to establish whether, and if so to 
what extent, financial problems will develop in the future. Indeed, there is evidence 
that certain provincial funds in Vietnam are already in financial debt. 
In the Vietnamese scheme, membership is voluntary and based on individuals, rather 
than families or other groups of individuals. Given that fixed, or flat, premia have 
been set within provinces, and those in poor health are not excluded, except for a brief 
waiting-period before accessing benefits, theoretical models predict that adverse 
selection will be a problem. One strategy in response to adverse selection is to adjust 
premia according to individual health status. Most non-profit health insurance 
schemes, however, on principle do not discriminate against patients by varying premia 
according to health status. As a result, adverse selection is far more likely to be a 
problem. For individuals with poor health status, a premium based on average risk 
probably represents good value for money, in turn increasing the likelihood that they 
will purchase insurance. The opposite is true for individuals with good health status. 
Given that age and health status tend to be closely linked, and that health service usage 
typically increases with age, the impact of age on the probability of insurance 
purchase is also an indication of adverse selection. 
Substantial empirical evidence of adverse selection in health insurance schemes exists, 
although mostly from high-income countries such as the USA and Australia. In order 
to establish whether or not adverse selection is present in the Vietnamese scheme, a 
model of health insurance purchase is estimated in Chapter 5, and allowed to depend 
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on, amongst other factors, health status. If good health status reduces the probability of 
insurance purchase to a statistically significant degree, this is considered evidence of 
adverse selection. Given the approach to setting premia in Vietnam, outlined in part 
1.3.2, adverse selection is expected to be a problem. However, there may be some 
variations across provinces, depending on local supply-side initiatives to limit adverse 
selection. 
Research Question 1: Does voluntary health insurance in Vietnam suffer from 
adverse selection? 
3.1.2 Attitudes towards risk 
Theory predicts that an individual for whom utility declines for each extra unit of 
income received will, in general, prefer a certain option to a risky or uncertain one 
(see Part 2.1.1). Since the introduction of direct user charges for government health 
services in 1989, uncertainty over future health expenditures has created a demand for 
health insurance. For many, reducing the risk of significant financial loss due to ill-
health, is motivated to purchase health insurance. In tum, many factors will influence 
expectations of future health expenditures, particularly an individual's current health 
status. The greater the utility an individual gains from the increased certainty that 
insurance brings, the greater the probability that they will purchase health insurance. 
Few studies have analysed attitudes towards risk empirically in the context of 
expected health expenditures. In the literature, it is generally assumed that individuals 
are risk-averse and will adjust their behaviour accordingly, as shown by Picone et al. 
(1998). One such adjustment is to purchase health insurance. Economic measures of 
aversion to risk typically involve experimental methods such as lottery or pair-wise 
choice techniques in which, for example, a respondent is invited to choose between a 
low-risk, low-return, gamble, and a high-risk, high-return, gamble. The choice gives 
some indication of attitudes towards risk.. 
Sociological studies of risk tend to focus on broader developments in society. In the 
U.K., for example, Taylor-Gooby (2000) notes the paradox of growing perceptions of 
uncertainty at a time of unparalleled levels of material wealth. One explanation is that 
whilst life expectancy is increasing, traditional social security systems designed to 
deal with risk, are perceived as being in a state of decay. The author also notes that 
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risk is increasingly concentrated amongst the weakest groups in an increasingly 
unequal society. 
Whilst the Vietnamese context is quite different from the U.K. some parallels can be 
drawn. For many Vietnamese households, economic transition is resulting in 
substantial increases in income. At the same time, however, social security 
mechanisms such as free health care have been eroded. The introduction of user fees 
in government health facilities is only one example - official tuition fees for public 
schools were also introduced nationally in 1989. Economic reforms have thus pushed 
financial risk onto individuals and households, which, overall, is likely to have created 
a greater sense of uncertainty over future household expenditures. Economic crisis in 
the region in the late 1990s can only have increased feelings of uncertainty for many 
Vietnamese, an observation made by Kumssa and Jones (1999), and discussed in 
Chapter 1. 
The extent to which culture influences attitudes towards risk is an interesting one, 
although there is little evidence on this issue. Southern Vietnam was subject to 
western influence throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, and remains the economic 
hub of the country today. At a time when northern Vietnam was under communist 
control, whether or not exposure to capitalist values in the south influenced attitudes 
to risk merits further investigation. Levels of generalised inter-personal trust probably 
influence attitudes towards informal risk-sharing, whilst trust in government is likely 
to influence willingness to share risks through a formal scheme, managed and operated 
by government. Research questions that develop these ideas are presented in Part 3.2. 
Although attitudes to risk in the context of health expenditures were not collected as 
part of the household survey, data were collected regarding worry about future health 
status (see questions b3S and b36 in Appendix 4). These data are incorporated into the 
demand function estimated in Chapter S. However, this measure of worry is expected 
to partially capture current health status, providing further evidence of adverse 
selection. Clearly, this variable is not a rigorous measure of risk aversion. However, it 
is felt that it may partially reflect aversion to risk, in addition to picking up an 
individual's recent health status, and hence the results are interpreted accordingly. 
Research Question 2: Do levels of worry about future health status influence the 
probability of health insurance purchase? 
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3.1.3 Economic status 
Theoretically, the effect of an increase in individual income, or economic status on 
demand for health insurance29, depends on two relationships, the first of which is the 
relationship between income and risk aversion. Part 2.1.1 summarised the theory, 
which expects individuals to become less risk-averse as their income increases, 
principally due to their ability to self-insure through savings. Hence, demand for 
health insurance might be expected to fall as income increases. Secondly, the 
relationship between income and taste (or preference) for quality will influence 
demand for health insurance, assuming that insurance provides access to better quality 
services. This link with service quality is an important one and drives much of the 
demand for private insurance in rich economies. In Vietnam, however, the benefits of 
being insured are purely in terms of cash reductions, rather than better quality 
services30• However, given the close links between demand for health services and 
demand for health insurance, noted in Part 2.1.1, service quality is likely to be 
important for the development of health insurance. In this thesis, rather than 
attempting to measure aspects of service delivery in any detailed way, which was not 
feasible due to time and monetary constraints, the focus is on obtaining the view of 
patients, in terms of their satisfaction with services received. 
Part 2.4 reviewed empirical studies of demand for health insurance, most of which 
evaluate insurance schemes in high-income economies. Understandably, findings are 
mixed, given the range of insurance schemes evaluated. Wolfe and Goddeeris (1991) 
estimate a positive wealth effect on demand for supplementary Medicare insurance, 
and Marquis and Long (1995) estimate demand for private health insurance in the 
non-group sector in the USA to be income-inelastic. This issue is under-researched in 
low-income countries. Two studies, in Ghana and India respectively, examine 
willingness to pay for health insurance and both conclude that income has a positive 
effect. 
Whether or not economic status explains the probability of entering an informal risk-
sharing arrangement is also ambiguous. In theory, wealthier individuals are more 
29 The terms 'economic status', 'income' and 'consumption expenditures' are used 
synonymously in this thesis. Economists routinely use estimates of consumption expenditure, 
rather than income, as a proxy for economics status, for reasons discussed in Part 4.4.2. 
30 There is some limited evidence. collected as part of the household survey, that service 
quality is better under insurance. in terms of separate rooms for inpatients, tea-making facilities 
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likely to self-insure, whereas there is some evidence (see previous chapter) that 
participation in risk-sharing schemes increases with income. In addition, richer 
individuals may prefer to self-insure rather than participate in a formal insurance 
mechanism, particularly if they are not confident of the scheme's management, or do 
not trust it. Overall, income is not expected to have a major influence on demand for 
health insurance in the Vietnamese context. If economic status is positively associated 
with insurance purchase, income-related inequalities in access to health services may 
be exacerbated (see evidence presented by Waters 2000, and Yip and Berman 2001). 
Research Question 3: Does individual economic status influence the probability 
o;rhealthinsurancepurchase? 
Given that premia do not vary within provinces, it is hot possible to estimate the effect 
of price on the probability of insurance purchase. The effect of variations in premia 
across provinces is captured in province-level dummy variables. However, these 
dummies capture a wide range of province level effects, making it impossible to 
disentangle the specific premium effect. 
3.1.4 Other influences 
Several other individual characteristics are expected to influence the probability of 
insurance uptake. An understanding of these issues is useful for the development of 
health insurance in Vietnam. Whilst many studies acknowledge the importance of 
education on health status, and on health-seeking behaviour, few estimate its effect on 
insurance purchase. Given the close links between demand for health services and 
health insurance outlined in Chapter 2, however, education is expected to have a 
positive effect on insurance purchase. This is supported by both Harmon and Nolan 
(2001), and Besley et al. (1999), who find education to have a statistically significant 
and positive influence on insurance purchase. Essentially this is an indirect effect, due 
to the expected positive effect of education on awareness of health problems, and 
recognition of the need for professional medical advice. 
Research Question 4: Do educational levels influence the probability of health 
insurance purchase? 
etc. However, this is not national policy, and information is incomplete for the communes in 
which the survey was conducted. It is thus not possible to control for this possible influence. 
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A common approach adopted by provincial insurance directorates is to promote and 
sell insurance policies through marketing campaigns at the commune level. 
Unfortunately, information on the frequency and duration of such campaigns, and the 
specific strategies adopted, was unavailable. As campaigns at the commune level are 
generally organised by district health insurance offices, district dummy variables are 
used to control for supply-side effects in province-level models. Several other 
characteristics, including occupation, religion, sex, marital status, whether a couple 
has children, and distance from a facility (reflecting private time and indirect financial 
costs), are also included as explanatory variables. Further details are presented in Part 
5.2.2. 
Finally, the sociological literature on uptake of benefits in the U.K. offers a threshold 
framework of beliefs and feelings, which may offer some insight into the uptake of 
health insurance in Vietnam. Kerr's psychosocial model presented in Corden (1999) 
presents a hierarchy of conditions that individuals satisfy to themselves before 
deciding to claim social security benefits. These are perceived need, a basic 
understanding of the benefits, perceived eligibility and utility, beliefs and feelings, and 
perceived stability of personal circumstances. A further model incorporates the impact 
of stigma, and the interventions by friends and relatives in triggering claims. Health 
insurance in Vietnam is somewhat different in that individuals must decide whether to 
purchase insurance, rather than take-up freely available benefits. Nevertheless, such 
influences may be important. In-depth research is used to interpret the econometric 
results presented in Chapter 5, taking into account this alternative framework of 
uptake. 
3.2 Demand for health Insurance: commune level Influences 
In addition to the characteristics of individuals, community structure may also 
influence the probability of health insurance purchase. Sobel makes the point that 
'When people decide how to behave, they take into account the social, economic, and 
legal implications of their actions. These implications depend on the environment in 
which people make their choices' (Sobel 2002: 146). 
Chapter 2 highlighted a range of influences that may possibly influence the decision in 
question, as presented in the literature. Hsiao (1995) suggests that closure in social 
networks facilitates collective action and, by extension, the development of local 
health insurance schemes. The review of development economics literature raises the 
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possibility that informal financial networks may also influence demand for formal 
insurance, the argument for which is developed later in this chapter. The main 
question is whether social cohesion increases the willingness, and hence probability, 
that an individual will enter a risk-sharing arrangement. Hsiao (1995) proposition that 
the social capital of a community has an independent and positive effect on the 
individual decision to enter a risk-sharing mechanism is discussed first. Whilst this 
thesis does not consider that social cohesion can automatically be defined as social 
capital, the arguments put forward in the social capital literature are, nevertheless, 
relevant. An alternative interpretation of the effect of social cohesion is then 
discussed, presenting a new theoretical insight into the development of voluntary 
health insurance. 
3.2.1 Collective action hypothesis 
The two hypotheses detailed in this and the next section, draw on ideas in the 
sociological and development economics literature, presented in Chapter 2, which are 
synthesised to offer a new insight into demand for voluntary health insurance. Recent 
ideas regarding the importance of social capital for the development of health 
insurance provided the starting point. However, many of the arguments presented in 
this literature, overlap with work in other disciplines. For example, social network 
analysts have looked in detail at the internal structure of networks and their impact on 
the existence of collective action. Furthermore, development economists have been 
studying systems of informal insurance in low-income countries for several decades. 
Seminal theoretical writings on social capital claim that it provides an explanation for 
the emergence of informal risk-sharing mechanisms in certain communities. Two 
texts, one authored by Coleman (1990) and the other by Putnam (1993a), argue that 
the various informal financial networks widely observed in low and middle-income 
countries are evidence of social capital. Generically referred to as ROSCAs, and 
discussed in Chapter 2, both authors argue that such arrangements could not exist 
without spontaneous social solidarity, which can only occur in high-trust 
communities. Social capital, it is argued, is an essential ingredient in the evolution of 
institutions for collective action. Interestingly, Besley (1995a), in a review of the 
literature, points out that previous attempts to explain the evolution of informal risk-
sharing institutions typically ignore the level of social capital in the host community. 
As with many other studies, however, this argument is not developed in any detail. 
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Hsiao draws heavily on Coleman's work in extending this general idea to community-
based health insurance. In doing so, he develops what he refers to as a socio-economic 
theory, which combines expected utility theory and social theory. Hsiao argues that, 
ceteris paribus, levels of social capital can be used to predict whether risk-sharing for 
health will take place voluntarily. In other words, cohesive communities will 
recognise the mutual benefits of pooling, and be more likely to 'pull together' to make 
a health insurance scheme work. By implication, less cohesive communities will fail 
to find solutions to the dilemmas of collective action required for voluntary risk-
sharing to succeed. In the same way that Putnam sees ROSCAs as a manifestation of 
spontaneous risk-sharing in high-trust communities, and evidence of collective action, 
Hsiao views the re-emergence of cooperative health care organisations in rural China 
as further evidence of social capital. 
In Hsiao's initial exploration, the mechanisms through which cohesive communities 
are more prone to collective action are not discussed in detail and, as with Coleman's 
discussion of ROSCAs, the argument relies on assumptions about the effect of 
community level trust on individual willingness to share risks. The wide-ranging 
literature reviewed earlier provides some insights, however, in suggesting that inter-
personal trust may facilitate voluntary risk-sharing by increasing the availability of 
information regarding the behaviour of other individuals. 
To the extent that entering a risk-sharing alliance constitutes a risk, and assuming most 
individuals are risk-averse, trust may be important in mitigating perceptions of risk. 
Put simply, if a person is asked to join a risk-sharing arrangement, but does not fully 
trust the others involved and their default would have negative implications for her, 
then she is unlikely to consider pooling money with them. Better information about 
the reputation of others can thus have an important influence on willingness to enter 
an unenforceable, informal risk-sharing agreement. Other factors may also influence 
the probability of entering such an agreement, such as altruism, and a desire to 
maintain reputation. It is questionable whether this argument also holds when risk-
pooling is not local, but takes place at the provincial or national level, as in Vietnam, 
particularly given the hierarchical, top-down, and government-dominated nature of 
management arrangements (see Part 1.3.3). 
In terms of empirical evidence, a small number of studies from development 
economics examine the importance of community structure for informal risk-sharing, 
and generally find positive results. Rosenzweig (1988) stresses the importance of 
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kinship ties in sustaining information flows, which are crucial to maintaining 
insurance-based private transfer arrangements across space and time. Grimard (1997) 
provides similar evidence from Cote d'Ivoire, and recent work by Foster and 
Rosenzweig (2001) concludes that altruism within families facilitates risk-sharing by 
overcoming problems of imperfect commitment and unenforceable contracts. None of 
these studies refers specifically to social capital. 
In the context of Vietnam the collective action hypothesis is unconvincing. Purchasing 
a voluntary health insurance policy cannot be considered collective action in the same 
way that Hsiao proposes in the context of China. The main argument is that given the 
institutional design of the scheme, which has little community control or involvement, 
local levels of social cohesion are largely irrelevant. It might be possible, however, to 
argue that individual attitudes towards national schemes that embody social solidarity 
may have an influence. Whilst the sociological literature may well classify feelings of 
national solidarity as social capital, this thesis argues that the two are not synonymous. 
However, building on the idea in the social capital literature that membership in 
voluntary organisations is a feature of civic society, which facilitates collective action, 
data were collected on individual membership in mass organisations. Whilst mass 
organisations are not considered an expression of civil society in the Vietnamese 
context (see Part 1.5.3), their effect (both at the individual and commune levels) on 
private demand for insurance is still examined. The principal reason is to produce new 
evidence on this under-researched feature of Vietnamese society. 
Research Question 5: Does Me",bership in a ",ass organisation influence the 
probability of health insurance purchase? 
In conclusion, whilst Part 2.3.1 reviewed the literature, which argues social capital has 
a positive effect on the development of voluntary risk-sharing, this idea is not 
supported in the context of Vietnam. Previous studies have measured social capital by 
quantifying an individuals membership in various social groups. The assumption is 
that these groupings are a fundamental dimension of civil society. This cannot, 
however, be considered true in the case of mass organisations in Vietnam. 
As Sobel (2002) notes, however, the social capital literature, which was used as the 
starting point in developing this research question, has proved useful in drawing 
attention to a broad multi-disciplinary literature. In this section, the review of research 
into informal risk-sharing systems presented in Part 2.3.2, has also been used in 
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thinking about this particular question. This idea is developed further in the following 
section. The effect of membership in a mass organisation, about which little 
information is currently known, is examined empirically in Chapter 5. 
3.2.2 Substitute hypothesis - a framework of risk-reducing strategies 
The research question presented below takes the thinking prompted by the social 
capital literature a stage further. In doing so, the work of development economists, 
summarised in Chapter 2, is particularly useful. Development economists 
conceptualise risk in terms of expenditure shocks, whether they result from the cost of 
treating an unexpected illness, a poor harvest, or any number of events. Interestingly, 
much of the literature concerned with risk in low-income countries uses the example 
of ill-health, as one of the major risks facing individuals and 'households. 
To the extent that different types of risk have similar consequences on consumption, 
similar strategies may be used to mitigate risk, whatever its cause. Faced with user 
charges in order to obtain health services, households will adopt one, or possibly 
several, of the risk-reducing strategies available to them. Clearly, some households 
will have more options available to them than others. Voluntary health insurance 
promoted by government is, from the perspective of the consumer, one more strategy 
to deal with risk. Viewing demand for health insurance in this way allows it to be 
placed in a more holistic context, in turn enabling the development of a more 
comprehensive, analytical framework of demand for health insurance. 
Table 3.1 builds on this idea, which is consistent with the broad definition of 
insurance discussed earlier, presenting a range of options, or strategies, available to 
deal with risk. Whilst not comprehensive, placed at one end are examples of strategies 
that do not require collective action i.e. voluntary cooperation between individuals. At 
the other end, are examples of actions based on formal, or institutionalised, 
cooperation such as traditional government social security schemes. 
Some options involve collective action in an informal way. Formal collective action is 
defined as that which is institutionalised i.e. some form of official membership is 
required to access benefits (for example, joining a mass organisation, or a government 
health insurance scheme). Deaton refers to the latter as anonymous risk-sharing 
(Deaton 1997: 373). Informal collective action thus refers to arrangements between 
individuals that are not anonymous, and require no official membership in an 
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Strategy Details References Informal I 
NO COLLECTIVE ACTION 
Self-insurance Self-insurance for those with sufficient income or savings. In Levin (1995) .4 ~ 
Vietnam, future health costs are the primary motivation for Rosenzweig (2001) 
saving among'St survey respondents. 
NO COLLECTIVE ACTION 
Unofficial Widely reported in rural communities in low-income Besley (199 5b ) 
commercial countries. May form the only source of credit at short notice, 
lending / loan and tends to be expensive i.e. high interest rates. Known as 
sharks 'vay lai' in parts of Vietnam. 
INFORMAL COLLECTIVE ACTION 
Particularly important in low-income countries. Primarily Cox et at. (1998) 
Private transfers intra/inter household/familial transfers, but also between Cox and Jimenez friends. Can be both financial and non-financial (e.g. food, (1991 ) 
clothing, durables, favours). Remittances are an example, Rosenzweig (1988) 
and are important in Vietnam, particularly in the south. May Morduch (t 999) 
be motivated by altruism or self-interested exchange. 
INFORMAL COLLECTIVE ACTION Besley et al. (1993; 
Informal credit Informal credit is most commonly found in the form of Bouman (1995) 
and insurance rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs). Credit Calomiris and 
schemes performs an insurance function by allowing consumption to Rajaraman (1998) 
remain smooth in the face of 'shocks'. Morduch (t 999) 
FORMAL COLLECTIVE ACTION 
Range of institutions from guilds in 14th century Europe, to 
Guilds I loan credit cooperatives in mid-19
th century Germany, and loan Putnam (t 993a) 
funds in Ireland around the same time. Micro-credit Hollis and Sweetman funds / credit 
organisations can be found in most low-income countries (1998) 
cooperatives I today e.g. the Grameen Bank. In many rich countries, such Besley and Coate 
credit unions as Ireland, the popularity of credit unions is increasing, again (1995) 
in response to the failure of banks to provide credit to poorer Guinnane (2000) 
individuals. Member organisations of the Irish League of 
Credit Union, for example, tend to have a common bond e.g. 
living in the same community, having a common profession. 
Public insurance FORMAL COLLECTIVE ACTION 
(both compulsory Range from public safety net programmes (e.g. cash or food Dercon and Krishnan 
and voluntary) transfers) to community based schemes. (2002) 
FORMAL COLLECTIVE ACTION Besley and Coate 
Provide loans I credit at relatively low interest rates. (1995) 
Examples include Agricultural Banks such as those in Besley et al. (1994) Development Europe in the mid-19th century. Also widespread in agrarian Coleman (1990; 
banks economies. The World Bank is one example. Putnam (1993a) 
FORMAL COLLECTIVE ACTION 
Commercial bank Commercial banks, charging higher interest rates than nla ~, 
loans development banks. Tend to be a feature of industrialising 
economies. Generally underdeveloped in poorer countries. Formal I 
TABLE 3.1: A FRAMEWORK OF RISK-REDUCING STRATEGIES 
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organisation31 • At one end of the spectrum, individuals self-insure with savings. If an 
individual's level of income, or savings, is sufficient to self-insure e.g. to pay full user 
charges for health services, then the need to enter reciprocal or similar arrangements 
with other individuals diminishes. Expectations that collective action is less pervasive 
in wealthier communities are based on this observation, even if empirical evidence is 
mixed. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum are commercial bank loans, a common 
arrangement in wealthier, modem economies. Whilst borrowing from a commercial 
bank is a form of collective action, in that one individual makes an agreement with 
another individual or, in this case, an institution, this is a formal arrangement. As with 
development banks and compulsory insurance schemes, community structure is 
largely irrelevant with respect to whether an individual is eligible to enter such an 
agreement. It is argued, however, that social structure is important for the development 
of risk-sharing based on informal collective action, and helps to explain why such 
institutions emerge in certain communities but not others. One consistent theme in the 
literature is that favours, private transfers, and the various ROSCA type organisations 
cited by various authors, tend to flourish in communities with a strong degree of 
network closure. For individuals living in such a community, it is likely that the 
number of risk-mitigating options available to them will be greater, ceteris paribus, 
than for individuals living within non-closed networks. 
Evidence of the way in which formal and informal risk-sharing mechanisms interact, 
reviewed in Part 2.3.2, raises the question whether individuals living in more socially 
cohesive communities may be less likely to purchase health insurance. Assuming, 
ceteris paribus, that social cohesion facilitates informal risk-sharing, then expected 
utility under government health insurance (formal collective action) which must be 
purchased, may be lower than under private financial networks (informal collective 
action). Expected utility under formal health insurance may reduce, for example, as 
the number of alternative risk-reducing strategies available increases. The specific 
question is, do informal financial networks crowd-out demand for formal health 
insurance? 
31 This is similar to the distinction between informal and formal risk-sharing in which the latter 
is defined as an agreement with a money price. 
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An individual who considers others in her community to be trustworthy, possibly 
altruistic, or with whom she has reciprocal relationships, may feel infonnal support 
networks to be reliable, and immediately available in a time of need. Furthennore, 
such arrangements may be preferable to purchasing government-provided insurance, 
in which there is no accountability to the community. Several factors will influence 
preferences in this context, including perceptions of corruption amongst government 
officials, and feelings of duty to the government, aspects of Vietnamese society 
discussed in Chapter 1. An alternative view is that fonnal and infonnal risk-sharing 
arrangements are complements rather than substitutes. 
Bringing together these various ideas, Figure 3.1 shows the range of possible 
outcomes when fonnal health insurance is introduced into a highly socially cohesive 
community, with a dense network of informal risk-sharing. The figure incorporates the 
expected effect of perceived corruption amongst government officials, and a sense of 
duty to the State. Uptake of insurance is expected to be relatively high in communities 
which perceive there to be substantial benefits from joining a fonnal health insurance 
scheme, have trust in government, and have a sense of duty to the State (represented 
by the extreme left-hand side of the diagram). In contrast, where the benefits of the 
scheme are perceived to be low, government officials are seen as corrupt, and there is 
little sense of duty to the State, then uptake will be relatively low (represented by the 
extreme right-hand side of the diagram). 
The six outcomes between the two extremes are a function of the interplay between 
perceptions of corruption and duty to schemes implemented by government. Where 
both are negative, or positive, then a definite outcome is expected. However, where 
one is positive but the other negative, the outcome is ambiguous - the one exception is 
where benefits are perceived and there is trust in government. By incorporating duty 
into the framework, a fundamental concept in Confucian doctrine, the model of 
expected utility can be extended. Rather than predicting purchase of health insurance 
only if expected utility is greater than under informal risk-sharing arrangements, duty 
may generate demand even where the perceived benefits are low, or where there is 
little trust in government. The relationship between duty and trust, however, requires 
further research. 
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Most empirical studies conclude that informal risk-sharing is only partial and, hence, 
inefficient (see Cox and Jimenez 1992, Grimard 1997, and Ligon 2001), a factor 
which will influence expected utility under formal insurance. This evidence is based, 
however, on evaluations of freely available safety net programmes such as direct cash 
transfers and food aid. In contrast, the decision facing individuals in Vietnam, is 
whether to purchase health insurance. Morduch (1999) argues that, despite the fact 
that many public schemes crowd-out informal risk-sharing networks, communities 
typically experience a net gain, with greater proportions of household resources freed 
up for productive activities. The way in which informal and formal insurance 
mechanisms interact is thus of considerable importance, not only for welfare, but also 
for expected utility under each. 
Support for the idea that informal financial networks may actually crowd out formal 
insurance, the opposite to most predictions, is provided by Rosenzweig (1988), who 
reports that in India formal credit is seen as inferior to familial transfers and self-
insurance. There is however, little evidence of this effect from elsewhere, possibly 
because this is an under-researched issue. It is unlikely that formal insurance will 
completely crowd out informal insurance, or vice versa - the most probable outcome 
lies between these two positions, with formal and informal mechanisms co-existing, 
and the balance between them shifting over time. Levenson and Besley (1996) provide 
some evidence from Taiwan to support this (see Part 2.3.2), and can also be 
represented in terms of individuals moving up and down the continuum presented in 
Table 3.1 across time. 
Research Question 6: Does social cohesion increase or decrease the probability 0/ 
health insurance purchase? 
With respect to corruption, and perceptions of corruption in government institutions, 
there is substantial evidence that this is widespread and growing in many low-income 
countries, including Vietnam (see the discussion in Part 1.5.3). As Hsiao (1995) points 
out, one reason for the collapse of the cooperative health system in China, was 
excessive patronage and corruption. Relatives of officials were frequently included on 
the payroll of health facilities, despite having no qualifications, or indeed not actually 
working there. Hsiao rightly poses the question, why should communities pay 
voluntarily to maintain a corrupt system? 
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In summary, the purchase decision of a risk-averse individual, in a low-income 
country such as Vietnam, will be influenced by the availability of alternative risk-
sharing mechanisms, and the expected utility under each. High levels of social 
cohesion may increase the portfolio of options available, through a willingness to trust 
others and enter risk-sharing arrangements. Hence, individuals living in cohesive 
communities will, ceteris paribus, probably have a broader set of risk-sharing 
strategies on which they can draw. Finally, perceptions of corruption, and a sense of 
duty to the State, may also influence an individual's decision to purchase health 
insurance. 
Figure 3.2 combines ideas from Figure 2.1 and Figure 3.1, incorporating the possible 
influences of duty and perceived corruption on demand for voluntary health insurance. 
Due to a lack of data however, the effect of duty and corruption are not examined 
empirically. 
3.3 Impact of health Insurance 
3.3.1 Patient satisfaction 
In richer economies, private health insurance products tend to be marketed, and 
purchased, on the basis that insured patients gain access to higher quality services. In 
Vietnam, however, insured patients receive only reductions in user charges, with care 
provided in the same facility and from the same doctors, as for uninsured patients. In 
some respects it is more appropriate to compare the scheme with publicly funded 
systems, such as the NHS, which are low-cost but also long-wait. For this reason, 
health insurance is expected to make little difference in terms of patient satisfaction, 
except that related to the lower cost of accessing health services (i.e. value for money). 
Few studies have examined patient satisfaction in the context of health insurance in 
low-income countries. In Thailand, Tangcharoensathien et a1. (1999) compare 
satisfaction with in-patient and outpatient services, in hospitals of different ownership. 
Patients rate non-profit hospitals the highest for both types of care. The authors also 
find that patients covered by the Social Security Scheme (under which hospitals are 
reimbursed on a capitation basis), consistently gave lower ratings in terms of 
satisfaction with outpatient care, than other patients. 
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In Tanzania, Gilson et al. (1994) conducted research into service quality, finding that 
structural factors (e.g. the supply of medicines), and inter-personal skills, to be 
important determinants of perceived service quality. Given the increasing dependence 
of public health facilities in Vietnam on private payments, since do; moi, as noted by 
Bloom (1998) in Chapter 1, combined with reports of corruption amongst government 
health workers, the effect of insurance on patient satisfaction in the Vietnamese 
context is somewhat ambiguous. 
Research Question 7: What is the impact 0/ voluntary health insurance on 
patient satisfaction? 
3.3.2 Private out-or-pocket health expenditures 
Evidence of the effect of insurance on out-of-pocket health expenditures is critical for 
policy-makers to establish whether the scheme reduces the shocks to consumption 
highlighted by Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (2001) in Figure 1.2. If out-of-pocket 
expenditures are lower amongst insured patients, ceteris paribus, then it is reasonable 
to assume that financial access to health services has increased. This issue is tested 
empirically in Chapter 6, through the estimation of a model of health expenditures, 
which is allowed to depend on insurance status as well as a battery of other 
explanatory variables. 
Given that the principal benefit of voluntary health insurance is to reduce user fees by 
80%, insured patients are expected to spend less out-of-pocket, ceteris paribus. than 
uninsured patients. Evidence that demand for health care is price elastic complicates 
this picture however. Recently, Nyman (1999) has suggested that insurance purchase 
is partly motivated by the increased access it provides i.e. that consumers wait until 
they have insurance in order to access care that would otherwise be unaffordable. If 
this is the case, then out-of-pocket expenditures amongst insured patients may be 
significantly greater than 20% of those payments made by the uninsured. 
Empirical evidence on this issue from other countries is mixed. Rubin and Koelln 
( 1993) found that insured households have significantly higher out-of pocket 
expenditures than uninsured households. The authors explain the finding in terms of a 
moral hazard effect. The RAND Health Insurance Experiment also found that per 
capita out-of-pocket expenditures increased as the rate of co-payment fell (see Part 
2.1.2), confirming that demand is sensitive to changes in price. 
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Induced demand by health professionals, in order to boost their own income, may also 
explain increased consumption amongst insured patients. This in turn will lead to 
increases in out-of-pocket payments. One study examining this issue in a low-income 
country setting is by Carrin et al. (l999b), who confirms that whilst the Chinese rural 
cooperative medical systems reduced the burden of health care costs on families, the 
reduction was modest. A recent review of the health sector (World Bank 2001) 
analyses out-of-pocket expenditures using data from the Vietnamese Living Standards 
Survey for 1998. Comparing expenditures per visit to a public hospital, the review 
estimates the cost of a visit for an insured patient to be, on average, only 30-60% of 
the out-of-pocket expenditure incurred by an uninsured patient, as opposed to 80%. 
However, this analysis does not distinguish between those individuals insured under 
the compulsory schemes, and those under the voluntarily scheme. Finally, perceptions 
of quality are also likely to influence the desire to incur out-of-pocket expenditures, 
whether official or unofficial. 
Research Question 8: What is the effect of being insured on total out-of-pocket 
health expenditures? 
3.3.3 Utilisation of health services 
3.3.3.1 Increased consumption (moral hazard) 
Part 2.1.2 discussed the issue of moral hazard under insurance, which results from 
both the reduced price of accessing health services to patients (i.e. price elasticity), but 
also behavioural changes linked to risk-taking behaviour amongst the insured. The 
central research question is whether, ceteris paribus, individuals who feel sick, and are 
insured, are more likely to seek care than uninsured individuals who feel sick. There is 
considerable empirical evidence that insurance leads to the increased consumption of 
health services, mostly from the USA and other high-income economies. 
One interesting question is whether such evidence holds any real message for health 
insurance in Vietnam given the very different nature of the health system and the 
society within which it functions. For example, the non-price cost of accessing health 
services, such as transport and time costs, can be substantial in rural communities, and 
is likely to have a rationing effect on the consumption of health services. Given that 
demand for health insurance is derived from a demand for health services, the greater 
the non-price costs for a sick individual, the lower the effect of health insurance in 
terms of total cost reduction. In this sense, one would expect moral hazard to be less of 
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a problem in predominantly rural societies. Furthermore, insured patients in Vietnam 
are obliged to pay 20% of the cost of services used as a co-payment, a strategy 
commonly used to counter moral hazard problems. 
Several aspects of health care consumption are examined in Chapter 7, each relating to 
consumer decisions to seek health services when feeling i1132. First, the impact of 
being insured on the probability of seeking the advice of any trained health 
professional (i.e. in the public or private sector) is estimated. This gives an idea of the 
impact of the voluntary component of the scheme on the overall access to, and 
consumption of, health services. Secondly, given that the scheme only insures those 
services provided in the public sector, its impact on the probability of seeking 
government health services is examined. Finally, the effect of insurance on the 
probability of self-treating is tested empirically. A more detailed discussion is 
provided in the motivation of each model in Part 7.2.1. 
Increased consumption of health services can be interpreted in two ways. As noted in 
Part 2.1.2, it may be positive, particularly in the context of a country with high levels 
of unmet health needs. However, valid concerns exist that greater consumption is 
driven primarily by unnecessary over-supply by doctors, or the decision to seek advice 
for minor health problems. Such concern is particularly understandable in a resource-
poor health system. Overall, some evidence of ex-post moral hazard is expected. 
Finally, two additional issues are not controlled for in the following analysis, but 
which may influence the results, and are hence issues for future research. The first is 
behavioural change, which could result from the purchase of insurance and result in an 
individuals probability of falling ill increasing. Secondly, service quality also 
influences the consumption of health services, and may provide a partial explanation 
for any variations in observed behaviour. 
Research Question 9: What is the effect of being insured on treatment-seeking 
behaviour? 
In terms of supplier-induced demand, the shift from fixed in-patient day payments to 
providers, to a fee-for-service basis, increases the incentive for providers to supply 
more services. Given that each Province sets its own level of user charges, as well as 
32 Genier (1998) finds, for example, that health insurance in France affects only the consumer 
decision to seek health care, and not the quantity of care consumed per episode. 
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reimbursement rates to providers, the extent to which supplier-induced demand is a 
problem may be influenced by the income an insured patient brings to the health 
facility relative to an uninsured patient. Little detailed infonnation is available on this 
issue, however, and hence it is not tested empirically in this thesis. 
3.3.3.2 Social cohesion and moral hazard 
If moral hazard is a problem, and harnessing social cohesion offers a possible solution 
to mitigate it, policy-makers may decide to introduce local management and 
monitoring mechanisms to reap the benefits, as was the case in the credit cooperative 
movement in 19th century Germany. 
In cohesive communities where there is considerable closure in social networks, the 
information asymmetry, which limits the ability of fonnal institutions to monitor 
contracts, may be overcome. For this reason peer monitoring is part of many lending 
schemes, such as the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, whose clients typically have 
insufficient physical collateral to secure loans from traditional banks. Amott and 
Stiglitz (1991) find evidence that peer monitoring mitigates moral hazard, as do 
Besley and Coate (1995). Wydick (1999) shows that social ties among members have 
a statistically insignificant effect on moral hazard, however. The second key 
advantage of infonnal institutional arrangements lies in their ability to enforce 
contracts through the threat and use of social sanctions, for example by banning an 
individual who reneges on an agreement, from future risk-sharing alliances (Besley 
and Coate 1995). 
Dufwenberg and Lundholm's (2001) .idea of a per capita externality is useful here. 
Where an insurance scheme is locally organised, in tenns of fund pooling and 
management, the per capita externality of another person reneging on their contract is 
relatively high. In the case of voluntary health insurance in Vietnam, management and 
policy decisions are relatively centralised, and risk-sharing takes place at the 
provincial level. Under this scenario, the per capita externality of another person's 
inappropriate behaviour is very low. In other words, it is unlikely that one member 
would view what she thought to be the inappropriate use of health services by another 
member, as having a negative consequence for herself. If, however, the per capita 
externality of misuse by another is perceived to be considerable, or if such behaviour 
is deemed immoral, then highly cohesive communities may be less likely to suffer 
from moral hazard problems under insurance. 
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Research Question 10: Does social cohesion mitigate moral hazard? 
3.4 Concluding remarks 
A range of research questions is presented in this chapter. In summary, the first five 
relate to factors that are expected to have a significant influence on demand for 
voluntary health insurance in Vietnam. Drawing on the first two chapters, research 
questions are formulated based on both the predictions of theoretical models, 
evaluations of other schemes, and the specific context of Vietnam. The first examines 
the effect of health status, and hence examines a classic issue in insurance theory, 
namely adverse selection, in the context of a low-income country. Research questions 
two, three and four, examine the influence of worry about future health status, 
economic status, and levels of education respectively. 
Research questions five and six also address demand for health insurance, but analyse 
the effect of community level characteristics. The fifth question aims to generate 
knowledge on an under-researched issue, mass organisations, whilst the sixth 
incorporates ideas from sociology, political science, and development economics, and 
addresses the effect of levels of social cohesion on demand for formal health 
insurance. Perceptions of corruption in government, and a sense of duty to the State, a 
central concept in Confucianism, are also considered in the development of this 
particular hypothesis. A framework of risk-reducing strategies is proposed, in which 
government health insurance constitutes only one of a range of risk-reducing strategies 
for households. 
Research Questions 7 to J 0 address the impact of health insurance on a variety of 
policy objectives. These include patient satisfaction, out-of-pocket expenditures, 
treatment-seeking behaviour, and the effect of social cohesion on moral hazard. Each 
question is tested empirically, in Chapters 5-7, using data from a household survey 
and in-depth interviews, which are discussed next. 
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Research 
Question 
1 Does voluntary health insurance in Vietnam suffer from adverse 
selection? 
1 Do levels of worry about future health status influence 
probabilities of health insurance purchase? 
3 Does individual economic status influence the probability of 
health insurance purchase? 
4 Do educational levels influence the probability of health 
insurance purchase? 
S Does membership of a mass organisation influence the 
probability of health insurance ~urchase? 
6 Does social cohesion increase or decrease the probability of 
health insurance purchase? 
7 What is the impact of voluntary health insurance on patient 
satisfaction? 
8 What is the effect of being insured on total out-of-pocket health 
expenditures? 
9 What is the effect of being insured on treatment-seeking 
behaviour? 
10 Does social cohesion mitigate moral hazard? 
TABLE 3.2: SUMMARY OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
.. 
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4.1 General approach 
The research questions posed in the previous chapter are tested empirically using 
primary data collected through both a household survey of 2,751 individuals, and in-
depth interviews with fifty-one individuals. Data were collected in partnership with 
researchers from the Institute of Sociology (lOS) in Hanoi (see both the Authors 
Declaration and Acknowledgements at the beginning of this thesis). Depending on the 
specific research question, different instruments for data collection are appropriate. 
For example, when evaluating the impact of insurance on patient satisfaction, which 
includes personal opinions and perceptions about the quality of health services, 
qualitative data are generally considered more accurate. In the case of data collected 
on out-of-pocket expenditures, respondents provided estimates as part of a structured 
interview, and the data analysed using statistical techniques. In addition, data 
regarding unofficial payments, a more sensitive issue, were collected through in-depth 
interviews. The rationale for adopting both techniques was a concern that the 
interviewee would not disclosure certain infonnation during the more fonnal, less 
relaxed environment, of the structured interview. 
Chapter 2 summarised the main fmdings of relevant previous studies, including 
attempts to measure social capital. Given the focus of this thesis on voluntary health 
insurance, a choice-based sampling approach is used, in which both members and 
eligible non-members of the Vietnamese scheme are interviewed. Uninsured 
individuals thus fonn the control group, allowing the impact of health insurance on 
various aspects of the health system to be evaluated. It was argued in Chapter I that 
further enrolment into the compulsory scheme, will be detennined as much by broader 
economic development, as by policy measures designed to ensure compliance. Whilst 
compulsory schemes do not suffer from problems of adverse selection, moral hazard 
remains a potential problem. Blrnighausen and Sauerbom (2002) stress the need for 
voluntary schemes to gradually introduce compulsion as soon as is feasible. 
Of the three sub-groups eligible for voluntary health insurance (see Figure 1.3), only 
two, schoolchildren/students (sub-group I), self-employed, fanners, and other 
informal workers (sub-group 3) must purchase a policy. Greater coverage amongst the 
other group, those in need of humanitarian assistance (i.e. those living below the 
poverty line - sub-group 2), is dependent on both the level of funds available with 
government, as well as the expenditure priority given to this group. Increases in 
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coverage for 8PL families will not result from a better understanding of demand for 
health insurance; hence this group is also excluded from the surveY3. As noted in the 
previous chapter, substantial increases in risk-sharing across the Vietnamese 
population at current levels of economic development will, in the future, be achievable 
principally through the greater coverage of adults under the voluntary scheme, the 
majority of whom are farmers, and self-employed workers in the informal sector. Data 
analysis is conducted in two ways34. First, econometric techniques are used to test 
hypotheses using data collected through a household survey. Secondly, qualitative 
data were collected on sensitive issues (e.g. unofficial payments) and those relating to 
opinions (e.g. perceptions of service quality). These data also help to add meaning and 
understanding to coefficients generated through statistical analysis. 
At the design stage of the research, several different approaches were considered. 
Initially, the intention was to conduct two household surveys approximately eighteen 
months apart, giving a temporal dimension to the data, and allowing changes over time 
to be assessed. This approach was changed, however, to only one, cross-sectional 
survey, primarily due to the fact that the household questionnaire took longer to 
design than anticipated, due to the complexities of the scheme which it was necessary 
to understand in order to produce a questionnaire of adequate quality. To achieve this, 
a range of interviews, field trips, and pre-testing of the questionnaire were conducted 
(see Part 4.2.2). 
Any sample-based research aiming to draw conclusions about a larger population will 
be subject to error or bias. First, error may result when the sample is not representative 
of the larger population, making any statistical inference invalid. In order to prevent, 
or limit the possibility of drawing an unrepresentative sample, two techniques are 
commonly used. The first is to draw a random sample and the second to draw a 
sufficiently large sample. Both approaches are adopted in this study (see Part 4.2.1). 
Despite this, any sample will still include a degree of random error, which must be 
accounted for during statistical analysis. 
33 Due to the relatively low coverage of families defined as below the poverty line (BPL) in the 
voluntary health insurance scheme, individuals in BPL households may consider it worthwhile 
to purchase insurance. Based on the figures presented in Part 1.3.1, however, very few 
observations in the sample fall below either poverty line definition. 
34 Deaton (1997) was an invaluable text, regularly consulted during research design and data 
analysis. 
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A second potential source of error, which is frequently problematic, is sampling bias, 
which refers to the tendency to systematically favour the selection of individuals with 
a particular characteristic, even when a sample is randomly drawn. A common cause 
of such bias is the self-selection of individuals into the programme intervention being 
evaluated. or a characteristic that consistently influences whether or not an individual 
agrees to be interviewed. In many cases, such bias can be prevented, for example 
through the timing of a survey. Otherwise, sample selection bias must be handled at 
the analysis stage, using statistical techniques such as the Mills Rati0 3s. From an 
econometric perspective, sample selection is the major issue for this thesis, given that 
entry into the insurance scheme is voluntary. Sample selection bias is dealt with using 
statistical techniques in Chapters 6 and 7, and is discussed in detail later in this 
chapter. 
Error may also result from the inaccurate measurement of variables, as well as from 
respondent, and interviewer bias. For example, the emphasis or intonation used by the 
interviewer when asking a question has the potential to alter the response. Bias may 
also occur from a respondent effect, for example, when opinions on a sensitive issue 
are being sought e.g. matters that the respondent considers personal, or those that are 
politically controversial. The well-documented Hawthorne effect results when 
respondents alter their behaviour in the knowledge that they are being studied. In the 
original study, it was found that the research intervention itself had a psychological 
effect on workers, which directly led to an increase in their productivity. Techniques 
such as double-blind trials have been developed to prevent such bias. The following 
section provides more details of the sampling approach used in this thesis. 
Finally, it is important to stress at this point, that better information on the way in 
which the delivery of health services varies across the survey sites, would enhance the 
research presented here, which has a strong demand side focus. Whilst Chapter I 
provides an overview of issues such as the setting of premia, reimbursement of 
providers, detailed information on local variations, would allow the findings to be 
interpreted with fuller information and hence accuracy. 
35 This selection correction approach was developed by Heckman (1979), and is widely used in 
econometrics to deal with the problem of sample selection bias within survey data. 
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4.2 Household survey 
This section describes both the sampling framework and questionnaire used for the 
household survey. A copy of the questionnaire can be found in Appendix 4. 
Household survey interviews were conducted between April and June 1999. 
4.2.1 Sampling design 
A two-stage approach to sampling was used. In the first stage, clusters of sampling 
units were selected, based on the administrative unit of communes, and in the second 
stage, individuals within each unit were randomly selected for interview. Only those 
provinces with a functioning voluntary health insurance scheme were included in the 
sampling frame for the selection of communes, amounting to fifty-five out of sixty-
one provinces at the time of the survey. Secondly, given the focus on adults and 
children who must pay for health insurance (as opposed to those who are eligible for 
compulsory, or fully subsidised voluntary health insurance), provinces without any 
such members were also removed from the sampling frame. In many provinces, only 
school health insurance has been developed and no paying adult members exist - this 
was the case in thirty-six provinces (see Appendix 1). Following background reading. 
and discussions with Vietnamese colleagues, it was also considered important for the 
survey to capture the significant socio-economic and cultural differences existing 
between communities in north and south Vietnam. discussed in Part 1.3 of this thesis. 
Such differences may influence attitudes towards risk or indeed towards government 
programmes. 
Initially, based on membership information provided by the Vietnamese Health 
Insurance Agency (VHIA) in Hanoi, two provinces were selected for fieldwork. These 
were Ninh Binh Province, and Dong Thap Province. in north and south Vietnam 
respectively. These provinces were considered typical of their region i.e. 
predominantly rural, but also had a functioning voluntary health insurance scheme. 
Further discussions were held with the Director of the YHIA. who requested that Hai 
Phong Province also be included as a second province in the north, in order to analyse 
the situation in a more advanced scheme. with relatively high levels of awareness and 
membership. This would also allow comparisons to be made with the less developed 
schemes in Ninh Binh and Dong Thap Provinces. An alternative approach would have 
been to select one province with a functioning scheme, and one without as the control, 
but it was felt that there would be too many area effects to account for in the 
econometric analysis, under such an approach. 
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Following discussions, it was agreed to include Hai Phong Province, but with a 
smaller sample size due to time and cost constraints. Within each province, districts 
were first categorised as either urban or rural. One urban and two rural districts were 
then randomly selected in each province, to broadly reflect the predominantly rural 
population structure of Vietnam. In each district, three communes, referred to as wards 
in urban areas, were randomly selected, giving a total of eleven districts and twenty-
seven communes included in the survey (see Appendix 3). Lists were supplied by the 
respective provincial VHIA offices containing the names of all members of the 
scheme in those communes selected, together with contact details. 
The second stage of the sampling process was to select the names of individuals 
within communes for interview. A stratified random sampling approach was used i.e. 
the population to which inferences are made were stratified into two sub-groups within 
sample clusters (i.e. communes), and a random sample drawn independently from 
each. In the econometrics literature this approach is tenned choice-based, or 
endogenous sampling, following Manski and Lerman (1977), wherein a sequence of 
chosen alternatives are drawn and the characteristics of the decision-makers observed 
i.e. observations are drawn based on the values of the variable endogenous to the 
model in question. In the dataset used here, the choice alternative is a binary one i.e. 
whether or not an individual has purchased voluntary health insurance. In contrast, 
exogenous sampling does the reverse i.e. a sample of decision-makers is drawn, and 
their characteristics and behaviour observed. 
Rather than creating two separate lists, one for adults and another for children, and 
drawing separate samples, which would have been extremely time consuming, it was 
decided to draw a sample of adults only. Ouring the interview, adults were then asked 
whether any children between the age of 6-17 years were living in the household. If 
so, a separate interview was completed for each child. Sub-groups of the sampled 
population can be defined as follows: 
• adult members (aged at least 18 years; currently a member, or has bought 
voluntary health insurance post January 1 It 1997) 
• eligible adult non-members (aged at least 18 years; never been a member, or 
has not bought voluntary health insurance post January lit 1997) 
• child members (aged 6-17 years; currently a member, or has bought voluntary 
health insurance post January I at 1997) 
• child non-members (aged 6-17 years - in Vietnam, children generally begin 
school at age 6 years.) 
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As a result of issues arising during sampling, it was necessary to use two different 
definitions of 'being insured' depending on the specific research question being 
analysed, for data analysis (see discussion later in this section). Given the importance 
of sample size for statistical inference, insured individuals were deliberately over-
sampled. At the time of the survey, data on membership of the scheme nationally were 
only available for 1997 (see Tables 4.1-4.3 and Appendix I). Manski and Lerman 
(1977: 1978) continue that, in a probabilistic choice model (such as the probit model 
presented in Chapter 5), .... .it is assumed that the analyst knows the fraction of the 
decision-making population selecting each alternative." This infonnation is available 
separately for each of the three provinces included in the survey (see Tables 4.1 to 
4.3). Studenmund (1997) also points out with respect to a logit model, which is similar 
to a probit model, that: 
"It's also important that a logit sample contains a reasonable 
representation of both alternative choices .... .It turns out that using 
different sampling rates for subgroups within the sample does not cause 
bias in the slope coefficients of a logit model even if it does in a linear 
regression." (Studenmund 1997: 512) 
Previous studies of demand for private health insurance follow the choice-based 
sampling approach. For example, Propper (1989) selects samples independently from 
insured and uninsured to ensure sufficient observations in each, for the estimation of a 
probit model. Propper (1989: 782-3) discusses the most efficient size of the 
proportions of the two groups, drawing on the work of Amemiya (1985) and Cosslett 
( 1981). They estimate that a 50010-50% split, on the binary dependent variable, 
minimises the ratio of asymptotic variance under the chosen sampling scheme to the 
variance under exogenous sampling, and is hence the ideal sampling ratio between the 
two groups. 
Asymptotic efficiency refers to estimates with minimum variance, whereas 
asymptotically unbiased means that for large samples one expects to get the true value 
on average. Under choice-based sampling, however, the probability of an insured 
individual being sampled is far higher than for an uninsured individual, which does 
not reflect the true situation. This problem is overcome by weighting the data (see Part 
4.4.2). The uninsured sample was selected from comprehensive lists of all residents in 
each commune, provided by the local Commune People's Committee, and is defined 
as individuals who are eligible for voluntary insurance but have not yet bought it (or 
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HaiPhong Ninh Binh Dong Thap 
Insured Uninsured Insured Uninsured Insured Uninsured 
Population 294,600 177,186 100,800 148,516 65,000 376,330 
Children Sample 18S 34 324 94 262 202 
Population 61,500 467,069 1,055 363,517 870 708,047 
Adults Sample 184 137 289 373 322 345 
Population 356,100 644,255 101,855 512,033 65,870 1,084,377 
All Sample 369 171 613 467 584 547 
TABLE 4.1: SAMPLING RA nos 
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Province 
----
Tar get population 
Co nfidence level 
Re quired sample36 
tual sample (adults Ac 
ins 
surv 
ured at time of 
ey) 
tual sample (adults Ac 
and 
tim 
children insured at 
e of survey) 
tual sample (adults Ac 
ins 
011 
ured since 
01/1997) 
tual sample (adults Ac 
and 
sin 
children insured 
ce 01/0111997) 
HaiPbona Nlnh Blnb Dool! Tbap __ 
356,100 101,855 65,870 
95% 99010 95% 99% 95% 99% 
150 260 150 259 150 259 
158 28 192 
210 33 300 
184 289 322 
369 613 584 
TABLE 4.2: SAMPLE SIZE: INSURED POPULA TlON37 
36 This assumes a confidence interval of eight percentage points. 
Total 
~-.---
523,835 
95% 99% 
150 260 
378 
543 
795 
1,566 
37 This definition thus includes adults and children, but excludes those with compulsory or 
humanitarian insurance. 
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-
Province 
-- --
T arget population 
c onfidence level 
R equired sample36 
ctual sample (adults A 
un 
su 
insured at time of 
rvey) 
ctual sample (adults A 
an 
at 
d children uninsured 
time of survey) 
ctual sample (adults A 
un 
o 
insured since 
110111997) 
A ctual sample (adults 
d children uninsured an 
SI nce 0110111997) 
Hal Pbong Nlnb Blnb Doni Tbap 
644,255 512,033 1,084,377 
95% 99% 95% .99% 94% 99% 
150 260 150 260 150 260 
163 634 475 
330 1047 831 
137 373 345 
171 467 547 
TABLE 4.3: SAMPLE SIZE: UNINSURED POPULATION 
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2,240,665 
95% 99% 
150 260 
1,272 
2,208 
855 
1,185 
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not since January 151 1997). The questionnaire consisted of two parts. The household 
section collected data on three separate issues; socio-economic information about all 
individuals living in the household (Section A of the questionnaire in Appendix 4), 
data on the respondent's local community, including perceptions of social cohesion, 
and membership in local organisations (Section B), and thirdly information regarding 
physical access to health facilities (Section C). 
Sections 0 to G of the questionnaire constitutes the individual section, in which data 
unique to the sampled individual were collected on the following issues: health 
seeking behaviour, utilisation of health services (frequency and type of facility), 
private expenditures during the most recent contact with a health provider, satisfaction 
with various aspects of health services, and several questions regarding their 
experience of, and opinions about, the health insurance scheme. The content of the 
individual questionnaire varied slightly, -depending on whether the respondent was 
insured. Reducing the number of filters minimised mistakes during interviews38• With 
respect to interviews concerning children, a parent or guardian, was questioned on 
their behalf. 
At the beginning of the interview, the respondent was asked a series of screening 
questions to cross-check their insurance status i.e. that individuals in the member 
sample were neither a member of the compulsory scheme (this was the case for 
seventy-one respondents), nor a recipient of free health insurance through 
humanitarian assistance (the case for eighteen respondents). In such cases, the 
interview was terminated and apologies made to the interviewee. Screening allowed 
errors in the sampling frame to be removed. Quotas were also set to ensure that the 
50%-50% ratio of interviews with members and non-members was broadly 
maintained. The approach to sampling is summarised in Figure 4.1, and the 
characteristics of the overall sample presented in Tables 4.1 to 4.3. 
Several issues arose during fieldwork. First, and most problematic, was the discovery 
that the sale of policies to adults in Ninh Binh Province had been suspended during the 
previous twelve months. This information became known during discussions with the 
Director of VHIA in Ninh Binh Province. There was no previous indication of this 
problem, which was apparently due to growing financial debt. The extremely low 
38 In other words where, depending on the response given to a certain question, subsequent 
irrelevant questions were skipped. 
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uninsured sample 
(1.185) 
Children in 
household 
interviewed 
t 
Screening question 
at beginning of 
interview confirms 
non-member status 
t 
Adult non-members 
randomly selected 
.... 
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(2.751 individuals) 
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Communes (27) 
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.. 
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Member!insured 
sample 
(1.566) 
t 
Children in 
household 
interviewed 
t 
Screening question 
at beginning of 
interview confirms 
member status 
t 
Adult members 
randomly selected 
FIGURE 4.1: PROCESS OF SELECTING INDIVIDUALS FOR SURVEY 
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, ..... ",--_._---------------_._" .. -._-
Sub-Category 
Households 
Number of 
Interviews 
1,663 
_I~n:..::dc:...civ_'_id_u __ a ls ____________ . ___ . _~.!J2 ... L 
Adults 1,650 (60%) 
__ ~!1_ild~::.::n'---__________ .. ___ ._ .. _____ !.1J..°t{4Q~L 
Males 1,409 (51%) 
~F~ema==l=es~ _____________________ ~1~4~~~l. 
Urban residents 917 (33%) 
Rural residents 
Members of voluntary scheme / insured 1,566 (57%) 
.. Non-members of voluntary scheme / uninsured ~ 181.H3~L 
Insured adults 795 
Insured children 771 
------_._--_._._--
Resident of Hai Phong Province 540 (20%) 
Resident ofNinh Sinh Province 1.080 (39%) 
Resident of Dong Thap Province 1.131 (41%) 
TABLE 4.4: SUMMARY OF SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS 
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number of current members in the scheme posed a problem for sample size. One 
solution considered was to select a new province to replace Ninh Binh. However, it 
was felt that, due to time constraints, and the possibility of further uncertainties in a 
newly selected province, that fieldwork would continue in Ninh Binh. Following 
discussions with local officials. it was decided to boost the insured sample by 
including all individuals who had purchased voluntary health insurance since 1 II 
January 1997. This definition was subsequently used in each of the three provinces to 
ensure consistency in sample definition. 
However. a retrospective definition of being insured raises issues for data analysis e.g. 
establishing the causal impact of health insurance on out-of-pocket health 
expenditures. For such questions, data are typically limited to the most recent illness 
e.g. within the previous month, or three months, in order to minimise recall bias. 
Specific questions were thus included in the questionnaire to establish whether the 
respondent was insured at the time of the interview, allowing two definitions of being 
insured to be used depending on the specific research question being addressed. The 
actual definition used is discussed in each of the results chapters. In the final sample, 
only 5% of insured respondents in Ninh Binh were members at the time of the 
interview, compared with 57% Hai Phong and 51% in Dong Thap. 
Further problems arose in Ninh Binh Province regarding the quality of membership 
information supplied by the Provincial Health Insurance Office. The approach was for 
fieldwork supervisors from the Institute of Sociology to contact local commune 
leaders to discuss the research project. and to request their assistance in locating the 
residence of sampled individuals. However, in the three selected urban wards of Ninh 
Binh Town. a large number of the names supplied were not correct or locatable. 
To overcome this problem, around one hundred local co-operators in each ward and 
street were asked to help locate the selected individuals. Furthermore, in order to reach 
the quota of insured respondents in this urban district, it was necessary to include all 
five wards rather than the three initially selected. The final split was as follows: Hai 
Phong (two urban wards and four rural communes), Ninh Binh (six urban wards and 
six rural communes). and Dong Thap (three urban wards and six rural communes). 
Thirdly, initial data analysis showed that there was a considerable number of missing 
values on questions regarding distance to a health facility (see Section C of the 
questionnaire). If non-responses to a particular question are systematically driven by 
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________________ c, ____ c".,. _. __ 
an underlying factor, and for a substantial number of respondents, then an unobserved 
factor is influencing and biasing the results. This issue is commonly referred to in 
econometrics as unobserved heterogeneity. For example, if individuals who have 
never visited a health facility are significantly less likely to respond to questions 
regarding distance, then a hidden or unobserved effect is at play, which results in 
correlation between the error term and the dependent variable. Such bias must be 
corrected during analysis. Regressors representing insurance status, where 
membership is voluntary, are also prone to self-selection bias and unobserved 
heterogeneity, an issue discussed further in Part 4.4.2. 
With respect to non-responses to questions regarding distance to health facilities, it 
was decided to recollect the information by telephoning local commune officials from 
Hanoi. Officials were asked to estimate the average distance from the main 
government building in their commune to a variety of health facilities. However, some 
of this additional data was also incomplete. At the province level, contextual 
• information was available in the Health Statistics Yearbook 199939, whilst data 
concerning local health problems and health infrastructure were obtained both through 
interviews with leaders of Provincial VHIA, and local government officials in each of 
the respective communes. This information is summarised in Appendix 3. 
4.2.2 Household questionnaire 
The structured household questionnaire was developed over a period of nine months, 
following a literature review, discussions with national and provincial directors of the 
VHIA, and preliminary in-depth discussions with members and non-members of the 
scheme. This was an iterative process, in which field trips were conducted to 
familiarise the author with the Vietnamese health and health insurance system, and to 
pilot the questionnaire. 
Linguistic and cultural differences between the author as researcher and Vietnamese 
colleagues increased the potential for error during the research, for example through 
measurement error, resulting from misunderstood concepts or objectives. However, as 
the survey was conducted as part of a wider research project funded by the U.K. 
Government's Department for International Development, funds were available to 
39 This document is produced by the Health Statistics and Informatic Division of the Ministry 
of Health. 
134 
Chapter 4: Research methods 
............ _._-----------------_._---
employ Vietnamese researchers with whom a relationship was developed, allowing a 
mutual understanding about the project to evolve. This was critical given the 
supervisory role played by the author in data collection. The collaboration with 
researchers from the Institute of Sociology (lOS) in Hanoi, many of whom spoke good 
English, enabled many issues to be discussed, at length and in detail. 
Initially, the household questionnaire and topic guides for in-depth interviews were 
developed in English, and discussed with colleagues at the University of York. 
Researchers from the lOS then translated the questionnaires into Vietnamese. In order 
to reduce to a minimum, errors and misinterpretations resulting from the translation 
process, an independent Vietnamese researcher fluent in written and spoken English, 
was employed to back-translate the questionnaire from Vietnamese into English, 
allowing this version to be cross-checked with the original English version. This 
researcher worked only from the Vietnamese version, and had not seen the original 
questionnaire in English. Further issues concerning data reliability, and measures 
taken to ensure its quality, are discussed in Part 4.4. 
Interviews were conducted by local teachers who were paid for their work. For 
example, in Dong Thap Province thirteen interviewers were recruited from the School 
of Politics in Sa Dec Town. Training sessions were held to sensitise interviewers about 
the objectives of the research project, to ensure both familiarity with the questionnaire, 
and that essential interviewer techniques were followed. Close supervision was 
maintained throughout the fieldwork. As local residents, teachers were also helpful in 
obtaining the assistance of commune leaders to help in locating households. 
4.2.3 Measuring contextual variables 
Part 2.3 highlighted the contradictory assumptions made by different authors about 
whether social capital is high or low in Chinese society, according to varying 
interpretations of the influences of Confucianism and Communism, two features also 
common to Vietnamese society. The main measure of community structure used in 
this thesis is the level of social cohesion at the commune level. This approach has been 
used by several authors to represent social capital, for example Narayan and Pritchett 
(1997) (see Part 2.2.4). However, this thesis does not equate social cohesion with 
social capital. 
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One of the more convincing arguments in the social capital literature, however, is the 
idea of closure within social networks, which is arguably an important determinant of 
levels of social cohesion. Following discussions with Vietnamese colleagues, and 
given limitations of space within the questionnaire, it was felt that a direct question to 
respondents regarding their perception of social cohesion in the community in which 
they live, would be satisfactory. Social cohesion is also a concept that is easily 
translated into Vietnamese, and its meaning is widely understood. Data on perceptions 
of social cohesion were collected using two different instruments. First, as part of the 
structured questionnaire, a direct question was put to respondents about their 
perceptions of social cohesion within the local community, with responses ranked 
against a simple five-point scale (see question b33). Secondly, information was 
collected through in-depth interviews, arguably a more valid instrument for the 
collection of data on such an issue. 
It should be stressed that this measure captures individual perceptions of cohesion. 
Social cohesion cannot by definition, exist at the individual level, and hence this 
measure alone is not reliable as a measure of levels of social cohesion within a 
community. Despite this, individual perceptions may have an important influence on 
the individual insurance purchase decision (see in particular the substitute hypothesis 
presented in Part 3.2.2). The effect of individual perceptions is hence also included as 
a separate explanatory variable in the analysis presented in Chapter 5. 
When individual perceptions are aggregated at the commune level, however, the 
results represent more than individual perceptions and arguably embody a valid 
measure of how cohesive a commune is. If, for example, a large number of individuals 
within the same community all say that they perceive their local community to be a 
highly cohesive one, then this is likely to reflect actual social cohesion. The variable is 
analysed in further detail in the next chapter. Qualitative data are also used to interpret 
the results for this coefficient. 
As discussed in Part 1.5, membership in a mass organisation is not considered a true 
expression of civil society40. Drawing on ideas in the social capital literature, however, 
they probably still play an important role in facilitating collective action. This issue 
exposes one of the weaknesses of the social capital literature. Whilst Putnam stresses 
40 See in particular Putnam's (1993a) work on Catholicism and civic behaviour in Italy 
discussed in Part 2.2. 
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civil society, Coleman stresses closures and social cohesion - it could be argued, using 
Fukuyama's idea of a radius of trust, that these two definitions actually reflect 
diametrically opposed community structures. 
With respect to mass organisations, further research is clearly required to improve 
understanding of the way in which they function. However, data on membership in a 
range of mass organisations, together with some qualitative data, were collected as 
part of the survey. This was justified on the basis of their potential importance for 
various other aspects of the research; first, mass organisations often offer savings and 
insurance mechanisms for their members; secondly, group membership is an important 
mechanism to mitigate adverse selection problems in voluntary health insurance 
schemes; and thirdly, as noted above, mass organisations are an under-researched 
phenomenon, particularly during the current period of economic transition. Hence, it 
was felt that further investigation might lead to useful theoretical and empirical 
insights. In the analysis presented in Chapter S, this variable is included at both the 
individual and the commune level, the latter reflecting, to some extent, network 
density. 
The questions posed to respondents in the household survey questionnaire are adapted 
from the work of both Narayan and Pritchett (1997) and Grootaert (1999) described 
earlier (see Section B of the questionnaire in Appendix 4). Respondents were 
presented with a list of names of common mass organisations in Vietnam, and asked 
whether or not they were a member (see questions b23 and b24 in Appendix 4). The 
organisations included were the Farmers Union, the Women's Union and the 
Veteran's Union (which were considered to be the most closely aligned with the 
Government of Vietnam), the Elderly Union, the Peer Union, the Longevity Union 
and Funeral Groups, defined fonowing discussions with the Institute of Sociology. 
Additional information was collected on various qualitative aspects of the organisation 
identified as the most important to the respondent, following the approach of Narayan 
and Pritchett (1997). It was later decided, however, not to use this data given the 
conceptual uncertainty over the value of heterogeneous versus homogenous 
membership structure. 
4.3 In-depth interviews 
Qualitative information can be collected using a variety of instruments (see for 
example Marshall and Rossman (1999). First, participation, or participant-
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observation, involves the researcher conducting the activity being researched 
themselves, and is a technique used extensively by anthropologists. Under the 
observation approach, the researcher records information whilst observing the activity 
being studied. A third technique is in-depth interviews, which may include informal 
conversations, the use of broad interview guides (or topic guides), or open-ended 
interviews. 
Qualitative data were collected for two purposes. The first was to confirm the validity 
of the research questions in the early preparatory stages, and to identify other issues 
for inclusion. A small number of informal discussions and in-depth interviews were 
conducted with members and eligible non-members of the insurance scheme. 
Secondly, several research questions required information to be collected about, for 
example, perceptions of social cohesion in the local community, pooling funds for 
risk-sharing, health seeking behaviour, the quality of health services provided by 
health professionals, and satisfaction with health insurance. 
In-depth interviewers allow a more in-depth understanding of the issues being 
researched. Information is collected in order to understand the local situation, without 
pre-determined ideas, and conversations are allowed to flow naturally, rather than 
being structured with pre-determined questions as in the household questionnaire 
(Walker 1985). Interviews were conducted with fifty-one individuals who had already 
completed full structured interviews. In order to focus the <iiscussion, interviewers 
were provided with Topic Guides (see Appendix 5). Fieldwork for the main in-depth 
interviews was conducted in September and November 1999, with both members and 
non-members of health insurance selected from the original random sample. One 
district in each of the three study provinces was selected for fieldwork, together with a 
mixture of rural and urban communes within each. 
On average, six interviews were conducted in each selected commune or ward, three 
defined as members and three as non-members. Quotas were set to ensure a balanced 
mix of interviews with males and females, people of different age groups, and 
economic status. Each interview was tape-recorded with the interviewee's permission. 
All information was transcribed into an Excel spreadsheet file, and then imported into 
the Access database programme to allow keyword searches and analysis by sub-
category of respondent to be easily conducted. Verbatim quotes are integrated in the 
discussion of econometric results in the three ~ollowing chapters. 
138 
Chapter 4: Research methods 
Greenhalgh and Taylor (1997) stress the importance of qualitative research in terms of 
its validity (closeness to the truth), rather than reliability (repeatability), which is a 
feature of quantitative analysis. They continue, that qualitative analysis should touch 
upon the core of what is going on, rather than skimming the surface. One potential 
pitfall, when using qualitative data, is to use isolated, interesting quotes, which may be 
slightly misleading to the reader. In this study, the author ensured a familiarity with 
the data, in order to avoid any such misrepresentation. Hence, clusters of verbatim 
quotations are used in the results chapters, to reflect an underlying them in the data. 
Combining quantitative and qualitative methodologies is increasingly commonplace in 
social science research, each complementing and enhancing the other (see for example 
Casley and Kumar (1988), and Walker (1985). Interestingly, Harriss (2002) argues 
that qualitative research can be rigorous, and that sophisticated mathematical 
modelling can actually be very soft, because of the simplistic or occasionally false 
assumptions on which it rests. The two approaches are brought together in this thesis 
in the interpretation of regression analysis. Without additional qualitative data, 
regression coefficients can often be interpreted in several often contradictory ways. 
Figure 4.2 summarises the research tools used. 
4.4 Data Issues 
Once household interviews were completed, paper questionnaires were taken to the 
lOS offices in Hanoi. Responses from each of the 2,751 questionnaires were then 
entered manually, under cl,?se supervision, into the SPSS statistical software package, 
by a local company with experience of such work. A separate variable was created for 
each question, defined as either numeric or non-numeric, and labelled to ensure ease 
of recognition during data analysis. Two separate SPSS files were created, one 
containing information from the household section of the questionnaire (i.e. 1,663 
observations), and the other information from the individual questionnaire (i.e. 2,751 
observations). The two SPSS files were then merged on the basis of unique province, 
commune, and household codes. Where more than one individual questionnaire was 
completed within the same household, each observation thus has identical values for 
the household section of the questionnaire. The dataset was later converted into the 
STAT A statistical software package, for data analysis. This is a more flexible software 
package for econometric modelling and features a user forum for discussion on 
technical issues. 
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FIGURE 4.2: INSTRUMENTS USED FOR DATA COLLECTION 
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Data-entry is a potential source of non-sampling error, which, if extensive, can lead to 
inaccurate statistical inference. Several steps were take~ to limit such problems. First, 
each completed questionnaire was checked immediately after the interview for errors 
or other problems by one of the supervisors, minimising coding error. Secondly, at the 
data analysis stage, the data entry form in SPSS incorporated controls for skip 
questions (i.e. filter questions, where a respondent misses out several irrelevant 
questions when a particular response is given41 ), range (e.g. where don't know 
responses are coded as 99, or 999), and was used to ensure internal inconsistency. 
Most human error in the coding of questionnaires was thus identified during data 
entry, e.g. an interviewee coded both as male and pregnant. In such a case, cross-
checks were made using sampling information or other responses to the same 
questionnaire, in order to establish the true sex of the respondent. As a final check, 
after data entry 10% of the paper questionnaires were randomly selected, and cross-
checked with the electronic data files. 
4.4.1 Reliability of the data 
Extreme values are commonly caused by errors in data collection or entry. Given that 
many extreme values occur naturally and are valid, however, outliers require 
investigation rather than immediate elimination42• One example in the dataset was an 
outlying observation on a question regarding out-of-pocket expenditures, where one 
observation was recorded as having incurred a total expenditure of VNO 40 million. 
This was detected during descriptive data analysis, the next highest value being VNO 
9 million, with an overall mean value ofVNO 255,000 across the sample. 
After further investigation, the value was found to be valid. The respondent was an 
elderly male with a long-standing heart condition had remained in a provincial 
hospital for over one month. Of this amount, VNO 30 million was spent on 
consultation costs and medicines, despite the patient being insured, VND 5 million on 
accommodation for the patient and relatives, VNO 1 million in extra payments or 
gifts, and VND 4 million in other costs. Initial sensitivity analysis was conducted to 
assess the impact of this single value on the results, particularly during sub-group 
41 For example, if the response to question d38, which asks whether respondents have been ill 
in the previous three months, is zero, there should be no response to the following question 
about how many times a health worker was contacted. Rather, the respondent is filtered to 
either d40, or d42, depending on whether or not they are insured. 
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analysis when sample sizes became low. In this particular case, whilst mean values 
were sensitive to this outlier, the overall conclusions were not. Whilst the observation 
was valid it was omitted from the analysis presented in Chapter 6 for other reasons43• 
Missing data, usually due to non-responses to certain questions, are also common in 
interview-based surveys. For example, a poorly defined or unclear question is likely to 
lead to non-responses, as is poor quality interviewing e.g. where a question is 
routinely skipped in order to speed up an interview. If non-responses are random 
across the dataset i.e. data are randomly missing, then estimations will remain 
unbiased. If, however, some underlying factor is driving or causing non-responses i.e. 
data on one particular variable is missing, conditional on the value of another variable, 
then ignoring this fact will lead to biased estimates. Assuming it is not feasible to re-
collect data on the variable in question, missing values can be dealt with in three ways. 
First, the entire observation can be dropped, secondly, a new value can be imputed, or 
thirdly a proxy variable may be used. 
As noted earlier in Part 4.2.1, there were substantial numbers of missing values on the 
question about distance to a health facility (question c37). It was, however, possible to 
recollect the data from another source, although problems still existed with the data. In 
this particular case a dummy variable representing whether the respondent lives in an 
urban or a rural community was used, although a substantial amount of precision is 
lost by using this proxy. 
4.4.2 Common issues in data analysis 
In each of Chapters 5-7, econometric analysis is presented, and qualitative data used to 
enrich the interpretation of the estimated coefficients. The motivation for each model 
is set out in the respective chapter. Many of the issues that must be dealt with during 
the analysis are common, for example the problem of sample selection bias in 
Chapters 6 and 7. Many of the explanatory variables are common across models. One 
such variable, health status, is discussed later. Economic status is commonly proxied 
by per capita annual consumption expenditure in econometric studies. The reason for 
this is that survey responses about household expenditures are considered more 
42 In other words, data quality is achieved by removing outliers only when they are the result of 
error. 
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reliable than those about income, and secondly that consumption expenditures tends to 
be smoother across seasons than income, particularly in agricultural communities: 
subsistent farmers form almost 42% of the adult sample. Perhaps most importantly, 
consumption expenditures are more important than income in determining levels of 
welfare, or standard of living. All financial data were collected in Vietnamese Dong 
(VND); at the time of the survey, US$l was equal to VND 13,500. 
4.4.2. J Weighting 
As a result of the choice-based sampling approach adopted, the probability of an 
insured individual being' sampled is far higher than it is for an uninsured individual. 
As noted by Deaton (1997), over-sampling of certain groups, in this case insured 
individuals, is often necessary in order to enhance the precision of estimates in 
regression analysis44. However, in order to mirror the true ratio of insured to uninsured 
individuals in the population, to which inferences are made, the data require 
weighting. 
In the sample, insured respondents constitute 56.9% of the total, although the 
proportion varies depending on the specific sample definition used to analyse each 
research question. For example, when only adults are used to analyse a question, 
members represent a lower 48.2% of the sample. Furthermore, the probability of being 
selected is not random between provinces, and hence data for each province are 
treated as a separate stratum and weights are applied separately for each province 
except where the data are pooled. 
For descriptive analysis, such as sample means, data are weighted using the aweight 
command in the STATA statistical software package. For regressions, the pweight 
sampling command is used, weights represent the inverse of the probability of the 
observation being chosen. Population data are taken from the National Census of 1999 
and are as follows: Hai Phong 1.673 million, Ninh Binh 0.884 million and Dong Thap 
1.565 million. 
43 The observation was dropped as the respondent concerned had fallen ill more than three 
months prior to the interview, the cut-off point used in order to minimise recall bias. 
44 In the case of Chapter 5, where the dependent variable is a dummy representing insurance 
status, the over-sampling of insured individuals minimises asymptotic variance relative to fully 
randomised, or experimental data. 
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4.4.2.2 Clustering and heteroscedasticity 
As in most surveys, sampling units were selected along the lines of pre-existing 
administrative units. In this study, individuals were selected within a limited number 
of communes. Hence, selected individuals are not randomly distributed over space, but 
are geographically grouped. Deaton (1997) notes that the advantage ofthis approach is 
that it allows data to be collected cost-effectively. 
However, selecting individuals within clusters leads to the possibility of intra-
commune correlation i.e. individuals from the same commune are more likely to 
behave similarly, than are individuals from different communes. If this is the case then 
non-zero correlation of responses between observations within communes may occur. 
Such correlation is problematic for statistical inference, biasing standard errors 
downwards, and allowing the null hypothesis to be rejected too frequently. Standard 
errors must thus be corrected, which is easily achieved in STA TA for example by 
using either the sry, or robust commands4s• 
Biased standard errors may also result from non-constant variation in the error term 
across observations, is common in panel or time-series datasets, and violates the 
assumption of constant error terms, which is required for the production of unbiased 
and consistent estimations. Water's discusses this issue in the context of the univariate 
and bivariate probit models he uses to estimate the effect of being insured on service 
utilisation, using data from Ecuador, and notes that "These techniques are subject to 
bias from heteroscedasticity, or non-constant variance" (Waters 1999). He continues 
that corrections must be made for the fact that error terms for individuals in the same 
household are likely to be correlated. 
Liao (1994) also points out that heteroscedasticity is a feature of limited dependent 
variable models, and has a similar effect to clustering, in that as explanatory variables 
are correlated across observations, so the regression residuals will also be correlated 
across observations. Again, further details are provided in each of the subsequent 
chapters. The robust command hence deals with both the problem of sample clusters 
45 It is unclear whether the 'svy' command can be used when estimating models that correct for 
sample selection, as presented in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. The robust command was thus used 
which, according to STATA " ... computes a robust variance estimator .... for ordinary data 
(each observation independent), clustered data (data not independent within groups, but 
independent across groups), and complex survey data with stratified cluster sampling." For 
further information, refer to the help function within the ST A TA software version 6.0. 
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within survey data, and heteroscedasticity resulting in part from the use of limited 
dependent variables. 
4.4.2.3 Sample selection, unobserved heterogeneity, endogeneity 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, unobserved heterogeneity is a common problem 
in econometric analysis, particularly when evaluating the effect of a programme 
intervention where participation is voluntary. Significantly, Jones (2000) uses the 
example of self-selection in insurance schemes, to illustrate this general problem: 
"The problem is to identify the effect of a 'treatment', for example, 
whether the individual has health insurance or not, on the outcome .... The 
pure causal effect cannot be identified from empirical data because the 
'counterfactual' can never be observed .... One response is to measure the 
average causal effect and attempt to estimate it with sample data ...... The 
problem for inference arise if a set of observed covariates and unobserved 
covariates are correlated and, in particular, if there are unobserved factors 
that influence whether an individual is selected in to the treatment group 
or how they respond to the treatment." (Jones 2000: 269) 
Mullahy (1997) discusses the issue in the context of count data models, and also uses 
the example of insurance status as a variable that is prone to self-selection bias. In one 
further example, Trivedi (2002), in a recent analysis of Vietnamese Living Standards 
Survey data from 1997-98, notes that when modelling the effect of being compulsorily 
insured on service utilisation, the insurance status variable can be treated as 
exogenous. For those who are voluntarily enrolled, however, individual choice plays 
an important role, which is an argument for treating the variable as endogenous, 
analogous to sample selection bias. However, Trivedi was unable to identify whether 
respondents were enrolled under the compulsory or voluntary scheme, and hence 
insurance status is treated as exogenous. 
Whilst in sample surveys certain characteristics of an individual will always be 
unobserved, this is a particularly important factor in voluntary health insurance 
schemes, as noted in the previous paragraphs. As there is likely to be a range of factors 
influencing the decision to purchase to health insurance, it is quite possible that some 
of these unobserved variables also influence utilisation behaviour (see Chapter 7), and 
private out-of-pocket expenditures on health (see part 6.2). For example, 
environmental and community-level factors may influence health status and, in turn, 
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demand for health insurance and patterns of service usage. Attitudes towards risk and 
treatment seeking are characteristics of each individual that may be unobserved, but 
influence both purchase of health insurance, and other behaviour processes such as the 
decision to seek care when feeling ill. Empirical analysis of Research Questions 6 to 9 
considers this problem, which is commonly referred to as unobserved heterogeneity. 
Different approaches exist to control, or correct for, unobserved heterogeneity, which 
results when self-selection into a voluntary health insurance is non-random. For 
example, the Heckman selection correction technique, widely used in econometric 
analysis, generates an Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) based on insurance status, which is 
then included in the particular model being estimated e.g. out-of-pocket expenditures. 
For example, Street et at. (1999) use the IMR to deal with the possibility that 
responses to questions on drug expenditures are systematically related to unobserved 
variables. The IMR approach is used as part of the dummy endogenous variable model 
presented in Chapter 6, which estimates the impact of being insured on out-of-pocket 
health expenditures. In Chapter 7, the effect of insurance on the decision to seek care 
is estimated using a bivariate probit model with sample selection, following the 
approach of Waters (1999) amongst others. 
Selection bias and endogeneity are often used synonymously in the literature (see in 
particular comments by Waters (1999: 475). However, the two can be interpreted quite 
differently. Whilst sample selection bias refers to influences not captured within an 
equation, endogeneity typically refers to variables, or regressors, that are included, but 
which have a recursive relationship with the dependent variable, violating the 
assumption that causality runs in only one direction, rather than two (see Studenmund 
1997: 529-530). 
A potentially endogenous explanatory variable used in the following analysis is health 
status. Respondents were asked to rate their own health status over the twelve months 
preceding the survey using a five-point scale, and to identify whether or not they 
suffered from a long-standing limiting illness. In the case of demand for health 
insurance, for which the retrospective definition of being insured is used, in order to 
boost the sample size, endogeneity is more likely to be a problem46• However. it is 
41> For example, an individual's health status may improve as a result of being insured. in which 
case reported health status at the time of the survey reflects an ex-post, rather than ex-ante, 
state., with respect to the purchase of health insurance. 
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argued that the core motivations for health insurance purchase are less subject to recall 
bias than responses to many other questions (e.g. those related to a particular 
experience at a health facility), and also that the fundamental socio-economic 
characteristics of respondents, which might influence this decision are, in the majority 
of cases, unlikely to have changed significantly across this period of time. 
4.5 Concluding remarks 
Two approaches are used to address the research questions defined in Chapter 3. The 
first is essentially deductive, with predictions made on the basis of existing theoretical 
models built on a series of assumptions, and tested using data collected from a 
representative population sample, which allows statistical inferences to be made. 
Logic underpins the cause and effect relationships inherent in these models, from the 
general to the specific situation of Vietnam, based on data collected through a 
structured questionnaire with predetermined questions and responses. However, 
drawing on empirical ~vidence from a range of countries, predictions are in some 
cases modified. By drawing a representative sample for insured and uninsured 
respondents in the survey provinces, inferences are made through hypothesis testing. 
Qualitative data are also collected, partly through open-ended responses to certain 
questions in the structured questionnaire, but primarily through in-depth interviews. 
This approach is inductive i.e. open-ended. Hence, overall, the research moves from 
the inductive (preliminary conversations and in-depth interviews), to the deductive 
(household questionnaire), and back to the inductive (in-depth interviews). 
The extent to which the results are generalisable to schemes in other provinces in 
Vietnam depends largely on the design of the sampling framework, which was 
discussed in the previous section. Given that the sample is randomised by choice, or 
within two stratified groups i.e. insured and uninsured populations, the data can be 
considered as representative of insured and eligible uninsured individuals in the three 
provinces where fieldwork took place, and to a large extent, generalisable to other 
provinces. Making generalisations to health insurance schemes in other countries is a 
more complicated matter, requiring assessment on a case-by-case basis. The key issue 
is the extent to which the health system and economy of another country, together 
with culture and other societal characteristics, differ from Vietnam. Further discussion 
of this issue is presented in the concluding chapter. 
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Chapter 5: Private demand for health insurance 
This chapter empirically tests Research Questions 1 to 5, by estimating of a model of 
demand for voluntary health insurance in Vietnam, using household survey data. 
Predictions based on theoretical models, and empirical evidence from health insurance 
schemes in other countries, were presented in Part 2.1. To summarise, demand for 
health insurance is, to a considerable degree, a function of demand for health care and, 
ultimately, a demand for health. In addition to the usual battery of individual socio-
economic characteristics, attitudes towards risk, which economics tackles using 
marginal utility of income theory, is an important part of existing frameworks. 
Empirical analysis of demand for health insurance, which is dominated by experience 
in high-income countries, is varied. This is perhaps not surprising, given the range of 
insurance products evaluated (e.g. whether or not they supplement or substitute for 
public insurance), variations in benefit packages, and differences in the price and 
quality elasticity of demand for health services across societies. Adverse selection and 
moral hazard, two issues central to the theory of health insurance, are analysed 
empirically in this chapter, to add to the currently limited evidence base from low-
income countries. 
Research Question 6, which asks whether social cohesion increases or decreases the 
probability of health insurance purchase, represents a new conceptual advance. Whilst 
there are now frequent references in the literature to the importance of social capital 
for the development of voluntary health insurance, most of the analysis is somewhat 
superficial, without discussing the definitional problems facing the concept. Only 
Hsiao (1995) attempts to develop a detailed framework, extending directly from 
(Coleman 1990) work on social capital, and its implications for collective action. Part 
2.2 attempts to unpick the social capital literature, arguing that due to definitional 
problems, the focus should remain on individual components of social structure (in 
this case social cohesion). Part 2.3 reviews Hsiao's proposition in the light of evidence 
from development economics, and presents an alternative hypothesis in which social 
cohesion, via informal risk-sharing networks, substitutes for formal health insurance. 
This proposition also incorporates the potential influence of perceptions of corruption, 
and duty to the State. 
Using data collected from a representative sample, of insured and uninsured 
individuals, inferences are made about factors driving insurance purchase. 
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Characteristics of both individuals and their communities are used to specify the 
demand function, with coefficients representing marginal effects on the probability of 
purchase. Qualitative data, based on in-depth interviews, are also incorporated into the 
analysis to enrich the interpretation of statistical results. 
5.1 Background and descriptive analysis 
5.1.1 Sample definition 
As discussed in Part 4.2, the definition of being insured was retrospectively extended 
to include all those who had bought a policy since 1st January 1997, in order to boost 
the sample of insured individuals47• Whilst this extended period creates a possible 
recall problem, it is argued that the core motivations for buying health insurance are 
less subject to recall bias than responses to many other questions. It is further argued 
that the fundamental socio-economic characteristics of respondents that might 
influence this decision are, in the majority of cases, unlikely to have changed 
significantly across this period48• However, the health status reported by individuals 
who had bought insurance more than one year before the survey (the period to which 
self-reported health status relates) might reflect improvements as a result of improved 
access to health services under insurance. If this were the case then adverse selection, 
the subject of Research Question J, would not be captured49• 
Secondly, the purchase decision is only modelled for adults, for several reasons. The 
decision to purchase school health insurance is made by a parent or guardian for their 
child i.e. an agent makes the decision. The agency problem is common in health care 
markets, best known for the role played by physicians, in determining the health 
services consumed by a patient. As discussed in Part 2.1.2, previous studies have 
motivated a two-part model to deal with physician-agency (e.g. Pohlmeier and Ulrich 
1995), in which the initial contact decision is made by the patient. and modelled first, 
followed by a second model estimating decisions regarding the type and amount of 
services consumed, which is heavily influenced by the physician (and related to 
47 In other words, up to a maximum of just over two years prior to the survey. 
48 For example, in the majority of cases the health status and economic status of respondents. is 
unlikely to have fundamentally changed. 
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supplier-induced demand). In the case of an adult purchasing health insurance for a 
child, however, it is conceptually less easy to motivate a two-part model, although it 
might be argued that parents attempt to act as perfect agents on behalf of their 
children. However, given that strategies to extend risk-sharing in the future depend to 
a large degree on increasing uptake amongst adults, understanding demand amongst 
this group is of particular importance, and the analysis discounts children. 
Finally, models are estimated only for individuals who have heard of voluntary health 
insurance, which ensures that results reflect the decisions of those individuals for 
whom insurance forms part of the choice-set, over which consumption decisions are 
made (i.e. subject to budget constraints and personal tastes). In an earlier version of 
this analysis, a two-part model with sample selection was estimated, the first part 
modelling awareness of the insurance scheme, and the second purchase, conditional on 
awareness. Further discussion of this alternative approach issue is presented later in 
this chapter. 
5. t .2 Descriptive analysis 
As part of the household survey. respondents were asked their reasons for buying 
health insurance, and for intending to buy it in the futureso• The results are 
disaggregated by province and presented in Figure 5.l sl . Interestingly, in each 
province the most important reason stated is that insurance provides security, 
suggesting that aversion to risk is a key factor in the decision to buy health insurance, 
and also reflects the increase in out-of-pocket expenditures as a result of health 
financing reforms under do; moi. The effect is strongest in Dong Thap Province, 
where 74% of respondents gave this reason. Advertising and propaganda are the next 
most important reason given in each province, with the strongest effect in Ninh Binh 
Province 52. 
49 In other words, certain individuals may report good health status in the survey, when at the 
time of purchase their health status was worse. This limitation of the dataset is taken into 
consideration when interpreting the data. 
50 See questions g68, g88, g89 and g90 in the household questionnaire in Appendix 4. 
51 This chart is based on responses to question g68 in Appendix 4. 
52 In comparison with adults, purchase of insurance for schoolchildren and students was 
motivated less by 'greater security', and more by 'advertising and propaganda'. Interestingly, 
'following other people' was also more important, a finding consistent with reports that there 
is pressure for all children within a class to enrol. 
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Figure 5.2 shows provincial variations in the intention of adults to purchase voluntary 
health insurance in the future. Overall, respondents are positive about the scheme, 
particularly in Dong Thap Province, where 95% say they will definitely buy a policy 
in the future. Support is also very strong in Hai Phong Province, but weaker in Ninh 
Binh Province, where only 40% respondents say they will definitely buy an insurance 
card in the future. In Dong Thap Province, one-third of respondents are local 
government employees53, who are more likely to be loyal to a government promoted 
scheme, which would at least partially explain the strength of the finding there54• 
Indeed, further analysis shows that, overall, government employees are almost twice 
as likely as other occupations to say they definitely intend to purchase insurance in the 
future. 
Responses amongst insured and uninsured respondents are shown in Figure 5.3. A 
clear difference is evident, with 65ro of those who have previously bought a policy 
saying they definitely intend to buy another. In contrast, only 22% of the uninsured 
give a similar response, with almost one-third saying they are undecided. Overall, 
almost half give a positive response. Motivations for future purchase are again 
dominated by 'greater certainty', with 70-80% respondents giving this reply in each 
province (see Figure 5.4). Again, this finding suggests that many individuals are risk-
averse, and value greater certainty over future health expenditures. This effect is 
weaker in Ninh Binh Province, where 'poor health' and 'saving money' are stated as 
the next most important factors. 
Amongst adults who said they would not buy health insurance in the future, a follow-
up question was posed, asking the main reasons. The results, disaggregated by 
insurance status, are summarised in Figure 5.5. When combined, financial concerns 
such as 'waiting until I have ajob', 'lack of money' and 'financial difficulties' are the 
primary reason given by 43% of non-members, followed by 20% who said the reason 
was that they were 'still healthy'. For members however, the results are quite 
different, with 'don't trust the scheme' the most stated response at 23%, followed by 
'financial reasons' (16%) and 'bad staff attitudes' (15%). These responses were 
53 As noted earlier, the inclusion of government workers in the voluntary scheme was an 
anomaly, which appears to be a local feature of the Dong Tbap scheme, rather than national 
policy. 
54 The notion of loyalty has some similarity to that of duty, and is a possible influence on 
insurance purchase, discussed in Figure 3.2 and associated text. 
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unexpected, and although only the opinion of a minority, present an important insight 
into the impact of the scheme, and the way in which certain members view it. Further 
discussion on this finding is presented later in this chapter, and also in the first section 
of Chapter 6, which examines patient satisfaction. 
5.2 Econometric analysis 
Several models are presented in this section. First, a model of health insurance 
purchase is estimated using pooled data from the three provinces. Separate models are 
then presented for each province. The first approach maximises sample size allowing 
more accurate statistical inferences to be made. Essentially, as the size of a random 
sample increases, the sample variance reduces, and coefficient estimates converge on 
the true parameter values. Separate models for each province provide results that are 
more sensitive to the local context, and allow qualitative data to be used more 
effectively. 
S.2.1 The model 
Given that respondents have either purchased voluntary health insurance, or not, the 
dependent variable takes a binary form. Limited dependent variables such as this are 
common in research and evaluation, and appropriate models have been developed to 
handle such data. One example is the probit model, which is similar to the logit model, 
both of which are probabilistic. The probit model is used by both Propper (1989)55, 
and Besley et at. (1999), both of whom analyse data from England. Harmon and Nolan 
(200 I) also apply a probit model to data from the Republic of Ireland56• This approach 
is followed in the analysis presented below. 
Probit and logit models are based on a variant of the cumulative logistic function 
rather than a linear distribution. In the latter, which is the basis of the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) estimator, the distribution is unbounded, and hence inappropriate for a 
55 Propper notes that either the probit, or the logit maximum likelihood estimator, can be used 
to address this question, and that the two are virtually indistinguishable (see Propper 1989: 
782). However, Propper argues that the probit is preferable, given that the tail approaches 
extreme values more rapidly than the tobit model. This is a useful property, given that the error 
related to calculating expected utility with and without insurance once a year, is likely to be 
large. 
56 The results of these three studies were presented and discussed in Part 2.1.2 and Part 2.1.3. 
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limited dependent variable, which is bounded at 0 and 157. Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) thus results in problems of heteroscedasticity and non-normality in the 
distribution of the error term. Both these effects lead to biased standard errors, 
increasing the chance that a coefficient is deemed statistically significant when in fact 
it is not (see Part 4.4.2.2 for a detailed discussion). 
An alternative approach is to estimate the model using the maximum likelihood 
technique. Rather than choosing the coefficient with least variance, this approach uses 
iteration to identify coefficients that maximise the log of the probability, of observing 
the particular set of values of the dependent variable. For a linear equation, however, 
maximum likelihood (ML) and OLS estimates are identical. Biased coefficients may 
result for several additional reasons. For example, mass media campaigns may create 
greater awareness amongst better-educated individuals, whilst campaigns conducted at 
health facilities are more likely to reach individuals with poorer health status. This 
raises the issue of the validity of modelling the decision to purchase health insurance if 
an individual is not aware of it. Conceptually this is similar to the idea of consumption 
choice-sets elaborated by Propper (1993), also in the context of health insurance 
purchase, discussed earlier in Part 2.1. 
There are two ways to deal with the problem of non-awareness of the scheme. First, 
and simplest, is to estimate models only for those respondents who have heard of the 
voluntary health insurance scheme. This is the approach followed in this chapter. 
Awareness was established through a direct question to respondents (see question g68 
in the 'non-member' section of the questionnaire presented in Appendix 4). An 
alternative approach is to estimate a two-part model, in which an awareness equation 
is first estimated, followed by a model of insurance purchase conditional on 
awareness5S• However, this approach is more complex, and less easily motivated. 
Finally, a weighted likelihood function is used to correct for the endogenous sampling 
57 Further discussion is provided in various textbooks. Studenmund (1997: 509-513) provides a 
clear explanation. 
58 An earlier version of the analysis estimated demand using a two-part model. In this 
approach, awareness of the scheme is modelled first in order to establish whether insurance is 
part of the respondent's consumption choice-set. The demand equation is then estimated 
conditional on awareness. Awareness may reflect a desire to seek out health insurance, in 
which case the awareness model captures part of the purchase decision, and the two models are 
inter-dependent. If this is the case, the condition of independence between the models, required 
for the production of unbiased estimates, is violated. It was decided, however, to follow 
previous papers and to use the simpler probit model. One weakness of the selection model, for 
example, is that the instrument used is often of poor quality. 
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approach used, and the robust command (in STATA) was used to produce 
heteroscedasticity-corrected standard errors. This is required in order to deal with the 
effect of clustering inherent in the sampling design (see Part 4.4.2). 
5.2.2 Characteristics of individuals 
Details of the independent or explanatory variables used to specify the models, are 
discussed first, followed by a description of the estimator. Tables 5.1 to 5.4 summarise 
the data used for each of the provincial models, which are also disaggregated by the 
following sub-groups: those individuals who have not heard of insurance, those who 
have heard of insurance but have not purchased it, and those who have both heard of 
the insurance scheme and purchased a card. This allows an analysis of how awareness 
varies between individuals of different characteristics. Table 5.5 presents a correlation 
matrix of a selection of the variables. 
Adverse selection is a major theme in the insurance literature, given its policy 
implications. A theoretical discussion of the issue, which is one of the consequences 
of information asymmetry within health insurance markets, was presented in Part 
2.1.3. In the development of Research Question J (does voluntary health insurance in 
Vietnam suffer from adverse selection?) it was argued that, given the design of the 
voluntary component of the health insurance scheme, and following the predictions of 
theoretical models, adverse selection is expected to be a problem. The principal reason 
for this is that flat premia are offered to all those who wish to purchase insurance 
irrespective of their health status. Furthermore, no barriers to joining the scheme exist. 
However, due to a lack of information regarding the policy measures that each 
province has taken, if any, to limit this problem, the extent of adverse selection may 
vary in the provincial models. 
Respondent's health status is self-reported, in response to a direct question in the 
household survey, and relates to the twelve-month period preceding the interview. 
Based on these responses, two dummy variables are created representing good and fair 
health, and entered as explanatory variables within the probability model presented 
below. Note that estimated beta coefficients represent the marginal effect of health 
status on the probability of an individual purchasing health insurance, which is used to 
assess the presence of adverse selection. Respondents in poor health thus form the 
reference group. The estimated beta coefficients are used to make conclusions about 
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whether or not adverse selection is a problem and, if so, the magnitude of the effect. 
Health status is also considered exogenous to insurance purchase, given the structure 
of the data (see both Part 4.4.2.3 and the discussion related to sample definition at the 
beginning of this chapter). In Hai Phong Province, 87.5% of respondents who have 
not heard of the scheme are in good health, compared with 17.4% of those who have. 
Whilst this is an expected trend, in Ninh Binh Province the ratio is roughly equal in 
each sub-group (see Table 5.3), whereas in Dong Tbap 51.9% of those with insurance 
are in good health, compared with 31.4% of those who have not heard of it. Where 
those in good health are a minority within the scheme, adverse selection is expected to 
be a problem. Overall, Table 5.1 suggests that there is little difference in health status 
between insured and uninsured respondents across all adults in the sample. Of insured 
respondents, 36.2% report health status as good, compared with a slightly lower figure 
of 32.6% of uninsured respondents. Varying patterns are evident in Tables 5.2 to 5.3, 
however. 
Whereas in Hai Phong Province, only 17.4% of those with insurance report good 
health status, the figure stands at 23.2% in Ninh Binh Province, and 51.9% in Dong 
Thap Province. Proportions of those reporting fair health status, and a long-standing 
limiting illness, are similar across the provinces. Good health is significantly, and 
positively correlated, with economic status, education, and low worry about future 
health, and significantly and negatively correlated with being a farmer, being older, 
and worrying a lot about future health. 
A version to risk is central to health insurance theory, an issue discussed in Part 2.1. 
Although no detailed measure of risk aversion was used, respondents were asked how 
worried they felt about the future health status of themselves and their families, with 
responses coded against a five-point Likert scale (see questions b35 and b36). 
Responses to this question are used to address Research Question 2 (Do levels of 
worry about future health status influence the probability of health insurance 
purchase?). Whilst answers are expected to capture attitudes to risk, however, they are 
also expected to strongly reflect current health status, and hence to some extent can be 
considered an indicator of adverse selection. 
Figures 5.7 and 5.8 summarise the responses for each province. Interestingly, there is 
a substantial difference between north and south, with the latter appearing to worry 
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Explanatory variables Insured respondents Uninsured respondents 
Mean Minimum Maximum Mean Minimum Maximum 
Good health status 0.362 0 1 0.326 0 I 
Fair health status 0.457 0 I 0.467 0 I 
Long standing limiting illness 0.079 0 1 0.099 0 I 
Very worried about future health 0.658 0 1 0.572 0 1 
Medium worry about future health 0.189 0 1 0.212 0 1 
Economic status (thousand VND) 3,157 455 30,550 2,834 311 32,280 
Fanner 0.275 0 1 0.540 0 I 
Government employee 0.363 0 I 0.022 0 I 
Hired worker 0.1l9 0 1 0.096 0 1 
Service worker 0.143 0 1 0.163 0 1 
Years of schooling 8.829 0 16 6.738 0 16 
Age 40.147 17 88 41.362 17 85 
Female 0.364 0 I 0.536 0 I 
Has child/children 0.764 0 1 0.766 0 1 
Number of children 1.399 0 6 1.652 0 6 
Resident of a rural community 0.524 0 1 0.717 0 1 
Perceived social cohesion (individual level) 0.345 I 0 0.275 1 0 
Social cohesion (commune) 0.332 0.049 0.750 0.301 0.049 0.656 
Membership in mass organisation (individual level) 0.635 0 I 0.384 0 1 
Membership in mass organisation (average commune score) 1.194 0.343 4.276 0.897 0.343 4.276 
Number of observations 748 - - 809 - -
-
- - - ---
--
TABLE 5.1 : DEMAND FOR HEALTH INSURANCE - DESCRIPTION OF THE VARIABLES 
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Not heard of voluntary Heard of voluntary health Purchased voluntary 
Explanatory variables health insurance insurance but not purchased health insurance 
Mean Stddev. Mean Stddev. Mean Stddev. 
Good health status 0.875 0.354 0.388 0.489 0.174 0.380 
Fair health status 0 0 0.504 0.502 0.488 0.501 
Long standing limiting illness 0.125 0.354 0.049 0.218 0.139 0.348 
Very worried about future health 0.625 0.518 0.562 0.498 0.767 0.424 
Medium worry about future health 0.250 0.463 0.298 0.459 0.151 0.359 
Economic status (thousand VND) 2,424 614 2,260 933 2,934 1,855 
Farmer 0.5 0.535 0.702 0.459 0.535 0.500 
Government employee 0 0 0.025 0.156 0.029 0.168 
Hired worker 0 0 0.058 0.234 0.047 0.211 
Service worker 0.250 0.462 0.099 0.464 0.285 0.453 
Years of schooling 9.500 2.268 8.306 3.1H 8.227 3.309 
Age 31.625 8.141 41.215 13.702 44.889 13.682 
Female 0.750 0.463 0.512 0.502 0.569 0.497 
Has child/children 0.875 0.354 0.793 0.407 0.762 0.427 
Number of children 1.375 0.916 1.661 U87 1.407 1.086 
Kien Anh District (District 1) 0.375 0.517 0.223 0.418 0.401 0.492 
Thung Nguyen District (District 2) 0.500 0.534 0.397 0.491 0.267 0.444 
An Lao District 0.125 0.354 0.380 0.487 0.331 0.472 
Resident of a rural community 0.625 0.518 0.776 0.418 0.599 0.492 
Perceived social cohesion (individuallevei) 0 0 0.298 0.459 0.291 0.455 
Social cohesion (commune average) 0.259 0.061 0.300 0.068 0.282 0.073 
Membership in mass organisation (individual level) 0.375 0.518 0.554 0.499 0.669 0.472 
Membership in mass organisation (commune average) 1.017 0.221 1.098 0.182 1.025 0.199 
Number of observations 8 121 172 
--_._-----
-- ---
TABLE 5.2: DESCRIPTION OF THE VARIABLES (HAl PHONG PROVINCE) 
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Not heard of voluntary Heard of voluntary health Purchased voluntary 
Explanatory variables health insurance insurance but not purchased health insurance 
Mean Stddev. Mean Stddev. Mean Std dev. 
Good health status 0.226 0.421 0.286 0.453 0.232 0.423 
Fair health status 0.474 0.502 0.440 0.497 0.526 0.500 
Long standing limiting illness 0.155 0.363 0.234 0.424 0.191 0.394 
Very worried about future health 0.659 0.476 0.667 0.472 0.763 0.426 
Medium worry about future health 0.186 0.391 0.139 0.347 0.149 0.356 
Economic status (thousand VND) 2,509 1,537 3,128 2,476 3.054 2,115 
Farmer 0.526 0.502 0.595 0.492 0.339 0.475 
Government employee 0.021 0.142 0.024 0.153 0.084 0.278 
Hired worker 0.041 0.199 0.032 0.176 0.019 0.137 
Service worker 0.175 0.382 0.230 0.422 0.286 0.453 
Years of schooling 6.804 3.519 8.440 2.998 9.256 0.313 
Age 45.381 19.529 41.254 14.518 44.859 16.601 
Female 0.691 0.465 0.567 0.496 0.629 0.484 
Has child/children 0.629 0.486 0.833 0.373 0.767 0.423 
Number of children 1.216 1.139 1.825 1.247 1.542 1.264 
Kim Son District (District 1) 0.361 0.483 0.329 0.471 0.309 0.463 
Hoa Lu District (District 2) 0.351 0.479 0.321 0.468 0.328 0.470 
Ninh Binh Town 0.289 0.455 0.349 0.478 0.347 0.477 
Resident of a rural community 0.711 0.455 0.651 0.478 0.443 0.498 
Perceived social cohesion (individual level) 0.371 0.485 0.444 0.498 0.366 0.483 
Social cohesion (commune average) 0.425 0.151 0.417 0.146 0.425 0.168 
Membership in mass organisation (individual level) 0.485 0.502 0.611 0.488 0.664 0.473 
Membership in mass organisation (commune avera~ 0.959 0.330 0.986 0.338 1.203 0.396 
Number of observations 97 - 252 - 262 -
TABLE 5.3: DESCRIPTION OF THE VARIABLES (NINH BINH PROVINCE) 
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Not heard of voluntary Heard of voluntary insurance but Bought voluntary 
Explanatory variables insurance not purchased health insurance 
Mean SId dev. Mean SId dev. Mean Sid dev. 
Good health status 0.314 0.465 0.343 0.478 0.519 0.500 
Fair health status 0.485 0.501 0.433 0.499 0.411 0.493 
Long standing limiting illness 0.053 0.225 0.045 0.208 0 0 
Very worried about future health 0.519 0.501 0.522 0.503 0.554 0.498 
Medium worry about future health 0.189 0.393 0.194 0.398 0.226 0.419 
Economic status (thousand VND) 2,767 2,432 3,910 4,142 3,322 2,955 
Farmer 0.439 0.497 0.522 0.503 0.105 0.307 
Government employee 0.008 0.087 0.075 0.265 0.662 0.474 
Hired worker 0.167 0.373 0.089 0.288 0.201 0.401 
Service worker 0.144 0.352 0.194 0.398 0.006 0.079 
Years of schooling 5.023 3.196 6.448 3.649 8.981 2.958 . 
Age 41.333 16.004 39.940 14.012 35.583 10.535 
Female 0.523 0.500 0.418 0.497 0.140 0.348 
Has child/children 0.746 0.436 0.746 0.438 0.764 0.425 
Number of children 1.640 1.361 1.701 1.446 1.334 1.066 
Sa Dec Town (District 1) 0.330 0.471 0.239 0.430 0.430 0.496 
Lai Vung District (District 2) 0.375 0.485 0.296 0.461 0.513 0.501 
Hong Nu District 0.295 0.457 0.462 0.502 0.057 0.233 
Resident of a rural community 0.697 0.460 0.836 0.373 0.516 0.501 
Perceived social cohesion (individual level) 0.189 0.393 0.164 0.373 0.366 0.483 
Social cohesion (commune average) 0.234 0.159 0.228 0.148 0.322 0.175 
Membership in mass organisation (individual level) 0.174 0.380 0.328 0.473 0.605 0.489 
Membership in mass organisation (commune average) 0.805 1.030 0.620 0.662 1.282 1.491 
Number of observations 264 - 67 - 314 -
--
TABLE 5.4: DESCRIPTION OF THE VARIABLES (DoNG THAP PROVINCE) 
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EXPLANATORY Insured Social Member Good Economic Farmer Years of Age Number High 
V ARIABLES cohesion mass org. health status schooling children worry 
Insured 
Social cohesion 0.011 
Member of mass org. 0.359 0.128··· 
Good health 0.006 -0.059·" -0.065·" 
Economic status 0.009 0.024 0.020 0.031 
Farmer -0.0371 0.166·" 0.094·"'· -0.009 -0.085"''''''' 
Years of schooling 0.041 0.066"'·'" 0.057"'''' 0.222·"'· 0.102"''''''' -0.011 
Age -0.018 0.078" 0.242"''''''' -0.252··· -0.025 -0.020 -0.419"''''''' 
Number of children -0.014 0.089"''''''' 0.009 -0.009 -0.128·"'· 0.149·"'''' 0.012 -0.144··'" 
Very worried 0.012 0.129*** 0.106*·* -0.086"'*· 0.063*** 0.103**· 0.021 0.056*· -0.019 
Medium worry -0.004 -0.056"'· 0.006 0.009 -0.028 -0.034 -0.128"''' 0.050*· -0.039 -0.601"'" 
TABLE 5.5: CORRELATION MATRIX FOR SELECTED EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
'" Statistically significant (10%) "'. Statistically significant (5%) "' .. Statistically significant (1%) 
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considerably less about future health overall. Only 17% of respondents in the south 
say they are very worried, compared with 41 % in Ninh Binh and 32% in Hai Phong. 
Overall, Table 5.1 shows that 65.8% of insured respondents say they are very worried, 
compared with 57.2% of the uninsured. Disaggregated data, presented in Tables 5.2 to 
5.4, indicate that around three-quarters of insured respondents in the two northern 
provinces are very worried, compared with just over half in Dong Thap Province. 
As noted in the previous paragraph, the correlation matrix presented in Table 5.5, 
shows that very worried individuals also tend to be in poor health. Hence, the variable 
does appear to reflect health status, although in overall epidemiological terms, health 
status is worse in Dong Thap than in the two northern provinces (see Table 1.3), 
raising questions for further research. Worry is also positively associated with social 
cohesion, being a farmer, and being older. In the econometric analysis two dummy 
variables are created, one representing high worry and one medium worry, with low 
worry forming the reference category. Interestingly, whereas utility of income theory 
predicts that risk-aversion falls with income, Table 5.5 shows that being very worried 
increases with income. 
Research Question 3 is concerned with the effect of individual economic status on the 
probability of insurance purchase. On average, economic status is more than II % 
higher for insured than uninsured individuals (see Table 5.1), with no significant 
association evident in the correlation matrix. Overall, mean values are highest in the 
southern province of Dong Thap at VND 3.15 million per annum (equivalent to US$ 
233.70), followed by VND 2.99 million (equivalent to US$ 221.48) in Ninh Binh, and 
surprisingly the lowest in Ninh Binh, the most urbanised province, at VND 2.65 
million (equivalent to USS 196.29). The sub-group with the highest economic status is 
those individuals in Dong Thap who have heard of the insurance scheme but not 
purchased it. Given the poverty lines defined in Part 1.3.1, the sample used here 
cannot be considered as poor. No clear pattern emerges from the disaggregated data 
presented in Tables 5.2 to 5.4, which supports the ambiguous effect of income 
expected by theoretical modelss9• Per capita annual consumption expenditure in the 
respondent's household is entered as a continuous variable in the model. 
59 This issue was discussed in Part 3.1.3, in which wealthier individuals are expected to be less 
risk-averse, given their ability to self-insure, but may demand health insurance where it allows 
access to better quality services. 
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The effect of education, measured in terms of the number of years of schooling, is the 
subject of Research Question 4, and is expected to have a positive effect on 
purchase60• This is supported by the data presented in Table 5.1 with, on average, 
years of formal schooling higher amongst insured respondents than uninsured 
respondents. The positive relationship is supported by the data in Ninh Binh Province 
(Table 5.3) and Dong Thap Province (Table 5.4), but not in Hai Phong Province (see 
Table 5.2). 
Given that the initial focus for the VHIA has been the development of compulsory 
social insurance for those in salaried employment, and insurance for schoolchildren 
and other students, it cannot be assumed that all adults are aware that voluntary health 
insurance is available for purchase. To analyse this issue in detail, better information 
on the promotional activities of the respective provincial VHIA offices is required 
than was available for this research. A high degree of non-awareness of voluntary 
health insurance may reflect low quality marketing strategies, or a low intensity of 
marketing activity. As expected, all insured respondents are aware of the scheme, 
compared with a level of 54.4% amongst the uninsured. Overall, awareness is highest 
in Hai Phong (97.3%), compared with 84.1% in Ninh Binh Province, and 59.1% in 
Dong Thap Province. This pattern is not unexpected, given that Hai Phong Province 
was the focus of pilot projects, and has received substantial technical assistance (see 
Part 1.3.2, and Part 4.2.1). 
In Hai Phong Province, where public health insurance was first introduced, almost all 
non-members have heard of the voluntary scheme, which may reflect effective 
marketing activity, or that across time, marketing strategies complemented by informal 
communication e.g. word of mouth, are highly effective. In addition, Hai Phong is the 
most urbanised of the provinces, which may have some bearing on the results in that it 
is generally easier to raise awareness in urban populations. In Ninh Binh Province, 
also in northern Vietnam, a similar pattern emerges, although one-third of surveyed 
individuals is unaware of the scheme. 
In the southern province of Dong Thap, the level of awareness amongst the uninsured 
is very low, which explains a considerable amount of non-purchase. Intra-provincial 
differences in levels of awareness are likely to results from different approaches to 
hO A positive effect is expected given that demand for health insurance is derived from demand 
for health services and health, and evidence that education positively affects the latter. 
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marketing, and differing levels of intensity of activity across districts. As noted earlier, 
dummy variables for districts are used to capture and hence control for these supply-
side effects, on which detailed data are not available. 
Table 5.6 summarises how respondents first heard about the insurance scheme, 
disaggregated by members and non-members, and by province. Overall, commune 
leaders are the most important medium for information flow, followed by mass media 
(e.g. newspaper, radio, television), health facilities, and relatives and friends. 
Interestingly, the role of the commune leader is the most important source of 
information in Dong Thap, accounting for 46% of responses, compared with 29% in 
Hai Phong and 16% in Ninh Binh. Relative to other provinces, health facilities, and 
relatives and friends are more important in Ninh Binh. 
A clear finding from in-depth interviews in Ninh Binh, is that considerable confusion 
exists about the specific details of health insurance, which may be a reflection of the 
initial period of establishing the scheme, during which time there are often many 
changes, in terms of premium levels and benefits for example. One male farmer said: 
"I get confused. For the previous health insurance card (HIC), people said 
that it can be used even in Hanoi Hospital. But the card we are now 
buying, people say that it is limited only for treatment at the provincial 
hospital? For the previous card and this one, the prices are the same, 
60,000 Dongs. Someone explained to me that I have to go to the district 
hospital (Phat Diem), then they will refer me to the provincial hospital in 
Ninh Binh where my card is valid. Others say that I have to go to Phat 
Diem hospital, then get a referral to Ninh Binh, and then to Hanoi; in that 
way my card is valid for all places." (Male, farmer, aged 58 years, 
insured, Kim Son District, Ninh Binh Province). 
Another interview with a farmer, also in Ninh Binh Province, also demonstrates the 
need for more and better information, as well as ensuring the physical supply of cards: 
"Some people say that having a health insurance card (HIC) has benefits 
for hospital bed-fees, and one does not worry about one's health when he 
gets sick. But others said that people having HIC are a little bit 
disregarded. Patients have to pay for everything except hospital bed. 
Besides, I thought that HIC price is fixed by the government but the 
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Hai Phong Province Ninh Binh Province Dong Tha Province __ % 
------.. --.--. 
---- - -- --------
Uninsured Insured Uninsured Insured Uninsured Insured 
Communal leader 34 55 36 53 6 172 28.8% 
Mass media 38 43 79 53 23 79 25.5% 
Health facility 6 23 18 119 1 7 14.1% 
Relatives or friends 16 12 74 28 11 4 11.7% 
School 15 4 44 7 20 1 7.4% 
Health insurance 4 20 1 12 1 13 4.1% 
worker 
Women's Union 5 8 2 2 0 0 1.4% 
Other 8 12 6 7 2 44 6.4% 
Don't know 0 0 4 2 1 1 0.6% 
TOTAL= 126 177 264 283 65 321 
---- ---------- -- --
TABLE 5.6: FIRST SOURCE OF INFORMA nON ABOUT HEALTH INSURANCE 
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prices of HIC are varied, this makes me confused. Before it was 30,000, 
now 60,000. Truly, fanners do not understand well about HIC ....... So J 
did not buy HIC for two reasons: first I am confident given my age, and 
second I have heard so many different stories so I have doubts ..... Many 
people want to have HIC but they do not know, it was informed about 
HIC only one or two times .... .! had a niece who suffers from the kidney-
stone and she wanted to buy a HIC, once she heard about a selling term, 
when she went there, it was out." (Female, aged 31 years, farmer, 
uninsured, Ninh My Commune, Ninh Binh Province) 
Several other characteristics of individuals are discussed next. Employment type is 
measured in terms of an individual's main occupation, and represented by a series of 
dummy variables. Whilst, in principle, government employees should enrol in the 
compulsory scheme in some provinces they are enrolled under the voluntary scheme61 • 
This is particularly the case in Dong Thap Province, where exactly one third of adult 
respondents are government employees. In contrast, the figure is 2.7% in Hai Phong 
Province, and 4.9% in Ninh Binh Province62• Age is entered as a continuous 
variable63. In Hai Phong, the average age of those with insurance is higher than the 
uninsured (see Table 5.2), whilst the opposite is true in Dong Thap - no clear pattern 
emerges in Ninh Binh. Overall, insured respondents tend to have fewer children than 
the uninsured, although this pattern is less strong in Hai Phong Province. 
One limitation of the dataset is the lack of information on both the price and quality of 
health services, two factors likely to influence both demand for health services, and 
health insurance purchase. The effect of these variables is captured through the district 
dummy variables in provincial models. A range of other factors which are likely to 
influences the purchase decision, such as the intensity of marketing activity, the use of 
different media e.g. newspapers or radio, and environmental conditions, is also 
captured in this dummy variable64• Many respondents report problems purchasing an 
61 To some extent, this reflects the relatively weak legal and policy framework covering the 
voluntary component of the scheme, relative to the compulsory scheme, an issue discussed in 
Part 1.3.2. 
62 High levels of government employees within the voluntary scheme in Dong Thap are likely 
to have an impact on the results (see Figure 3.2). This is discussed later in the chapter. 
63 During the analysis, age was also entered in different ways, for example as a squared term, 
and as a series of dummy variables representing different age groups. 
64 It is thus impossible to disentangle the independent effect of each. 
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insurance policy outside campaign periods, a further supply-side issue captured by this 
variable65• 
Finally, whilst data on distance to various health facilities were recollected by 
telephone from commune officials, there were still a considerable number of non-
responses. However, looking at the available distance data, dispersion appears to be 
low66• Given the doubts over the reliability of this variable a dummy representing 
whether the respondent lives in a rural community is used as a proxy for distance. 
5.2.3 Characteristics of communities 
Two explanatory variables are used to represent the social structure of the commune 
within which respondents live, following the discussion in Part 2.3 and Part 3.2. Each 
is based on a direct question posed to respondents during the household survey. 
5.2.3.1 Membership in mass organisations 
Membership in voluntary associations is, for Putnam (1993a), a measure of civic 
engagement, which he sees as central to the creation of social capital. In Vietnam, 
however, the only voluntary organisations are mass organisations, which cannot be 
considered a proxy for civil society (see the argument presented in Part 1.5.3). 
Nevertheless, membership of state-organised mass organisations in Vietnam is 
voluntary, and hence data were collected for the reasons discussed earlier, and are 
used to address Research Question 5. 
Almost half of the adult sample is not a member of any mass organisation. Table 5.7 
presents mean scores by provinces, which are considerably higher amongst the 
insured. The lowest and highest scores are in Dong Thap for the insured and uninsured 
respectively. As with the social cohesion variable, membership of a mass organisation 
is entered as an explanatory variable in the econometric analysis, both at individual 
and commune levels. This variable is also treated as exogenous with health insurance 
purchase. At the individual level a dummy variable is created, in which a score of one 
is applied if the respondent is a member of at least one mass organisation, and zero 
otherwise. This captures the membership effect, given that a relatively small 
percentage of respondents are a member of more than one mass organisation. The 
65 As noted in Chapter 4, this is another issue requiring further research. 
66 For example, 80% of respondents live within two kilometres of a commune health centre. 
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---------------_._----_ ........ _ ... _-
Mean score 
Hai Phong 
Ninh Sinh 
DongThap 
Overall mean 
Insured 
1.078 
1.180 
1.406 
1.257 
Uninsured 
0.892 
0.876 
0.344 
0.584 
TABLE 5.7: MEMBERSHIP IN MASS ORGANISATIONS 
Social cohesion HaiPhong Ninh Binh DongTbap. Total 
(Low) 
1 0.65% 0% 0.15% 0.19% 
2 1.96% 2.44% 1.08% 1.79% 
3 25.16% 14.29% 16.10% 17.16% 
4 43.79% 43.34% 55.42% 48.41% 
5 28.43% 39.94% 27.24% 32.46% 
(High) 
Observations 306 616 646 1568 
Mean 3.984 4.260 4.085 4.112 
TABLE 5.8: SOCIAL COHESION IN LOCAL COMMUNITY 
Hal Pbong Nlnb Binh DonITh~p __ 
Urban 3.832 4.111 3.893 
Rural 4.030 4.335 3.972 
TABLE 5.9: MEAN SOCIAL COHESION AT THE COMMUNE LEVEL (URBAN-RURAL) 
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-------------~------, .. -,. 
Province/ Observations Mean Standard Variance within 
Commune Deviation commune lower than 
across total sample? 
Hai Phong Province 
Phu Lien 78 3.999 0.585 Yes 
Tran Thanh Ngo 79 3.667 0.946 No 
Kien Bai 87 4.000 0.711 Yes 
Thien Huong 82 3.969 0.711 Yes 
Tan Vien 89 4.002 0.849 No 
Tan Dan 87 4.289 0.855 No 
Nlnh Blnb Province 
Van Hai 128 4.437 0.684 Yes 
Dien Hoa 57 4.464 0.775 No 
Quang Thien 96 4.323 0.739 No 
Ninh Hai 78 4.229 0.747 No 
Ninh Khang 102 4.346 0.689 Yes 
Ninh My 167 4.415 0.659 Yes 
Phuc Thanh 68 4.327 0.478 Yes 
Tan Thanh 65 4.218 0.604 Yes 
Thanh Binh 44 4.224 0.795 No 
Phat Diem 51 4.294 0.944 No 
Nho Quan 4 4.750 0.500 Yes 
Van Giang 149 3.925 0.701 No 
Dong Tbap 
Province 
Ward I 118 3.543 0.614 Yes 
Ward III 104 3.899 0.614 Yes 
Tan Phu Dong 112 4.352 0.624 Yes 
Lai Vung Town 102 4.438 0.791 No 
Tan Duong 149 4.237 0.674 Yes 
Tan Thanh ' 253 3.755 0.705 Yes 
An BinhA 74 3.955 0.559 Yes 
Long KhanhA 93 3.838 0.525 Yes 
Thuong Phuoc I 69 3.922 0.626 Yes 
Total sample 2,585 4.046 0.734 
TABLE 5.10: WITHIN-COMMUNE VARIATIONS IN SOCIAL COHESION 
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mean score at the commune level is also entered in order to represent the density of 
membership in mass organisations in the respondent's local community. 
5.2.3.2 Social cohesion 
Research Question 6 represents a conceptual advance by considering whether demand 
for formal health insurance is influenced by the presence of existing networks of 
informal financial networks in a community. Theoretical predictions are ambiguous, 
extending from both propositions in the social capital literature, and the work of 
development economists. Social capital frameworks suggest that informal risk-sharing 
mechanisms, such as ROSCAs, are evidence of a high trust, socially cohesive 
community, which demonstrates a propensity to act collectively for mutual gain. 
Building on evidence from the development economics literature, however, this 
attribute of community structure may result in strong informal financial networks, 
which. in certain circumstances, crowd out demand for formal health insurance67• 
Based on question b34 in the household survey, which asks individuals how socially 
cohesive they consider their local community to be, data are analysed at both the 
individual and commune level and summarised in Table 5.8. Overall, 81 % of 
respondents give a score of either 4 or 5, i.e. social cohesion is generally perceived to 
be high. Mean commune scores are highest in Ninh Binh Province, followed by Dong 
Thap Province and Hai Phong Province. The latter is the most urbanised of the three 
provinces, which may partly explain the results. 
The suggestion in the literature that closure within social groupings is important for 
the generation of social cohesion is validated by the data, assuming that social 
cohesion is an indication of social closure68• A rural-urban differential is evident 
within each of the provinces (see Table 5.9). Table 5.5 suggests that individuals who 
perceive their community to be socially cohesive, are significantly more likely to be a 
67 The extent to which individuals rely on infonnal risk sharing networks was estimated using 
responses to a question in the household survey, in which respondents were asked whether 
they had borrowed money in the previous twelve months (overall, 41 % of respondents stated 
that they had borrowed either money or rice in the previous year), and if so from which source. 
Responses ranged from formal (e.g. the bank) to infonnal sources (e.g. family and friends), 
and ranked on an ordinal scale from 1 to 7. Those borrowing from relatives score high, whilst 
those borrowing from commercial banks score low. Mean values were calculated at the 
commune level to give an indication of the strength of informal financial networks. This 
measure is somewhat crude, however, due to the limitations of the data set. Whilst it does 
provide an indication of whether respondents turn to informal or formal networks when in 
need of funds, the variable is not used in the econometric analysis. 
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member of a mass organisation, a farmer, older and, as noted earlier, very worried 
about future health status. Interestingly. social cohesion is strongest amongst those 
individuals in Ninh Binh Province who have not heard of voluntary health insurance69• 
Table 5.10 presents mean social cohesion scores by commune. The variance, measured 
in terms of the standard deviation as a proportion of the mean, is lower than the 
overall variance in two-thirds of the communes. If social cohesion truly exists locally, 
then one would expect the variance to be lower within communes, relative to the total 
sample. Two dummy variables are generated to represent social cohesion, one at the 
individual level, and the other at the commune level. Given that responses are 
clustered at the high end of the scale (see Table 5.8), those respondents giving a score 
of five are coded as one, and those giving a score of less than five are coded as zero. 
Social cohesion at commune level is the mean value across responses from individuals 
living in the same commune. This score thus represents the structure of the local 
community within which the individual respondent lives. 
Where joining an insurance scheme is a demonstration of solidarity with others in the 
same commune, social cohesion is likely to be endogenous to health insurance 
purchase. However, this is only likely to be the case where a scheme is truly 
community-based i.e. there is local control over such scheme, and risk-sharing takes 
place within relatively small groups, such as in the cooperative health care schemes 
described by Hsiao (1995). In Vietnam, however, the voluntary health insurance 
scheme was launched nationally by central government, and is organised at the 
provincial level - local involvement or control is non-existent. As such, it is assumed 
that purchasing insurance has little investment value in terms of increasing a sense of 
social cohesion in the commune - the variable is thus treated as exogenous to the 
purchase decision. 
5.3 Results 
The results of econometric analysis are presented in Tables 5.11 to 5.14. Qualitative 
data, collected through in-depth interviews, are used to strengthen the interpretation of 
68 See Part 2.2.2. 
69 This is one of several issues that merits further research. 
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results70• Four models are presented, one using pooled data, the others using data for 
individual provinces. Within each model four specifications are presented. The basic 
model is referred to as Probit vl. In the second specification (Probit v2), two 
additional variables are included, one representing perceptions of social cohesion, and 
the second membership in a mass organisation, both at the individual level. Probit v3 
includes two further variables representing average social cohesion, and average group 
membership, at the commune level. Finally, Probit v4 is a reduced version, which 
omits those variables showing little statistically significant effect in Probit v3. In 
certain models variables that perfectly predict the outcome are automatically 
dropped7 •• 
5.3.1 Individuallevellnftuences 
Coefficients representing individual health status are used to test for the presence of 
adverse selection (Research Question 1). If good health status has a statistically 
significant and negative effect, on the probability of insurance purchase, this is an 
indication of adverse selection. Overall, there is strong evidence of adverse selection 
(see Table 5.11), with individuals reporting good health having a 41 % lower 
probability of purchasing insurance, compared with those reporting poor health (which 
forms the reference category). This finding is robust across the four specifications, 
rising to almost 50% in Probit v3. In the provincial models, adverse selection is 
evident in Hai Phong and Dong Thap, but not in Ninh Sinh. As noted in Part 3.1.1 if 
older people are more likely to purchase insurance this also indicates adverse 
selection. Whilst there is limited evidence of this in the econometric analysis, in-depth 
interviews revealed that elderly people are often more likely to buy insurance: 
"I want to buy voluntary health insurance all the time now I am old. Now 
they do not sell voluntary health insurance cards people are dissatisfied. 
Old people say that if there is no voluntary health insurance card they 
70 Qualitative data collection focused on several issues, including the way in which informal 
and formal risk-sharing mechanisms interact, attitudes towards risk, and satisfaction with 
health insurance. Questions were also asked on other issues, such as levels of general 
understanding of the scheme e.g. specific benefits offered. The questions used to guide the 
discussions are presented in Topic Guide 1 in Appendix S. 
71 In several cases, the variable representing long-standing limiting illness is dropped for this 
reason. In other models, district dummy variables are dropped, suggesting that policies have 
not been sold in certain communes. 
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will suffer disease and die because they have no money for the hospital." 
(Female. aged 79 years. insured. Phat Diem Town. Ninh Binh Province) 
Those who have fallen ill are more likely to appreciate the value of health insurance 
and become a real advocate for the principle of sharing risks: 
"If a person has a severe disease, it is so difficult for his family to cover 
the cost of treatment, for example, a few millions dongs. If many healthy 
people contribute to the fund, it will ease the costs. So health insurance is 
mutual support for each other, contributing to each other; to show mutual 
affection to each other. We understand this. But other people may not 
understand because they haven't experienced a serious sickness. We have 
a saying "unbroken leaves protect the ragged ones." (Male. aged 52 
years. farmer. insured. Van Hai Commune. Ninh Binh Province) 
With respect to the fixed (flat-rate) premium, which is a primary cause of adverse 
selection, one farmer has a suggestion for the scheme's administrators: 
"It would be better if there are several prices for health insurance cards 
(HIC). Because in rural areas income levels are not equal, there are rich 
and poor. Many families have economic difficulties. With different 
prices, it is suitable for farmers, different people can afford to buy HIC." 
(Male. farmer. uninsured. Van Hai Commune. Ninh Binh Province). 
Lowering the premium for poorer individuals is unlikely to solve the problem of 
adverse selection, however. The coefficient for the 'long standing limiting illness' 
variable appears counterintuitive at first, with sufferers less likely to purchase 
insurance. As discussed in Part 1.3.1, however, patients with chronic diseases such as 
epilepsy, leprosy or tuberculosis, are eligible for free health services, which explains 
this finding. 
Part 5.1.2 presented some initial responses from the household survey, which 
indicated that there is widespread value given to the 'security' or 'certainty' aspect of 
insurance, rather than it simply being considered a mechanism to save money, 
although the two issues are linked. Lack of information, and in some cases a lack of 
health insurance cards, were also highlighted as factors preventing some interested 
individuals from purchasing insurance. As expected, comments about being worried 
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Explanatory variables Probit vi Probit v2 Probit v3 Probit v4 
Coefficient Robust S.E. Coefficient Robust S.E. Coefficient RobustS.E. Coefficient Robust S.E. 
Good health status -0.405*** 0.131 -0.399*** 0.139 -0.493*** 0.140 -0.493*** 0.136 
Fair health status -0.201 * 0.122 -0.203 0.131 -0.257** 0.126 -0.268** 0.121 
Long standing limiting illness -0.347** 0.163 -0.482*** 0.177 -0.514*·· 0.171 -0.505·*· 0.164 
Very worried about future health 0.376··· 0.119 0.485··* 0.136 0.419··· 0.136 0.367··· 0.110 
Medium worry about future health 0.134 0.142 0.214 0.154 0.131 0.159 - -
Economic status (thousand VND) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 - -
Fanner 0.132 0.128 0.079 0.131 0.118 0.139 
- -
Government employee 1.303··· 0.207 1.254··· 0.197 1.352··· 0.196 1.354··· 0.163 
Hired worker 0.368·· 0.182 0.223 0.185 0.162 0.223 
- -
Service worker -0.031 0.119 -0.074 0.124 0.004 0.154 
- -
Years of schooling 0.015 0.014 0.029·· 0.015 0.025· 0.154 - -
Age 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
- -
Female -0.092 0.079 -0.138 0.084 -0.109 0.087 -0.152* 0.084 
Has child/children -0.012 0.133 0.060 0.140 0.099 0.140 - -
Number of children -0.022 0.042 -0.033 0.044 -0.026 0.043 - -
Hai Phong Province -0.377··· 0.124 -0.423··· 0.124 -0.383··· 0.128 -0.288··· 0.117 
Ninh Binh Province -0.561··· 0.112 -0.619*·· 0.1l8 -0.702··· 0.142 -0.615··· 0.125 
Resident of a rural community -0.629*·· 0.117 -0.646··· 0.1l4 -0.734··· 0.126 -0.697··· 0.102 
Perceived social cohesion (individualievel) 
- -
-0.059 0.058 -0.096 0.058 -0.094 0.059 
Social cohesion (average for commune) 
- - - -
0.497 0.285 0.515·· 0.263 
Membership in mass organisation (individual level) - - 0.129··· 0.022 0.107··· 0.024 0.102··· 0.024 
Membership in mass organisation (commune average) - - - - 0.222·· 0.095 0.227·· 0.103 
Observations = 1,187 - 1,187 - 1,187 - 1,187 -
Wald test (p-value of chi-SQuared) = 156.92··· - 209.80··· - 209.67··· - 193.25··· -
PseudoR2= 0.178 - 0.205 - 0.222 - 0.217 -
TABLE 5.11: PROBIT MODEL OF DEMAND FOR HEAL rn INSURANCE 72 
72 * Statistically significant (lOOIo) ** Statistically significant (S%) *** Statistically significant (1%) 
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Explanatory variables Probit vI Probit v2 Probit v3 Probit v4 
Coefficient RobustS.E. Coefficient Robust S.E. Coefficient Robust S.E. Coefficient Robust S.E. 
Good health status -0.903"* 0.248 -0.990*" 0.255 -\.016*** 0.262 -0.867*** 0.214 
Fair health status -0.547*** 0.206 -0.566*** 0.204 -0.595*** 0.215 -0.454*** 0.179 
Long standing limiting illness -0.143 0.294 -0.221 0.313 -0.209 0.314 
- -
Very worried about future health 0.406* 0.224 0.475** 0.233 0.455** 0.241 0.607*** 0.188 I 
Medium worry about future health -0.268 0.245 -0.286 0.254 -0.281 0.257 
- - I 
Economic status (thousand VND) 0.000*" 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000··* 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 
Fanner 0.110 0.239 0.194 0.248 0.184 0.253 0.105 0.203 
Government employee 0.355 0.423 0.510 0.463 0.545 0.465 
- -
Hired worker -0.052 0.307 0.063 0.319 0.081 0.322 - -
Service worker 0.662*·· 0.257 0.662*** 0.259 0.666*** 0.262 0.614 0.231 
I Years of schooling 0.017 0.023 0.022 0.023 0.022 0.023 0.027 0.242 , 
Age 0.007 0.006 0.009 0.006 0.009 0.006 0.010 0.006 
Female 0.074 0.129 0.082 0.131 0.082 0.131 - -
Has child/children 0.471 0.245 0.465* 0.247 0.437· 0.252 0.438 0.252 
Number of children -0.189*· 0.093 -0.171* 0.092 -0.161* 0.094 -0.164· 0.091 
Kien An District (District 21) 0.425·· 0.213 0.459·· 0.222 0.380 0.328 0.485··· 0.322 
I Thuy Nguyen District (District 22) 0.081 0.152 0.095 0.153 0.154 0.209 0.132 0.195 
Perceived social cohesion (individual level) - - -0.137 0.085 -0.129 0.087 -0.086 0.082 
Social cohesion (average for commune) 
- - - -
0.267 0.913 0.205 0.888 
Membership in mass organisation (individual level) - - -0.021 0.047 -0.020 0.047 -0.019 0.047 
Membership in mass organisation (commune average 1 - - - - -0.497 0.928 -0.421 0.879 j 
Observations = 293 - 293 - 293 - 293 -
Wald test (p-value of chi-~uaredJ = 57.46··* - 58.53·*· - 58.54*** - 52.81*** - I 
PseudoJU =- 0.133 - 0.138 - 0.138 - 0.071 - - I ~-.- -----
----- - - - ---------- ---
TABLE 5.12: PROBIT MODEL - HAl PHONG PROVINCE 
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Explanatory variables Probit v I Probit v2 Probit v3 Probit v4 
Coefficient Robust S.E. Coefficient Robust S.E. Coefficient RobustS.E. Coefficient Robust S.E. 
Good health status -0.070 0.185 -0.050 0.189 0.067 0.232 0.084 0.133 
Fair health status -0.010 0.169 0.032 0.177 0.099 0.215 - 0.107 
Long standing limiting illness -0.176 0.179 -0.199 0.183 -0.169 0.224 
-
Very worried about future health 0.279** 0.122 0.382*** 0.126 0.370*** 0.146 0.359*** 0.107 
Medium worry about future health 0.034 0.137 0.016 0.147 -0.050 0.166 
- -
Economic status (thousand VND) -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
Fanner -0.287*** 0.118 -0.249** 0.126 -0.394*** 0.143 -0.338*** 0.109 
Government employee 0.158 0.237 0.177 0.239 0.329 0.253 
- -
Hired worker -0.354 0.263 -0.344 0.271 -0.222 0.274 
- -
Service worker -0.254** 0.131 -0.264* 0.133 -0.215 0.151 - -
Years of schooling 0.054*** 0.018 0.057*** 0.018 0.024 0.021 0.032* 0.019 
Age 0.007** 0.004 0.008** 0.004 0.008* 0.004 0.009** 0.004 
Female 0.101 0.078 0.063 0.087 0.054 0.092 
- -
Has child/children -0.118 0.145 -0.074 0.145 -0.032 0.179 - -
Number of children 0.006 0.043 0.013 0.043 0.040 0.057 - -
Resident of a rural community -0.255*** 0.108 -0.253*· 0.110 -0.487··· 0.158 -0.439·** 0.143 
Perceived social cohesion (individual level) - - -0.195*·* 0.085 -0.258··* 0.071 -0.240··* 0.067 
Social cohesion (average for commune) - - - - 0.523 0.355 0.679 0.338 
Membership in mass organisation (individual level) 
-
- 0.065*·· 0.094 0.037 0.031 0.039 0.028 
Membership in mass organisation (commune average) - - - - 0.795··· 0.152 0.725··* 0.142 
Observations = 514 - 514 - 514 - 514 -
Wald test (p-value of chi-squared) = 49.47··· - 55.63*·· - 83.73··· - 81.25··· -
Pseudo R2 = ,_ 0.056 - 0.071 - 0.116 - 0.105 -
---_ .. ---_.... --
-
TABLE 5.13: PROBIT MODEL - NlNH BINH PROVINCE 
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Explanatory variables Probit vI Probit v2 Probit v3 Probit v4 
Coefficient Robust S.£. Coefficient Robust S.E. Coefficient RobustS.E. Coefficient Robust s.£. 
Good health status -0.339 0.265 -1.057*** 0.357 -1.015*** 0.385 -0.494·* 0.238 
Fair health status -0.088 0.256 -0.598* 0.348 -0.386 0.306 - -
Very worried about future health 0.284 0.270 0.713*·* 0.266 0.774·" 0.261 0.395* 0.239 
Medium worry about future health 0.550* 0.303 0.654* 0.376 0.494 0.344 
- -
Economic status (thousand VND) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*- 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
Farmer 1.260" 0.600 0.669 0.688 1.204 0.847 1.595*** 0.571 
Government employee 2.997*" 0.613 2.903*** 0.713 3.457*** 0.887 3.735--* 0.583 
Hired worker 0.952 0.668 1.019 0.761 1.398* 0.819 1.776·*- 0.521 
Service worker -0.905 0.629 -1.141· 0.681 -1.421-· 0.739 -1.227*· 0.583 
Years of schooling -0.037 0.042 0.087· 0.049 0.112*** 0.046 0.080* 0.047 
Age 0.002 0.011 0.005 0.017 -0.000 0.016 0.002 0.012 
Female -0.773*·* 0.271 -0.733*· 0.333 -0.624** 0.302 -0.353 0.306 
Has child/children 0.027 0.379 -0.600 0.451 -0.565 0.428 
- -
Number of children -0.085 0.109 0.01l 0.155 0.050 0.138 - -
Resident of a rural community -2.059*** 0.316 -1.930*** 0.331 -1.945*** 0.339 -1.800**- 0.344 
Perceived social cohesion (individual level) - - 0.725·*· 0.117 0.750·*· 0.158 0.691"* 0.144 
Social cohesion (average for commune) -
- - -
-1.408** 0.683 -1.486** 0.662 
Membership in mass organisation (individual level) - - 0.212*** 0.066 0.152-·* 0.063 0.101* 0.059 
Membership in mass organisation (commune avera gel - - - - 0.223 0.144 0.343 0.139 
Observations = 377 - 377 - 371 - 377 -
Wald test (p-value of chi-squared) = 181.66*** - 222.89·** - 224.78*** - 210.73·** -
PseudoR2= 0.446 - 0.544 - 0.546 - 0.552 -
TABLE 5.14: PRoBrr MODEL - DONG THAP PROVINCE 
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about the future are bundled with comments about poor current health status. 
In the econometric analysis, the coefficient representing high levels of worry about 
one's own and one's family's future health status, has a highly significant effect, 
robust across the four specifications of the model (see Table 5.11), with worried 
respondents being 31-40% more likely to purchase insurance. This variable is used to 
address Research Question 2. This effect is consistent across specifications in Hai 
Phong and Dong Thap, but less so in Ninh Binh Province. Indeed the variable is one 
of the most consistent predictors of insurance purchase across all the models 
presented, even more so than health status, suggesting that it does capture a strong 
element of risk aversion. The data presented earlier in this chapter support this view. 
Economic status, the subject of Research Question 3, has no significant effect in Table 
5.11. This is the case in all the provinces except for Hai Phong where richer 
individuals are more likely to purchase insurance. Part 3.1.3 discussed theoretical 
predictions that the probability of insurance uptake will reduce, as income rises, 
except where it is linked to better service quality. The results raise the question of 
whether the health insurance scheme in this province, which is considered the most 
advanced nationally, is perceived as leading to better quality health services? The 
following quote, from Ninh Binh Province, reveals that many see the scheme as a 
mechanism to help the poor: 
"HIC is for poor people. Rich people have money and they can go to any 
hospital they like. We are poor people - we trust in hospital treatment and 
we hope to get help from government to cover the cost of treatment." 
(Male. farmer. insured. Phat Diem Town. Ninh Binh Province). 
Despite this, the following comment from one official, the Vice-Chairman of the 
Farmer's Union in a rural commune in the Mekong River Delta (Dong Thap 
Province), sees it as the duty of wealthier individuals to purchase insurance: 
"The rich people definitely should buy HIC in order to help the poor. If 
rich people do not want to buy HIC we encourage them to do so - we 
should propaganda them about the meaning and policy of health 
insurance, how they can help the poor people; for example, if I am still 
healthy, I do not get any sickness but I buy HIC so I can support for ill 
people. If sick people go for treatment, health insurance will take care of 
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them ..... so even though I do not get sick I still buy HIC in order to 
support other people". (Male, aged 57 years, Vice-Chairman of Farmer's 
Union. insured, Tan Duong Commune, Dong Thap Province). 
The following insight suggests that it is the richer families that have the means to 
share-risks more than poorer families (see the debate on this issue in the final 
paragraph of Part 2.3.1): 
"It is for sure that large family with better earning members will help 
each other easier. If my relatives are as poor as I am, it's hard for them to 
help. Only people outside can help by lending money for interest. Here 
the interest rate is about 3%. I borrowed in an emergency. Neighbours 
can lend a few ten thousand dong, but more than that, say a few hundred 
thousands, one has to pay interest rates. In the case of sickness, 
neighbours visit quite a lot, mainly for sympathy, for materially mainly 
the family has to bear. For serious sickness, members of the Farmer's 
Associations, the Elderly Group, Women's Union, come and bring gifts 
like sugar." (Male, aged 49 years, farmer, insured, Tan Dan Commune, 
Hai Phong Province). 
There is some evidence that education has a positive effect on the probability of 
insurance purchase (Research Question 4). Probit v2 and Probit v3 suggest that each 
additional year of formal schooling increases the probability of insurance purchase by 
2.5% to 2.9%. Evidence of this relationship, partially derived from the importance of 
education for demand for health services, is also evident in Ninh Binh and Dong Tbap, 
but not in Hai Phong Province. 
In terms of the respondent's main occupation, as expected, being a government 
employee has a strong positive effect overall, an effect almost entirely driven by the 
results in Dong Tbap Province. Farmers, who constitute perhaps the major target 
group for voluntary insurance, are no more or less likely to purchase insurance than 
those in the reference group (i.e. not working). Despite this overall effect, in Ninh 
Binh Province, farmers are significantly less likely to purchase insurance, whilst the 
opposite is true in Dong Tbap, which may simply reflect differing approaches to the 
development of the voluntary scheme by the respective provincial administration. 
Ninh Sinh has had a particularly strong focus on developing the scheme amongst 
schoolchildren, for example. These results show the value of disaggregating data to 
183 
Chapter 5: Private demand for health insurance 
the province level. One consistent effect across provinces is that rural residents are far 
less likely to purchase insurance than urban residents. The magnitude of this effect on 
the probability of purchase ranges from 25-205%. 
Perhaps the main other result of note is the significance of province dummies in the 
pooled model, and district dummies in the provincial models (in particular Ninh Sinh 
and Dong Thap). Given the large number of factors captured by this variable, 
including a variety of supply-side issues, this is not surprising. In Hai Phong Province, 
residents of Kien Anh, a smaller district close to the capital city, are more likely to 
have purchased insurance than both residents of Thuy Hguyen, a large rural district, 
and An Lao District, a smaller rural district further away from the provincial capital. 
In Ninh Binh Province, residents of the main town are less likely to have purchased 
insurance than Kim Son, a rural district. Finally, in Dong Thap Province, individuals 
living in Sa Dec Town and Lai Vung District, are more likely to purchase insurance 
than are those living in Hong Nu District. which lies at the far north-western corner of 
the province73• The latter finding may simply reflect low availability and marketing of 
insurance in rural areas. A weakness of this research is the lack of good information 
on the location and intensity of promotional campaigns. Such information is likely to 
explain the strong effect of these area dummies allowing. in turn, an improved 
specification of the model. 
5.3.2 Commune level Influences 
Research Questions 5 and 6 are examined in this section. The effect of membership in 
a mass organisation is tested at both the individual and commune level (the latter 
representing a form of network density). Both measures have a positive and significant 
effect on insurance purchase across the various models with the exception of Hai 
Phong Province. As noted earlier, this variable is not considered a proxy for civil 
society. It may reflect, however, a sense of duty to the State or national solidarity. If 
this is the case, then the results offer some support for the collective action hypothesis. 
Motivation for joining a mass organisation is an issue that is not currently well 
_ understood, and is a topic for future research. Mass organisations clearly play an 
73 In both Ninh Binh and Dong Thap Provinces, district dummies are not reported as they 
perfectly predict insurance purchase. 
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important role in a range of areas, including social support, education and cultural 
activities at the commune level, as pointed out by one official: 
"For cultural activities, we have the Front of Motherland which is 
integrated with the Women's Union, Youth Union, Farmer's Association, 
Veteran Association ..... to conduct cultural activities to build up educated 
families. Propaganda for friendly communities, happy couples, educated 
families, contributions for the community, public obligation etc. is 
organised by these associations." (Male. aged 57 years. Vice-Chairman 
of Farmer's Union. insured. Tan Duong Commune. Dong Thap 
Province). 
The following quotation, from a farmer in Ninh Binh Province, demonstrates the 
support function played by mass organisations, which may have an influence on the 
effectiveness of measures to promote voluntary health insurance: 
"Mass organisations, such as the Farmer'S, Women's, Veteran's group 
work well. Each unit has its own contributions - the amount depends on 
each unit. The fund is used mainly for meetings, activities and visiting 
sick members, the amount is small, just fruit, sugar, milk. The other part 
of the fund is used for loans. For the promotion of HICs, it's best to 
integrate the activities of different mass organisations, because member 
of Farmer's association is the husband, and Women's Union is wife - it 
needs to combine." (Male. aged 52 years, farmer. insured. Van Hai 
Commune. Ninh Binh Province). 
The idea that purchasing a voluntary health insurance card is an expression of social 
solidarity is voiced by several farmers: 
"We buy the Health Insurance Card (HIC) to ensure treatment, but if we 
are lucky not to be sick, that money would go for the treatment of poor 
people. That's the mutual support in society. Health insurance needs to be 
maintained but it also needs that people should be honest, and have good 
will." (Male. farmer, insured, Phat Diem Town, Ninh Binh Province) 
"My family has five HICs but only I have used my card. I do not feel 
loss, however, because we go for examination and treatment only if we 
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have disease. Besides, I consider it as involvement in the social 
movement. We buy HIC not for getting sick, but for taking precaution 
only - if not sick, it is a contribution for others." (Male, aged 39 years. 
farmer, insured, Tan Dan Commune, Hai Phong Province) 
"Government covers a millions dongs for some patients, and only a few 
thousand dongs for others - I think they take from the majority to serve a 
minority. Many healthy people serve a sick person but it doesn't matter. 
But if a person is sick long term in years, the government suffers losses, 
and other people buy HIC for 5-7 years but do not go to hospital -if you 
think carefully it's not so fair. But it is humanitarian job that the 
government does, what the government does is right." (Male. aged 70 
years, farmer. uninsured. Ninh My Commune. Ninh Binh Province). 
The following quote from Dong Thap Province shows how a sense of solidarity has a 
role to play in mitigating adverse selection: 
"A person should not buy voluntary health insurance only when he is sick 
because that benefits only himself and not others. It is not fair to other 
people who buy voluntary health insurance when they are healthy." 
(Female. Office secretary, member. Lai Vung Town. Dong Thap 
Province). 
Overall, whilst the theoretical basis for including this variable is somewhat 
underdeveloped, being a member of a mass organisation is one of the more powerful 
explanatory variables in the demand function. One possible mechanism through which 
membership may influence the probability of insurance purchase is duty to the State 
and the schemes it promotes. Duty is a central concept in Confucian philosophy 
(discussed in Part 1.5.2 and Part 3.2), but a greater understanding of how widespread 
this feeling is, and how it might impact on insurance purchase, is required. A sense of 
societal solidarity may also be important here, as may some more obvious factors, 
such as cheaper premia due to membership through such groups. 
Research Question 6 is tested by estimating the effect of both individual perceptions 
of social cohesion, and average social cohesion at the commune level, on the 
probability of insurance purchase. In the pooled model the only significant effect is at 
the commune level in Probit v4, suggesting that for every additional unit increase in 
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social cohesion, individuals are 50010 more likely to purchase insurance. This finding 
offers support to the collective action hypothesis. However, the effect is inconsistent 
across provinces. In Hai Phong the variable has no effect, whilst in Ninh Binh there is 
a strong negative effect, in particular at the individual level, which supports the 
substitute hypothesis. In Dong Thap Province, there is a strong positive effect at the 
individual level, but a strong negative effect at the commune level. 
Central to the argument in Part 3.2.2, that social cohesion may substitute for formal 
insurance, is that socially cohesive communities are more likely to develop strong 
networks of informal risk-sharing. In-depth interviews were used to probe respondents 
about their attitudes towards private risk-sharing networks. The following quotation, 
from Ninh Binh Province, stresses the importance of neighbours for financial support, 
whilst noting its limitations: 
"It is possible to ask help from neighbours or relatives but I think having 
voluntary health insurance is better. You can ask for help only up to a 
certain level. Having voluntary health insurance to reduce the cost of 
treatment plus relative's help in addition is necessary for us. Having 
voluntary health insurance is like having a good neighbour." (Male, age 
31 years, farmer/small business, uninsured, Van Hai Commune. Ninh 
Binh Province). 
The idea that individuals and households draw on a portfolio of strategies to deal with 
the risk of consumption shocks, of which health insurance is only one, is supported by 
this quote. In the next quotation, from Ninh Binh Province, the importance of financial 
support through close family networks is highlighted, particularly given that other 
sources of funds are usually restricted for directly productive activities, such as 
agriculture: 
"Borrowing money is little bit hard here. You can borrow paddy or rice, 
it's OK. There is no cash lending here. Because people here do not have 
cash people raise pigs and sell - there is no other source for cash. People 
doing small business borrow money from the bank. The Women's Union 
provides funds for poor families. I borrowed two million dongs for 
eighteen months with an interest rate of 0.8%. I borrowed to raise pigs. 
For health treatment we rely on close relatives and family - we can 
borrow within close relatives. We can also borrow from neighbours but 
187 
Chapter 5: Private demand for health insurance 
,----------_._-_._---- .... _ ... ., . 
mainly from our close relatives." (Female, aged 33 years, farmer, 
uninsured, Tan Dan Commune, Hai Phong Province). 
In-depth interviews highlight the considerable range of options open to individuals, in 
tenns of borrowing funds. Many of these are government institutions (e.g. Bank for 
the Poor, Agriculture Bank, People's Credit Fund), as well as mass organisations such 
as the Women's Union. However, funds accessed from these sources are often 
restricted to productive activities, in particular farming, which backs up the 
observations ofWolz (1997) and lzumida and Duong (2002) discussed in the opening 
chapter, that informal networks still have an important role to play. For example: 
• 
"In urgent need people can "hot borrow" from neighbours. Then they can 
sell paddy or get help from brothers, or sisters, to return the debts. Such 
lending is non-profit, for help. There is the Bank for the Poor, interest 
rate of 0.6% and the People's Credit Fund - 1.5%. Bank for the Poor is 
only for poor families, so they can pay the interest rate and the loan. 
Credit Fund is for people who want to invest more for production. The 
Agriculture Bank gives loan with low interest rate (0.7%) to members of 
the Farmer's Association, and only to members who can pay the loan, for 
the term of two years. One can borrow money for health treatment but not 
much. People mainly rely on help from their relatives in the family and 
family lineage." (Female, age 3/, farmer, uninsured, Ninh Binh 
Province). 
"My family was in the list of poor ones. Actually, I can borrow from the 
Fund for the Poor, but this year the policy is to lend to poor women. But 
my wife cannot borrow because she hasn't pay the Women's Union fees. 
In the last two years I was lent 1 million but the term is for 1 year with 
interest rate of 1.2% - how could we pay back only in one year?" (Male, 
aged 58 years, bicycle repair-man, uninsured, Phat Diem Town, Ninh 
Binh Province). 
These comments suggest that people regularly fall back on private networks to fund 
access to health services. Where there is confusion about the scheme, many 
individuals may consider private networks more reliable. In addition, the extent to 
which official corruption is perceived as a problem locally, could influence individual 
preferences with respect to which risk-mitigating strategy to adopt: 
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"I do not trust. They serve members worse than they serve people coming 
for extra service. People who come for extra service are given the best 
treatment because they have money. For farmers, we do not have money 
to go for extra services." (Female, aged 36 years, farmer, insured, Ninh 
My Commune, Ninh Binh Province). 
Government health insurance might displace informal risk-sharing networks, or co-
exist alongside them, for a range of reasons. In addition to risk aversion, income 
levels, health status, and a range of other individual characteristics, the effectiveness 
of government marketing techniques will also be important, as will levels of trust in 
government. Further insights into the way in which informal and formal risk-sharing 
networks may interact, from in-depth interviews, are presented from Dong Thap 
Province below: 
"I can borrow from people but for short time only. In the case of urgent 
need I can borrow from the "hot loan" lender with high interest rate, for 
instance, if I borrow 100,000 VND, I have to pay in total 120,000 VND 
in 12 days, daily pay of 10,000 VND. Poor people are very hard if they 
have to borrow money. I have to work hard, if I could not earn enough in 
a day, my husband should work hard to earn money to pay back debts. I 
have to work hard to earn money for my children to pay school fee." 
(Female, aged 34 years, hired worker, uninsured, Lai Vung Town, Dong 
Thap Province). 
"No one here borrows money with paying interest for health treatment. 
How would it be if the case is so serious and the patient spends all money 
and cannot pay back even interest. People only lend money for 
investment. Private lender takes high interest rate of 6.7% up to 10%." 
(Female, aged 35 years, Three colours uniform collaborator74, 
uninsured, Lai Vung Town, Dong Thap Province). 
74 Three colour uniform collaborators help to organise family planning, primary health care, 
and child nutrition programs at the commune level. 
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5.4 Concluding remarks 
New empirical evidence is presented in this chapter regarding demand for voluntary 
health insurance in Vietnam. Research Questions I to 4 are concerned with the effect 
of various individual characteristics based on issues central to the theory of health 
insurance. The main findings are summarised below. 
Voluntary health insurance suffers from adverse selection (Research Question I), with 
individuals in poor health around 40% more likely, on average, to purchase voluntary 
health insurance. This finding supports the predictions of theoretical models and is 
consistent with findings from other countries reviewed in Chapter 2. The data support 
and demonstrate the trade-off between a fixed premium under voluntary membership 
and adverse selection. The magnitude of this effect varies across provinces, however, 
with little evidence of the problem in Ninh Binh Province. More detailed information 
on supply-side arrangements in each province is required to understand these varying 
patterns. Adverse selection constitutes a threat to the longer-term financial 
sustainability of the scheme, unless greater public subsidy is made available, an issue 
discussed further in the concluding chapter. 
Research Question 2 examines the importance of risk aversion, a concept central to 
theoretical frameworks of health insurance. Worry about future health status has a 
significant and positive effect on the probability of insurance purchase. Whilst closely 
linked to health status, this constitutes an independent effect, which is remarkably 
robust across the models. Further research into attitudes towards risk, in the specific 
context of the health sector, would be useful given the current proliferation of health 
insurance schemes in low-income countries. 
With respect to Research Question 3, individual economic status has little significant 
effect on the probability of insurance purchase, overall. This offers some support to 
predictions that wealthier individuals are more likely to self-insure although further 
investigation is necessary on this point. From the perspective of income-related 
inequalities in access to health services, this is a positive finding, given evidence from 
certain countries that if income has a positive effect of uptake, income-inequalities in 
access to health services would widen as a result. The positive effect of income in Hai 
Phong Province suggests that a quality effect may be at play, and is another supply-
side factor that requires further investigation. Statistically significant district dummy 
variables also support this assertion. 
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An original aspect of this research is the inclusion of two variables representing 
community structure. The first, membership in a mass organisation (Research 
Question 5), has a remarkably robust, positive effect, on insurance purchase. Whilst 
the theoretical basis for the variables inclusion requires further development and 
refinement, the findings shed new light on an under-researched, but significant aspect 
of Vietnamese society and culture. Earlier chapters discussed the possibility that 
membership in a mass organisation may reflect a sense of duty to the State, or even a 
feeling of solidarity with others in society. Again, further research is required both 
into reasons for joining a mass organisation, and the way in which they function as 
institutions. 
The second variable representing community structure, and perceptions of community 
structure, is used to examine Research Question 6. Whereas some commentators 
suggest that cohesive communities (often equated with high social capital), are more 
likely to join a health insurance scheme voluntarily, Part 3.2.2 argues that the effect 
could also be negative, with informal networks crowding out formal insurance. 
Overall, in the pooled model, there is some support for the collective action 
hypothesis. In the provincial models, the results are highly significant, but not robust. 
For example, in Ninh Sinh Province there is a strong negative and statistically 
significant effect, supporting the substitute hypothesis, whilst in Dong Thap the 
coefficient moves in opposite directions at individual and commune levels. 
One interpretation of these findings is that social cohesion is important, but that it's 
causal effects are complex, depending on broad range of local factors, which in tum 
are shaped by history and culture. For example, understanding the way in which social 
cohesion and informal financial networks interact would be particularly useful in this 
context. Cohesive communities may also be more likely to support initiatives that 
express national solidarity, but not necessarily so. Solidarity with society in a broad 
sense is often considered a pre-requisite for the development of national risk-sharing 
schemes, but is not necessarily important for local community-based schemes. 
The model specified in this chapter, together with the results, demonstrates the value 
of integrating frameworks and ideas from other disciplines (in this case sociology and 
development economics), in partiCUlar when the institutional environment in low-
income countries is very different to those in which theoretical models have been 
developed. 
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As mentioned earlier, however, there is a lack of detailed information on the way in 
which institutional arrangements differ across survey locations. For example, both the 
quality of the health services that are insured, and the marketing strategies used to 
promote health insurance, are likely to influence levels of uptake. This imperfect 
understanding limits the interpretation of the findings and hence the extent to which 
they are generalisable. 
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Whereas Chapter 5 focused on the issue of demand for health insurance, this chapter 
and the next empirically test Research Questions 7-10, which address the impact of 
the scheme on various aspects of the health system. Figure 1.1 represents important 
elements of the broader health system relevant to this thesis. Research Question 7 asks 
whether using insurance when contacting a health provider affects satisfaction with 
the service. Evaluation is based on patient perceptions of service quality, or patient 
satisfaction, which arguably has a more important influence on the decision to 
purchase health insurance than actual clinical quality. Given that responses reflect 
individual opinions, the following analysis is based on responses to both structured 
and in-depth interviews. 
The growing dependence of health facilities on locally generated income, since the 
process of economic transition began in Vietnam in 1986, was discussed in Chapter I. 
Whether this factor has increased or decreased satisfaction levels is difficult to predict. 
This is the subject of Research Question 7 (What is the impact of voluntary health 
insurance on patient satisfaction?). On the other hand, the incentives inherent in a fee-
for-service physician reimbursement mechanism are expected to increase the supply of 
health services, which may lead to an increase in patient satisfaction. 
The second question addressed in this chapter is whether, overall, insured patients 
spend less on health services, ceteris paribus, than uninsured patients (Research 
Question 8). Improving financial access to health services is a major objective of the 
scheme, as with most non-profit insurance schemes, but little evidence on this issue 
from elsewhere currently exists, except in the USA where there is evidence that out-
of-pocket expenditures increase as the rate of cost-sharing falls (see Part 2.1.2). The 
effect of a dummy variable representing insurance status on total out-of-pocket health 
expenditures during the most recent contact with health services is used to test this 
question. As noted in Part 3.4.2, insured patients are expected, ceteris paribus, to have 
lower out-of-pocket expenditures than the uninsured. However, to the extent that 
demand for health services increases in response to reductions in price, consumption 
may increase, increasing expenditures and tempering the effect of insurance. 
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6.1 Patient satisfaction with health services 
6.1.1 Descriptive analysis 
Part 5.1.2 presented some evidence of the different ways in which insured and 
uninsured respondents view voluntary health insurance, and gave an initial insight into 
perceptions of service qUality. Opinions of health insurance are inextricably linked 
with an individual's experience of using health services. For this reason, questions 
regarding satisfaction with several specific aspects of health services were posed to 
respondents as part of the household questionnaire. Preliminary analysis of these data 
is presented in Table 6.1. The remaining analysis is primarily qualitative in nature and 
based on responses made during in-depth interviews. 
Information collected as part of the household survey is discussed first. When insured 
adults were asked if they wanted to make any comments to the Vietnam Health 
Insurance Agency about the scheme 65% declined to do so. The results from those 
who did respond were presented earlier in Figure 5.6. Whilst satisfied overall, probing 
on this issue revealed dissatisfaction over certain issues. Of those who replied, one 
quarter make the general point that there should be improvements in the insurance 
policy, which together with comments about the need for a better quality of service, 
dominated the responses. Specific issues mentioned include a lack of trust, bad staff 
attitude, discriminatory behaviour by medical staff. and the urgent need for health 
workers to be made more responsible. Many insured patients clearly feel that they 
receive poor treatment relative to uninsured patients. Overall, 16% of insured adults 
compared with 7% of uninsured adults cited the bad attitude of the staff as the main 
reason for not intending to purchase insurance in the future. 
Almost a quarter of insured adults not intending to renew their card say this is because 
they do not trust the scheme. In terms of provincial variations, the highest level of 
likely non-renewals is in Ninh Binh Province, where 29% of current and previous 
members say they won't buy another policy (21 % due to a lack of trust, and 19% due 
to bad staff attitudes). Next, 13% of members in Hai Phong Province say they will not 
buy another insurance card (of which 30% say they don't trust the scheme and 9% 
blame bad staff attitudes). Finally, in Dong Thap Province in southern Vietnam, the 
picture is quite different, with only 1.2% of respondents saying they wouldn't renew 
their policy. 
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Drawing on questions posed in the household questionnaire, concerning various 
dimensions of patient satisfaction (see Section F in Appendix 4), Table 6.1 compares 
weighted mean scores for insured and uninsured respondents. Respondents were first 
asked to state whether they were satisfied with service quality, at different types of 
health facility, using a simple five-point Likert scale. On average, uninsured patients 
are more satisfied with service quality at each level of health facility. Additional 
analysis of this data could be conducted, for example using econometric techniques, in 
which the dependent variable is one dimension of patient satisfaction. The ordered 
probit model would be a relevant estimator in this case. 
6.1.2 Results of in-depth interviews 
Insured respondents were asked whether they received a better service when using 
health insurance. In a separate question, both uninsured and insured respondents were 
asked whether they thought health workers treated them differently, compared with 
the other group. In Hai Phong Province, the reduced cost of accessing care with 
insurance was the primary difference reported, although this has a knock-on effect to 
the quality of care received, as discussed earlier in this chapter. One insured farmer 
said that: 
"Examination is the same for members and non-members. The different 
thing is that non-members of voluntary health insurance have to pay for 
services which brings benefit to the hospital - voluntary health insurance 
is the government's work. So the quality of service for voluntary health 
insurance member is limited because the staff cannot collect money. 
Direct and immediate money is different to the money given to 
government. Despite having no voluntary insurance if you have money 
you can get quicker treatment than people with health insurance .... we 
have voluntary health insurance - they will examine us but it takes a long 
time." (Male. farmer, aged 55 years, insured, Tan Dan Commune, Hai 
Phong Province) 
Another male insured respondent, in Tan Dan Commune, stresses the importance of 
unofficial payments, saying that: 
" ... for member and non-members ... .I think service quality is the same, 
the difference is only reimbursement. When you have health insurance 
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Mean scores 
Dimension of patient satisfaction7S Insured Uninsured 
.. --~-------.. 
Satisfaction with commune health centre 1.983 2.397 
(n=194) (n=523) 
Satisfaction with district hospital 2.177 2.536 
(n=213) (n=525) 
. Satisfaction with provincial hospital 1.772 2.405 
(n=105) (n=579) 
Satisfied with waiting time 2.398 2.521 
(n=360) (n=I,034) 
Satisfied with advice of health worker 2.S57 2.459 
(n=322) (n=I,004) 
Satisfied with official payments 2.599 2.601 
(n=212) (n=823) 
TABLE 6.1: DIMENSIONS OF PATIENT SATISFACTION 
75 Based on a five-point scale in which five indicates a high level of satisfaction. 
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the workers dislike because they cannot "gain profit". They "gain" more 
from people with no health insurance. So when I go to hospital I say to 
them that I do not have health insurance card until I have to pay - then 1 
show my card. People say that it is not good to present health insurance 
card in advance." (Male, insured, Tan Dan Commune, Hai Phong 
Province) 
One theme that comes out strongly from these responses is that many health workers 
give preferential treatment to uninsured patients, possibly in terms of waiting times, 
but also the way in which patients are treated. The quotations also show the 
importance of user charges as a source of revenue for hospitals, suggesting that the 
amount of money patients bring to the facility influences the way they are treated. 
Interestingly, the insurance premium is seen as money for the government, but user 
charges are not, despite the fact that both comments refer to services received in a 
public health facility. Responses also suggest that income from user charges is greater 
than from insurance reimbursements, and possibly quicker and less bureaucratic to 
obtain. Furthermore, the incentive effect of fee-for-service physician reimbursement 
appears not to be as significant as expected. The second quotation above, from Tan 
Dan Commune, highlights the unpredictability of service quality, which depends on 
the attitude of the particular health worker consulted. Relevant to this issue, the 
following comments were made by a female farmer, also in Hai Phong Province: 
"My sister in-law just returned from hospital - she has health insurance 
card but the service was not as good as for others without health 
insurance - they receive medicines. She told that patients with money can 
give gifts or something like that, and they can get medicines and careful 
examination. The person with health insurance just lies there. My sister 
in-law said we pay money to the insurance office, which takes our 
money, and give us a health insurance card. But people in hospital are the 
ones who have power. How can the insurance office know how the 
hospital provides treatment and what kind of medicines are given to 
insured patients?" (Female, farmer, aged 50 years, uninsured, Phu Lien 
Commune, Ninh Binh Province) 
These comments suggest an element of resignation that the government cannot control 
or regulate the actions of health workers, consistent with the idea that health facilities 
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are increasingly operating outside bureaucratic control in this period of economic 
transition. Patients also report pretending not to have health insurance, until the time 
to pay arrives, in order to get the best of both worlds i.e. quick and pleasant treatment 
and price reductions. In Ninh Binh Province, a similar theme comes out of the 
interviews, with the bureaucracy faced by insured patients at health facilities leading 
to much longer waiting times. 
Several respondents suggest that quality of service is systematically different for 
insured and uninsured patients. This might, to some extent, be a function of higher 
expectations amongst insured patients. Further evidence that members frequently do 
not use their insurance policy when accessing care, depending on how much of a hurry 
they are in, and whether or not they have money, is provided by one elderly insured 
farmer: 
"Examination with and without a health insurance card is the same, but 
because it takes a long time for members to wait for examination, we did 
not use the health insurance card ..... to get a quicker examination. It 
means that it's convenient to use money - for example, I need an X-ray - I 
gave money directly in the X-ray room so I can get my X-ray quicker. It's 
quick. When using the health insurance card it takes time, going here and 
there - it doesn't cost any money but it takes time. Now if you have 
money you go there directly and they do things for you quickly." (Male. 
aged 70 years, farmer, insured, Ninh My Commune, Ninh Binh Province) 
For example, one male farmer comments that: 
"The amount to pay for health insurance is small, VNO 60,000, just 
enough to buy some drinks. If someone bas a serious disease and gets the 
high costs of care covered, and another bas a minor disease and low costs 
of care covered, it's really fair. The main thing lies in the quality of 
treatment which needs to be fair to all patients." (Male, age 53 years. 
insured. Van Hai Commune, Ninh Binh Province). 
This view is reinforced by a younger female respondent who reports that: 
"With health insurance you do not have to pay fees. But the service 
attitudes of health workers are not so good. They serve members of 
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insurance not so warmly. So I think it is still bureaucratic, and procedure 
is quite troublesome, not like treatment for non-members. It is more 
administratively complicated for members than non-members." (Female, 
aged 36 years, farmer, insured, Ninh My Commune, Ninh Binh Province) 
Finally, the response from an uninsured female farmer in another commune, suggests 
that the way insured patients are treated differs across facilities: 
"Patients with health insurance get better care. I do not have health 
insurance but my brothers and my children have a card. I used to go to 
hospital to take care of them so I know. The health worker asked in detail 
about everything. Even the room is different. Insurance members stay in a 
different room - there is even an electric fan in the room." (Female, aged 
50 years, Van Rai Commune, Ninh Binh Province) 
In Dong Thap Province, health insurance appears to function quite differently, with 
few complaints that uninsured patients are treated preferentially. Indeed, there is a 
perception that insured patients receive a better service. For example, one young 
female with health insurance, reports that: 
"If I do not have a health insurance card the health service is not as good 
as for those with health insurance. One example is shorter waiting time. 
In the CHC, those with health insurance are served the same as non-
members, but members do not have to pay, that's the only difference." 
(Female, aged 37 years, member of Women 's Union, insured, Tan Duong 
Commune, Dong Thap Province) 
I f the quality of care in Dong Thap is the same, irrespective of the patient's insurance 
status, satisfaction will be driven by the reduced cost of treatment rather than 
perceived quality. As in Ninh Binh, there is evidence that the bureaucracy involved in 
using health insurance means that many patients decide to pay full charges for minor 
health problems. A range of responses on this issue are presented next: 
"There is no discrimination in treatment for patients, but sometimes 
people have to wait for a long time for an examination, it may take the 
whole morning for a person to get examined at hospital. Therefore. our 
staff feels reluctant to go for examination. Compulsory and voluntary 
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members are treated in the same way. Secondly, the procedure is 
complicated. The doctor examines. then he gives a receipt to the 
accountant. then you have to go here and there to pay - the procedure has 
several steps. In general. if my health is below 50% I'll go to the health 
facility for examination. If I only have a minor problem such as a cough, 
running nose. or minor aches. I seldom go for examination - other 
colleagues do the same as me. We go to pharmacies to buy medicines." 
(Male. Chief of the People's Committee Office. insured. Tan Thanh 
Commune. Dong Thap PrOVince) 
The following quotes are from uninsured respondents in Dong Thap Province. and 
suggest strongly that the only difference between being an insured patient is one of 
access costs, rather than quality of service: 
"I think having health insurance should give more benefit for 
examination or medicines. Members of health insurance should benefit 
more than non-members because they pay money for the card. I never 
heard about discrimination in treatment between members and non-
members of health insurance." (Male, farmer. uninsured. Tan Thanh 
Commune. Dong Thap Province) 
"Treatment for members is the same as for non-members. Because now 
people have the opportunity to complain and give their opinion about 
health services. If health workers do not follow the hospital regulations 
people will reflect this to the manager. So the situation in hospital is 
better now. The different thing is that members of health insurance get 
the cost of treatment reduced." (Male. Chief of the People's Committee 
Office. uninsured. La; Vung Town, Dong Thap Province) 
"Sometimes I think that health insurance member may get better services. 
but in the end, if I do not have health insurance card they also give me 
treatment. If 1 have health insurance, I may get the treatment's expenses 
reduced. Doctors here treat patients well." (Female. farmer. uninsured. 
La; Vung Town. Dong Thap Province) 
Overall, the qualitative data presented here provide a very different insight to that 
from the household questionnaire. The responses expose the way in which health 
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insurance influences the experience of patients when they contact a facility, through a 
variety of incentives and disincentives to providers. It is worth reminding the reader 
that, overall, insured individuals are satisfied with the scheme, with most intending to 
renew their policy. Overall satisfaction is driven primarily by reductions in the cost of 
accessing care, which is expected, given that this is the primary benefit of insurance. 
However, amongst those respondents not prepared to renew their policy, poor quality 
of care is a major factor. Using insurance frequently means sacrificing the quality of 
service received, in terms of both longer waiting times, and poorer staff attitudes. To 
some extent, however, lower satisfaction may be a function of higher expectations. 
The suggestion that many health workers treat patients according to the revenue they 
bring to the facility backs up the suggestion in Part 1.4.2 that economic liberalisation 
has resulted in reduced regulation of health facilities. In addition, facilities have 
become increasingly dependent on user fees. This theme is strongest in the two 
northern provinces of Hai Phong and Ninh 8inh. The implication, interestingly, is that 
whilst supplier-induced demand may well be a significant problem, health insurance is 
probably not the cause. Responses also suggest that insured patients are more likely to 
use their card when expected financial gains are substantial. Hence, for minor health 
problems, insured patients often prefer to pay full user charges and obtain faster 
treatment, rather than use their insurance card and wait. The findings show clearly that 
patients trade-off service quality with expected financial and time savings. 
6.2 Private out-of-pocket health expenditures 
A central objective of health insurance is to reduce the risk to individuals and 
households of incurring substantial out-of-pocket expenditures due to illness. 
Evidence presented in Part 1.3 shows that out-of-pocket expenditures on health 
services push many households into poverty, implying that substantial financial 
sacrifices are made to access health services to the extent that welfare is put at risk. 
The analysis that follows addresses Research Question 8 (What is the effect of being 
insured on total out-ofpocket health expenditures?). 
Given that mitigating risk is an important objective of health insurance, the following 
analysis assesses total out-of-pocket health expenditures, rather than only those 
incurred at government health facilities. If only the latter were examined then the 
effect of health insurance may be overestimated. Data collected on out-of-pocket 
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expenditures include official user charges (or co-payments for the insured), as well as 
indirect and unofficial payments made during the respondent's most recent contact 
with a health facility16. Both adults and children are included in the analysis. Insured 
respondents are defined as those with health insurance at the time of the survey (as 
opposed to the retrospective definition used in Chapter 5). The design of the sample 
allows the effect of insurance to be estimated, given that uninsured patients are not 
eligible for free health services, and have hence paid full user charges. 
6.2.1 Background and descriptive analysis 
Respondents were asked whether they had been ill in the three months preceding the 
survey. For those who had, data were collected on whether they had sought 
professional medical advice, and if so whether inpatient services were required. In 
terms of health expenditures, patients were asked to recall both indirect (i.e. travel 
costs), and direct payments (i.e. user fees for consultations, diagnostic tests and 
medicines), as well any unofficial payments made. 
Insured individuals were asked how much they paid for their insurance policy. 
However, there were substantial non-responses on this question, possibly for the 
reason that many individuals purchased their policy several months before the survey. 
In order to incorporate the premium amount into the calculation of average payments, 
it would be necessary to establish how many times the policy is used during its 
lifetime (i.e. both past and present usage). For example, the contribution of the 
premium to average health expenditures per contact will fall as total usage of the 
policy across its lifetime increases. Given the difficulty in accurately establishing this 
figure the premium is not included in estimations of health expenditures for the 
insured. Whilst a downward bias in estimates will result, the underestimation is 
unlikely to be substantial, given the low level of premia relative to average health 
expenditures amongst insured patients. 
Out of 2,751 respondents in the household survey 45% reported feeling ill during the 
three months preceding the survey. Of this group 87.5% sought medical assistance 
from a professional health worker either at a facility, or through a home visit17. On 
average, insured patients spent substantially less than uninsured patients for inpatient 
76 Based on responses to question e56 and e61. 
77 This figure is based on question d39. 
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care (VND 310,198 or US$ 22.98, compared with VND 911,701 or US$ 67.53). All 
data refer to the most recent contact with a health provider. For outpatient services, 
there is also a substantial difference (VND 25,551 or US$ 1.89 compared with VND 
137,908 or US$ 10.21). Table 6.2 reports total expenditures by consumption quartile, 
which is the aggregate of payments for transport, consultations, diagnostic tests (e.g. 
X-ray), medicines, and any extra or unofficial fees. 
Across the sample, average out-of-pocket expenditures rise with economic status. 
Those in the richest consumption quartile spend, on average, 135% more than 
individuals in the poorest quartile. As expected, uninsured patients tend to spend more 
than the insured, ranging from a multiple of three to eleven. The overall average is 
VND 66,673 (USS 4.94) and VND 211,577 (US$ 15.67) respectively. In consumption 
quartile 3, insured patients pay around double what insured patients pay, an 
unexpected finding that may reflect extreme adverse selection in this group. 
In Table 6.3, health expenditure data (i.e. the total cost of the most recent contact with 
a provider) are analysed as a percentage of annual consumption expenditure, and again 
by consumption quartile and insurance status. These figures indicate the extent to 
which health expenditures are a burden on an individual's budget, or in other words 
the financial sacrifice made to obtain health services. For an individual living in a 
household in the poorest quartile 1, health expenditures during the last visit were on 
average 14.5% of total annual consumption expenditures, compared with 4.2% in 
high-income households. This confirms the pattern found in previous studies, that 
richer households sacrifice substantially less financially, in order to access health 
services (see, for example, Fabricant et a1. 1999, and Pannarunothai and Mills 1997). 
These figures are, however, substantially lower than those reported in the Vietnam 
Living Standards Survey 1998, which estimates that households in the poorest group 
spend on average 22% of discretionary expenditure on health services. The difference 
probably results from the different sample definition used. The poorest households in 
Vietnam are not included in this sample, given that in principle they are eligible for 
fully subsidised health insurance. When expenditure data for insured and uninsured 
patients are compared, within consumption quartiles, a similar pattern emerges. In the 
poorest quartile, the uninsured paid on average 14.9% of their annual income during 
their last visit, compared with 1.6% for members. 
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_ Consumption quartile Insured Uninsured Total 
I 24,061 113,500 110,681 
(311,000 to 1,844,999 VNO) 
2 17,338 187,864 184,191 
(1,845,000 to 2,454,999 VNO) 
3 668,893 316,115 310,143 
(2,455,000 to 3,485,999 VNO) 
4 95,313 279,037 259,912 
(3,486,000 to 32,280,000 VND) 
Average = 66,673 211,577 192,312 
TABLE 6.2: AVERAGE OUT-OF-POCKET EXPENDITURE (CONSUMPTION QUARTILE) 
C~nsumption quartile Insured Uninsured Total 
-_._----
1 1.63 % 14.96 % 14.53 % 
(311,000 to 1,844,999 VNO) 
2 0.81 % 8.65% 8.48% 
(1,845,000 to 2,454,999 VNO) 
3 22.34% 11.13% 10.92 % 
(2,455,000 to 3,485,999 VNO) 
4 1.69% 4.54% 4.24% 
(3,486,000 to 32,280,000 VND) 
Average = 1.65% 10.35 % 8.4% 
TABLE 6.3: AVERAGE OUT -OF-POCKET EXPENDITURE AS % ANNUAL CONSUMPTION 
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Within richer quartiles, health expenditures amongst the uninsured tend to represent a 
higher proportion of annual consumption expenditures. The descriptive analysis 
suggests that overall, having insurance reduces health expenditures. In quartile 3, 
however, the findings are counterintuitive. Whilst the number of observations is very 
low for insured patients, it is also possible that insured individuals have, on average, 
poorer health status than uninsured individuals. This would explain why, even with 
insurance, that health expenditures are considerably higher for this group. 
6.2.2 Econometric analysis 
A range of factors influences the level of health expenditures incurred by ill 
individuals, for example illness severity. However, when using descriptive analysis, 
confounding variables may cloud the effect of being insured on out-of-pocket health 
expenditures. In order to estimate the true insurance effect, rather than an effect 
resulting only partly from insurance, household survey data are also analysed using 
regression analysis. Provided explanatory variables are exogenous to health 
expenditures, and the specification of the model is satisfactory, regression analysis 
allows the independent effect of each variable on health expenditures to be estimated. 
First, an ordinary least squares (OLS) model is used to estimate the effect of 
insurance, which assumes that conditional on observable characteristics of each 
observation, membership of the scheme is independent of unobservable factors that 
influence health expenditures. OLS models thus control only for observable factors 
that may be correlated with the insurance decision. As noted in earlier chapters 
however, it is likely that self-selection into the voluntary insurance scheme is 
influenced by unobservable factors, which in turn influences the magnitude of health 
expenditures incurred. If this effect is not controlled for, coefficient estimates will be 
biased and inconsistent's. 
To deal with this problem an alternative model is used to control for any sample 
selection bias that may be present. This is achieved by allowing unobserved factors, 
which influence the decision to purchase voluntary health insurance, to be related to 
unobserved factors that also partially determine health expenditures. Health seeking 
behaviour influenced by a unique local culture, or specific to an individual, is one 
78 Consistent estimates are those that approach the true beta values when the sample is large 
(see Studenmund 1997: 536). 
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such possible influence. Following Heckman's (1979) sample selection correction 
technique, the model used can be described as an endogenous, dummy variable model. 
The effect of controlling for unobservable effects is highlighted in Table 6.5. A 
dummy variable representing insurance status is included to measure its effect on 
health expenditures. Economic status is measured by the natural logarithm of per 
capita annual income consumption expenditure in the respondent's household, during 
the twelve months preceding the survey. The dependent variable is defined as the 
natural logarithm of total health expenditures, which is commonly used in such 
analysis (see Newhouse 1977). The coefficient on the log of consumption 
expenditures (economic status) can thus be interpreted as the income elasticity of 
health expenditures. 
Two dummy variables representing province of residence are included with Dong 
Thap defined as the reference province. A dummy variable is also used to represent 
whether or not the respondent lives in a rural area, which acts as a proxy for distance 
to a health facility. Distance is expected to have a negative effect on demand for health 
services, and hence demand for health insurance, given that one is derived from the 
other (see Besley 1991, and the discussion in Part 2.1.1). Two dummy variables are 
included to represent good and fair health. Illness severity, which is expected to 
significantly increase health expenditures, is controlled using a dummy variable 
representing the use of inpatient services (the dataset was limited in terms of detailed 
information on the type of illness and its severity). Level of education is represented 
through a continuous variable based on total years of formal schooling. Age is 
included as both a linear and non-linear (squared) term. Finally, dummy variables are 
included to represent the respondent's occupation, whether the respondent is an adult 
or a child, and whether male or female. 
One issue analysed in detail, in the following chapter, is that being insured may 
influence whether or not an individual seeks care when ill, in tum influencing out-of-
pocket expenditures. In the analysis presented here, health expenditures are only 
analysed for those with positive out-of-pocket health expenditures i.e. only those who 
decided to seek care. In other words, if uninsured individuals are less likely to seek 
medical care when feeling ill, and hence incur zero expenditure, they are excluded 
from the sample. Not reflecting this insurance effect limits the findings to a partial 
interpretation of the causal impact of health insurance on total health care 
expenditures. 
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The non-inclusion of zeros is justified on several grounds. First, the proportion of sick 
individuals not seeking care is low, at 12.5%, and hence almost all the insurance effect 
is captured through an analysis of positive health expenditures. Secondly, whilst 
insurance status is positively correlated with the probability of an individual seeking 
medical advice, the relationship is weak (r=0.0586). Furthermore. the following 
chapter provides a detailed analysis of the effect of insurance on the decision to seek 
care. Finally. due to non-responses to certain questions used as explanatory variables. 
only 980 observations are used to estimate the models. 
6.2.3 Results 
Table 6.4 describes the explanatory variables used whilst 6.5 summarises the results of 
. regression analysis. First, an OLS model is estimated in which the coefficient 
representing insurance status indicates that, for those who sought medical care when 
last ill. insured patients spent on average 50.6% less than the uninsured. statistically 
significant at the I % level. Several other explanatory variables are also statistically 
significant. 
For example. economic status has a strong positive influence on health expenditures 
with a coefficient of 0.499. This implies that for a 10% increase in annual income an 
individual will, on average, increase health expenditures by 4.99% confirming the 
results of previous studies, that at the individual level health expenditures are income 
inelastic (see Part 2.4.2). As expected, those with good and fair health status spend 
significantly less than those with poor health, with those using inpatient services 
spending significantly more than outpatients, by over 250%. The model passes the 
Ramsey RESET test of model specification, or omitted variables (p=0.229), and 
returns an R2 value of 0.354. 
The second model is an endogenous dummy variable model, referred to as 'Heckman 
(version 1)'. which uses the same explanatory variables but tests and corrects for 
selection bias through the inclusion of the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR). The IMR 
effectively captures unobservable effects that determine insurance purchase. and hence 
correct for any selectivity bias (see Deaton 1997: 104-5). A t-test of the null 
hypothesis. that the coefficient on this variable is zero, indicates whether a correlation 
exists between insurance status and health care expenditures. Whilst the IMR is not 
significant, it still generates a consistent estimator of the effect of insurance status 
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Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Total health expenditures (thousand VNO) 980 205.22 641.44 1 6,500 
Insurance status 980 0.004 0.062 0 I 
Annual income/consumption expenditure (thousand VNO) 980 3,000.87 2,688 311.11 30,550 
Resident of Ninh Sinh 980 0.275 0.447 0 1 
Resident of Hai Phong 980 0.065 0.246 0 1 
Resident of rural area 980 0.825 0.380 0 1 
Good health status in previous 12 months 980 0.185 0.388 0 1 
I Fair health status in previous 12 months 980 0.527 0.499 0 1 
Used inpatient services 980 0.097 0.297 0 1 
Education level (years of schooling) 980 5.165 3.556 0 16 
Adult 980 0.715 0.451 0 1 
Female 980 0.565 0.496 0 1 
Age 980 35.924 21.049 6 83 
Occupation - retired 980 0.074 0.262 0 1 
Occupation - government worker 980 0.010 0.099 0 1 
Occupation - service sector 980 0.112 0.314 0 1 
_Qccullation - other 980 0.608 0.488 0 1 
TABLE 6.4: PRIVATE HEALTH EXPENDITURES - DESCRIPTION OF THE VARIABLES 
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Heckman (ve.:;(~n 3) I Variable OLS model Heckman (version 1) Heckman (version 2) 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value ! 
(Standard error) (Standard error) (Standard error) (Standard error) 
Constant 0.506 0.623 -0.875 0.420 -0.404 0.685 -0.751 0.457 
( 11.02) ( 1.084) (0.996) (11.009) 
Member of voluntary -0.971 0.001 -2.015 0.050 -0.948 0.287 4.524 0.043 
health insurance scheme (0.284) (1.027) (0.890) (2.238) 
Log of annual incomel 0.499 0.000 0.548 0.000 0.512 0.000 0.572 0.000 
consumption expenditure (0.123) (0.138) (0.137) (0.135) 
('OOOs VND) 
Resident of Ninh Binh 0.211 0.198 0.084 0.690 0.266 0.224 0.259 0.079 
(0.163) (0.212) (0.159) (0.147) 
Resident of Hai Phong 0.366 0.137 0.681 0.084 0.462 0.000 0.447 0.185 
(0.246) (0.393) (0.399) (0.337) 
Resident of rural area 0.223 0.212 0.245 0.180 0.214 0.273 0.062 0.686 
(0.178) (0.183) (0.162) (0.153) 
Good health status in last -0.609 0.008 -0.530 0.033 -0.653 0.000 -0.647 0.006 
12 months (0.231) (0.248) (0.240) (0.234) 
Fair health status in last 12 -1.004 0.000 -1.046 0.000 -1.032 0.000 -1.002 0.000 
months (0.165) (0.169) (0.165) (0.163) 
Used in-patient services 2.495 0.000 2.513 0.000 2.509 0.000 2.485 0.000 
(0.224) (0.226) (0.219) (0.221) 
Education level (years of -0.014 0.507 0.029 0.315 
schooling) (0.018) (0.028) 
Adult -0.326 0.344 0.146 0.006 0.180 0.262 
(0.345) (0.165) (0.161) 
Female 0.080 0.561 0.056 0.685 0.063 0.612 0.091 0.495 
(0.138) (0.137) (0.132) (0.133) 
Age 0.007 0.690 0.019 0.467 
(0.017) (0.026) 
Age-squared -0.000 0.948 -0.000 0.692 
(0.000) (0.000) 
TABLE 6.5: PRIVATE HEALTH EXPENDlTIJRES - ECONOMETRIC RESULTS 
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Occupation - service sector 0.416 0.090 0.444 0.072 0.462 0.318 
(0.245) (0.247) (0.226) 
Occupation - retired -0.179 0.516 -0.192 0.490 
(0.275) (0.278) 
Occupation - other -0.007 0.970 0.032 0.867 
(0.193) (0.192) 
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.599 0.287 0.003 0.013 -0.016 0.963 
(0.563) (0.499) (0.346) 
Interaction tenn: income -0.665 0.018 
and insurance status (0.281) 
Number of observations 980 980 980 980 
RESET test (prob > F) 0.229 0.091 0.220 0.108 
R2 0.354 0.356 0.351 0.348 
TABLE 6.5: PRIVATE HEALTH EXPENDmJRES - ECONOMETRIC RESULTS 
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on positive health expenditures79• 
Uninsured patients spent on average considerably more than insured patients, and by a 
far greater magnitude than estimated by the OLS model. Income elasticity of health 
• 
expenditures is substantially greater at a value of 0.54, but remains inelastic. 
Coefficients on most other variables remain stable i.e. similar to the OLS model, in 
tenns of both direction and level of statistical significance. This model just passes the 
RESET test (assuming a 5% threshold) with a p-value of 0.091, and has an R2 value of 
0.356. 
In order to improve identification of the independent effect of insurance, a third 
model, referred to as 'Heckman (version 2)', is a refined version of 'Heckman (version 
I )' in which several statistically insignificant variables are dropped. These include 
level of education, both the age and age squared tenns, and individuals defined as 
being retired or in the 'other occupation' category. Insured individuals still spend 
considerably less than the uninsured (94.8%), and income elasticity of expenditure 
similar at 0.512. Only the coefficient representing adults (compared with children) 
gains statistical significance over the previous version of the model. The R2 value of 
0.351 is almost identical to previous models. The model comfortable passes the 
Ramsey RESET test (p=O.220). 
Finally, an interaction tenn combining insurance status and economic status is 
incorporated into a second version of the Heckman model, referred to as 'Heckman 
(version 3)'. This term allows the effect of insurance status on health expenditures to 
be estimated as an individual's economic status changes. The resulting coefficient, 
0.665, is statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating that patients with higher 
incomes have less dramatic reductions in out-of-pocket expenditures as a result of 
insurance than do poorer patients. In other words, insurance reduces expenditure more 
7<) An alternative version of the model was estimated without weighting, in which the sign and 
statistical significance of most coefficients were similar, but the Inverse Mills Ratio was highly 
significant, indicating a sample selection problem. There is some discussion in the literature 
over the need for weighting in regression analysis. Deaton says: "A weighted regression 
prOVides a consistent estimate of the population regression function ..... Of course if we are 
trying to estimate behavioural models. and if those models are different in different parts of the 
population. the classic econometric argument is correct. and weighting is at best useless." 
Deaton 1997: 71. However, Manski and Lerman (1997), discuss the need to create a Weighted 
Exogenous Sampling Maximum Likelihood (WESML) Estimator when estimating coefficients 
from data based on choice-based sampling. 
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for the poor than the rich80• This model also passes the Ramsey RESET test (p=O.l 08) 
with a similar R2 value of 0.348. In terms of unofficial payments for health services, 
little quantitative data were collected as part of the household survey. Hence, this issue 
was an important focus of discussion during in-depth interviews. Several quotations 
are listed below to give a sense of how important these payments are, particularly in 
order to improve the quality of care received. First, insured patients: 
"My son gave "extra money" not me, but I believe that if I do not give 
money I would get the services, but I am not sure that I would get 
medicines in time. I have to recognise medicines are available right after 
"money. Money makes things easier. I cannot prevent that. The whole 
society is like that and I have to follow. Everyone likes money. If you 
have money you can even buy a fairy". (Male, Hai Phong, 50 years, 
farmer, insured) 
This first quote supports reports by Transparency International and other observers, 
that corruption is widespread in Vietnam. For the poor, however, and those with 
chronic diseases, exemptions do often apply although, again, often at the cost of 
quality: 
"My husband had a chronic disease for years and my family is poor, so 
we did not have to pay anything. But it is true that if you have money you 
will get better treatment. If you have voluntary health insurance, they 
don't dare take any money. If you don't have voluntary health insurance 
you should have cash". (Female, Hai Phong, 44 years,farmer, insured) 
In Dong Thap Province, there is clearly flexibilty in the timing of payments, which 
also plays a role in protecting access to services: 
"In this area, extra payment to health workers does not exist. Even when 
you do not have money to pay for treatment, you can pay later. Giving 
extra money for treatment is not right. I'm poor, even I cannot have 
80 Note that when insurance status is represented in a regression model both as an independent 
variable, and as one of the variables in an interaction variable, only the interaction term should 
be interpreted. The marginal effect of the independent insurance variable is no longer the 
coefficient on the dummy variable. 
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enough money to pay for treatment, how can I have money to give for 
extra payment?" (Female, age 41, Dong Thap,/armer, uninsured) 
An interesting comment in the quote above is that staff dare not take money, from 
those with voluntary insurance, which is consistent with the findings presented earlier 
in this chapter. It also supports the insight that insured patients do not bring money to 
health facilities and, as a result are not valued in the same way by health workers. The 
following quotes give a further idea of the experience of insured patients when they 
visit a health facility: 
"I have a voluntary health insurance card but I seldom use it. I am tired 
frankly. Having voluntary health insurance makes easier access to 
hospital, but for better service, you need money. Although we have health 
insurance card, the service is not as good as people who do not have it. If 
you have a card but you give "extra money" they are more happy. People 
giving money can get examination first, although I have health insurance 
card I sit and wait there. They do not need to queue, they pay for the fee 
and they can get examination quickly." (Female, Ninh Binh, farmer, 
insured) 
"And in reality, if you stay in hospital and you rely only on your health 
insurance card you wait for the end of your life, frankly you have to give 
"extra money", otherwise, your life is like" an egg on a stick" ..... why, 
when you and I stay in the same hospital, you get better services than 
me? Because you have a "relationship" with doctors. You "take care" of 
the doctor and the doctor "takes care" of you - it's a personal feeling. It's 
like you create favourable conditions for them and they do favour for 
you. You give "extra money" to make sure that things go well. Other 
people do that, you have to follow." (Male, age 70, Ninh Binh, insured) 
"In my thinking when people give extra money to doctors, they want to 
show their own feelings ..... but if you have a voluntary health insurance 
card you don't have to give extra money." (Female, Dong Thap. Vice-
Chairman o/Women 's Union, insured) 
This final comment suggests, as with responses regarding patient satisfaction that in 
Dong Thap the situation is quite different. Generally, respondents are more positive 
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about health services and health insurance, which may partly reflect the high number 
of government officials incorporated into the scheme in this province. The following 
responses are from patients without health insurance: 
"Voluntary health insurance is beneficial but you still have to give gifts to 
get quick treatment. Many patients with voluntary health insurance 
should give extra money, otherwise they will never get as good treatment 
as those without insurance. In case of my sister who got eye operation, 
my mother told that she gave each nurse only few tens of thousands, 
totally about 200,000. They did not ask us to do like that, but my mother 
said that she did that to make sure that the service for my sister be 
adequate and quick. It's just to give some money for them for drink. It's 
depends on individual affection to health workers - they do not require 
anything." (Female. Hai Phong, farmer. uninsured) 
"People give money as gifts to doctors and nurses, hoping that they will 
take good care of their sick relative. If no gift-money is given the health 
staff will give treatment, the same medicines or injection, but less 
quantity or time than to those who give money." (Male. Dong Thap. 
farmer. uninsured) 
"For treatment at hospital, my mother with health insurance care got good 
treatment and care. But people say if I have insurance I should also give 
some "extra gift" for health workers for them to work hard at night shift, 
or operation. Having something for them in order to get more careful 
services. Among 5 people, 4 of them said that if there is no " extra 
money" to them, they just fulfil their responsibility, for example, they 
came for injection at the injection time, and next day you get care only in 
examination time. If someone feel badly in the afternoon outside the time, 
he wants to invite health workers, they may not come to you. I heard that 
from people returned from hospital. This becomes a social problem. This 
is not right thing to do but everyone does the same. If we did not do that 
we cannot quickly cure our diseases. No one likes it but still does it. The 
government policy is right but implementers do wrong. We believe the 
government but we do not trust implementation." (Female. age 30. Ninh 
Binh. farmer. uninsured) 
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Interestingly, this last respondent perceives doctors in government hospitals as being 
outside government, or at least outside government control. This backs up the idea that 
since do; moi, health facilities have become increasingly independent from regulation, 
and dependent on direct income from patients. Some suggest, however, that these 
payments are principally gifts: 
"I heard about extra payment but I did not witness it. I think doctor 
provides services accordingly to their responsibility. It depends on the 
patient's family. People giving extra payment because of their gratitude to 
doctor, they give voluntarily, some tea or tobacco." (Male. Ninh Binh. 
farmer. uninsured) 
"The doctors themselves do not ask for extra money. It comes from the 
patients who want to give money to get affection." (Female. Dong Thap. 
tailor. uninsured) 
6.3 Concluding remarks 
The first part of this chapter presents evidence that, overall, insured patients ~e 
satisfied with health insurance. Patient satisfaction reflects two aspects of the scheme, 
value from the increased certainty that insurance provides, and expected financial 
savings. When insured patients are questioned in more detail as part of in-depth 
interviews, it becomes clear that many consider the quality of care they receive to be 
inferior, to that received by fee-paying patients. Dissatisfaction was expressed 
principally in tenns of staff attitudes, and waiting times, and in many cases is of 
sufficient magnitude that insured patients often decide not to use their card. The 
answer to Research Question 7 is very clearly that health insurance reduces the 
perceived quality of health services. 
Expected benefits from using insurance wh~n accessing health services, clearly extend 
beyond cost reduction, although this is one of the most important factor for patients. 
Depending on the severity of the health problem (and expected financial gains under 
insurance), and expected quality of service under insurance, insured patients make a 
decision whether to use their health insurance card or to pay full user charges. For 
those who are time-sensitive, and not particularly price sensitive, then for relatively 
minor health problems the insurance card may not be used. Some patients, however, 
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aim to maximise i.e. get the best of both worlds, by pretending not to be insured until 
the time of payment. 
Research Question 8, concerned with the effect of being insured on total out-of-pocket 
health expenditures, is also empirically examined in this chapter. After controlling for 
a range of possibly confounding factors, it is estimated that insured patients spent, on 
average, substantially less than uninsured patients, during their most recent contact 
with a health provider. Two types of model are used to analyse this effect. First, an 
ordinary least squares (OLS) model which assumes that membership of the insurance 
scheme is distributed randomly across individuals, and secondly a model which tests 
and corrects for selection bias following Heckman (1978). Selection bias is a central 
econometric issue when analysing the impact of a voluntary health insurance scheme, 
and was discussed in Part 4.4.2.3. From a methodological perspective, those results 
which corrected for selection bias are a more accurate reflection of the true insurance 
effect. The results are highly statistically significant, and provide strong evidence that 
health insurance reduces the financial burden to households, incurred when accessing 
health services. 
Several explanatory factors are robust across model specifications. Economic status, 
proxied by an individual's annual consumption expenditure, shows a positive and 
highly significant effect, although overall is income inelastic. This finding suggests 
that ability to pay remains an important determinant of health expenditures even for 
patients with insurance, and is consistent with the results of in-depth research 
concerning patient satisfaction. Extra payments are still seen as necessary by insured 
patients, in order to obtain a better quality, and more timely service. This finding is 
particularly strong in the two northern provinces. Whilst additional payments are also 
made in Dong Thap Province, comments indicate that these are less critical to ensure 
good treatment. 
Individuals in good and fair health status also spend significantly less, out-of-pocket, 
than those in poor health, a second finding consistent across model specifications. This 
finding is not unexpected, but points to the fact that policy makers must remain 
vigilant in ensuring that financial access to necessary health care is maintained for 
poorer individuals. Finally, respondents living in Hai Phong Province tend to spend 
significantly more than those living in Dong Thap in the Mekong River Delta, which 
is slightly surprising given the worse health status overall in the south (see Table 1.4). 
One possible explanation for this finding is differences in unofficial expenditures 
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between the provinces. Further analysis of the data shows that, on average, such 
payments were 50-100% higher in the northern Provinces. 
As noted in earlier chapters, the extent to which these findings are generalisable is 
limited by a lack of information on the supply side. For example, differing levels of 
bureaucratic control of health workers, and unofficial payments, are likely to influence 
both perceived service quality and out-of-pocket expenditures, the two issues 
addressed in this chapter. Better information on the way in which health services are 
delivered, and the way health workers respond to health insurance, would allow the 
model to be better specified, and would enhance the analysis. The next chapter 
examines the impact of health insurance on treatment-seeking behaviour, which is 
closely linked to the analysis presented here. 
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7.1 Background and descriptive analysis 
7.1.1 Background 
A major issue in the health insurance literature is the way in which insurance changes 
the consumption of health services. As discussed in some detail in Part 2.1.2, this issue 
is covered by the literature on moral hazard, which explains increased consumption 
amongst insured patients in terms of behavioural changes amongst both consumers 
and providers. First, economic theory predicts that patients will consume more health 
services when the price of those services faUs i.e. demand is sensitive to changes in 
price. Furthermore, there is evidence that as an individual's income falls, they become 
more sensitive to changes in price (for example, Sauerborn et a1. 1994 provide 
evidence from Burkina Faso). This is consistent with evidence that poorer households 
have been worst affected by the introduction of user charges in many low-income 
countries. 
Secondly, insurance may lead to changes in the behaviour of both consumers and 
provider. In the case of consumers, there is concern that insurance encourages more 
'risky' behaviour, which in turn increases the probability of that individual requiring 
medical treatment. In the case of providers, their role as an agent may also lead to 
increased consumption by insured patients. This is particularly likely when providers 
are reimbursed on a per-case basis by an insurance fund, as in Vietnam, and is 
commonly referred to as supplier-induced demand. This issue, however, is not tested 
empirically in this thesis. Somewhat unexpectedly, the results presented in the 
previous chapter suggest that supplier-induced demand is not a major problem, at least 
not as a result of the incentives produced by health insurance. It appears that insured 
patients bring less money to health facilities and, hence, often have to wait longer to 
receive treatment, and are in many ways considered less important. 
Research Question 9 focuses on treatment-seeking behaviour i.e. the effect of being 
insured on the probability that an individual feeling ill seeks treatment. As discussed 
in Chapter 2, increased consumption can be interpreted either positively or negatively. 
Indeed, there are strong theoretical arguments to support the idea that moral hazard, or 
increased consumption, is beneficial (see in particular Nyman 1999, and 
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Cutler and Zeckhauser 2000). Unmet health needs are substantial in most low-income 
countries, principally due to the inadequate supply of health services and associated 
opportunity costs (see Gertler and van der Gaag 1990a), but increasingly as a result of 
financial barriers. 
The suggestion that health insurance leads to the wasteful over-consumption of health 
services, implicit in much of the literature concerned with western health systems, is 
less convincing in low-income countries. Rather, a major concern since the 
introduction of direct user charges in government facilities in 1989, is that unmet 
health needs have actually increased (see the discussion in Part 1.3.1). By focusing on 
the behaviour of patients reporting an illness, the analysis begins to focus in on real 
health needs. However, differing perceptions of need, will also drive the decision to 
seek treatment. In an attempt to deal with such influences, which are not easily 
observed, appropriate identification techniques have been developed and are used in 
the econometric analysis that follows. A second aspect to the analysis presented in this 
chapter, is the effect of insurance on the first action taken (e.g. choice of provider). 
Finally, Research Question 10 (Does social cohesion mitigate moral hazard?) 
addresses the role of community structure in overcoming information asymmetry 
within a health insurance scheme. 
7.1.2 Sample definition and descriptive analysis 
In terms of the 'member' sample, only those respondents who had health insurance at 
the time of the survey are included in the following analysis. In Ninh Binh Province, 
only thirty-one respondents were insured at the time of survey (see Table 4.2 and 
associated text), and are hence combined with Hai Phong Province. A dummy variable 
representing 'northern province' is thus included, as an explanatory variable, with 
Dong Thap Province in the south of Vietnam forming the reference province. The 
sample includes both adults and children. 
As part of the household survey, respondents were asked whether they had felt ill in 
the previous three months (question d38), and if so what their first action was 
(question d46). Responses indicate whether or not care was sought, and if so with 
which provider (e.g. government, private, or traditional healer). Evidence from 
Vietnam other low-income countries, reviewed in Part 2.1.2, concludes overall that 
insured patients are more likely to contact a provider for curative care than uninsured 
patients. 
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Overall, 45% respondents reported feeling ill in the previous three months with, 
slightly surprisingly, more uninsured (46.1%) than insured (36.7%). Of this group, 
87.5% said they either visited a health facility or called a health worker to their 
houses, . In this analysis, however, the focus is whether the individual's first action 
was to seek advice from a health professional (question d46), which produces a much 
lower figure of 30.9% (see Table 7.1). Using this question, seeking medical advice 
includes any care sought from a government health facility, or a private health worker, 
but excludes the purchase of medicines from a pharmacist or contact with a traditional 
healer. 
Insured individuals are more likely to seek professional advice overall, (51% 
compared with 37%), and with respect to seeking care from a government health 
facility (47% compared with 23%)82. Figure 7.1 looks at the initial treatment-seeking 
behaviour in more detail, and suggests that insured individuals are less likely to self-
treat with medicines (37%), compared with uninsured respondents (52%). After self-
treatment, the uninsured are more likely than the insured to visit a private practitioner 
as their first action, or a Provincial Hospital, and less likely to visit a Commune Health 
Centre (CHC) or a District Hospital. This picture suggests that insured individuals are 
more likely to use lower levels of the health system first. From a broad perspective, 
insurance thus appears to alter treatment-seeking behaviour in a positive way. 
At the provincial level, this pattern is also evident in Dong Thap Province (Figure 7.2) 
where over 70% of the uninsured say they self-treat first, compared with 40% of 
insured individuals. After self-treatment first, the next most likely first action for the 
insured is to contact a CHC (38%), a District Hospital (18%), and finally a Provincial 
Hospital (4%). The opposite is true of the uninsured - whilst self-treatment is very 
high (72%) and is the most likely first course of action, the next most likely first 
action is to visit a Provincial Hospital (11 %), a private practitioner (8%), a District 
Hospital (9%) and a CHC (7%). 
A different pattern emerges in the two northern provinces (see Figure 7.3), however. 
Whilst self-treatment as the first action is lower than in the south, the difference 
81 This figure is based on question d39. 
82 Weighted sample means are presented in Table 7.1 
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between insured and uninsured individuals is marginal. Insurance also appears to 
encourage first contact at a higher point in the health system e.g. district hospital, 
rather than the primary level Commune Health Centre. From a broad health system 
perspective, this suggests that insurance is having a negative effect by pulling patients 
up to higher levels of the system, rather than encouraging contact with lower levels of 
the health system first. 
In Topic Guide 2 used for in-depth interviews (see Part 4.3 and Appendix 5), two 
questions were put to respondents relevant to the research questions addressed in this 
chapter. The first question is "Would you say you sometimes use health services 
because you have a card, when you might not if you didn't have one?" The second 
question reads "00 you think that overall you use health services more than if you 
didn't have health insurance?" Responses are incorporated into the text to enrich the 
interpretation of econometric analysis. 
7.2 Econometric analysis 
Whilst descriptive data provides a useful starting point, it is not possible to establish 
whether patterns are driven by health insurance, or other factors, such as different 
perceptions of illness severity. The effect of factors that are easily observed and 
measured, can be controlled within regression analysis, in tum allowing the 
independent effect of health insurance on treatment-seeking behaviour to be estimated. 
However, where unobserved factors influence both the probability of being insured 
and the use of health services, the estimated effect of insurance is likely to be biased. 
In addition to perceptions of illness severity, features of a community and the 
environment in which an individual lives, may also be important. This effect, referred 
to in the econometrics literature as unobserved heterogeneity, is of particular 
importance when analysing the impact of an insurance scheme in which membership 
is voluntary (see the discussion in Part 4.4.2.3). 
Pohlmeier and Ulrich (1995) recognise the two distinct behavioural processes that 
drive demand for, or consumption of, health services (see Part 2.1.2). They motivate a 
two-part model, which first addresses the contact decision by the patient, i.e. a binary 
outcome. It is assumed that any contact other than the first is initiated by the physician 
and. in the second part of their model, this is estimated using a count data model. 
Using the moral hazard terminology, the first stage may be referred to as consumer 
moral hazard, closely linked to price elasticity of demand, and the second, provider 
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moral hazard, otherwise known as supplier-induced demand. The focus of the 
following analysis in this chapter is the effect of health insurance on the first stage i.e. 
the contact decision. 
7.2.1 Univariate and bivariate probit models 
Given the strong possibility that unobserved factors influence both the purchase of 
health insurance, and the utilisation of health services, then estimated beta coefficients 
would be biased if this effect were not controlled. Several previous studies have 
addressed this issue, including Harmon and Nolan (2001), who use a bivariate probit 
model to model data from Ireland, and Holly et at. (1998) who also use the bivariate 
probit to analyse data from Switzerland. More recently, Trujillo (2002) applies a 
trivariate model to analyse the effect of compulsory and private insurance on service 
utilisation, using data from Colombia. Waters (1999) presents the results of both 
univariate and bivariate estimators, to data from Ecuador, and is the approach 
followed in this chapter. 
Waters (1999) notes that selection bias is likely to be a problem when the choice to 
insure is voluntary (see Part 2.4). In this case, certain independent variables may be 
correlated with unobservable factors whose effect is relegated to the error term, or 
hidden within other coefficients. The bivariate probit is a two-equation model in 
which both dependent variables are binary, in this case one model representing 
insurance status, and the other whether health services were sought. Maximum-
likelihood is used to estimate the two models simultaneously, which allows for 
correlation between the corresponding error terms, and hence produces consistent beta 
coefficients (Jones 2000). 
In most cases, using econometric techniques to correct for non-random self-selection 
into a health insurance scheme significantly alters the effect of insurance. In the case 
of Ireland, the effect of insurance approximately doubles when treated as endogenous, 
whereas in Colombia the effect reduces. In Ecuador, the effect works in opposite 
directions for preventive and curative care. An understanding of the specific design 
and context of each scheme is required to explain these differing effects of selection 
bias. 
Following Waters (1999), both univariate and probit models are presented for each of 
the specifications, which address Research Question 9. First, the probability of 
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seeking care from any health professional, whether in the public or private sector is 
estimated, and reflects a more holistic view of access to professional health care, 
rather than a specific provider. In the second model, the probability of seeking care 
from a government facility is analysed. In this case, the effect of insurance on 
utilisation rates in public facilities is estimated, and gives some sense of whether 
insurance, which links benefits specifically to public facilities, effectively pulls 
patients into the public sector. If this is the case, and at the expense of regulated 
private providers, the effect may not be entirely desirable, at least from a perspective 
of the overall financial sustainability of the health system. 
However, where greater use of public facilities is at the expense of self-treatment or 
contact with a traditional healer, as suggested in Figure 7.1 and 7.2, then the effect 
may have real benefits to the system. For example, the proliferation of self-treatment 
with medicines resulting from price reductions under economic transition, has 
dramatically increased growth in drug resistance, and raised fears for the quality of 
treatment received (see Part 1.4.2). If insurance reduces self-treatment then its effect 
on the pattern of consumption of health services would in this respect be beneficial. 
The third model addresses this issue more directly, by estimating the probability of 
self-treatment or use of a traditional healer, as the first course of action. Self-treatment 
is defined as using home-made medicines, buying medicines directly from an 
unlicensed or a licensed seller, visiting a traditional healer, or carrying on as normal 
(i.e. doing nothing). In each model, the dependent variable reflects a binary choice. 
Models are only estimated for individuals reporting an illness in the three months prior 
to the survey. 
In each model, the marginal effect of insurance is assessed through a dummy variable, 
which represents the respondent's insurance status at the time of the survey. If this 
coefficient is positive and statistically significant then, ceteris paribus, health 
insurance increases the probability of a sick individual seeking professional medical 
advice, or self-treating, depending on the model in question. The insurance and 
treatment-seeking models within the bivariate probit are specified differently, which is 
preferable in order to identify the selection effect more accurately. 
Finally, in the fourth model, a simple probit model is used to analyse the effect of 
social cohesion on the decision to seek government services amongst insured patients, 
(see further details of the research question in Part 3.3.3.2). This specification 
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addresses Research Question 10, which asks whether socially cohesive communities 
overcome the information asymmetry that leads to moral hazard. Given the 
institutional arrangements of the scheme, however, social cohesion is not expected to 
have any statistically significant effect. 
7.2.2 Results 
Table 7.1 describes the variables and the four models are presented in Tables 7.2 to 
7.5. In each case, only the treatment-seeking model is presented i.e. the insurance 
equation used to identify the effect of self-selection is omitted. In the first model, 
presented in Table 7.2, the univariate probit model estimates that insured individuals 
are more likely to seek professional medical care when they feel ill, whether in the 
public or private sector. When unobservable factors are controlled for using the 
bivariate probit estimator, however, this effect disappears. This suggests that 
unobservable factors were driving the insurance effect evident in the simple univariate 
probit - the significance of the Wald test of correlation between the models confirms 
this. 
Furthermore, the direction of the selection effect, or correlation, is positive, suggesting 
that individuals who seek professional care for unobservable reasons are also more 
likely to be insured. A version to risk is likely to be one such reason. In a separate 
specification of the model, a dummy variable was included representing whether or 
not the respondent is very worried about future health status. Whilst the results were 
similar, the statistical significance of the Wald test of correlation disappeared, 
suggesting that this is indeed an important factor. 
Whilst overall there is little difference between insured and uninsured individuals, in-
depth analysis shows some uninsured individuals expect insurance to make a 
significant difference: 
"I think if I bought voluntary health insurance I would get better 
treatment. But I am poor and don't have any money. Sometimes when I 
get sick, I am reluctant to look for health services. If I had a voluntary 
health insurance card I wouldn't hesitate to go for an examination.' 
(Female. Dong Thap. aged 41 years. farmer. uninsured) 
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Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Seek care from any medical professional (either public or 1,122 0.309 0.462 0 1 
private practitioner) 
Seek care from government facility 1,122 0.159 0.366 0 1 
Self-treat (purchase medicines without prescription or do 1,122 0.709 0.454 0 1 
nothing) 
Insurance status 1,122 0.046 0.209 0 1 
Good health status in previous 12 months 1,122 0.203 0.402 0 I 
Fair health status in previous 12 months 1,122 0.521 0.499 0 1 
Long-standing limiting illness 1,122 0.119 0.324 
Economic status (thousand VND) 1,122 3,038 2,962 311 32,280 
Farmer 1,122 0.417 0.493 0 1 
Government employee 1,122 0.010 0.100 0 1 
Hired worker 1,122 0.069 0.255 0 I 
Service worker 1,122 0.109 0.312 0 I 
Years of schooling 1,122 5.304 3.568 0 16 
Age 1,122 35.391 20.837 6 83 
Female 1,122 0.551 0.498 0 1 
Northern Province (Hai Phong and Ninh Binh) 1,122 0.364 0.481 0 1 
Resident of rural community 1,122 0.829 0.377 0 1 
TABLE 7.1 : TREATMENT SEEKING BEHAVIOUR - DESCRIPTION OF THE VARIABLES 
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Univariate Probit Bivariate Probit 
Variables Coefficient Robust S.E. Coefficient Robust S.E. 
Insurance status 0.559* 0.313 -0.481 0.371 
Good health status in previous 12 months -0.009 0.021 -0.066 0.245 
Fair health status in previous 12 months 0.126 0.204 0.136 0.200 
Long-standing limiting illness 0.189 0.237 0.192 0.233 
Economic status (thousand VND) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Farmer -0.024 0.164 -0.127 0.166 
Government employee -0.513 0.481 -0.491 0.488 
Hired worker 0.175 0.266 0.046 0.267 
Service worker 0.140 0.237 0.034 0.235 
Years of schooling 0.009 0.021 O.ot8 0.021 
Age 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.004 
Female -0.013 0.129 0.001 0.128 
Northern Province (Hai Phong and Ninh Sinh) 0.953·** 0.141 0.875·** 0.143 
Resident of rural community 0.229 0.206 0.273 0.203 I Constant -1.467**· 0.384 -1.399*** 0.378 
Observations = 1,121 - 1,121 -
Pseudo R2 = 0.112 - nla - , 
___ Wald test of correlation (p.-value ofChe) = nJa - 0.707*** -
---
TABLE 7.2: INSURANCE AND CONTACTING ANY HEALTH PROFESSIONAL 
* Statistically significant (l 0%) .* Statistically significant (5%) * •• Statistically significant (I %) 
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Univariate Probit Bivariate Probit 
Variables Coefficient Robust S.E. Coefficient RobustS.E. I 
Insurance status 0.778" 0.337 -0.094 0.547 
Good health status in previous 12 months 0.077 0.307 0.086 0.300 
F air health status in previous 12 months 0.066 0.255 0.070 0.251 
Long-standing limiting illness -0.116 0.272 -O.1l2 0.268 
Economic status (thousand VND) -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
Farmer -0.128 0.169 -0.238 0.184 
Government employee -0.766** 0.366 -0.709* 0.396 
Hired worker 0.423 0.318 0.284 0.336 
Service worker 0.138 0.264 0.035 0.266 
Years of schooling 0.032 0.024 0.041* 0.025 
Age 0.004 OJ)04 0.003 0.004 
Female -0.029 0.149 -0.008 0.145 
Northern Province (Hai Phong and Ninh Binh) 1.215*** 0.169 1.121*** 0.191 
Resident of rural community 0.363 0.253 0.406 0.244 
Constant -2.227*** 0.519 -2.154*" 0.528 
Observations = 1,121 
- 1,121 -
PseudoR2 = 0.168 - nla -
Wald test of correlation (p-value of Chi2) = nla - 0.623 -
TABLE 7.3: INSURANCE AND CONTACTING A GOVERNMENT HEALTH FACILITY 
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Univariate Probit Bivariate Probit 
Variables Coefficient Robust s.E. Coefficient RobustS.E. 
Insurance status -0.559* 0.313 0.381 0.428 
Good health status in previous 12 months 0.009 0.021 0.054 0.241 
F air health status in previous 12 months -0.126 0.204 -0.135 0.198 
Long-standing limiting illness -0.189 0.237 -0.194 0.232 
Economic status (thousand VND) -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
Farmer 0.024 0.164 0.127 0.168 
Government employee 0.513 0.481 0.479 0.481 
Hired worker -0.175 0.266 -0.042 0.268 
Service worker -0.140 0.237 -0.036 0.235 
Years of schooling -0.009 0.021 -0.018 0.021 
Age -0.004 0.004 -0.002 0.004 
Female 0.013 0.129 -0.000 0.127 
I Northern Province (Hai Phong and Ninh Sinh) -0.953*·* 0.141 -0.871*** 0.146 
Resident of rural community -0.229 0.206 -0.273 0.203 
Constant 1.467*·* 0.384 1.389**· 0.373 
Observations = 1,121 - 1,121 -
PseudoR2 = 0.112 - nla -
. Wald test of correlationJp:value of Che) = nla - -0.707·*· -
--- --
TABLE 7.4: INSURANCE AND SELF-TREATMENT OR VISITING A TRADITIONAL HEALER 
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"When I did not have a health insurance card, I also went for examination 
when I got headache or running nose, but it cost me more money then. 
Here many people go to CHC, but there are also many private 
practitioners ..... Rich people often go to private doctors." (Female. aged 
40 years. Vice-Chairman of Women's Union, insured. Tan Duong 
Commune, Dong Thap Province) 
The first quotation is consistent with the different findings in this southern province 
presented in the previous chapter, but not revealed in the econometric analysis. 
Another point, highlighted in the second quote, is that for minor illnesses, visiting 
government facilities can be more expensive, even with health insurance. 
In Table 7.3, the effect of insurance on contacting a government facility is estimated, 
and a similar pattern emerges. Under the univariate probit, insured individuals are 
more likely to seek government services as their first action when feeling ill, and the 
results are statistically significant at the 5% level. In terms of direction and magnitude, 
the effect is again positive, and the estimated probability is 78% higher for insured 
individuals. Once the effect of unobservable influences is controlled for, using the 
bivariate probit estimator, this effect again disappears83. On one level, these results are 
surprising, given that they suggest that the decision to seek government services is not 
sensitive to price, at least not in any statistically significant way. In several alternative 
specifications, the logarithm of per capita consumption expenditures was used rather 
than a simple per capita figure, which allows income elasticity of demand to be 
estimated. The results were robust across models and again showed no statistically 
significant effect. 
Focusing on contact with government providers brings several other factors into 
consideration. Given that at the time of the survey benefits were restricted to one 
designated public facility, typically a hospital, indirect costs are likely to playa more 
significant part in the decision to seek care. The importance of non-price costs in 
rationing demand was discussed earlier in both Part 1.2 and Part 2.1.2. Two quotations 
from respondents collected during in-depth interviews are presented below. They 
83 This finding is consistent across different model specifications, for example, when the 
dependent variable is defined specifically as contact with a government hospital, rather than a 
facility at the primary level. 
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highlight the importance of distance to a facility when deciding whether to seek care, 
and which type of provider to contact: 
"If my child is so sick he gets a high fever I go out and buy some 
medicines for him. I do not bring him to hospital because the hospital for 
health insurance is quite far, at Duon, in the district, which is about 5 km 
away. I have no time to bring him there, so I go and by medicines for 
him, I do not use his health insurance card". (Female. aged 33 years. Hai 
Phong, farmer, insured) 
Despite the finding that insured respondents are less likely to self-treat overall, 
(although not as a direct result of insurance), some respondents are clearly time-
sensitive, and prefer convenience even when health insurance reduces the direct cost 
of health services. This observation supports the theoretical framework of utility, 
presented in Part 2.1.1, in which individuals compare the relative utility overall of 
health insurance. In this case, however, the calculation is not whether purchasing 
health insurance yields higher utility, but whether actually using it (when an individual 
has already bought it) does. Two further quotations on this theme are presented next: 
"Frankly, my children are ready to buy a health insurance card for me, 
but the benefit of the card is not much, you can have a card but use it only 
sometime a year or once in a few year, and each time you get only few 
medicines then go home, you use all the received medicines and it is not 
cured and you have to buy more medicines. Besides, health services at 
the village are very convenient, near the house and prices are reasonable." 
(Male. aged 70 years. farmer. uninsured. Ninh My Commune. Ninh Binh 
Province) 
"I get mainly minor diseases, such as headaches, or common flu, so I use 
traditional herbal exhaling, or take some medicines for relief. Therefore, I 
seldom go to the Commune Health Centre or hospital. I went to the CHC 
last time I got diarrhoea". (Male. aged 70 years, Chairman of Farmers 
Association. insured. Dong Thap Province) 
These quotations stress the importance of local health services, such as drug vendors, 
for which limited information was available in the communes where fieldwork was 
conducted. Better information on the quantity and quality of supply in the private 
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sector would improve the specification of the models presented in Table 7.2 and Table 
7.3. Perceptions of the severity of a health problem are also important in the decision 
about which type of provider to contact, and hence whether or not health insurance is 
used, which is consistent with the findings presented in Chapter 6 regarding patient 
satisfaction. 
Insured respondents are, on average, 56% less likely to self-treat, or contact a 
traditional healthier as their first course of action, than uninsured individuals. This 
finding, which is statistically significant at the 10% level, is based on the univariate 
probit estimator, and is consistent with the descriptive data presented in Figure 7.1. 
Again, the insurance effect disappears when unobservable effects are controlled for, 
using the bivariate probit estimator. As expected, the direction of unobservable effects 
is negative, unlike the two previous models. The implication is that individuals who 
self-treat for unobservable reasons are also less likely to purchase voluntary health 
insurance. Attitudes towards health and health-related issues are likely to be important 
here. 
In the final, fourth model, Research Question lOis addressed and the results presented 
in Table 7.5. The arguments used to develop this specific research question build on 
the insights of Stiglitz (1990) and others (see Part 3.3.3.2). In order to assess whether 
social cohesion has a mitigating effect on the increased consumption of health services 
expected under insurance, the model and sample are defined differently. The 
dependent variable is defined as seeking government health services, given that 
insurance benefits are linked specifically to them. At the time of the survey, no 
incentive effect existed under the insurance scheme, for individuals to seek more 
health services in the private sector. 
Only respondents insured at the time of the survey, and reporting feeling ill in the 
three months prior to the survey are included in the analysis, amounting to a total of 
234 respondents. The main finding is that social cohesion (at both the individual and 
the commune level) has no statistically significant effect on the probability of seeking 
government services. This result is expected, given that no mechanisms exist to 
harness local peer monitoring within the scheme, and the perceived per capita 
externality of the inappropriate behaviour of others is likely to be low. 
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Univariate Probit 
Variables Coefficient Robust S.E. 
Perceived cohesion (individual level) 0.068 0.224 
Social cohesion (commune level) 0.029 1.088 
Good health status in previous 12 months -0.603 0.699 
Fair health status in previous 12 months -0.466 0.754 
Long-standing limiting illness -0.757 0.809 
Economic status (thousand VND) -0.000 0.000 
Farmer -0.052 0.819 
Government employee -0.583 0.778 I 
Hired worker -0.727 0.813 
Service worker -0.346 0.626 
Years of schooling -0.027 0.064 I 
, 
Age 0.039** 0.019 I 
Female 0.299 0.426 
Northern Province (Hai Phong and Ninh Sinh) -0.133 0.464 
Resident of rural community -0.189 0.336 
Constant -0.551 4.606 
Observations = 528 
- I 
Pseudo R2 = 0.134 -----~, 
TABLE 7.5: SOCIAL COHESION AND CONTACT WITH A GOVERNMENT FACILlTV 
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7.3 Concluding remarks 
This chapter presents clear evidence that individuals with health insurance are far 
more likely to seek contact with a government health facility (or indeed any health 
professional), as their ftrst action when feeling ill, than are uninsured individuals. 
Similarly, insured individuals are signiftcantly less likely to self-treat with medicines, 
or to contact a traditional healer. However, this effect does not appear to be a direct 
result of insurance itself, but rather unobserved factors which both influence the 
decision to purchase health insurance and treatment-seeking decisions when an 
individual feels ill. Juxtaposing univariate and bivariate probit models demonstrates 
the importance of using an appropriate estimator when estimating the impact of 
voluntary health insurance. One factor, which may be driving the results, is variation 
in individual attitudes towards health-related risk. Although an attempt has been made 
to proxy for risk aversion, more detailed research into this issue is required. 
Despite the fact that many of the effects presented in univariate models are only 
indirectly related to insurance purchase (i.e. the effects disappear in the bivaraite 
model), they are nevertheless important from the perspective of the dynamic of the 
health system overall. For example, the ftnding that insured patients are only slightly 
more likely to contact a professional health worker, an effect which is much stronger 
with respect to government providers, suggests that a substitution effect is occurring. 
In principle, the univariate model is inappropriate given that it does not control for a 
selection bias, which is clearly present, it does raise some interesting issues in terms of 
interpreting the data. If, as seems to be the case, health insurance is effectively 
strengthening a process in which patients are favouring public providers over private 
ones (both formal and informal), then in the medium to long-term this may have a 
positive effect on population health. The argument, in one sense, is that observed 
changes in the consumption of health services would not have occurred without the 
existence of the scheme, and is an issue that needs further development. 
The assumption here, however, is that the clinical quality of care is better in 
government facilities, which at least for hospital care is certainly the case, given the 
almost non-existent supply by the private sector. Furthermore, health insurance may 
indirectly be helping to mitigate the growing resistance to antibiotics and other 
medicines, such as anti-malarial drugs, which is fuelled in part by inappropriate self-
treatment with pharmaceuticals. 
235 
Chapter 7: Utilisation of health services 
One other trend in the data, of which policy-makers should be aware, is that in some 
provinces insurance may be unnecessarily pulling patients up the system, in terms of 
their first contact when feeling ill. Rather than making their first contact at the primary 
level, the expected financial gain of health insurance may encourage first contact with 
a hospital, where quality of care is often perceived as superior. This is more likely to 
be the case in urban communes, where the non-price cost of accessing hospital care is 
relatively low. Given that this analysis is based on cross-sectional analysis, however, 
ongoing monitoring of the situation is required to validate the findings presented here. 
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This final chapter summarises the main theoretical insights and empirical findings 
generated by this thesis. Implications for current policy regarding health insurance in 
Vietnam are discussed, as is the extent to which the results can be generalised, 
together with the identification of important issues for further research. Chapter 3 
detailed ten research questions. Six concern factors that drive demand for voluntary 
health insurance, whilst the other four address the impact of the scheme on various 
health system outcomes. 
Whilst overall this thesis has a strong demand side focus, the findings are interpreted 
in the context of a dynamic health system, as represented in Figure 1.1, and have 
implications for the way in which health services are delivered. A central message, 
from a conceptual perspective, is the importance of the institutional environment 
within which health insurance, and the broader health system, functions. In most low-
income countries, the institutional environment is very different to that in high-income 
countries, in which most theoretical frameworks and their related assumptions have 
evolved. 
New knowledge is based on an evaluation of voluntary health insurance in Vietnam 
seven years after its introduction by the government. Interest in risk-sharing 
mechanisms in the health sector has grown rapidly over the past decade. One reason 
for this trend is that insurance offers the potential to raise extra finance for health 
services, whilst simultaneously protecting access to health services for the poor. In 
addition to these theoretical merits, however, insurance brings with it many well-
documented problems, notably the incentive for patients to consume more care, and 
for providers to supply more care, than may be required. At present, however, little 
evidence exists on the extent to which expected incentive problems are also a feature 
of health insurance schemes in low-income countries. Without such evidence, policy-
makers must rely on the experience of rich economies. 
When a country's economy is structured principally around informal activity, 
universal compulsory health insurance is unlikely to be feasible. This argument is 
developed by Ensor (1999) amongst others. For this reason, a better understanding of 
individual and community level factors that influence the voluntary purchase of health 
insurance, is critical for the development of policies that successfully promote and 
extend risk-sharing. 
237 
Chapter 8: Conclusions 
Bringing ideas and evidence together from several sub-disciplines in the social 
sciences is an important feature of this thesis. Whilst health insurance is a mainstream 
topic within health economics, literature from political science, sociology, and 
development economics, offers a wealth of frameworks and evidence that adds 
considerably to current thinking. For example, the suggestion that social capital is 
critical for the emergence of community-based health insurance schemes was the 
catalyst for much of the literature reviewed in Chapter 2. 
Methodologically, econometric analysis of household survey data is combined with 
verbatim quotations, collected through in-depth interviews. Research methods used 
here thus move from the inductive (preliminary qualitative data collection), to the 
deductive (household questionnaire), and back to the inductive (in-depth interviews). 
Both the power of statistical inference, and revealing insights from in-depth 
interviews, are the basis for the results and conclusions. The use of cross-sectional 
data, however, limits the analysis in terms of understanding the dynamic of a health 
system across time. 
Many of the new ideas and evidence presented are generalisable to other low-income 
countries in terms of the structure of the economy and the institutional environment. 
For example, informal risk-sharing and unofficial economic activity, are common 
features of many poor countries. Furthermore, policies towards health financing have 
tended to develop in a similar way, moving, for example, from free care at the point of 
service, to the introduction of user charges, followed by an attempt to develop greater 
risk-sharing through health insurance (see the arguments motivating this thesis in Part 
1.1). Many of the ideas and results are, however, not generalisable to other countries, 
particularly those which to a large degree reflect the particular culture of Vietnamese 
society. Each of the findings discussed in the remainder of this chapter is also 
considered in terms of its generalisability i.e. the extent to which the finding is a 
feature of Vietnam, of health insurance, or of both. 
8.1 Demand for health Insurance· theoretical Insights 
Most theoretical work into health insurance has been generated in the context of rich 
• 
economies, in which universal health and social security systems are common, and 
government institutions are well-established and strong (for example in their role as 
regulators). The institutional environment in Vietnam, and many other low-income 
countries, is very different. For example, government regulation of provider behaviour 
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is often weak, evident in Vietnam from the widespread reports of corruption discussed 
in Part 1.5.3. 
Nevertheless, insights by authors such as Akerlof (1970), Arrow (1963), and Pauly 
(1968), regarding the structure of information and incentives in health insurance 
markets, remain highly relevant to health insurance schemes in a variety of 
institutional settings. For example, the self-interested individual who maximises 
expected utility, provides a solid foundation for the analysis of private demand for 
health insurance. In essence, individuals will purchase health insurance if they expect 
to be better of with it, than without it. 
Research Question J addresses one of the classic features of health insurance markets, 
adverse selection, and tests empirically whether or not this is a problem in the 
voluntary component of Vietnamese Health Insurance. Adverse selection, which 
describes a situation in which individuals in poor health dominate an insurance 
scheme, is one example of market failure, reSUlting from non-perfect, or asymmetrical 
information. Consequently, health risks are not shared efficiently, and it is 
questionable whether the fund in question is able to sustain itself financially beyond 
the short-term. Adverse selection is thus a major concern for all those who direct and 
manage such schemes. 
Under certain conditions, however, the market failures that underpin adverse selection 
can be overcome, allowing risk-sharing to occur. Economists and other social 
scientists often use repeated games to represent such conditions, in which cooperation 
may be preferable to selfish behaviour, even if an individual incurs a loss in the short 
run. In repeated games, reputation is important, and reflects the reality today in pre-
industrial communities in which social networks are largely closed, and social 
structure highly cohesive. Living within such a social structure, a person may decide 
to cooperate with others in part to maintain their own reputation, but also to ensure the 
welfare of his offspring. Informal risk-sharing may occur voluntarily as a result. 
Drawing on the work of Coleman (1990), who suggests that voluntary cooperation 
between two or more individuals is a function of the level of social capital in the 
community in which they live, Hsiao (1995) extends this idea to the development of 
risk-sharing in the health sector. Essentially, the argument is that individuals who trust 
each other are more likely to voluntarily enter a risk-sharing agreement, which is not 
backed up by an enforceable written contract. In contrast, the economic literature 
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stresses the importance of better information, and the preservation of reputation, when 
explaining the development of such contracts. The review of the social capital 
literature in Chapter 2, highlights the current lack of an agreed definition, and the 
conceptual leap often made from ideas such as network closure, and social cohesion, 
to social capital. In this thesis, social structure is represented through a measure of 
social cohesion, which previous economic studies have also used in the analysis of 
information asymmetry within group-lending schemes (see in particular Wydick 
1999). 
Hsiao's central argument is that individuals who are part of a group that is socially 
cohesive. are more likely to trust one another, and hence be more willing to share 
risks. In the context of voluntary, as opposed to compulsory insurance, this may be of 
importance (see Research Question 6). For example, trust can facilitate endeavours 
requiring collective action, which have the potential to produce mutual benefits for 
participating individuals. Hsiao suggests that voluntary health insurance is one such 
example. This hypothesis does not appear relevant, however, in the context of health 
insurance in Vietnam, due to the total dominance of government in the scheme's 
organisation and management (see Part 8.2). In contrast, Hsiao's idea was developed 
in the context of community-based health insurance in China. 
In examining the social capital concept, an extensive review of the political science, 
sociological, and development economics literature was conducted and presented in 
Part 2.2 and Part 2.3. For example, current work by development economists, into the 
interaction between public safety-net programmes and systems of informal risk-
sharing was particularly useful to enrich current frameworks used to analyse health 
insurance. The general conclusion of this body of literature is that government safety-
net interventions crowd-out pre-existing informal risk-sharing networks in low-income 
countries. Such information cannot be ignored when thinking about the development 
of formal health insurance, particularly give widespread evidence of private transfers 
in Vietnam, which indicate informal risk-sharing. 
With this insight, it is suggested that Hsiao's initial idea may unfold in a different 
way. If socially cohesive communities develop strong networks of informal risk-
sharing, it is possible that they may actually resist or substitute for formal health 
insurance, especially where perceptions of corruption amongst government officials 
are widespread. Cultural factors such as duty to the State may also influence the 
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decision whether or not to purchase health insurance, and hence complicate the picture 
further. 
Part 3.2.2 brings these various ideas together, placing formal health insurance within a 
broad framework of risk-reducing strategies. Using this framework, voluntary health 
insurance is only one of a range of risk-reducing strategies, available to individuals 
and households. These strategies may be formal or informal, involving risk-sharing or 
not, and mayor may not require collective action. Furthermore, different individuals 
and households will have access to a different range of options. For example, 
individuals living in urban communities may have a more restricted choice-set. If this 
is the case, they may be more likely to rely on formal strategies that do not require 
collective action. Finally, the idea that formal and informal risk-sharing are pure 
substitutes is unlikely to be unrealistic, with individuals and households more likely to 
draw on several strategies at anyone point in time. Adopting a broader perspective, 
such as the one presented here, would be a considerable shift for policy-makers, and 
indeed many researchers, concerned with understanding the development of health 
insurance. This particular insight can be generalised to any society in which there is a 
large informal economy, and where universal social security mechanisms do not exist. 
The observations of, amongst others, Arrow, and more recently Fukuyama (see Part 
2.2), that behaviour can only be explained within an understanding of the customs, 
morals, and habits of the society in which it occurs, seem particular relevant here. For 
example, the teaching of Confucian doctrine that a subject should be subordinate to 
the ruler i.e. the State, may affect the way in which individuals respond to government 
propaganda regarding health insurance. Indeed, in-depth interviews reveal that during 
government campaigns, propaganda often appeals to a sense of public obligation and 
duty to society, in an attempt to encourage insurance purchase. Again, this point 
stresses the value in extending and revising the assumptions of standard economic 
frameworks, in the light of cultural and other features of the society in question. 
Furthermore, it makes some of the findings less generalisable, in the sense that they 
are influenced, at least in part, by a particular feature of Vietnamese culture and 
society. 
In summary, the decision to purchase formal insurance is influenced by a range of 
factors. Individual characteristics, such as educational levels, are likely to have a direct 
bearing, as will various supply-side factors. Understanding and explaining demand for 
insurance in low-income countries, also requires a consideration of the very different 
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structure of the health system, economy, and society in general, in particular the 
extensive role of informal social security mechanisms. Furthermore, perceptions of 
corruption in government institutions are widespread in Vietnam, and may lead 
individuals to rely more on self-insurance or local, informal, risk-sharing networks. 
These are the major conceptual insights presented in this thesis. 
8.2 Demand for health insurance· new empirical knowledge 
This section summarises the findings of Chapter 5, and discusses whether the 
assumptions and predictions of theoretical frameworks, reviewed in Part 2.1, hold true 
in the context of voluntary health insurance in Vietnam. Implications for policy are 
also discussed. 
A central issue in health insurance theory is the trade-off between the gains from risk-
sharing, and the incentive problems arising from information asymmetry between the 
insurer, and the insured. Research Question 1 addresses one such issue (Does 
voluntary health insurance in Vietnam suffer from adverse selection?). Overall, 
individuals reporting good health have a 41% to 55% lower probability of purchasing 
insurance, a finding that is robust across several model specifications. The findings 
thus support the predictions of theory. In the provincial models, adverse selection is 
evident in Hai Phong Province and Dong Thap Province, but not in Ninh Sinh 
Province. Indeed, those who have fallen ill are more likely to appreciate the value of 
health insurance, and become a real advocate for it. Overall, the findings support the 
expected trade-off between financial stability and offering a fixed premium in a 
scheme with voluntary scheme, and no exclusions to entry. This finding is consistent 
with evidence from higher-income countries, and appears to be generalisable across a 
range of contexts i.e. levels of income, and the extent to which institutions are 
transparent and effectively regulated. 
Appropriate policy responses to adverse selection need to be found, given the 
importance of the scheme's poverty alleviation focus, and its non-profit nature. One 
option is to set premia according to individual risk, as suggested by Cutler and 
Zeckhauser (1997), but this strategy would be unacceptable in that uptake by 
individuals in poor health is likely to reduce. However, the limited separation of risks 
may be worth considering in order to attract low-risk individuals into the scheme, 
especially given that the poorest in society are eligible for free insurance. For 
example, offering several policies, one of which has a relatively low premium and a 
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high co-payment, and another with a higher premium and a low co-payment, would 
lead to a better balance of risks within a fund. If adverse selection is not dealt with, it 
is debatable whether the current system is financially sustainable. 
Another option is to make the scheme compulsory,although as discussed earlier, such 
a strategy is not feasible given the current structure of the Vietnamese economy. One 
further strategy is to structure membership around groups rather than individuals, for 
example through contracts with entire communes, or the mass organisations that are 
widespread in rural Vietnam. This approach would mitigate adverse selection 
considerably. Bimighausen and Sauerbom (2002) draw lessons for low and middle-
income countries, from the development of social health insurance in Germany, and 
recommend the introduction of compulsion as early as possible. 
Ensuring that health insurance is part of a person's consumption choice-set is a pre-
requisite for extending the scheme in rural areas. A first step in this process is to 
ensure that people are aware of the scheme and have some basic information about it. 
This is the primary objective of propaganda, or information campaigns, conducted by 
the government. Given the significant variation of awareness across districts, detailed 
information regarding current propaganda strategies e.g. the type of information 
provided, the focus of the message, and the relative intensity of campaigns across 
provinces and districts, would have strengthened this research. Despite this, valuable 
information was collected during the survey, about when and where individuals first 
heard about the scheme, for policy-makers to use. 
Research Question 2 asks 'Do levels of worry about future health status influence the 
probability of health insurance purchase?'. Whilst individual aversion to risk was not 
measured in detail, both the household survey and in-depth interviews reveal that 
'greater security' is the primary motivation for buying insurance. This finding 
suggests that current information campaigns are effective in promoting a conceptual 
understanding of insurance, presumably aided by high levels of literacy in Vietnam. 
Chapter 5 presents clear evidence that 'worry about future health status', has a highly 
significant and positive effect on the probability of insurance purchase, which is 
robust across the four specifications of the model (see Table 5.11). 
To the extent that 'worry' is a proxy for aversion to risk, the findings support 
theoretical predictions. Indeed, this effect is one of the most consistent explanatory 
factors across the various model specifications in Hai Phong and Dong Thap, and is 
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one that policy-makers should take into account when promoting health insurance. To 
a large extent, risk-averse individuals will seek out health insurance themselves, 
implying that government strategies should identify and focus on risk-loving 
individuals. Cultural differences between north and south Vietnam may also be 
important here, and is an issue area worthy of further research. Generalising these 
results beyond Vietnam is somewhat problematic, however. The question posed to 
respondents may be interpreted differently across cultures and societies, as evident 
from the results presented here, which differ significantly between north and south 
Vietnam. The high statistical significance of the results suggest, however, that further 
research into measuring worry and attitudes towards risk is merited. 
Economic status has no significant effect on the probability of an individual buying 
health insurance, which is a positive finding, in that access to health insurance, which 
improves financial access to health services, is not captured only by the wealthy. 
Addressing Research Question 3 (Does individual economic status influence the 
probability of health insurance purchase?), this finding lends some support to 
predictions that wealthier individuals are more likely to self-insure. If poorer 
individuals dominate the scheme then risk-sharing across income groups is limited. 
The finding is also consistent with the current design of benefits, which focuses on 
reductions in user charges, rather than better service quality. With respect to Research 
Question 4 (Do educational levels influence the probability of health insurance 
purchase?), there is some support for the prediction that education has a positive 
effect on insurance purchase. Again, this information should help policy-makers to 
target promotional campaigns accordingly, for example by developing special 
messages for those of a lower educational standard. 
Research Questions 5 and 6 empirically test the new theoretical insights developed in 
this thesis. With respect to the first (Does membership in a mass organisation 
influence the probability of health insurance purchase?), there is considerable 
evidence that where dense networks of mass organisations exist at the commune level, 
the probability of insurance purchase is significantly higher. Whilst the theoretical 
basis for this particular question is underdeveloped, the results are highly significant 
and remarkably robust across models. As discussed earlier, whilst this variable is not 
considered a proxy for civil society, it may reflect a sense of duty to the State, or 
national solidarity, and hence offers some support for the collective action hypothesis. 
The results suggest that promoting insurance purchase through voluntary mass 
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organisations may be a fruitful approach to the extension of membership, for example 
to fanners in rural areas. 
Mass organisations are a peculiar feature of communist political systems, and hence 
the findings may have some relevance to other south-east Asian countries, such as 
China, Cambodia or Laos. However, the extent to which a sense of duty to the State in 
the current period of economic and social transition in many countries affects attitudes 
towards mass organisations, complicates the picture and will affect the generalisability 
of the results. To some extent, these results may simply be a feature of Vietnamese 
society rather than the health insurance scheme itself. Clearly, however, the principle 
of marketing health insurance through organised groups of individuals, such as dairy 
cooperatives in India, is widely valid. 
With respect to Research Question 6 (Does social cohesion increase or decrease the 
probability of health insurance purchase?), the collective action hypothesis was 
presented in Part 3.2.1, and the substitute hypothesis developed and presented in Part 
3.2.2, following a wide review of literature from several disciplines. Econometric 
results of the pooled sample offer some support for the collective action hypothesis. In 
the provincial models, however, in particular in Ninh Binh Province, much stronger 
support for the substitute hypothesis exists. This may be the result of a combination of 
influences, including strong infonnal risk-sharing arrangements at the commune level, 
and a preference for these networks over government schemes. 
The significance of these results raises the question of their generalisability to other 
countries and settings. Raising the potential importance of infonnal risk-sharing 
networks for the development of fonnal risk-sharing schemes, is valid in most low-
income countries, and many middle-income countries, in particular where universal 
social security mechanisms are weak. However, as discussed in the development of 
this particular research question (see Part 3.2), local perceptions of corruption amongst 
the institution, often government, responsible for organising the scheme in question, 
and cultural influences regarding duty to the State for example, are likely to influence 
the generalisability of the results. Indeed, this thesis demonstrates the importance of 
local social structure, and other and cultural factors, in understanding the way in 
which health insurance in a low-income country develops. 
Finally, there was interesting feedback from respondents with respect to their intention 
not to purchase insurance in the future. These include, for uninsured individuals and in 
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rank order, 'bad staff attitude', 'don't trust the scheme', and 'being healthy'. For 
existing members who do not intend to renew their policy, financial reasons are the 
primary reason, followed by 'being healthy' and 'don't trust the scheme'. The 
importance of trust as a factor motivating the purchase decision was not foreseen, and 
is closely linked to the findings regarding service quality, presented in the next 
section. For policy-makers concerned with designing strategies that increase uptake of 
insurance, the message is that greater regulation of service provision is required, in 
particular with respect to the reported importance of unofficial payments for service 
quality. 
8.3 Impact of health insurance - new knowledge 
Two theoretical insights are made with respect to the impact of health insurance, in the 
context of Vietnam. First, the conflict implicit in much of the literature, between risk-
sharing and increased consumption, is less self-evident in the context of high unmet 
health needs. Secondly, if increased consumption under insurance is considered 
unnecessary then, drawing on the work of development economists, socially cohesive 
communities may be able to overcome the information asymmetry driving such 
behaviour. This idea was developed following a reading of evidence provided by 
economists such as Wydick (1999). 
A further insight, which runs repeatedly throughout this thesis, is the importance of 
the different institutional environment in low-income countries, which has an 
important bearing on how health systems, and health insurance systems, function. 
Furthermore, the assumptions on which many theoretical models are built, may need 
to be revised as a result. The following paragraphs further highlight this issue. 
8.3.1 Patient satisfaction 
There is little in the way of theoretical predictions concerning the effect of health 
insurance on service quality and patient satisfaction, the subject of Research Question 
7 (What is the impact of voluntary health insurance on patient satisfaction?). Part 
3.3.1 highlights the fact that in richer economies, private health insurance tends to be 
directly linked to improved service quality, whereas in Vietnam the only benefit is an 
80% reduction in user charges. Overall, health insurance is expected to have little 
impact on patient satisfaction, except that which is related to the lower cost of 
accessing care. The scheme is, in many respects, more comparable to publicly funded 
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systems in which demand is rationed through longer waiting times rather than through 
increased access costs. 
Overall, however, most insured individuals are very satisfied with voluntary health 
insurance. When further questioning was made as part of in-depth interviews, many 
people actually reported dissatisfaction with service quality. Two main reasons for this 
emerged. The first is a lack of trust in the scheme and, the second, the poor attitude of 
health workers. Dissatisfaction was principally voiced in terms of relative quality i.e. 
in comparison with uninsured patients who pay full user charges. An unexpected 
finding of the research was that many insured individuals report receiving an inferior 
quality of service, a response voiced most strongly in Ninh Binh Province in northern 
Vietnam. The strength of feeling amongst many respondents was not anticipated, and 
may hinder the development of the scheme in the longer-run. It is thus an issue which 
policy makers need to investigate further and address. 
Feelings that health workers cannot be trusted are driven principally by reports that 
unofficial payments are important to obtain quality service. There is strong evidence 
that the amount of money a patient brings to the facility has a significant bearing on 
the attitudes of staff towards them. This finding is consistent with the observations 
highlighted in Part 1.4, that under economic transition, health facilities have become 
increasingly independent from bureaucratic and political control. Furthermore, the 
findings also support reports that corruption within government is widespread and 
increasing. These observations provide an example of the need to adapt theoretical 
frameworks and their assumptions, to the reality of the Vietnamese health system. 
This particular finding is likely to be generalisable to other low-income countries 
given that corruption and unofficial activity is a feature of many societies without the 
institutions to regulate provider behaviour. 
Despite some dissatisfaction with service quality, insured patients report trading these 
off, against the benefits of expected financial savings. This insight sheds new light on 
the way in which health insurance has altered patterns of treatment-seeking behaviour, 
and adds to current understanding of the impact the health insurance scheme has had 
on the dynamic of the health system. In-depth interviews revealed that many insured 
patients pick-and-choose when to use their insurance card, commonly paying full fees 
when a health problem is minor. When a health problem is perceived as serious, 
however, and the expected cost of treatment is substantial, insured patients consider it 
worthwhile to accept the downside of insurance in terms of longer waiting times and 
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inferior service quality. In some cases, patients try to have the best of both worlds, 
pretending not to be insured during treatment, but producing their insurance card at 
the time of payment. This is a further finding, which enhances understanding of the 
way in which supply and demand in the health system interacts, essential for the 
development of future policy. 
From a policy perspective, health insurance may be important in mitigating, or 
preventing the development of, supplier-induced demand. Whilst not examined in 
detail in the thesis, supplier-induced demand was expected to be a problem, given the 
reimbursement mechanism used. However, if as indicated by insured patients, they are 
perceived by health workers to bring less money to a facility, there appears to be no 
incentive for providers to increase the quantity of care that insured patients consume. 
By implication, the reimbursement mechanism plays an important role in influencing 
the quality of services provided, an insight not previously made in the literature. 
On the one hand, and with the benefit of hindsight, it is not surprising that service 
quality is poorer under insurance. If the scheme provided both better quality, and 
substantially cheaper care to the patient, it is unlikely that uptake would be as low as it 
currently is. However, poor quality may hamper the development of the scheme, 
particularly in terms of attracting healthier and wealthier individuals into the scheme, 
which is critical to counter problems of adverse selection. If, for example, premia were 
to increase without parallel improvements in service quality, the perceived balance 
between benefits and negative effects will shift towards the latter, effectively reducing 
expected utility under insurance. If the extent to which the scheme is considered good 
value for money, which it currently is, is eroded, this may lead to problems in terms of 
extending the scheme and ensuring its financial sustainability. 
To summarise, the reimbursement of providers under health insurance, service quality, 
and demand for health insurance, are interdependent, an important fact for policy-
makers to recognise, and one that has not previously been emphasised. Improving the 
quality of care for insured patients would help both to retain existing members and to 
attract healthier individuals into the scheme, an important objective for the scheme at 
present. However, this interdependence also creates a dilemma, as increasing the 
reimbursement rate to improve provider behaviour and hence service quality, may also 
create pressures for supplier-induced demand. This suggests that stronger regulation of 
provider behaviour is probably the best next step. 
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8.3.2 Protecting financial access to health care 
Once user charges exist at the point of service delivery, as in Vietnam, a market for 
insurance is expected to evolve. In most cases, a central motivation for introducing 
insurance is to protect patients against uncertain, and potentially welfare-damaging, 
out-of-pocket expenditures, evidence of which exists in Vietnam (see Figure 1.2). 
Given substantial evidence that exemption mechanisms tend to be an ineffective tool 
for protecting the poor against user charges, principally due to the weakness of 
institutional capacity, as well as strong incentives for providers to collect user fees, 
policy-makers in many countries have turned to health insurance. 
The expected impact of health insurance on out-of-pocket expenditures (Research 
Question 8), was discussed in Part 3.3.2. Insurance offers an 80% reduction in user 
charges, and hence private expenditures are expected to be lower for insured patients. 
However, assuming that demand for services is sensitive to changes in price, the effect 
may not be as strong as expected. Evidence from the USA and elsewhere shows that 
as the rate of cost-sharing decreases, out-of-pocket expenditures tend to increase, 
although the extent to which these findings are relevant to health systems in low-
income countries is debatable, for example given the greater importance of non-price 
rationing costs. 
Evidence presented in Chapter 6, using econometric analysis that controls for sample 
selection bias, supports these predictions, concluding that, ceteris paribus, voluntary 
health insurance reduces out-of-pocket expenditures, and substantially so. On average, 
private expenditures by insured individuals are 970/0-200% less than those incurred by 
uninsured patients. This finding provides strong evidence that health insurance can be 
effective in ensuring financial access to health services, and no similar effect has been 
reported elsewhere in the literature. Despite this finding, there is evidence that 
economic status remains an important determinant of total out-of-pocket expenditures. 
This finding is consistent with reports that unofficial payments, which are included in 
these estimates, are widespread in Vietnam. Unofficial payments are important to 
receive care that is both timely, and of better quality, at least in terms of staff attitudes. 
Overall, however, health insurance reduces private expenditures proportionately more 
for poorer patients, than for richer patients, an important finding given the policy goals 
of the scheme. 
The results provide strong evidence that health insurance improves equity in health 
financing by equalising expenditures between insured patients of different economic 
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status. Given that, overall, demand for health insurance is not sensitive to individual 
economic status, it can be concluded that equity in access to health services has 
improved for society as a whole. Were the wealthier more likely to purchase 
insurance, then income-inequalities in access would have been exacerbated. There is, 
however, evidence that income drives insurance purchase in Hai Phong Province (see 
Part 5.3.1), which requires closer analysis by policy-makers. Furthermore, if reduced 
out-of-pocket expenditures have resulted in greater use of health services, and 
assuming that this additional use is not unnecessary, then it is possible to conclude that 
previously unmet health needs are now being met, directly as a result of health 
insurance. 
8.3.3 Treatment-seeking behaviour 
As with user charges, the introduction of insurance into a health system is likely to 
alter patterns of treatment seeking behaviour and service utilisation, both in terms of 
who uses health services, with which type of provider, and how often. Chapter 7 
addresses this broad issue (Research Question 9: What is the effect of being insured on 
treatment-seeking behaviour?). 
Relevant theory, reviewed in Part 2.1.2, predicts that insured individuals have a 
tendency, ceteris paribus, to consume more health services than uninsured individuals. 
Dealt with in the literature on moral hazard, this prediction depends on demand being 
sensitive to changes in price. In low-income countries, whilst insurance may reduce 
the direct cost of accessing health services, unofficial payments and high indirect costs 
may reduce the extent to which health insurance reduces the total access costs. 
Several aspects of treatment-seeking behaviour were considered in this research. In 
summary, using a simple probit analysis, insurance patients who feel ill are 
significantly more likely to seek care from a health professional, whether in the public 
or private sector, and are significantly less likely to self-treat. These findings support 
theoretical predictions. However, when bias resulting from non-random self-selection 
into the scheme is corrected using the bivariate probit estimator, which jointly 
estimates models of insurance and treatment-seeking behaviour, the direct effect of 
insurance disappears. This suggests that unobservable factors are simultaneously 
driving both the purchase of health insurance and treatment-seeking behaviour. One 
possible factor is different attitudes towards ill-health, related to health-related risk-
aversion. Whilst this thesis presents findings related to 'worry' about future health 
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status, which appears to capture something more that current health status, it is 
acknowledged that a better understanding of attitudes towards risk and health is 
required through further research. 
Even if the effect of insurance on treatment-seeking behaviour is only an indirect one, 
there are some clear messages for policy-makers. Health insurance may lead to 
improved population health through two main effects. First, if health care received in 
government facilities is of a higher clinical quality than self-medication, or compared 
to that received in private facilities, then patients will receive better treatment for their 
health problems. Secondly and similarly, more appropriate use of medicines should 
help to counteract the rapid growth in resistance to many communicable diseases, in 
particular typhoid and tuberculosis, which have become major public health concerns 
for the Vietnamese Government in recent years. 
Finally, with respect to Research Question 10 (Does social cohesion mitigate moral 
hazard?), the finding that social cohesion has no impact on the probability of seeking 
government services amongst insured patients is expected, but has ambiguous 
implications. If the increased consumption of health services is appropriate i.e. meets 
previously unmet health needs, then the findings are not problematic. However, if 
some of the increased consumption is wasteful, then the current institutional design is 
missing the opportunity to harness local monitoring mechanisms, which may be 
effective at countering these incentive problems. Questioning current institutional 
arrangements, and considering alternatives, when developing the policy framework 
around health insurance, could have a significant impact on the financial sustainability 
of the scheme in the future. 
8.4 Agenda for further research 
A number of issues for further research have been raised during this thesis. Perhaps 
the most important is to strengthen understanding of the way in which health 
insurance is organised i.e. the supply-side. This thesis has focussed, through the 
collection of data directly from individuals, on demand side issues i.e. the system as 
viewed by the consumer. However, many of the results presented in Chapter 5, for 
example the highly significant signs on dummy coefficients representing provinces 
(and districts), might be explained with a better understanding of the different ways in 
which Provincial Health Insurance Offices promote the scheme. For example, the 
significant variation of awareness across districts may simply be explained through a 
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better understanding of propaganda strategies. The content of information provided, 
the focus of the message, and the relative intensity of campaigns across provinces and 
districts, are all factors likely to explain varying levels of awareness and purchase of 
health insurance. 
Further research into attitudes towards risk, in the specific context of the health sector, 
would be useful given the current proliferation of health insurance schemes in low-
income countries. In the specific context of Vietnam, exposure to capitalist values in 
the south of the country, at a time when northern Vietnam was under communist 
control, may have influenced attitudes to risk. Results presented in Chapter 5 (see 
Figure 5.7) suggest that worry about future health is substantially lower in the 
southern province of Dong Thap Province (in the Mekong River Delta). This is 
despite the fact that overall health status is worse here relative to the Red River Delta, 
the location of the two northern provinces surveyed (See Table 1.4). 
The introduction of social structure into the analysis raises several further questions. 
For example, how deep are public perceptions of corruption in government 
institutions, how do they vary geographically, and how do these perceptions influence 
demand for health insurance? With respect to mass organisations, little is understood 
about the way in which these organisations function, despite the very important role 
they play in Vietnamese society. Furthermore, what motivates an individual to join a 
mass organisation? The results to these questions may be useful in informing 
strategies that enable the extension of health insurance into rural areas and to workers 
in the informal economy. 
The finding that insured patients are seen as bringing less money to health facilities, 
often have to wait longer to receive treatment, and are generally considered to be less 
important than fee-paying patients, raises a number of important issues for policy-
makers. A better understanding of the dynamic at play here, in terms of the supply of 
health services, for example through in-depth facility surveys and in-depth interviews 
with providers would be extremely beneficial in this regard. Finally, this thesis has not 
specifically addressed the overall financial sustainability of the scheme, a critical area 
for government policy-makers to have a detailed knowledge of. 
252 
Chapter 8: Conclusions 
8.S Final thoughts 
Voluntary health insurance is a fundamental part of the Vietnamese Government's 
strategy to develop a financially sustainable health system that provides universal 
access to health services. Having successfully enrolled the majority of formal sector 
workers into the compulsory scheme, and a substantial number of children through 
school health insurance, the key to achieving this goal is to increase voluntary entry 
into the scheme. Extending voluntary risk-sharing scheme in a predominantly informal 
economy, whilst also limiting the incentive problems that can undermine such 
schemes financially, is a serious challenge for Vietnam. Any country that manages to 
chart a successful course through these dilemmas will have the attention of policy 
makers around the world. 
One clear message from this thesis is that good policy design is no guarantee of 
successful outcomes. This is the case in any health system, but particularly when 
government policies are implemented in an economy undergoing economic transition, 
a health sector which is liberalising, and where regulation and bureaucratic control of 
service provision is weak. It is particularly difficult, in this context, to make accurate 
assumptions about a range of provider and consumer behaviour. Data collected 
through household surveys thus provide one of the more effective ways of 
understanding how an intervention such as health insurance, impacts on issues such as 
treatment seeking behaviour and access to health services (see Figure 1.1). 
As noted in Chapter 1, 'It has still to be shown that voluntary local prepayment 
schemes can make a major contribution to health financing, except perhaps in a 
coercive political system' (Abel-Smith 1994). Extending insurance is a difficult task, 
but one which may be achievable in Vietnam, given its particular culture. For 
example, the strong networks of mass organisations at the community level could be 
harnessed to help extend health insurance to rural farming communities. In addition, 
where there is a strong sense of duty to the State, and its programmes, the probability 
that individuals will join a government health insurance scheme may increase. These 
factors are, however, particular features of Vietnamese society, and hence limit their 
generalisability to other countries. 
Theoretically, the findings presented in this thesis add to the small body of evidence 
that welfare based government interventions in particular those requiring voluntary 
participation, are influenced by the informal networks within which an individual 
functions. For policy makers, this is an additional factor for consideration when 
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designing a scheme, and may explain some of the lack of progress made in extending 
health insurance in certain provinces, districts and communes. 
Overall, the introduction of voluntary health insurance has had many positive effects 
with respect to health system outcomes. Financial access to health services has 
improved, and more so for poorer patients. This finding is particularly positive given 
that economic status is not a significant determinant of health insurance purchase. By 
implication, rather then exacerbating income-related inequalities in access to services, 
health insurance has probably had a direct effect in terms of reducing these 
inequalities. For many households, reductions in private health expenditures bring 
comfort and security, especially during the current period of economic transition. This 
finding suggests that, overall, the scheme has had a positive impact in term of health 
policy outcomes, and that policy-makers should continue to develop the scheme. 
Continual monitoring and evaluation is, however, clearly required. 
One interesting finding of this study is the importance of perceived service quality, 
which forms a link between the way in which providers are reimbursed and levels of 
demand for health insurance. Patients paying full user charges appear to be valued 
more than those with insurance, by health workers, and seems to reflect the amount of 
money they bring to a facility. The inferior quality of services many that insured 
patients receive has a negative impact on their satisfaction with the insurance scheme. 
This should be a priority issue for health policy-makers in Vietnam given its 
potentially destabilising effect, and low levels of enrolment overall. Rather than 
increasing reimbursement rates to compete with income from user charges, which 
would create incentives for providers to induce consumption of health services, 
stronger bureaucratic control is probably the best next step. 
This thesis has attempted to demonstrate how, by drawing on frameworks from 
disciplines such as sociology and development economics, current thinking about the 
development of voluntary health insurance in low-income countries can be enriched. 
Indeed, this is probably true for health economics as a whole. In many cases it is a 
question of emphasis: for example the discussion relating to the crowding out of 
informal insurance networks by formal ones, and vice versa, fits within existing theory 
regarding competition. Other issues, however, such as those relating to the role of 
duty, and social norms of behaviour, are not adequately dealt with at present by 
economics frameworks. Finally, whilst voluntary health insurance in Vietnam has 
many positive aspects, significant challenges remain to ensure that its members 
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continue to consider it to be, as one respondent commented, like having a good 
neighbour. 
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Appendix 1: Enrolment in health insurance (1997) 
1 Viet Nam 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
Chi Nhanh 
HaNoi 
Tp.Hcminh 
Hai Phong 
Ha Giang 
TI Quang 
Cao Bang 
Lang Son 
LaiChau 
Yen Bai 
Lao Cai 
Thai Nguyen 
Son La 
Phu Tho 
Bac Giang 
QINinh 
Hoa Binh 
Ha Tay 
Hai Duong 
Thai Binh 
Nam Dinh 
Ninh Binh 
Than Hoa 
Nghe An 
Ha Tinh 
QIBinh 
Quang Tri 
TTHue 
TP Da Nang 
QINgai 
Binh Dinh 
KhlHoa 
Ninh Thuan 
Binh Thuan 
Phu Yen 
Gia Lai 
Kontum 
Daklak 
ALL HEALTH INSURANCE 
TOTAL Compulsory Voluntary 
164,197 164,197 0 
148,636 148,636 0 
596,000 376,000 220,000 
1,123,352 421,160 702,192 
649,100 231,000 418,100 
37,760 29,910 7,850 
64 ,967 49,317 15,650 
43,240 41,930 1,310 
70,202 44,402 25,800 
40,549 29,549 11,000 
66,190 59,190 7,000 
44,557 37,470 7,087 
234,900 108,200 126,700 
53,400 53,400 0 
196,807 123,387 73,420 
88,000 88,000 0 
259,918 116,370 143,548 
64,301 53,563 10,738 
167,420 164,064 3,356 
159,594 142,648 16,946 
283,655 158,440 125,215 
315,358 174,599 140,759 
229,127 91,347 137,780 
368,458 255,690 112,768 
336,879 233,179 103,700 
117,426 106,345 11,081 
85,173 65,964 19,209 
66,929 45,050 21,879 
193,288 64,400 128,888 
122,898 74,250 48,648 
98,594 65,594 33,000 
228,215 79,880 148,335 
80,695 57,106 23,589 
56,695 18,429 38,266 
120,500 40,500 80,000 
52,901 34,432 18,469 
57,775 57,500 275 
20,712 20,641 71 
136,889 86,889 50,000 
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PUBLIC VOLUNTARY HEALTH 
INSURANCE 
School Adults Humanitarian 
chi ldren (paying) 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
150,000 0 70,000 
696,194 0 5,998 
294,600 61,500 62,000 
7,850 0 0 
12,864 2,786 0 
1,310 0 0 
25,000 500 300 
10,000 1,000 0 
7,000 0 0 
6,655 422 0 
125,000 1,700 0 
0 0 0 
71,095 2,239 86 
0 0 0 
138,823 0 4,725 
9,200 1,500 38 
2,867 0 489 
16,700 60 186 
118,998 6,000 217 
133,119 7,640 0 
100,800 1,055 35,925 
98,000 13,703 1,065 
95,000 1,500 7,200 
11 ,024 0 57 
19,191 0 13 
19,414 2,396 9 
125,000 1,300 2,583 
48,638 0 10 
33,000 0 0 
145,000 200 3,135 
14,493 0 9,096 
38,090 0 176 
80,000 0 0 
17,691 618 160 
275 0 0 
71 0 0 
50,000 0 0 
a Lam Dong 4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
50 
5 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
1 Bmh Duong 
2 Tay Ninh 
3 Dong Nai 
4 Long An 
5 Dong Thap 
6 An Giang 
7 Tien Giang 
8 Ben Tre 
9 Vinh Long 
Tra Vinh 
1 Gan Tho 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
Soc Trang 
Kien Giang 
GaMau 
Br-Vtau 
Gia Thong/ 
Transport 
Dau Khi/ 
Petroleum 
Gao $u/Rubber 
Than/ Goa/-
Energy 
Bac Gan 
Bac Ninh 
Hung Yen 
Bac LIeu 
HaNam 
Quang Nam 
Binh Phuoc 
Vinh Phuc 
TOTAL 
80,431 43,600 
125,500 55,500 
37,966 37,966 
124,468 114,189 
162,701 63,894 
109,748 43,850 
92,451 48,800 
101,051 69,420 
71 ,209 64,157 
67,821 36,367 
38,552 38,552 
98,999 68,497 
47,040 35,605 
76,670 46,050 
49,241 48,497 
95,431 45,337 
115,480 111,480 
12,500 12,120 
93,740 74,400 
69,086 63,584 
25,164 17,402 
108,300 63,300 
73,252 73,252 
67,198 28,770 
96,008 48,300 
141,800 87,500 
41,200 16,200 
80,265 67,013 
9,548,529 5,736,230 
36,831 35,000 1,822 9 
70,000 70,000 0 0 
0 0 a 0 
10,279 9,000 a 1,279 
98,807 98,165 642 0 
65,898 65,000 870 28 
43,651 40,000 3,169 482 
31,631 31 ,631 0 0 
7,052 7,052 0 0 
31,454 30,927 463 64 
a 0 0 0 
30,502 29,950 250 302 
11,435 10,000 591 844 
30,620 30,000 600 20 
744 0 0 744 
50,094 50,000 0 94 
4,000 3,000 0 1,000 
380 380 0 0 
19,340 0 19,340 0 
5,502 4,098 1,404 0 
7,762 7,762 0 0 
45,000 40,000 5,000 0 
0 0 0 0 
38,428 36,220 2,051 157 
47,708 47,708 0 0 
54,300 54,000 0 300 
25,000 25,000 0 0 
13,252 12,615 637 0 
3,812,299 3,460,470 142,958 208,791 
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Appendix 3: Survey provinces and sampling units 
HAl PHONG PROVINCE 
Sampling Units 
Province District Commune / Ward Sub-c:ommune 
HaiPhong KienAn PhuLien Go Cong I 
Go Cong 2 
Phu Lien 
QuyTuc 
HaiPhong KienAn Tran Thanh Ngo To 1, Tav Son 
To 1, Cum 1 
To 1 Cum2 
Dong Son 
HaiPhong Thuy Nll\lyen Kien Bai Doi3 
Doi 5 
Doi 6 
HaiPhong ThuyNguyen Thien Huong Doi 1 
Doi 5 
Doi 6 
Doi 8 
Doi 9 
HaiPhong An Lao Tan Vien LuongCau 
KinhDien 
Du Vien 
HaiPhong An Lao Tan Dan Kinh Xuyen 
Vi Xuyen 
LaiThuong 
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Appendix 3: Survey provinces and sampling units 
NINH BINH PROVINCE 
Sampling Units 
Province Distrlet Commune I Ward Sub-eommune 
Ninh Binh Kim Son VanHai Trung Chinh 
TayBac 
Dong Tho 
Ninh Binh Kim Son DinhHoa Xom2 
XomS 
Xom8 
Ninh Binh Kim Son Quang Thien XomS 
Xom 11 
Xom 16 
Ninh Binh HoaLu NinhHai KheNgoai 
Coi Khe 
Ninh Binh HoaLu NinhKhang Phu Gia 
Kim Phu La Phu 
Phan Trung, Bach Cu 
Dai Phu 
Ninh Binh HoaLu Ninh My MyLo 
Dong Dinh 
Tay Dinh 
DongNam 
TayNam 
TayBac 
NhanLy 
'Quan Dong 
Xom Benh vien HL 
Xom Nam Chiem 
Vinh Vien 
Thach Tac 
Ninh Binh Ninh Binh Town Phuc Thanh PhucThai 
Phuc Tan 
LyThuong Kiet 
NgoGia Tu 
Hai Thuong Lan Ong 
PhucTrung 
Tran Hung Dao 
Ngl!Yen Dinh Chieu 
Tran DanR Ninh 
LeQuyDon 
Kim Dong 
Phan Cbu Trinh 
Tran Phu 
PhucNam 
Phuc HunR 
Tran Binh Trong 
Ninh Binh Ninh Binh Town Tan Thanh DauLong 
Dau Bac 
IQuyTan 
Ninh Binh Ninh Binh Town Thanh Binh Tran Kien 1 
Tran Kien 2 
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Appendix 3: Survey provinces and sampling units 
Ninh Binh Kim Son PhatDiem Phu Vinh 
TuonAKiem 
Hung Tien 
Kien Tuy 
Dong HuonA 
Kicn Thai 
Phat Diem Nam 
Ninh Binh NhoQuan Nho_Quan NAhcThi 
HocThi 
Ninh Binh Ninh Binh Town Van Giang To 3 Pho 2 
DuonA3 Ph02 
To 3-,-Pho 3 
Duong Tran HunA Dao 
T06,Ph03 
To~Ph03 
DuonjllO, Phuong Bich Dao 
Duong 4, Pho 2 
To 1 
Pho 3 
Duong Pham Hong Thai 
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Appendix 3: Survey provinces and sampling units 
._-----------_ ... ---.• ---_ ..... - .. _-
DONG TRAP PROVINCE 
Sampling Units 
Province District Commune I Ward Sub-commune 
Dong Thap Sa Dec Town Ward I Khom 1 
- - -
Khom2 
- - -
Khom3 
- - -
Khom4 
DongThap Sa Dec Town Ward III Khom 1 
- - -
Khom2 
- - -
Khom3 
DongThap Sa Dec Town TanPhuDong ApPhuHoa 
- - -
ApPhu Thuan 
- - -
Ap Phu Long 
DongThap Lai Vuoa Lai Vuoa Town Khom 1 
- - -
Khom2 
- - -
Khom3 
- - -
Khom4 
- - -
KhomS 
DongThap Lai Vuog Tan Duong Ap. Than Thuan 
- - -
ApTanDuong 
- - -
ApHau Thanh 
- - -
ApTan Loc 
DongThap Lai Vuog Tan Thanh ApTanHung 
- - -
ApTanLoc 
- - -
ApTanLoi 
Dong Thap HongNgu AnhBinhA ApAnLoi 
- - -
ApAnHoa 
- - -
ApAnLoc 
DongThap HongNgu Thuong Phuoc I Ap 1 
- - -
Ap2 
- - -
Ap3 
DongThap HongNgu LongKhanhA Ap Long Phuoc 
- - -
Ap Long Thach B 
- - -
Ap Long Ta 
- - -
Ap Long Huu 
- - -
Ap Long Chau CKB 
- - -
Ap Long Binh CKB 
- - -
Ap Long Thai CKB 
- - -
Ap Long Hau 
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Visit I 
Visit 2 
Visit 3 
Appendix 4: Household survey questionnaire 
RESPONDENT INFORMATION (Adult member sample) 
IndividualID: []J I I I I []J Interviewer code: EB 
Supervisor code: 
i) Name o/respondent: ________________ _ 
ii) Interviewee category 
Non-member 1 
Former insurance member 199718 2 
Current member - adult 3 
Current member - schoolchild 4 
Current member - humanitarian/weI/are 5 
Other (WRITE IN) 6 
iii) Year 0/ birth: L..I ....L.....L. __ ..... 
v) HOME ADDRESS 
Province 
---:-----CommuneIWard, _____ _ 
vi) Urban D 
Rural D 
vii) Insurance details: 
d d m m y 1 
Card expiry date: I I I I I I 
Nominated healthfacility: ______ _ 
viii) Other details: 
d d m m y y 
Date of interview: I I I I I I I 
Lx) Visit record 
Date Available Not present / Dead 
_( I) (2) unavailable (3) (4) 
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iv) Male 
Female B 
District 
-------
Time interview begins: 
Time interview ends: 
Appointment date Refusal 
and time (S) (6) 
Other notes (7) 
INTRODUCTION 
I Locate respondent and say ••• 
I am from the Institute of Sociology in Hanoi and we are undertaking a 
research project in partnership with the University of York in England. The 
research is investigating how much people use and spend on health care, 
and what they think about the health insurance system. The aim of the 
research is to provide information to Vietnamese Health Insurance and the 
Ministry of Health. The survey will provide vital information to help 
improve the health services that you use. We are not trying to sell you 
health insurance. We would like to ask you some questions about a variety 
of issues and ask you to be as honest as possible. All the answers you give 
will be treated confidentially and no-one apart from key members of the 
research team will be able to trace them back to you. We expect the 
interview to last less than one hour. Are you available? 
If NO tben fiU la details on cover page making an appointment if 
possible. 
If YES tben ask: 
a) Do you currently have a health insurance card? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Don't knowIcan't remember 3 go to c) ~ 
b) Which health insurance scheme are you a member of? 
State compulsory health insurance 
State voluntary health Insurance 
BaoVtet 
BaoMinh 
Local community health Insurance scheme5 
Other (WRITE IN) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
6 
go to e) 
go 10 Q1 ~ 
c) Have you ever had a state voluntary health Insurance card, that 18 the govemment health 
insurance scheme for farmers and other self-employed people? 
Yes 
No 
Don't know/can't remember 
d) When did your last insurance card expire ? 
Before 1" January 1997 
On or after 1" January 1997 
Don't know/can't remember 
1 
2 end Interview 
3 end Interview 
~ ~ goloQ1 
e) Do you have any children between 5 ancI17 years who live In the household? 
Yes 
No 
Don't know/can't remember 
1 go to Q1 
2 end Interview 
3 end Interview 
IF YES COMPLETE THE HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE AND THEN 
ONE INDIVIDUAL QUESTIONNAIRE FOR EACH CHILD 
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Visit 1 
Visit 2 
Visit 3 
RESPONDENT INFORMATION (Commune People. Committee sample) 
IndividuallD: CD I I I I CD Interviewer code: EE 
Supervisor code: 
QN~eofrespondem: ________________________________ __ 
ii) Interviewee category 
Non-member 1 
Former insurance member 199718 2 
Current member - adult 3 
Current member - schoolchild 4 
Current member - humanitarianlwelfare 5 
Other (WRITE IN) 6 
iii) Year of birth: 
v) HOME ADDRESS 
iv) Male 
Female B 
Province _______ _ District _______ _ 
CommuneIWard. _____ _ 
vi) Urban B 
Rural 
vii) Insurance detaJIs d d m m y 1 
Card expiry date: I I I I I I 
Nominated healthfacility: _______ _ 
viii) Other details: 
d d m m y y 
Date of interview: I I I I I I I Time interview begins: 
Time interview ends: 
ix) Visit record 
Date Available Not present I Dead Appointment date Refusal 
(1 ) (2) unavailable (3) (4) and time (5) (6) 
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Other notes 
J7J 
INTRODUCTION 
Locate named interviewee. Ideally interview tbe bead of bousebold 
togetber witb penon responsible for running tbe bouse (e.g. busband 
and wife) and say ••• 
I am from the Institute of Sociology in Hanoi and we are undertaking a 
research project in partnership with the University of York in England. 
The research is investigating how much people use and spend on health 
care, and what they think about the health insurance system. The aim of 
the research is to provide information to Vietnamese Health Insurance 
and the Ministry of HellIth. The survey wUl provide vital information to 
help improve the health services that you use. We are not trying to sell you 
health insurance. We would like to ask you some questions about a variety 
of issues and ask you to be as honest as possible. AU the answers you give 
will be treated confldentially tIIId no-one apart Irom key members 01 the 
research team will be able to trace them back to you. We expect the 
interview to last less thtlll one hour. Are you available? 
If NO tben fill In details on cover page making an appointment If 
possible. If YES tben ask: 
a) Do you currently have a health insurance card? 
Yes 
No 
Don't knowlcan't remember 
b) Which health insurance scheme are you a member of? 
State compulsory health insurance 
State voluntary health Insurance 
BaoViet 
BaoMlnh 
Local community health Insurance schemeS 
Other (WRITE IN) 
1 
~ ~gotoC) 
1 go to e) 
2 end Interview 
: ~O~Q1 
c) Have you ever had a voluntary health Insurance card, that Is the govemment health 
insurance scheme for farmers and other self-employed people? 
d) When did your last Insurance card expire? 
Before 1 at January 1997 
On or after 1" January 1997 
Don't know/can't remember 
Yes 1 
No 2 rt.. 
Oon't know/can't remember 3 U- go to Q1 
1 go to Q1 
2 end Interview 
9 end Interview 
e) Do any children between 5 and 17 years live in the household? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Don't know/can't remember 3 
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go to Q1 
end Interview 
end Interview 
Part I: Household Questionnaire Household IDO 0 ,--I -'---'---' 
A) HOUSEHOLD SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS 
I'd now like to ask you a few questions about the people that live in the household? 
(IF NECESSARY ASK ABOUT ALL THOSE PEOPLE THAT YOU USUALLY SHARE AN EVENING MEAL WITH) 
•••• ____ , __ n ••• _____ ....... _ .... _ ......... _ ... ,._ .... _ ... ~ __ • ,. ____ •• _._. 
Common name Relation to Year of Marital Current main Other jobsl ways 
head of Age birth Sex Status occupation of making Religion 
household (WRITE IN) money 
1 RESPONDENT 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
L- -----~ - -- -- ---_._--
- ---
Coding: 
MARITAL STATUS MAIN OCCUPA TION REliGION 
1 Single 1 Farmer 6 Student 1 Buddhist 
2 Married 2 Service/trader 7 Unemployed 2 Catholic 
3 SeparatedlDivorced 3 State employee 8 Retiredlbouseworker 3 None 
4 Widowed 4 Hired labour 9 Other 4 Other 
--
5 AnnylPolice 
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Part 1: Household Questionnaire Household IDO 0 1...-1 -I.-...l-..-J 
1. (continued). Please, tell me about the people who live in your household: 
Common name (identify subject) Level of Health Health status in Details of long-
I education insurance last 12 months term illness if Pregnant 
member relevant (Yes I No) 
(WRITE IN) 
1 RESPONDENT ! 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
I 
~ --
--
EDUCATION HEALTH INSURANCE HEALTH STATUS 
1 I Primary 6 College! 1 Compulsory 1 Good 
Universi 
2 7 Post- uate 2 Voluntary 2 Fairly good 
3 3 Bao Viet I Minh 3 Fairly bad 
4 4 Other 4 Long tenn illness/disability 
s S None 
~----
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Part 1: Household Questionnaire Household 10: 
2. NOW CODE THE TYPE OF HOUSE 
Apartment 
Villa 
Permanent house (1 floor) 
Permanent house (2 or more floors) 
Tiled roof, brick wall 
Thatch roof, brick wall 
Thatch roof, wood/mud wall 
~hM ____________________________ ___ 
Don't know 
3. What type of latrine do you have In your house? 
Primitive latrine 
Private - 2 tank system 
Private - flush system 
Shared toilet 
No latrine Other ____________________________ ___ 
Don't know 
4. What is your main source of drinking water from? 
Piped water 
Rainwater 
Well/pump well 
Lake/pond/river Other ______________________ ___ 
Don't know 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
9 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
9 
5. Which of the following does your household have In working order? (READ OUT AND TICK EITHER YES OR NO 
BOX AS APPROPRIATE) 
ITEMS YES NO NOTES 
a) Motorbike 
b) Car / van !Iorry / motor boat 
c) Video 
d) Colour TV 
e) Refrigerator I washing machine 
f) Telephone 
g) Agricultural machine 
h) Air conditioner 
i) Electric water pump (bought themselves 
j) Salon I bed 
k) Other lUXUry item 
SKIP FOLLOWING QUESTION IF NOT RELEVANT (e.g In urban areas) 
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Part 1: Household Questionnaire Household 10: 00 __ 1 ~ 
6. For each of the following items can you tell me how many you have. or have produced. and how much Income you 
made from selling each during the last 12 months ..... (READ OUT) 
ITEM UNIT VALUE 
('OOOs Dona) 
a) Crop 1 
b) Crop 2 
c) Crop 3 
d) Cereal 1 
e) Cereal 2 
f) Animal 1 
g) Animal 2 
h) Animal 3 
i) Animal 4 
TOTAL-
I'd now like to ask you a few more questions about the income of the household ••• 
7. Approximately how much Income did the household make In the last month. In VND from the following. 
(READOUT) 
PERSON 1 PERSON 2 PERSON 3 
a) Salary from main 
occupation 
b) Bonuses 
c) Eamings from extra jobs 
d) Pension 
e) Remittances I support from 
family 
f) Interest on savings 
e) Other (speCify) 
TOTAL-
SUPERVISOR TO COMPLETE NEXT QUESTION 
8. ADD THE INCOME TOTALS FROM 06 and 07 AND WRITE IN BELOW 
VND 
Now thinking about household expenditure: 
PERSON 4 TOTAL 
TOTAL FOR 12 
MONTHS-
9. Approximately how much does the household spend each day on food and drink, Including food you have grown? 
________ VND Total for 12 months = I-I ____ ..J 
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Part 1: Household Questionnaire Household 10: 00,--1 ~ 
10. Approximately how much did the household spend on electricity last month? 
________ VND Total for 12 months = 
11. About how much did the household spend on education In the last 12 months I for one school \i ear? 
CHILD 1 CHILD 2 CHILD 3 CHILD 4 ALL CHILDREN 
a) Annual fee 
b) Other fee 
(e.g. extra lessons) 
c) Other (e.g. text 
books, repairs, 
hygiene, gifts) 
TOTAL = 
12. Approximately how much did the household soend on health .ervlee. In the last 12 months? 
PERSON 1 PERSON 2 PERSON 3 PERSON 4 PERSON 5 TOTAL 
a) 1s• visit 
b) 200 visit 
c) 3'" visit 
TOTAL= 
13. How much did the household spend on production and Inve.tm.nt In the last 12 months? (E.g. machinery, 
fertiliser for farmers; fumlture, computers for urban residents). 
TOTAL _______________ VND 
14. In the last 12 months how much did the household spend on ceremonl •• ? 
TOTAL ______________ VND 
15. In the last 12 months how much did the household spend paying off regular debts? (READ OUT) 
___________ VND 
SUPERVISOR TO COMPLETE NEXT QUESTION 
16. ADD THE TOTALS FROM 09 to 015 INCLUSIVE AND WRITE IN BELOW. MAKE SURE TO MULTIPLY 
APPROPRIATE DATA TO GIVE 12 MONTHS ESTIMATES. 
VND 
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Part 1: Household Questionnaire Household 10: 
I'd now like to ask you a few quesdons about savings and credit ....... . 
17. In the last 12 months what methods did the household use to •• ve money, and how much was set aside with 
each method? (READ OUT) 
YES NO AMOUNT SAVED 
·OOO.VND 
a) Money pooling circle 1 2 
b) Credit book at bank 1 2 
c) Community fund (local official scheme) 1 2 
d) Secret place 1 2 
e) Make a special purchaseJinvestment 1 2 
(e.g. gold) 
f) Other 
1 2 
................................................ 
TOTAL-
- -
18. What was your main realon for setting money aside? (CIRCLE ONLY THE MAIN REASON) 
In case of bad harvest 1 
To pay for children's education 2 
To pay future health fees 3 
To repay debt 4 
To help relatives 5 
To help buy extra land/extend house 6 
Save for household Item 7 
To Invest in production 8 
Other (specify) 9 
Don't know 99 
19. In the last 12 months, did the household have to borrow or loan money/paddy? 
20. FILL IN FOLLOWING TABLE (3 MAIN REASONS) 
Yes 
No 
Don't know 
1 
2 go to Q21 
3 go to Q21 
What was the money borrowed for? How much money was Where was the money borrowed 
(WRITE IN) borrowed? ('OOOs VNO) from ? (WRITE IN) 
a) 
b) 
c) 
TOTAL-
1 Production 4 Health/medicines 1 Family/relative 4 Informal savings scheme 
2 Ceremonies 5 Holiday/entertainment 2 Friend 5 Moneylender 
3 Education 6 Other 3 Formal savings 6 Bank 
scheme 
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Part 1: Household Questionnaire Household 10: 
21. How do you feel your household compares economically to other households in the commune? 
Much poorer than average 
A little poorer than average 
About average 
A little better off than average 
Much better off than average 
Don't know 
2 
3 
4 
5 
9 
D D ........ 1 1......1..-.1 
22. SUPERVISOR TO FILL IN THE FOLLOWING BOX AT END OF QUESTIONNAIRE IF NECESSARY 
TOTAL FROM Q8 PLUS Q20 = 
(INCOME PLUS BORROWINGS) 
TOTAL FROM Q16 PLUS Q17 = 
(EXPENDITURE PLUS SAVINGS) 
VND 
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Part 1: Household Questionnaire Household 10: 
B) RISK ATTITUDES, RESOURCE POOLING AND SOCIAL CAPITAL 
I'd now like to ask you some questions about your local community. First of all •••••• 
23. Which of the following organisations, if any, are "ou a member of? (READ OUT) 
GROUP I ORGANISATION YES NO 
a) Farmers Union 1 2 
b)Women's Union 1 2 
c) Veterans Union 1 2 
d) Bao Viet I Bao Minh 1 2 
e) Other (WRITE IN) 
............................................................... 1 2 
............................................................... 1 2 
24. And which of the following groups if any, are yOu a member of? (READ OUT) 
GROUP I ORGANISATION YES NO 
a) Peer Organisation 1 2 
b) longevity Union 1 2 
c) Elderly group 1 2 
d) Funeral group 1 2 
e) Savings I credit I money-pooling scheme 1 2 
f) Other (WRITE IN) 
............................................................... 1 2 
............................................................... 1 2 
IF NONE GO TO Q34 
25. If you could join only one group which one would it be; which group is the most Important In your life? 
a) Farmers Union 1 
b) Women's Union 2 
c) Veterans organisation 5 
d) Bao Viet I Bao Minh 6 
e) Peer Organisation 7 
f) longevity Union 8 
g) Elderly group 9 
h) Funeral group 10 
i) Savings I credit I money-pOOling scheme 11 
26. Which of the groups involve credit, savings or money-pooling programmes, or types of social support mechanisms 
? 
POOLING ETC VISITING 
SCHEMES SCHEMES 
a) Farmers Union 1 2 
b) Women's Union 1 2 
c) Veterans organisation 1 2 
d) Bao Viet I Bao Minh 1 2 
e) Peer Organisation 1 2 
f) longevity Union 1 2 
g) Elderly group 1 2 
h) Funeral group 1 2 
i) Savings I credit I moneY-pOOling scheme 1 2 
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27. Which of the pooling/credit/savings schemes is the most Important to you? (CODE ONLY ONE) 
None/not applicable 
Farmers Union 
Women's Union 
Veterans organisation 
Bao Viet / Bao Minh 
Peer Organisation 
Longevity Union 
Elderly group 
Funeral group9 
Savings / credit / money-pooling scheme 10 
1 go to Q34 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
28. Can you tell me what the purpose of the group is ? For example can you use the scheme to raise money for health 
services, or must it be used for another purpose? 
29. Who are the group's members? Are thev .... , .... ,(READ OUT) 
a) Close relatives 1 
b) Close friends 2 
c) Business partners 3 
d) People from local community 4 
e) Other (WRITE IN) 
5 
........................................ 
f) Don't know 9 
30. Are all members from the same economic croup? 
a) All are the same 1 
b) Most are the same 2 
c) Mixture 3 
f) Other (WRITE IN) 
4 
........................................ 
Q) Don't know 9 
31. If a new person wants to join the grouP. what conditions s hould they meet? 
a) Must be friend/relative 1 
b) Must be from same commune 2 
c) Must be recommended 3 
d) Pay a fee 4 
e) Other (WRITE IN) 
5 
........................................ 
f) No conditions 8 
Q) Don't know 9 
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32. Overall, how would YOU rate the function Ina of the aro up? 
a) Very poorly functioning 1 
b) Poorly/weakly 2 
c) Average 3 
d) Good 4 
e) Excellent 5 
f) Don't know 9 
33. Why don't you put this money in the bank Instead? 
34. SHOW THE FOLLOWING SCALE TO THE RESPONDENT 
In general how cohesive would you say the community you live In Is ? Circle the number you think Is closest. 
VERY LOW 
COHESION 
o 
III 
2 3 4 
VERY HIGH 
COHESION 
5 
35. In general how would you say you think about the future In terms of your health and your family's health? IF 
NECESSARY PROMPT: For example would you say that In general you worry about the future or do you take each 
day as it comes? 
36. Please circle the number you think Is closest to your attitude. 
DON'T WORRY 
AT ALL 
o 
III 
2 3 
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4 
WORRY 
A LOT 
5 
Part 1: Household Questionnaire Household ID: 
C) ACCESS TO HEALTH SERVICES 
I'd now like to ask you some questions about health facUlties. First of all ••••••• 
37. How far is it from your home to each of the following health facilities. how would you usually travel there and about 
how long would it take? 
Method of <15 15·30 31·58 1 hour Don't 
KMS tran.port minute. minute. minute. or mort knowl 
."run: IN) never.n 
a) Commune health centre 1 2 3 4 9 
b) Inter-communal polyclinic 1 2 3 4 9 
c) District Hospital 1 2 3 4 9 
d) Provincial Hospital 1 2 3 4 9 
e) Traditional I spiritual 1 2 3 4 9 
healer 
f) Private health worker 1 2 3 4 9 
g) State pharmacy 1 2 3 4 9 
h) Private pharmacy 1 2 3 4 9 
i) Drug seller (unlicensed) 1 2 3 4 9 
j) Other (WRITE IN) 
1 2 3 4 9 
................................... 
CODES 
1 Car 
2 Motorbike 
3 Bicycle 
4 Cyclo 
S Bus 
6 Taxi 
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D) UTILISATION OF HEALTH SERVICES 
I'd now like to ask you some questions about your visit to health workers, for 
personal health issues. First of all: 
38. How many times have you been III in the last 3 months? (CIRCLE ONLY ONE RESPONSE) 
Once 1 
Twice 2 
Th~times 3 
Four times 4 
Five or more times 5 
None 6 go Q40 if member /Q42 if not 
Don't know/can't remember 9 
39. How many times did you visit a health facility or call a health worker to your house? 
Never 1 
Once 2 
TYrice 3 
Three times 4 
Four times 5 
Five or more times 6 
Don't know/can't remember 9 
FOR PEOPLE WITH INSURANCE CARDS NOW OR SINCE JANUARY 1897 ASK Q41. FOR NON. 
MEMBERS GO TO Q42. 
40. When was the last time you used the health Insurance card? 
Never 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
Don't know/can't remember 
NOW IDENTIFY THE MONTH USING THE FOLLOWING CALENDAR 
JAN Tat National Day 
3 4 5 6 7 
o 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
9 
11 
IF USED CARD SINCE 1997 GO TO Q43 
41. Why didn't you use your health insurance card since 19971 
goQS8 
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42. When was the last time you visited 8 health facility or called a health worker to your house? (CIRCLE 
ONLY ONE RESPONSE) 
One month or less ago 
2-6 months ago 
7-12 months ago 
1 - 2 years ago 
1 
2 
3 
5 
6 Over 2 years ago 
Never 
Don't knowlCan't remember 
7 goQI8 
8 
43. Why did you look for medical advice the last time? 
Routine preventive care/ante-natal care 
Felt ill 
Chronic illness I long-term care 
Accident 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Other (please speclfy)'---_____ _ 5 goQ45 
Don't know 
No answer 
44. Thinking about the last time you were III and got medical advice, what was the reason? 
(UP TO FOUR MAY BE CODED) 
Felt ill 
Chronic illness I long-term care 
Accident 
Other (please speclfy) _______ _ 
8 
9 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Never 
Don't know 
No answer 
7 goQI8 
8 
9 
45. How long did you have to stop normal activities for? 
Not at all 1 
Less than one day 2 
2-7 days 3 
1-2 weeks 4 
3-4 weeks 5 
2-6 months 6 
Over 6 months 7 
Don't knowlCan't remember 9 
46. What did you do when you started to feel III ? (UP TO FOUR ACTIONS MAY BE CODED - CODE 
CHRONOLOGICALLY) 
First Second Third Fourth 
a) Used home-made medicine 1 1 1 1 
b) Bought drugs from drug-seller (unlicensed) 2 2 2 2 
c) Bought drugs from private pharmacy 3 3 3 3 
d) Bought drugs from state pharmacy 4 4 4 4 
e) Visited commune health centre I CHW at home 5 5 5 5 
f) Visited inter-communal polyclinic 6 6 6 6 
g) Visited district hospital 7 7 7 7 
h) Visited provincial hospital e e 8 8 
i) Visited private health worker 9 9 9 9 
j) Visited traditional I spiritual healer 10 10 10 10 
k) Other (please specify) .............................. 11 11 11 11 
............................................................ 
I) Carried on as normal 98 98 98 98 
m) Don't know I can't remember 99 99 99 99 
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47. How long was it between when YOU felt ill to when YOu ......... (REAO OUT) 
BOUGHT DRUGS CONTACT WITH HEALTH 
PROFESSIONAL 
a) Less than one day 
b) 2 -7 days 
c) 1 - 2 weeks 
d) 3 - 4 weeks 
e) 2 - 6 months 
o Over 6 months 
0) Don't know/can't remember 
48. Why did you delay going to the health facilHy when you felt III? 
49. Did you need in-patient services? 
SO. How long did you spend In hospital? 
Thought It might go awaylwalt and see 1 
Too much work 2 
Charges too expensive 3 
Too far away 4 
Walt until market day 5 
Other (WRITE IN) 6 
Don't know/can't remember 9 
Ves 
No 
Don't know/can't remember 
< 3 days 1 
3-7days 2 
8 -14days 3 
15-3Odays 4 
Over one month (WRITE IN)____ 5 
Don't know/can't remember 9 
1 
2 go Q51 
3goQ51 
51. About how long would you say you spent In total at health facilities wilting to 1M Ind being 
treated by health workers for this Illness episode? (CIRCLE ONL V ONE RESPONSE) 
Less than 30 minutes 1 
30 - 59 minutes 2 
1 - 2 hours 3 
Over 2 hours but less than 4 hours 4 
Over 4 hours but less than 6 hours 5 
Over 6 hours 6 
Don't know/can't remember 9 
52. Did you have difficulties getting an examination when you arrived at the health faCility? 
Ves (WRITE IN DETAILS) 1 
No 8 
Don't know/can't remember 9 
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E) HEALTH EXPENDITURES 
Thinking about your last visit(s) to the health facUity, I'd like to ask you some 
questions about how much you had to spend overall ••• •••• 
53. Did you have to spend any money during your last visit to a health facility? 
54. Why didn't you need to make any payment? 
Yes 
No 
Don't know/can't remember 
No fee required for consultation 
No medicines received 
Exempt· poor 
Exempt· other 
Covered under health Insurance 
Received credit / delayed payment 
1 go to Q55 
2 
9 go to Q81 
gotoQ81 
Other _________ _ 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
e 
7 
Don't know/can't remember 9 
55. Can you estimate how much in Dong you had to pay for each of the following items? 
(IF PAYMENT NOT MADE IN CASH ASK FOR EQUIVALENT CASH AMOUNT AND WRITE IN) 
(IF MORE THAN ONE FACILITY VISITED COLLECT AMOUNT IN TOTAL) 
VNO '000. 
a) Bill for treatment and medicines 
b) Food for patient/carer 
c) Extra payment/gift 
d) Other (WRITE IN) 
TOTAL-
56. IF A GIFT OR ADDITIONAL PAYMENT WAS MADE ASK THIS QUESTION. OTHERS GO TO Q61. 
Thinking about the extra payment/gift you made, who did you make It to ? 
VND 'OOOa 
a) Doctor / doctor assistant 
b) Nurse / midwife 
e) Receptionist 
d) Manager/administrator 
e) Other (WRITE IN) 
..................................................... , .............................. 
f) Don't know/can't remember 
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57. Why did you make this extra payment/gift ? 
To get better treatment 1 
To get quicker treatment 2 
To get better treatment next time . 3 
Custom / workers expect It 4 
To say thank-you / gift from the heart 5 
Other (WRITE IN) 6 
Don't know/can't remember 9 
58. Where did you get the gift / the money for the gift from? (CIRCLE MAIN REASON ONLY) 
YES NO DON'T KNOW 
a) Readily available cash / savings 1 2 3 
b) Reduce spendina on food 1 2 3 
c) Reduce spending on non-essentials 1 2 3 
d) Sell personal belonainQslanimals 1 2 3 
e) Borrow money 1 2 3 
f) Other (WRITE IN) 1 2 3 
................................................. 
59. ASK MEMBERS ONLY - OTHERS GO TO Q61 
Can I just check that even though you had a health Insurance card you stili had to make additional 
payments. Is that correct ? 
60. Why did you have to make this payment? 
Yes 
No 
Don't knowlcan't remember 
1 
2 go to Q61 
9 go to Q61 
61. About how much did you pay In totll for transportation travelHng to and from that health facility? 
(IF PARENT WENT WITH CHILD ASK FOR TOTAL COST FOR BOTH) 
______ (,ooos VNO) 
(WRITE IN IF NECESSARY) ___________________ _ 
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F) PATIENT SATISFACTION 
I'd now like to ask you some questions about tile qutdlly of health services and how 
satisfied you are with them. Tllinking agflln tlbout tile last time you visited a 
government health facUlty •• •••• 
62. How satisfied were you overall with the qua/lty of service you received last time at the 
GOVERNMENT health facility, or from a government worker at home? (CODE FOR ONLY THOSE 
FACILITIES VISITED) 
Very Quite Neither Quite Very 
satisfied satisfied satl8fled not dissatisfied dissatisfied 
dissatisfied 
a) Commune health centrelCHW 1 2 3 4 5 
at home 1 2 3 4 5 
b) Inter-communal polyclinic 1 2 3 4 5 
c) Government district hospital 1 2 3 4 5 
d) Government provincial hospital 1 2 3 4 5 
e) Other gov. facility (WRITE IN) 
63. Thinking about the service you received the last time you visited a GOVERNMENT facility, would 
you say that in terms of ... (READ OUT CATEGORIES) ... you were .•. (READ OUT SATISFACTION 
SCALE) 
Very Quite Neither Quite Very 
Never been 
9 
9 
9 
9 
9 
Not 
satisfied satisfied satisfied nor dl88atlsfied dissatisfied applicable 
READ OUT BELOW di888tlsfled 
a) Waiting time 1 2 3 4 5 
b) Attitude of health workers 1 2 3 4 5 
c) Skill of health workers 1 2 3 4 5 
d) Official bill payment 1 2 3 4 5 
e) Extra payment 1 2 3 4 5 
f) Bureaucracy using card 1 2 3 4 5 
64. Do you have any (other) comments about the GOVERNMENT health service? 
65. Thinking now about PRIVATE health professionals, how satisfactory do you think the services they 
provide are in general? (CODE FOR EACH FACILITY EVER VISITED) 
Very Quite NeIther Quite Very 
satisfied satisfied satisfied nor dissatisfied dissatisfied 
dissatisfied 
a) Drug-seller (unlicensed) 1 2 3 4 5 
b) Private pharmacy 1 2 3 4 5 
c) Private doctor/nurselmidwifelCHW 1 2 3 4 5 
d) Other private facility (WRITE IN) 1 2 3 4 5 
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9 
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9 
9 
9 
Never 
visited 
9 
9 
9 
9 
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66. Thinking about the different aspects of the service from PRIVATE health professionals, how 
satisfactory would you say that the following are ? (READ OUT CATEGORIES and SATISFACTION 
SCALE) 
Categories Very Quite Neither Quite Very 
satisfied satisfied satisfied nor dissatisfied dissatisfied 
dissatisfied 
a) Waiting time 1 2 3 4 5 
b) Attitude of health workers 1 2 3 4 5 
c) Skill of health workers 1 2 3 4 5 
d) State of repair of building I 1 2 3 4 5 
equipment 
e) Official bill payment 1 2 3 4 5 
f) Extra payment 1 2 3 4 5 
67.00 you have any other comments about the service at PRIVATE health facilities? 
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Not 
applicable 
9 
9 
9 
9 
9 
9 
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G) HEALTH INSURANCE 
Finally I'd like to ask you some questiolls about the Vietllamese voluntary health 
insurance scheme whereby individuals call buy illsurance cards alld get a reductioll 
in the cost of care at goverlllnellt hospitals •••••• 
68. First of all have you ever heard of the Vietnamese state voluntary health Insurance scheme? 
IF YES ASK THE NAME OF IT 
69. How did you hear about the scheme? 
Yes 
No 
Don't knowlcan't remember 
Newspaper I radio I TV 
Family I friends Ineighbours 
VHI office representative 
Commune Peoples Committee 
School 
Health facility 
Women's Union 
Other (WRITE IN) _________ _ 
Don't knowlcan't remember 
70. Do you know what health services benefits the health Insurance card covers? 
Treatment in emergencies 
Examination 
Medicines 
In-patient services 
Other (WRITE IN), ________ _ 
Don't knowlcan't remember 
1 
2 go to Q71 
9 go to Q71 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
99 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
9 
71. I'd now like to do a short exercise with you, in order to find out what you think about different aspects 
of the state voluntary health insurance scheme. Under the scheme you buy a carel for yourself only, 
which then lasts for one year. Once you become a member of the scheme you get certain benefits. For 
example if you need health care at the hospital you can receive it without paying anything extra for 
consultations, drugs or inpatient care. 
The following list shows a hypothetical list of different health Insurence schemes you could 
join. Each option specifies a different level of benefits available In terms of the health facility, 
and the total amount of money you would have to pay for a ONE year Insurance policy. 
Which level of health insurance do you prefer? CIRCLE ONE OPTION ONL Y 
A = CommunelWard health clinic 40,000 VND 
B = District hospital + CommunelWard health clinic 80,000 VND 
C = ProvinciaUcity hospital + District + Communelward 90,000 VND 
D = National hospital + ProvinciaUcity + District + Commune/ward 120,000 VND 
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72. You have the option to make one full payment, as Hsted above, or make several payments across 
the year. However, the more times you pay, the more money you have to pay in total. Please consider 
the options below and tell me which you prefer. CIRCLE ONE OPTION ONLY 
A = ONE time, paying right at the rate selected above 
B = TWO times, paying at the rate selected above add 10% 
C = FOUR times, paying at the rate selected above add 20% 
73. Would you consider buying an Insurance card for yourself or one of your family? 
Yes 
No 
Don't know 
74. Why wouldn't you buy a health insurance card? 
Never heard of It 
Walt until have Job 
Don't need It I healthy 
Very few benefits 
Too expensive 
Bad attitude of staff 
Hospital too far away 
Don't trust scheme 
Already pay taxes 
Other (WRITE IN):..-________ _ 
Don't know 
75. What would be your main reason for buying a health Insurance card ? 
Saves money . 
Sick person In houI8hoId 
Gives security/certainty 
Currently use services a lot 
Uttlelno choice - have to buy Other (WRITE IN) _______ _ 
Don't knowlcan't remember 
76. Where would you get the money from to pay for the Insurance card ? 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
99 
1 go to Q7S 
2 
9 end Interview 
end Interview 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
9 
ReadHy available cash 1 
From household savings 2 
Household work longer hours 3 
Reduce expenditure on essentials 4 
Reduce expenditure on non-essentlalltems 5 
Sell personal belongings 6 
Sell livestock 7 
Borrow from friend or relative 8 
Borrow from money lender 9 
Other (WRITE IN) 10 
Oon'tknow 98 
No answer 99 
Thank the respondent for their time and stless that a" the Information Is confidential. End 
interview. 
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G) HEALm INSURANCE 
I'd now like to ask you so",e questions about your health insurance card: 
68. What was your main reason for buying the card? (CODE ONE ANSWER ONLY) 
Reduces cost of health care 
Sick person in household 
Don't worry so much/more certainty 
Currently use services • lot 
Little/no choice - have to buy 
Other (WRITE IN) _______ _ 
DID NOT BUY CARD I GOT FOR FREE 
Don't knowlcan't remember 
69. How did you first hear about the scheme? 
Newspaper I radio I TV 
Family I friends/neighbours 
VHI office representative 
Commune Peoples Committee 
School 
Health facility 
Women's Union 
Other ____ -----------------------
Don't know/can't remember 
70. Where did you get your health Insurance caret from ? 
Bought from VHI oflice I traveHlng representative 1 
Bought from school 2 
Bought from local health centre (WRITE IN NAME) 3 
Provided free by CPC 
Provided free by NGO 
Other (WRITE IN) ________________ __ 
Don't knowlcan't remember 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
98 
99 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
99 
71. How long was it from when you first heard about the scheme, to when you bought the card? 
Less than 3 months 
3-6 months 
7-12 months 
Over one year 
Don't know/can' remember 
72. Why did you wait before buying your card ? 
Scheme not operating In district 
Lack of finances 
Complicated application procedure 
Healthy / no need 
1 go to Q73 
2 
3 
4 
9 go to Q73 
Other (WRITE IN), __________________ _ 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Don't knowlcan't remember 9 
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73. How long was It between when you wanted to buy the card, and when you actually bought 
it? 
Less than 1 month 
1-2 months 
3-6 months 
7-12 months 
Over one year 
Don't know/can't remember 
74. Did you have any difficulties in getting the card ? 
75. Who paid for your card ? 
Myself 
Parent 
Child 
No 
Yes (WRITE IN) 
(WRITE IN) ...................................... .. 
Don't know/can't remember 
76. Where did you / the person get the money from to pay for the card ? 
Readily available cash 
Savings 
Sale of assets 
Borrowed / credit 
Other (WRITE IN) _______ _ 
Don't know/can't remember 
77. Did you receive any written or verbal Information about the benefits of the card? 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
9 
1 
2 
1 
2 
3 
4 
9 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
9 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Don't know/can't remember 9 
78. Which health service benefits were covered with your health Insurance card? 
Treatment in emergencies 
Examination only 
Medicines only 
In-patlent services 
Other (WRITE IN)'--______ _ 
Don't know/can't remember 
79. Did you ever use your health insurance card? 
Yes 
No 
Don't know/can't remember 
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1 go to Q81 
2 
9 go to Q84 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
9 
80. You say you had a card but have never used It. Why Is this? (WRITE IN) 
gotoQ84 
81. Did you use the card for inpatient services, outpatient services or both? If so how many 
times have you used the card for each? 
~tlentoo~ ________ _ 
Both Inpatient and outpatient. __ _ 
Don't knowIcan't remember 
2 
9 
82. Did you use a facility other than that named 00 your card? (IF YES ASK WHY AND 
WHERE) 
No 
Yes (WRITE IN) 
1 
2 
83. How long was it between when you bought your most reoent card and first used it? 
(WRITE IN) 
less than 3 months 
3-6 mooths 
7·12 months 
Over one year 
Don't know/can't remember 
1 
2 
3 
4 
9 
84. Did you hear of anybody in the commune lending their card to someone else, or borrow 
someone else's card? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Don't know/can't remember 9 
85. What comments would you make to Vietnamese Health Insurance about improving the 
scheme? 
86. I'd now like to do a short exercise with you, in order to find out what you think about different 
aspects of the state voluntary health insurance scheme. Under the scheme you buy a card for 
yourself only, which then lasts for one year. Once you become a member of the scheme you get 
certain benefits. For example if you need health care at the hospital you can receive It without 
paying anything extra for consultations, drugs or Inpatient care. 
The following list shows a hypothetical list of different health Insurance schemes you could join. 
Each option specifies a different level of benefits available In terms of the health facility, and the 
total amount of money you would have to pay for a ONE year insurance policy. Which level of 
health insurance do you prefer? CIRCLE ONE OPTION ONLY 
A = CommunelWard health clinic 
B = District hospital + CommunelWard health clinic 
C = ProvinciaVcity hospital + District + Communelward 
4O,OOOVND 
80,OOOVND 
80,000 VND 
D = National hospital + ProvinciaVcity + District + Communelward 120,000 VND 
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87. You have the option to make one full payment, as listed above, or make several payments 
across the year. However, the more times you pay, the more money you have to pay in total. 
Please consider the options below and tell me which you prefer. CIRCLE ONE OPTION 
ONLY 
A = ONE time, paying right at the rate selected above 
B = TWO times, paying at the rate selected above add 10% 
C = FOUR times, paying at the rate selected above add 20% 
88. Would you consider buying another health Insurance card ? 
Definitely yes 
Probably yes 
Undecided I it depends 
Probably not 
Definitely not 
GET FOR FREE 
Don't know 
89. Where would you get the money from to pay for the insurance? 
90. Why not? 
Readily available cash 
From household savings 
Household work longer hours 
Reduce expenditure on essentials 
Reduce expenditure on non-essentlals 
Sell personal belongings 
Sell livestock 
Borrow from friend or relative 
Borrow from rnoney-lender 
Other (WRITE IN) _______ _ 
Don't know 
Never used it 
Too expensive 
Not good value for money 
Treated badly by staff 
Other ____________________ _ 
Don't know/can't remember 99 
1 
2 
:~gotOQ90 
6 end Interview 
9 end Interview 
1 
2 
3 
end Interview 
4 end Interview 
5 
I'd now like to ask about some questions about your children and the last time 
they were sick ... .. . 
(NOW COMPLETE A SEPARATE INDIVIDUAL QUESTSIONNAIRE FOR UP 
TO THREE CHILDREN) 
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Appendix 5: In-depth interviews (topic guides) 
The dates of interviews for the in-depth interviews were as follows: 
I. Hai Phong Province: from 25/1111999 to 30/1111999 in commune Tan Dan and Tan Vien (An Lao district) and Phu Lien ward 
(Kien An district) 
2. Ninh Binh Province: interviews conducted from 9/11/1999 to 1411111999 in communes an Hai and Phat Diem Town in Kim Son 
district, and commune Ninh My in Hoa Lu district. 
3. Dong Thap Province: interviews conducted from 24/9/1999 to 30/9/1999 in two rural communes, Tan Thanh and Tan Duong, Lai 
Vung District and urban Lai Vung Town. 
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Interviewer information: 
Household ID number: rn IT] IT] 
rOB: 
IT] 
Name of respondent: r T I·· ···1 J 
Province Commune Sub-comrne Hhld 
dd mm ~ 
Date of interview: rn rn U-J Time interview begins: , ,. r] Time interview ends: " 
Name of interviewer. _______ _ 
Health insurance status: member 0 non member 0 Occupation: ________ _ 
~non~mtenWew: _______________________ _ 
IDtroduetioD: 
Do you remember the questions we asked you about health insurance? I'd now like to ask you about a few more of those 
issues in more detail. Again I'd like to confirm that we are from the University of York in England and the Institute of 
Sociology in Hanoi. We select all interviewees randomly, and all the information is confidential and anonymous. It will be 
used to try and improve the organisation and design of the voluntary health insurance scheme. First of all I'd like to ask you 
a few questions about the health insurance: 
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TOPIC GUIDE 1: HEALTH INSURANCE SCHEME AND UNDERSTANDING OF RISK-SHARING 
K~issues 
What do people understand by the concept of insurance and risk-sharing. What do they think about the idea 
of sharing risks? 
Questions Key responses 
~ How many different health insurance schemes do you know? 
~ Why do you think that the government set up the health insurance 
scheme for schoolchildren and fanners? 
~ When people talk about health insurance what do YOB understand by 
this? Who do you think benefits most from usin2 the HIe? 
~ What do you think is the main reason for buying a health insurance 
card? 
~ Why did you buy I did you not buy a health insurance card? 
~ Many people who join health insurance schemes volWltarily do so 
because it reduces the risk of losing large amoWlts of money from 
expensive hospital bills. What do vou think about this? 
~ Many health insurance schemes aim to share the risk of large financial 
loss ftom expensive treatment For example. healthy people in the 
scheme will support sick people, wealthier people will support poorer 
people. What do you think of this idea? 
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TOPIC GUIDE 2: HEALTH-SEEKING BEHAVIOUR AND QUALITY OF CARE 
Key issues 
Does health insurance card make a difference to decisions about seeking health care, how often people 
decide to go to a health facility, and their experience of health care. 
Whether or not health insurance had reduced the amount of money paid for health services? 
Questions KeyresponleS 
~ How would you describe the relationship between people in your community? 
~ How would you describe your kinship relationships within the community? 
~ Do you visit YOUT neighboUrs often? Do you help each other out often? How? 
~ How would you say things have changed over the past 10-15 years in your community? 
~ For example would you say you can trust people in the community? In what ways do people 
trust each other? What about the role of older people and head of family line? 
~ Are you a member of any organisation or association? (pROMPT e.g. Fanners Union, 
Women's Union, Church). What about infonnal groups (peer groups, pooling groups)? 
~ Which one is the most important to you and why? 
~ Which type of group, formal or infonnal has more influence on your family life? 
~ Do you think these organisations and the type of people that join them are changing? Why is 
this? 
~ If you needed to borrow money, for example for health services, who would you borrow this 
money from? What sort of arrangement do you have? 
~ Do you think some people would rather borrow money from family, friends, or an 
association they are a member of, for health expenditures rather than buy voluntary health 
insurance? Why? 
~ Would you say you sometimes use health services because you have a card, when you might 
not if you didn't have one? 
~ Do you think that overall you use health services more than if you dido't have health 
insurance? 
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Questions Key responses I 
~ Can you use your card at any health facility? 
~ Do you think you receive a better quality of service when you use the HIC compared with if 
you didn't use it? Does it make a difference? What are the differences between treatment for 
cardholders and health treatment for people without a card? What benefits do you receive 
with the card? 
~ Do you think that overall the health insurance card has reduced the total amount of money 
you pay for health services or hasn't it made any difference? Do they know of people who 
sell important assets, or borrow money to pay for health services? 
~ What do you think about the introduction of co-payments? Why do you think the 
government introduced them? 
~ Have you ever made, or heard of people making unofficial payments for health services? 
Who is the money usually given to and why do you think this happens? Do people still have 
to make these payments even if they have a health insurance card? Why? 
~ Some people say they do not trust the health insurance cards in term of getting better 
treatment, or getting cheaper treatment? Do you _agree with this point of view? Why? 
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Appendix 6: Bibliographic database searches 
Examples of two literature searches are presented below, which were conducted on 
bibliographic databases for articles on social capital. Similar searches were repeated 
periodically throughout the thesis. 
1) EconLlt 
No. Records Request 
I 43935 Social 
2 59974 capital 
3 122 social capital 
4 208049 theory 
5 8 #3 near #4 
6 18322 Health 
7 21 #6 and #3 
8 18322 Health 
9 5758 Health in ti,ab 
10 5 #9 and #3 
11 18322 Health 
12 35328 Production 
13 2232 Health production in developing countries 
14 I #3 and #13 
2) Sociologlca. Abstracts 1986-1999/06 
No. Records Request 
I 354257 Social 
2 9042 capital 
3 354257 Social 
4 11212 Cohesion 
5 354257 Social 
6 7956 Networks 
7 12378 Social capital or social cohesion 
8 61469 Health 
9 122398 Theory 
10 177554 health or theory 
II 70 #7 near #10 
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